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Chapter 1
Knowledge, Action, and Space: 
An Introduction
Peter Meusburger and Benno Werlen
 Open and Contested Research Questions
This book starts from the widely accepted premise that parts of knowledge can be 
defined as ability, aptitude, or “capacity for social action” (Stehr, 1994, p. 95)1 and 
that the production and dissemination of knowledge are always embedded in spe-
cific environments (spatial context, spatial relations, and power structures). That 
point of departure makes it evident that the mutual relations between knowledge, 
action, and space are central research issues in disciplines dealing with human exis-
tence. For instance, acting under conditions of uncertainty, people must rely on 
experience gained in various situations and environments. To achieve their goals, 
they have to gather new information, acquire new knowledge, and develop new 
skills in order to cope with unexpected situations and unfamiliar challenges. 
Knowledge, experience, and information-processing are the foremost resources 
determining how aims of actions are set; how situations, opportunities, and risks are 
assessed; and how constellations, cues, and patterns are interpreted. They are the 
primary foundations for evaluating locations and spatial configurations, solving 
1 The close relationship between knowledge and power is evident by the very fact that they have the 
same etymological roots. The word power derives from the Latin potere (to be able). The Latin 
noun potentia denotes an ability, capacity, or aptitude to affect outcomes, to make something pos-
sible. It can therefore be translated as both knowledge and power (see also Avelino & Rotmans, 
2009, p. 550; Meusburger, 2015c, p. 31; Moldaschl & Stehr, 2010, p. 9; Schönrich, 2005, p. 383). 
Most authors define action as goal-directed human activity that should be differentiated from pure 
behavior. Action is that part of behavior that occurs intentionally (see the Chap. 6 by Joachim 
Funke in this volume). Knowledge has an impact on action and behavior.
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The present epoch will perhaps be above all the epoch of space.
Michel Foucault (1984/2002, p. 229).
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problems, and enabling individual actors and social systems to appropriate space. 
Knowledge, learning, and information-processing can be regarded as links between 
action and space or action and environment (for details see Meusburger, 2003). 
Conversely, the spatial dimension plays a key role in the acquisition of knowledge 
and the implementation of actions. Scholars broadly agree on several points:
• Commitment and willful intent alone do not guarantee goal attainment.
• Goal-setting (is a given goal desirable and feasible?) and goal-striving (how is 
the goal being pursued?) are affected by knowledge, skills, experience, and the 
search for new information.
• Experience rests upon former actions in specific settings.
• There are manifold relationships between knowledge, power, and action,
• Learning processes are embedded in, and to some extent shaped by, the social 
and material environment.
• Settings and locations have a fundamental significance in the search for and 
access to rare or valuable information, the acquisition and distribution of knowl-
edge, and the successful implementation of actions.
However, the devil is in the details. Relationships between knowledge, action, 
and space are very complex, some of them are still not fully understood. Some theo-
retical approaches focus on very simple problems (laboratory experiments) or work 
with a number of black boxes or questionable premises. Studying the interrelations 
of knowledge and action, one is apt to raise the following questions: To what extent 
is knowledge a precondition for action? How much knowledge is necessary for 
action? To what extent do various types of knowledge influence aspirations, atten-
tion, evaluation of situations, search for alternatives, implementation of intentions, 
decision-making, and problem-solving? How do bidirectional connections between 
knowledge and action function? How do different representations of knowledge 
shape action? Are knowledge, skills, experience, and educational achievement use-
ful categories or should they be replaced by broader terms such as “reflective sys-
tem” or “cognitive capacities”? How rational is human behavior? What categories 
of rationality should be distinguished? Does irrational behavior reflect a lack of 
appropriate information or is it rather affected by the impulsive system and orienta-
tion knowledge? How do deliberative, rational thought and impulsive affect interact 
and influence action? Why do people occasionally act against their knowledge? 
What are the social functions of knowledge? In which way can action research 
profit from interventions of arts and aesthetics?
Some of the most pressing questions in the study of the interrelations of action 
and space are: Which concepts of space and place are appropriate for analyzing 
relations between knowledge, action, and space? At what level of aggregation 
 (individual, organization, spatial units)2 can relations between knowledge, action, 
2 A social system’s ability to act competently and achieve its goals depends not only on the knowl-
edge of individual actors but also on their integration in organizations (institutions), the way orga-
nizations process information and share knowledge, interact with external social environment, and 
structure the way decisions are taken.
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and space be documented by which indicators and empirical methods? How much 
are the spatial conditions of actions exposed to historical transformation? What 
exactly is the role and importance of spatial representations for the construction of 
sociocultural realities in the past, present and future? How does the digital revolu-
tion change the historically established society–space relations? What are the spa-
tial implications for the formation of knowledge? Is the term environment an abstract 
category, a social macrophenomenon, a local cluster of individual factors of influ-
ence, or a localized culture? How can one measure an environment’s impact on 
action and knowledge production (Meusburger, 2015a)?
These and other questions indicate that relations between knowledge, action, and 
space are not as simple as some people might assume or as some decision and risk 
models or traditional rational choice theories suggest. The questions simultaneously 
underscore the urgent need to explore the interdependencies of knowledge, action, 
and space from different disciplinary angles, scales of analysis,3 time dimensions,4 
and ontologies.
The main ambition of this book is to contribute to the clarification of the linkages 
between knowledge, action and space beyond the well-established models. To 
redeem this claim it is first necessary to overcome the problematic legacy of homo 
oeconomicus and traditional rational choice theories and discuss some of the rea-
sons why the spatial dimension was neglected or played only a marginal role in 
action-centered social theories. If we want to deepen the insights into the relations 
between action, knowledge and space, then the spatial dimension needs as much 
theoretical inquiry as the relations between knowledge and action (see the chapters 
by Werlen (Chap. 2), Ernste (Chap. 3), Olsson (Chap. 4), Gardenförs (Chap. 12), 
and Berthoin Antal and Friedman (Chap. 13) in this volume).
 The Neglected Spatial Dimension in Modern Social Theory
Until the first decade of this century, one of the key shortcomings of modern social 
theory was the nearly total neglect of the spatial dimension of agency (Giddens, 
1984), communication, social actions (Werlen, 1993b), and social relations. 
Systematic social theories and action theories in particular have so far widely 
ignored the spatial dimension of the social. This blindness for the spatial is embed-
ded in more general features of modern social theory that have important implica-
tions not only in the field of theory, but consequently also for current societal 
problem constellations.
3 Each scale of analysis yields certain insights that other scales cannot deliver.
4 Often the question of whether actors possess the knowledge necessary to solve a problem and of 
which impact on decision-making and actions is due to superior or earlier knowledge or ignorance 
can be answered only after events or actions have taken place and unintended consequences have 
surfaced. Time lags between knowledge acquisition (e.g., research) and successful action (e.g., 
innovations) can amount to many years or even decades.
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According to Giddens (1984), one of the chief reasons for the underrepresenta-
tion of spatial issues in social theory is the overemphasis on time. Time, not space, 
has been pivotal for philosophy (Hegel, Bergson), the social sciences (Marx, 
Spencer, Durkheim), biology (Darwin), and history. Time—the sequential ordering 
of events—is obviously central in action theory. The implementation of action plans 
and intentions lies in the future, whereas the present situation of actions has resulted 
from actions of the past. Another notable reason that space aspects have not figured 
greatly in social theory is that the spatial dimension refers first to the ordering of 
physical objects and artifacts. It is thus allied somewhat more closely to immediate 
visual experience and is therefore less “abstract” than is the case with the temporal 
order. But the main explanation for the relative neglect of the spatial dimension 
pertaining to social realities in the action-centered perspective certainly stems from 
emphasis on the subjective meaning of action. The theory of social action as formu-
lated by Weber (1912/1988, 1913, 1922/1980) implied that the embodied actor and 
the physical world were largely left out of the biologistic and functionalist tenden-
cies in the social sciences (Werlen & Weingarten, 2003, pp. 205–207). This exclu-
sion essentially arrested the development of concepts that could have integrated the 
spatial dimension and avoided the pitfall of biologistic or materialistic 
reductionism.
However, when the spatial dimension is taken into account, the word space is 
often not understood as a theory-dependent term but rather as a given fact. The 
social sciences commonly refer to notions of geographic space that are considered 
rather traditional or outdated in current social and cultural geography because they 
conceptualize space as a material object, a container, or projection plane of material 
and immaterial social life. Although lack of a systematic theoretical reformulation 
of space in a more sociotheoretical compatible way is detectable in the work of 
Pierre Bourdieu as well as in substantial parts of Giddens’ (1984) theory of struc-
turation, it is primarily found in social and cultural studies after a shift toward 
acceptance of the spatial dimension occurred. Exponents of this “spatial turn” claim 
to have overcome the spatial ignorance identified in their fields and disciplines of 
study. Their assertion is often unconvincing, however, because space continues to be 
thought of as a material object or container, with little progress toward a conception 
of space that is firmly grounded in social theory in a manner compatible with action.
The continuing overemphasis on the container or geographical earth-space in 
cultural studies and the social sciences leaves the spatial turn incomplete, inflexible, 
and myopic. These limitations also underlie fields of research and social policies in 
which it is not apparent at first glance, especially when “nature” is taken into 
account. An especially prominent example is the sustainability research based on 
the World Commission on Environment and Development (1987), known as the 
Brundtland report (Gäbler, 2015; Werlen, 2015), and on purportedly environmental 
policies derived from it. Casting the environment as a container space conceived in 
terms of Newton’s mechanics, the recommendations for environmental policies are 
the product of a mechanical world view. They advertise the idea that it could suffice 
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to turn some screws of the world machine to, say, decrease the global temperature 
by 2.0° Celsius, as propagated by the COP 21.5
Reconceptualization of the spatial dimension is imperative in the study of the 
interrelation of knowledge and space. When focusing on the role of places, spaces, 
spatial settings, environments, milieus, and fields of communication for cognitive 
processes, learning, knowledge production, and action, one must be careful to use 
the appropriate concepts of place and space in order to avoid implicit determinism 
and reductionism. When the concept of space as used in the natural sciences 
becomes a primary category of social research, it has major and problematic impli-
cations. In keeping with Newton’s theoretical construction of space as a container, 
the two most relevant ones are the underlying spatial determinism and the likelihood 
that values, norms, and other nonmaterial entities will be reduced to earth-spatially 
positioned material objects. The morphing from immaterial to material or physical 
form will certainly not improve the results of social sciences and social politics, for 
all it does is falsify the real nature of sociocultural realities. Social research needs to 
find its own conceptualization of the spatial dimension of societal realities, includ-
ing the generation of knowledge (for details see Schwan, 2003; Steiner, 2003; 
Weichhart, 2003, pp. 19–39).
For decades, unfortunately, subject-oriented action theory neglected the link 
between action and space, that is, the knowledge, competence, experience, skills, 
and learning processes of individuals, social systems, and institutions. Vague allu-
sions to cognitive processes and reflective systems or ascriptions of meaning and 
value to material objects do little to explain why actions succeed or fail, why goals 
are achieved or missed, why some agents are competitive and others not, or why 
interactions with and adaptations to the environment vary so greatly in the spatial 
dimension. The focus should be more on different preconditions and outcomes of 
cognitive processes. To what extent do different levels of knowledge, educational 
achievement, occupational skills, experience, and scientific and technological stan-
dards influence the results of cognitive processes—from perception and situation 
analysis to decision-making and acting.
Material artifacts and spatial configurations acquire a social or symbolic mean-
ing only through symbolic appropriation, through processes of learning, evaluating, 
interpreting, and using them. The results of such ascriptions, evaluations, and inter-
pretations range from knowledgeable to ignorant, depending on the degree of expe-
rience brought to these processes, and the results change over time. It is therefore 
crucial to take into account the social, spatial, and cultural disparities of knowledge, 
competence, and experience as well as the level of research and technology when 
analyzing relations between space and action.
Geodeterminism emerges when the learning and evaluation processes between 
space (as a material object) and action are skipped. For instance, a geodeterminist 
would argue that a mountain range is a natural border; a specific terrain or a gorge, 
an optimal location for a fortification. A social geographer would argue that it is not 
5 Conference of the Parties (COP 21) held in Paris, 15–16 April 2016, was part of the cycle of 
major UN conferences on climate change.
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the terrain, gorge, or mountain pass itself that has induced people over the centuries 
to build one fortress after the other at the same place. It is rather the result of knowl-
edge accumulation and experience over many generations that led to the firm con-
viction or knowledge that a specific place is an ideal location for a fortress given the 
available transportation and military technologies. As soon as hitherto existing tech-
nologies are disrupted or political territories are expanded, the situation will be 
evaluated differently and people will conclude that other locations are more 
suitable.
In human geography the adventurous sense of reconceptualizing space and spa-
tiality suffuses the publications of Belina (2013), Gregory (1994, 1998), Harvey 
(2005), Lippuner (2005), Lippuner & Lossau (2004), Massey (1985, 1999a, 1999b, 
2005), Paasi (1991), Schmid (2005), Soja (1985), Tuan (1977), Weichhart (1996, 
1999, 2003), and Werlen (1987, 1993a, 1993b, 1995, 1997, 2010a, 2010b, 2013, 
2015), to name just a few. Geographies of knowledge, education, and science 
(Freytag, Jahnke, & Kramer, 2015; Jöns, 2008; Livingstone, 1995, 2000, 2002, 
2003; Meusburger, 1998, 2000, 2008, 2009, 2015a) and creativity studies (Amabile, 
Conti, Coon, Lazenby, & Herron, 1996; Amabile, Goldfarb, & Brackfield, 1990; 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1988, 1999; Hennessey & Amabile, 1988; Meusburger, 2009; 
Sternberg & Lubart, 1999) contributed to that discussion by documenting how edu-
cational achievement, occupational skills, research, and creative processes influence 
actions of individuals and social systems, how research and creative processes are 
the result of interactions between agents and their environment, and why various 
spatial disparities of socioeconomic structures persist for long periods.
 The Problematic Legacy of Homo Oeconomicus and Rational 
Choice Theories
Taking the spatial dimension into account first requires a critical review of the clas-
sical models used in social sciences, especially the model of economic actions 
based on the concept of homo oeconomicus. The claims about its general validity 
and applicability are inherently linked to the alienation of space. The concept of 
homo oeconomicus and the assumptions that traditional rational choice theorists 
make about the human decision-maker and some other premises have been criti-
cized by many authors as empirically unfounded and psychologically unrealistic 
(Buskens, 2015; Flache & Dijkstra, 2015; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2015; Green & 
Shapiro, 1994; Goldthorpe, 2000; Haselton et al., 2009; Hertwig & Herzog, 2009; 
Samuels & Stich, 2015). Theories of bounded rationality, behavioral economics, 
evolutionary economics, new theories of the firm, the strategic management 
approach, and nonrational theories have been divested of many unrealistic premises; 
nevertheless, some theoretical concepts of decision-making used in economics and 
partly also in social sciences6 still carry the detrimental legacy of homo oeconomicus 
6 For an overview of the large variety of rational choice models, see Wittek, Snijders, & Nee (2013).
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and traditional rational choice theories. We do not repeat here the extensive critique 
of that model but rather focus on those aspects for which the lack of sensitivity to 
the spatial dimension of human existence and sociocultural realities is playing an 
important role, at least from a geographer’s point of view. In the geography of 
knowledge (Meusburger, 1998, 2015a, 2017), one critique is that many theoretical 
concepts of decision-making ignore—
• social and spatial disparities of knowledge;
• the impact that environments, spatial contexts, and spatial relations have on the 
generation and diffusion of knowledge;
• the selective mobility of different categories and levels of knowledge; and
• power structures in space. The enduring persistence of national and global urban 
hierarchies is due mainly to relations between knowledge and power, the spatial 
concentration of power, the vertical division of labor, and selected migration.
Mutual relations between knowledge and power have been intensely discussed else-
where (Gregory, 1998; Meusburger, 1998, 2000, 2015c; Meusburger, Gregory, & 
Suarsana, 2015) and need not be repeated here. They are neatly summarized by 
Foucault (1980):
• The exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowl-
edge constantly induces effects of power. (p. 52)
• Knowledge and power are integrated with one another, and there is no point in 
dreaming of a time when knowledge will cease to depend on power. (p. 52)
• It is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, it is impossible 
for knowledge not to engender power. (p. 52)
It is also criticized that some scholars do not distinguish between knowledge and 
information,7 and that the costs and time needed to acquire the knowledge, exper-
tise, and the advanced levels of educational achievement necessary to solve com-
plex problems are neglected or underestimated.
From a geographer’s point of view, the ideal-type premises of homogeneous 
space and ubiquity of knowledge are the most critical shortcomings, the assump-
tions farthest from empirically verifiable realities. Unequal spatial and social distri-
bution of various categories of knowledge and skills can be traced to early human 
history, at least to the time when the first scripts were developed (5500 BC). Spatial 
and social inequalities of knowledge, spatial concentrations of power (Meusburger, 
1998, 2000; 2008; 2015c) and hierarchically structured urban systems are a consti-
tutive element of highly differentiated societies that are based on horizontal and 
vertical division of labor. In a knowledge society, the range of knowledge gaps, 
knowledge asymmetries, and spatial disparities of knowledge is larger than ever and 
is constantly growing.8 With respect to the assumption that knowledge is spatially 
7 For detailed discussion see vol. 10 in the series on Knowledge and Space.
8 This statement contradicts the popular view that anybody in the digital age has access to the 
knowledge available worldwide. The Internet offers access to information, not to knowledge. 
Whether available information is understood, accepted, and assimilated into a person’s existing 
knowledge base depends on complex psychological processes (Meusburger, 2017).
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ubiquitous, the rational choice model is so remote from the empirical facts that its 
heuristic value tends toward zero if the spatial dimension is taken seriously. The 
wide dissemination and use of the premise that space is homogenous certainly has 
to do with the exclusion of spatial and cultural constellations. Unfortunately, it has 
ecologically and culturally problematic consequences as well.
Even within the rules of social modeling, the rational choice model does not 
meet applicable standards. Models may idealize empirical reality only if their heu-
ristic value is not undermined (see Werlen 1993a; 1993b, pp. 43–51). If the model 
strays too far from empirical reality, it can no longer help detect that reality’s regu-
larities or properties. “Without knowledge, or beliefs that correspond to reality, 
thinking is an empty shell” (Baron 2008, p. 15, italics in the source).
The premise that knowledge is ubiquitous is sometimes justified by the impact of 
the Internet. The Internet facilitates the spatial distribution of easily understandable 
information and routine knowledge but certainly does not have deeper balancing 
effects on spatial disparities when it comes to the spatial distribution of jobs that 
need advanced scientific, technical, and expert knowledge. Such jobs are not as 
mobile as some authors may assume, they tend to concentrate in certain places or 
areas (Malecki, 2000; Meusburger, 2000, 2017). Different categories of knowledge 
travel at different speeds and very selectively.9 The individual has limited cognitive 
capacities and only a minute and constantly diminishing share of all knowledge 
worldwide (see the Chap. 7 by Stehr in this volume). Even if the individual pos-
sesses the cognitive capacities to specialize in a certain field, it takes years and 
incurs great cost for that person to acquire such knowledge, educational achieve-
ment, and expertise.
For decades, traditional rational choice theory and instrumental rational action 
models focused on a peculiarly rational and omniscient type of person who has or 
easily gains access to all the knowledge, skills, and expertise needed in order to 
make rational decisions and achieve his or her goals.10 Most adherents of these theo-
ries have ignored or suppressed the fact that people differ in their cognitive capaci-
ties, level of knowledge, professional experience, and skills, not to mention their 
level of education.11 A number of authors writing about rational choice theory 
9 Mobilities of knowledge are the topic of volume 10 in this series.
10 “Neoclassical economics typically employs the assumption of perfect rationality…Rational 
actors never fail to find the action that maximizes their utility, even if this requires unlimited 
capacities to process and memorize all information available and to have unlimited foresight of the 
consequences of all available courses of actions in a distant future” (Flache & Dijkstra, 2015, 
p. 907). Empirical evidence shows that people have limited and unequal information-processing 
and computational capabilities. These findings have led to various models of bounded rationality 
(Simon, 1956, 1982, 1990).
11 Professionals, scientists, engineers, and other experts must study many years to acquire the task-
related or goal-relevant knowledge they need for their problem-solving and decision-making. 
Much of this knowledge and expertise can be learned only in specific institutions of higher educa-
tion. It is therefore difficult to understand why differences in the level of educational achievement 
play but a marginal role in action theory and rational choice theories.
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(e.g., Buskens, 2015; Radner, 2015) simply altogether avoid using categories such 
as knowledge, skills, expertise, and educational achievement.
Another weakness of traditional rational choice theory is the fact that  rationality—
conventionally understood to be a method of thinking and logical consistency—has 
little explanatory power. The concept of rational behavior focuses on a person’s 
strategic choice of the best means to achieve a certain goal, but it does not include 
consideration of the goal’s reasonableness and attainability or of the resources 
needed in order to pursue the goal.
[F]ormal logic is concerned with the rules for drawing conclusions from evidence with 
certainty. That is, it is concerned only with inference. It says nothing about how evidence is, 
or should be, obtained. Formal logic, therefore, cannot be a complete theory of thinking. 
(Baron, 2008, p. 81)
In decision-making and goal-oriented social action, formal logic must be combined with 
knowledge, expertise, skills, and the newest information. Because actors differ in their 
levels of information, knowledge, skills, experience, and educational achievement, they 
arrive at very different decisions if they follow the principle of rational decision-making. 
What seems rational to an agent who has little expertise and relies on public information 
might be irrational to an actor with great expertise or to a stock broker with insider 
knowledge. “[A] given act may appear rational at the time it is undertaken; yet when a 
different goal is activated to which that act was detrimental it may appear irrational and 
one might come to regret it” (Kruglanski & Orehek, 2009, p. 647). High levels of knowl-
edge, skill, expertise, and early access to important information help people come to 
decisions that are apt to achieve the desired goal. Gaps in expertise, skills, educational 
achievement, and information usually restrict goal attainment.12
Like any goal-directed activity, thinking can be done well or badly. Thinking that is done 
well is thinking of the sort that achieves its goals. When we criticize people’s thinking, we 
are trying to help them achieve their own goals. When we try to think well, it is because we 
want to achieve our goals. (Baron, 2008, p. 29)
Max Weber (1922/1980), who first made rationality a key concept in modernistic 
thinking, was interested in the fact that rationality created a culture of objectification 
(Versachlichung) and relegated myths, superstition, and unjustified beliefs to the 
background. He used the term specifically in the sense of economic rationality that 
denotes the strategic choice of the best means to reach a given goal. However, 
Weber’s concept of rationality was later extended to fields where it was not appropri-
ate. Max Weber never asserted that rationality alone will help define expedient and 
achievable goals, that rational agents are capable of recognizing the value and the 
utility of their goals, or that rational behavior will trigger creativity and innovation.
Aspects of space and spatial contexts did not play a particular role in the debates 
mentioned above, but they were highlighted by debates around nonrational theories. 
Since the late 1990s, nonrational theories, concepts of ecological rationality, geog-
raphies of science, and other fields of social geography have developed a growing 
sensitivity for the significance of spatial contexts, spatial relations, environments, 
12 This observation is even more relevant for social systems than for individual decision-makers.
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and contact fields for learning processes, knowledge production, decision-making, 
and innovation. They have emphasized that learning processes are intrinsically 
interwoven with conceptions of space (see the Chap. 12 by Gardenförs in this 
volume).
 Recent Developments in Decision-Making Theories 
and Geographies of Science: Improvements 
in the Understanding of Relations Between Knowledge, Action, 
and Space
In proposing to use theories of heuristics13 and nonrational tools, Gigerenzer and his 
collaborators have introduced a concept they call ecological rationality (Gigerenzer 
& Gaissmaier, 2011; 2015; Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 
2002; Samuels & Stich, 2015; Todd, Gigerenzer, & ABC Research Group, 2012). 
Unlike rational choice theories, heuristic theories of decision-making are concerned 
with psychological realism relating to the capacities and limitations of actual 
humans and emphasize the importance of a specific context, frame, or environment 
and focus on the performance of actors in the external physical and social world 
(Buskens, 2015, p. 903; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2015, pp. 911–912; Hertwig & 
Herzog, 2009; Lindenberg, 2013; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000).
In a world where not all risks are known and where optimization is not feasible, ‘nonra-
tional’ tools such as heuristics are needed…[N]onrational theories apply to ‘decision- 
making under uncertainty,’ where not all alternatives, consequences, and probabilities are 
known or knowable…Rational theories, in contrast, are tailored to situations where all risks 
are known. (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2015, p. 911)
The study of the ecological rationality of heuristics,14 or strategies in general, is a frame-
work to study performance in the external world: A heuristic is ecologically rational to the 
degree that it is adapted to the structure of the environment. Heuristics are ‘domain-specific’ 
rather than ‘domain-general’; that is, they work in a class of environments in which they are 
ecologically rational. Heuristics provide not a universal rational calculus but a set of 
domain-specific mechanisms…, and have been referred to collectively as the ‘adaptive tool-
box’. (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2015, p. 912)
13 “A heuristic is not per se rational or irrational; rather, its rationality depends on the match 
between the architecture of the tool and the structure of the environment in which it is employed” 
(Hertwig & Herzog, 2009, p. 668). “An inferential or judgmental strategy is ecologically rational 
if it is accurate and efficient on the sorts of tasks that were important in the environments in which 
we evolved” (Samuels & Stich, 2015, p. 722).
14 “A heuristic is a strategy that ignores part of the information, with the goal of making decisions 
more accurately, quickly, and frugally (i.e., with fewer pieces of information) compared to more 
complex methods” (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2015, p. 913). “A heuristic is ecologically rational 
to the degree that it is adapted to the structure of the environment. Heuristics are ‘domain-specific’ 
rather than ‘domain-general’; that is, they work in a class of environments in which they are eco-
logically rational. Heuristics provide not a universal rational calculus but a set of domain-specific 
mechanisms” (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2015, p. 912).
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The heuristic approach to decision-making and the concept of ecological ratio-
nality are very similar to concepts used by geographies of knowledge and science 
(Livingstone, 1995, 2000, 2002, 2003; Meusburger, 1998, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c). 
They not only respect the view that human cognitive abilities are unequal because 
of different experience and learning processes, but—like the geography of knowl-
edge—also take the environment’s information structure and knowledge milieu into 
account. They accept that both the formulation of goals and the processes of 
information- processing, learning, research, and decision-making can be somewhat 
shaped by their social environment (Flache & Dijkstra, 2015, pp. 908, 911; 
Meusburger, 2015a).
Depending on the prior knowledge and experience of actors, a physical and 
social environment can play the role of an external storage space of information that 
may trigger associations and send cues to the informed agent. People, pictures, 
traces, patterns, institutions, and written sources can help overcome the limitations 
of human memories and cognitive capacities, including the time and effort needed 
to acquire specific forms of knowledge and expertise (Baron, 2008, p. 15). Structures 
and dynamics of environments also affect how people seek out information (Navarro, 
Newell, & Schulze, 2016, p. 45) and which kind of bias they must cope with in their 
search (Fiedler & Wänke, 2009).
Two categories—recognition-based heuristics15 and one-clever-cue heuris-
tics16—closely resemble a concept used in the geography of knowledge, prior 
knowledge. The term Vorwissen (translated in this chapter as prior knowledge) 
draws on the hermeneutic circle and Gadamer’s (1960/1999) term Vorverständnis 
(prior understanding, pp. 250, 275).17
Prior knowledge accrues through learning and experience, includes intuition and 
latent subconscious experience, and is domain specific. Optimal search for 
 possibilities, evidence, new goals, and “actively open-minded thinking” (Baron 
2008, p. 63, italics in the original) need a superior level of prior knowledge. Prior 
knowledge determines whether and how available information is perceived, ana-
lyzed, and evaluated by an actor and whether it enters and broadens that person’s 
body of knowledge.18 Prior knowledge helps one select the most meaningful cues 
and has an impact on how patterns and cues are interpreted. Bushmen (San) in the 
15 The goal of recognition-based heuristics is to “make inferences about a criterion that is not 
directly accessible to the decision-maker, based on recognition retrieved from memory” 
(Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2015, p. 914).
16 One-clever-cue heuristics looks for only one ‘clever’ cue and bases its decision on that cue alone 
(Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2015, p. 914).
17 Prior knowledge and prior understanding are synonymous in the hermeneutic method. The 
method entails a paradox in the sense that what is to be understood somehow has to have been 
understood beforehand. Gadamer also calls it positive prejudgment (hence the terms Vorwissen 
and Vorverständnis). To have prior knowledge or prior understanding of something, one has to 
have already understood individual parts or aspects of it. This requisite is also called the hermeneu-
tic circle. Philosophers preceding Gadamer also thought about this circle.
18 The concept of prior knowledge plays an important role in the communication of various catego-
ries of knowledge (for details see Meusburger, 2017).
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Kalahari are able to sleuth animals like nobody else. Experienced doctors can diag-
nose a disease by interpreting a few signs (students of medicine may not have this 
ability yet). Geographers who are specialists in a certain field of knowledge may 
draw path- breaking conclusions from a thematic map, whereas other persons will 
glean no information at all from the same map. Local people living in the Alps may 
have acquired enough knowledge from previous generations or from personal expe-
rience to recognize from scant, subtle indications which places may be endangered 
by avalanches; most tourists will not be able to evaluate these risks. Many culturally 
transmitted bodies of knowledge are learned through observation of19 important 
environmental cues. In fact, observing and interpreting cues and spatial configura-
tions is a long-standing heuristic device of geography.
Humans are susceptible to social influence and to the type of information that is 
available in their environment. Geographies of knowledge and science have illus-
trated how learning processes, research, and scientific careers can be influenced by 
the local availability of role models, resources, specific thought styles,20 face-to- 
face contacts to prominent scholars, institutional logics, and organizational rules. 
The interrelationships of these factors and others constitute the knowledge environ-
ment of a place (for details see Meusburger, 2008, 2015a; Meusburger & Schuch, 
2012). An extreme example of the impact that different informational environments 
have on decision-making and acting is given by Gregory (2015, pp. 113–114). 
Describing World War I battlefields at the western front and the differences between 
a paper war and a trench war,21 he illustrates the insurmountable gulf between the 
experienced knowledge of the infantry in the muddy trenches of the battlefield and 
the abstract knowledge of the staff officers surrounding the map table in a comfort-
able room and planning the movements of their soldiers for the next days.
Scientific evidence from cognitive psychology (see the Chap. 6 by Funke in this 
volume), sociology (Stehr, 1994, 2005), social geography (Meusburger, 2015a, 
2015c; Werlen, 1993b, pp. 8–11), and other research fields shows that there is no 
direct if–then relation between knowledge and action. There are a number of 
 intervening variables—many of them related to the environment or place of action—
that may modify, weaken, or strengthen the relations between knowledge and action. 
The concurrence and coaction of these variables at a certain place or in a specific 
area build a spatial context, social environment, or knowledge milieu that may affect 
decision-making and action. As pointed out by Fiedler and Wänke (2009, p. 699), 
properties of the environment can constrain or enhance the input to cognitive pro-
cesses. These two researchers illustrate that error and bias may often originate in the 
information environment, in selective accessibility to information; that observations 
19 Learning by observing “includes all cases in which we learn about our environment from obser-
vation alone, without intentional experimentation” (Baron, 2008, p. 14).
20 “The greater the difference between two thought styles, the more inhibited will be the communi-
cation of ideas” (Fleck, 1935/1979, p. 109).
21 “Trench war is an environment that can never be known abstractly or from the outside. Onlookers 
could never understand a reality that must be crawled through and lived in. This life, in turn, equips 
the inhabitant with a knowledge that is difficult to generalize or explain” (Leed, 1981, p. 79).
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can be influenced by environmental sampling; and that agents—in their capacity as 
available sources of information—may lack first-hand experience, overdo some 
risks, and neglect others. In brief, “cognitive processes are fed with an environmen-
tal input that is itself often biased and highly selective” (p. 700).
Talent, motivation, and wealth of ideas are not the only characteristics determin-
ing how successfully a scholar’s research and academic career develops (Meusburger, 
2015a). What we academics call creative is never the result of individual action 
alone. Learning processes and actions are situated in environments, organizational 
structures, and spatial relations. We cannot study scientific creativity by isolating 
scholars and their works from the social and historical milieu in which their actions 
are carried out. The key issue is the interaction with the environment. It is well 
known from creativity studies that a stimulating environment and a talented indi-
vidual must come together and interact before a creative process can occur (for 
details see Amabile et al., 1990, 1996; Csikszentmihalyi, 1988, 1999; Hennessey & 
Amabile, 1988; Meusburger, 2009; Sternberg & Lubart, 1999).
An environment’s impacts on action must not be regarded deterministically. An 
environment should not be thought of as an independent variable that directly influ-
ences all relevant actors through a direct cause-and-effect relation (if A, then B). It 
depends on processes of evaluation based on learning, knowledge, and experience 
whether spatial structures, physical space, or social environments have an impact on 
human action.
A knowledge environment is a locally available potential or a local range of resources. It 
stands for incentives, challenges, stimulations, opportunities, and support networks that can 
be used, overlooked, or ignored. A knowledge environment can operate as it should only if 
the actors involved use the local resources and interact with each other. The outcomes of 
human interactions and experiences in life are always indeterminate. No one can predict the 
results of appropriation and interaction, whether and how often the local potential for inte-
grating diverse viewpoints and knowledge bases will be activated, and how the relation-
ships between creative agents will develop. Therefore, a knowledge environment’s 
significance and effect can be analyzed only after events have taken place, after the scien-
tific careers and research results associated with that environment have become evident. 
(Meusburger, 2015a, pp. 266–267)
 Collective Action
Organizations, institutions, and other power structures are an environment’s most 
efficient elements for enhancing or impeding the conversion of a person’s knowl-
edge into action. Without the support of institutions, most decision-makers cannot 
reach their goals (Meusburger, 1999, 2015a; Werlen, 1995, pp. 40–49). When study-
ing the relations of knowledge and action in social systems, organizations, or insti-
tutions, one must take additional aspects into account (some of them are discussed 
in the Chap. 11 by Reitz; others, in volumes 6 and 7 of this series). As Goldman 
(2004) states, epistemic organizations need nodal points where information con-
verges and theoretical conclusions are arrived at. But any organization has at least 
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two problems to cope with. First, the knowledge and experience necessary for solv-
ing a problem or making the right decisions to achieve a certain goal may be avail-
able somewhere in an organization, but it may not reach the people authorized to act 
on it. Second, the nodal points or authorized decision-makers may not have the prior 
knowledge, experience, and intuition necessary to understand and evaluate the 
importance of information that has been forwarded to them. Those who decide often 
not understand those who know. And those who know are often experts in narrow 
domains only or are not close to those in power.
Weber’s (1922/1980) ideal bureaucracy rested on the principles of meritocracy 
and the absence of nepotism and incompetence. In that system the hierarchy of 
decision-making corresponded to a hierarchy of competence. High-ranking 
decision- makers were expected to have broader expertise and more experience than 
their subordinates; the superiors would at least be able to understand, evaluate, and 
embrace the information forwarded to them. In large and complex organizations, it 
happens quite frequently that line managers (immediate superiors) have achieved 
their position because of merits other than broad knowledge and expertise in a cer-
tain domain. In some political systems, ideological reliability and loyalty to a politi-
cal party, ethnic group, or powerful network counts for more than expertise does 
when it comes to promotion to a high post. Even if managers understand the rele-
vance and urgency of information, they may fail to draw the necessary practical 
consequences because they are indebted to a political party or a powerful person or 
are under pressure from their social environment.
Organization theory, especially the research field following the tradition of 
Mintzberg (1979), and the geography of knowledge have an abiding interest in the 
organization and coordination of social systems in space and in the spatial concen-
tration of jobs involving high levels of educational achievement and decision- 
making. Originally, region meant a space that was organized, coordinated, 
controlled, and influenced by a power center or a social system’s authority (for 
details see Berthoin Antal, Meusburger, & Suarsana, 2014; Gottmann, 1980; 
Meusburger et al., 2015). Organization theory and the geography of knowledge 
have documented how the structure of a social system—the centralization or decen-
tralization of decision-making authority, skills, and competence within an organiza-
tion—varies with the complexity of its tasks and the uncertainty of its environment. 
In summary, a number of research fields have underlined the importance of an envi-
ronment or spatial context and its possible impact on individual and collective 
action, but their strands of argumentation have seldom coalesced.
 Aims, Claims, and Content of this Volume
A main intention of this volume is to raise awareness of important research issues 
that various disciplines have brought into the field of knowledge, action, and space 
to define research gaps and misunderstandings and, if possible, to build bridges 
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between diverse theoretical approaches. For this purpose we editors have selected a 
broad range of topics and various scales of analysis. More than a dozen disciplines 
do research on knowledge, learning, education, innovation, and creativity. Even a 
glance at the definitions and concepts of knowledge used in different disciplines22 
documents the necessity of looking beyond the fence of one’s own subject and 
avoiding monodisciplinary lists of references. Even if some of the approaches ini-
tially seem mutually incompatible, a synopsis of the relevant research from a variety 
disciplines can help improve the understanding of the links between knowledge, 
action, and space and can prompt new research questions.
This volume brings together a broad range of theoretical approaches delving into 
knowledge, action, and space from different angles. Some of the contributors dis-
cuss knowledge as a social construct based on collective action, on socially embed-
ded and guiding social action. Others look at knowledge as an individual capacity to 
act. The breadth of studies ranges from the role of knowledge in individual action to 
its role in collective action, from knowledge and action in the hunter–gatherer soci-
ety to knowledge production in financial capitalism. The discussion of concepts and 
theories of knowledge touches on topics such as semantic knowledge and its orga-
nization into domains, asymmetrical knowledge and the polarization of knowledge 
and nonknowledge, knowledge and collective action,23 situated problem-solving, 
spatial dispersion of knowledge, knowledge and planning, and expertise as a link 
between knowledge and practical action.
In the chapter following this introduction, Benno Werlen describes the long path 
geographers had to follow before they arrived at concepts of space suitable for 
issues of social geography. Until the late 1990s, the theoretical concepts in many 
fields of human geography diverted attention from the key role that the social 
dimension plays in the construction of meaningful geographical realities.24
Werlen identifies the reasons for the current failure of the spatial turn in the 
social sciences and offers an action-centered approach to developing a constructiv-
ist geography for the digital age. His contribution includes a specific, action-related, 
and action-compatible theory of space that can also take account of different con-
cepts of space for different types of action. In this conceptualization of space, the 
spatial dimension of action and society is related to the corporeality of the actors 
and to the necessity of overcoming distances between actors and the physical ele-
ments of situations and means of action. Because the actor’s body is simultaneously 
22 For an overview of different concepts and definitions of knowledge, see Abel (2008), Meusburger 
(2015c), Stehr (1994, 2005), Stehr and Meja (2005), and Reitz (Chap. 11 in this volume). Reitz 
distinguishes between knowledge as a systematic set of applicable recipes, knowledge as an orga-
nized body of theoretical statements, and knowledge as a developed capacity for situated 
problem-solving.
23 The role of knowledge in organizations was the focus of volume 6 in this series (Berthoin Antal 
et al., 2014) and will be discussed in volumes 11 and 13 as well.
24 The hitherto most convincing theoretical way to integrate the spatial dimension into the field of 
action research is also the narrowest and is of only limited use in social and cultural studies—that 
is, embedding metric space in locational decision-making theory applied to action models based 
on rational choice.
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the key criterion for distinguishing between direct and mediated experiences and 
between face-to-face and mediated communication, the three main foci of this 
book—action, knowledge, and space—are conceptualized in a new framework, the 
socially constructed relations of space.
The geographer Huib Ernste illustrates in his chapter that the divorce of rational-
ity and reason during the philosophical development of modernity led to recognition 
of different types of rationality, each with its own logics of deliberation and argu-
mentation. Poststructuralists emphasize that each rationality contains multiple para-
digms, each establishing its own set of principles, institutions, and lines of conflict 
that need to be taken into account. He demonstrates how these views are intricately 
involved in late-modern geographical theories of action and in language-pragmatic 
approaches25 in geography.
Proponents of poststructuralist approaches emphasize the structural aspects of 
discourse, especially power structures. Laclau and Mouffe (1985), by contrast, try 
to retain and restore the possibility of deliberative interventions in these discursive 
structures by inverting Foucault’s power/knowledge equation. Ernste explores the 
extent to which this inversion reinstates responsible and rational spatial decisions 
and actions as a focus of research in human geography. In his view rationality could 
be reconstituted as a culturally contingent phenomenon, and critical geographical 
analysis could again contribute to concrete problem-solving, albeit in a culturally 
much more informed and embedded way than hitherto. Ernste also discusses geo-
graphical action theory as put forward by Werlen (1987, 1993a, 1993b, 1995, 1997, 
2010a, 2010b, 2013, 2015; see also Werlen’s Chap. 2 in this volume) in the phenom-
enological tradition of Schütz (1932). According to that school of thought, the inter-
nal mental intentionality directed to outer objects is what ascribes meanings to these 
objects, as people do through their everyday place-making and everyday spatially 
differentiated actions. Ernste interprets this geographic action theory as the 
 subjectivist version of what Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina, and Savigny (2001) and 
Reckwitz (2002) designated as the mentalist paradigm in social theory. This 
approach contrasts with the objectivist version of mentalism, which stems from 
classical structuralism.
Ernste shows that the advent of poststructuralist thinking ushered in a great 
reluctance to conceptualize human behavior as conscious rational actions and that 
the term action is generally avoided in most poststructuralist literature. Talking 
about practice instead of action indeed amounts to a novel picture of human agency 
and rationality (Reckwitz, 2008, p. 98). In contrast to Benno Werlen, with his sub-
jective, meaning-oriented approach to geographical action theory, and unlike 
Zierhofer (2002), who advocated the language-pragmatic approach in geography, 
poststructuralist thinkers do not tend to place structures inside the mind or in prag-
matic procedures of interaction but rather “outside” both—in chains of signs, in 
symbols, discourse, or text.
25 Pragmatics is “a branch of linguistics dealing with language in its situational context, including 
the knowledge and beliefs of the speaker and the relationship and interaction between speaker and 
listener” (“Pragmatics,” 2010).
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Ideologies of urban and regional planning have a powerful effect on human 
actions. But to what extent can social behavior be influenced or even determined by 
planning concepts? How can one explain the gap between intention and behavior? 
The geographer Gunnar Olsson describes the ideology of social engineering that 
predominated in Sweden in the 1950s and early 1960s, principles intended to forge 
a happy marriage between scientific knowledge and political action. As the affinities 
between totalitarian thinking and social engineering are impossible to deny, Olsson 
starts his narrative with the role that central place theory and location theory played 
in Nazi Germany. Christaller (1933) and Lösch (1943/1954) were seeking a scien-
tific method to colonize or settle a given area, especially how a set of hierarchically 
nested and hexagonally distributed centers should be tied together into a functional 
whole.
In the thought style of location theory, regional science, positivist thinking, spa-
tial models, and social engineering, it is necessary to describe the functioning of 
society by mathematical calculations. In the 1950s and 1960s politically anchored 
experts took it as their mission to turn Sweden into a People’s Home, a state of 
rationality in which the maximizing principles of utilitarian ethics were institution-
alized. Their intention was to capture the power of social relations in a net of scien-
tific laws (e.g., the social gravity model) and to acquire the means for understanding 
the world and for changing it as well. The history of the social gravity model in 
regional science and of quantitative geography provides an excellent example of the 
ups and downs of theoretical concepts. At first the model was treated as a formula-
tion of great explanatory power; subsequent generations have come to see it as an 
expression of autocorrelation. To demonstrate power-and-knowledge relations in 
the form of a self-referential presentation, Olsson discusses the sculpture Mappa 
Mundi Universalis, conceived and designed by himself and Ole Michael Jensen and 
exhibited in the Museum Gustavianum in Uppsala, Sweden.
A Marxist view on relations between knowledge, action, and space is presented 
by the geographer Richard Peet. Viewing knowledge production from a global scale, 
he analyzes the role of expertise26 in financial institutions, which are now the domi-
nant economic institutions in capitalist societies. Following Marx and Gramsci, he 
states that knowledge production serves a class interest and that class forces lead, 
direct, and control the production of knowledge. What matters in the making of his-
tory are the broad social and cultural trends in thought, imagination, and compre-
hension, such as political-economic-cultural ideas.
He calls the production of sophisticated, but inimical, knowledge in the financial 
system perverse expertise. In this expertise some of the world’s finest minds, such 
as professional economists, do the intellectual and practical modeling and are well 
paid and respected for doing so. But they accumulate knowledge in order to con-
tinue augmenting the incomes of already wealthy people, the capitalist class. In 
Peet’s view, critical mass reaction to financial crisis or the pending world environ-
mental catastrophe is prevented by hegemonic control over imaginaries by a combi-
26 Peet (Chap. 5) defines expertise as high-quality, specialized, theoretical, and practical knowledge 
and regards it as the junction of knowledge and action.
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nation of perverse expertise and mass social unconsciousness. The elites practice 
perverse expertise, and the masses lose their capacity to think rationally and respond 
unconsciously. Peet’s conclusion is that the intersecting economic and environmen-
tal crises will continue ad infinitum because the existing hegemonic knowledge can-
not guide effective social action. Although investor confidence is presented by the 
business media as a neutral, technical, and necessary factor—in everyone’s best 
long-term interest—it is actually a committed, financial capitalist interest based on 
utterly biased knowledge. An instructive example is the global bond market. The 
interest paid on sovereign bonds is determined by the risk of default, with experts 
employing formulae stemming from long experience measured statistically—appar-
ently scientific and necessary. Yet it is actually a few thousand experts representing 
the interests of accumulated capital who tell governments how to run their 
economies.
The next seven chapters focus on the microscale of analysis and discuss con-
cepts, definitions, and research results from philosophy, psychology, and sociology. 
Psychologist Joachim Funke starts his contribution with three questions: How much 
knowledge is necessary for action? Is action possible without knowledge? Why do 
people sometimes act against their knowledge? He discusses some of the standard 
views on the relation between knowledge and action, specifically, the theory of 
planned behavior, the theory of unconscious thought, and the option-generation 
framework. He illustrates the delicate relation between knowledge and action with 
an example from problem-solving research. In Funke’s understanding, problem- 
solving means the intentional generation of knowledge for action instead of simple 
trial-and-error behavior. His studies on the MicroDYN approach, which was used in 
the 2012 cycle of the worldwide PISA study, demonstrate the existence of a clear 
connection between the generation of knowledge and action (i.e., application of that 
knowledge). From the angle of a problem-solving approach, the connection between 
knowledge and action is a classical means–end relation. It is not possible to act 
without knowledge, but people can act against their knowledge.
Nico Stehr, a sociologist of science, offers a sociological critique of the prevalent 
argument that the increasing polarization of knowledge and nonknowledge (or igno-
rance) has become a distinguishing feature of modernity. He acknowledges that 
significant asymmetries of knowledge exist and that knowledge gaps are growing, 
but he rejects the interpretation that nonknowledge is the opposite of knowledge. 
Seeking to avoid that either–or polarity as an arbitrary, theoretically and empirically 
unproductive antithesis, he posits knowledge instead as a context-dependent anthro-
pological constant representing a continuum. In his view there is only less or more 
knowledge, and there are only those who know something and those who know 
something else. The practical problem is always to know how much or how little 
one knows in a given situation. From his perspective the key sociological question 
is how to address the issue of knowledge asymmetry and knowledge gaps in various 
spheres of modern society, such as the economy, politics, the life world, and gover-
nance. He argues that nonknowledge has, in different societal institutions, its own 
functional meaning. There are myriad convincing references to the virtues and 
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advantages of ignorance, a lack or asymmetry of knowledge, and nontransparent 
situations.
The psychologists Ralph Hertwig and Renato Frey address the question of how 
different representations of knowledge shape human actions. Before choosing to 
act, people often try to acquire knowledge about a given situation, opportunities and 
risks, and possible consequences of their actions. In some cases they can draw on 
convenient descriptions of actions and their consequences—such as a medicine’s 
accompanying information on possible side effects and their probabilities. People 
thereby make decisions from description. In everyday life, however, there are usu-
ally no actuarial tables of risks to consult. Instead, people make such decisions in 
the twilight of their sampled—and often limited—experience.
Recent research in psychology has demonstrated that decisions from description 
and decisions from experience can lead to substantially different choices, especially 
where rare events are involved. Studies on modern behavioral decision-making have 
commonly focused on decisions from description. The observations stemming from 
this research suggest that humans overestimate and overrate rare events. To improve 
the understanding of how people make decisions with incomplete and uncertain 
information and how people respond to rare events that have severe consequences, 
Hertwig and Frey recommend study of the psychology and rationality of people’s 
decisions from experience. They find that people relying on knowledge from experi-
ence behave as though rare events are attributed less impact than they deserve, rela-
tive to their objective probabilities. These two researchers review the literature on 
this gap between description and experience and consider its potential causes and 
explanations, arguing that research on description-based behavior should not be 
played off against research on experience-based behavior, that the contrast between 
the two types is enlightening. These observations are not contradictory; they 
describe how the mind functions in two different informational environments.
In recent years many psychologists have proposed that action (social behavior) is 
affected by two interacting systems—the reflective system and the impulsive sys-
tem—that are operating according to different principles (for an overview of the 
literature, see Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004, 2007). “The 
reflective system generates behavioral decisions that are based on knowledge about 
facts and values, whereas the impulsive system elicits behavior through associative 
links and motivational orientations” (Strack & Deutsch, 2004, p. 220). The psy-
chologists Anand Krishna and Fritz Strack focus in their chapter on the striking 
duality of (a) actions planned with reflective, deliberate thought and (b) actions 
caused by spontaneous impulses. First separately evaluating the characteristics of 
reflective and impulsive styles of thinking, Krishna and Strack find that the reflec-
tive system operates according to propositional principles; it is flexible, it requires 
effort and motivation, and its operation is typically conscious. The impulsive system 
operates according to associative principles; it is inflexible, effortless, always active, 
and capable of operating unconsciously.
Building on existing theories of rational thought as well as impulse, impulse 
control, and implicit attitudes, the authors propose an integrative model of thinking 
and action—the reflective-impulsive model (RIM)—to show when which system of 
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thought will be active and under what circumstances they will influence behavior. 
The rational and rule-based reflective system is slow and driven by working mem-
ory capacities and arousal, which set limits for its ability to process information. 
The impulsive system can be thought of as long-term memory and therefore has 
functionally unlimited capacity.
In their RIM model Krishna and Strack describe how the reflective and impulsive 
systems interact during the process of thought. When the reflective system operates, 
it operates in parallel with the impulsive system, not in place of it. When a reflective 
operation begins, perceptual input has already activated several associative ele-
ments. The purpose of the RIM is to provide an answer to the central question of 
how the two mental processes are linked to behavior and especially how they inter-
act through behavioral schemata.
The psychologists Frank Wieber and Peter M. Gollwitzer examine the role that 
spontaneous and strategic planning have in turning an individual’s knowledge into 
action. They point out that knowing which goal one intends to pursue and commit-
ting oneself to that goal are only the first step toward successful goal attainment. 
Planning when, where, and how to act with implementation intentions27 has proven 
to be an effective self-regulation strategy for reducing the intention–behavior gap. 
The authors introduce specific if–then plans for when, where, and how to act, and 
they discuss how such implementation intentions support goal attainment.
They highlight the importance that the accessibility of goal-relevant knowledge 
has for spontaneously formed implementation intentions. As for strategically 
formed implementation intentions, they point to the importance of systematically 
selecting goal-relevant knowledge and translating it into implementation intentions 
by using the self-regulation strategy called Mental Contrasting with Implementation 
Intentions. The authors discuss the interplay of automatic and reflective processes 
and suggest that strategically planning the automatic activation of goal-relevant 
knowledge can support reflective decision-making and goal-directed actions through 
use of context-sensitive reminders. Goal systems are introduced as a conceptual 
framework because they address the question of how goals can increase the acces-
sibility of knowledge about when, where, and how to pursue the goal.
The authors discuss a recent experimental study suggesting that such strategic 
planning is very useful in unstructured situational contexts that require identifica-
tion and selection of appropriate goal-relevant knowledge. They further suggest that 
strategic planning is less useful in structured situational contexts that prompt goal- 
directed actions without requiring any knowledge about advantageous opportunities 
to act and about potential obstacles. One of their main findings is that combining 
mental contrasting and implementation intentions in order to extend planning has 
proven more effective than either mental contrasting or implementation intentions 
alone.
Two chapters present a philosophical perspective on knowledge and action. 
Philosopher Tilman Reitz gives an overview of the broad range of philosophical 
27 Implementation intentions refer to specific plans in which individuals and groups can, by using 
an if–then format, specify when, where, and how they intend to act.
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positions on the essence of knowledge. He argues that the social sciences largely 
lack a well-considered definition of knowledge, whereas philosophical debates 
about such a definition usually fail to include discussion of the social constitution of 
knowledge. In his view both approaches have overlooked or repressed a theoretical 
challenge: the spatial dispersion of social knowledge. He presents a concept of 
knowledge that is both philosophically transparent and empirically helpful for 
understanding basic structures of the knowledge society. Following a pragmatic 
epistemology, he is interested in the question of which understanding of knowledge 
makes sense in what kind of everyday circumstances. In his view the nature of 
knowledge also depends on its social organization. Do people talk about the knowl-
edge of individuals, of collectives, or rather of knowledge incorporated in a set of 
rules? He is interested in changes in the organization and dispersion of epistemic 
practices and in delocalized and resituated knowledge in the digital information age, 
when new information technologies will have huge practical and epistemic effects. 
Encoded information or data can be automatically processed without the interven-
tion of human agents. Stock market programs buy and sell shares, police software 
identifies dangerous persons, and semantic tools browse scientific data bases. Such 
operations involve neither beliefs nor truth and justification; no emotion, prejudice, 
or thought style interferes with them. But they trigger a number of new problems 
and new research questions.
The philosopher Peter Gardenförs, in support of his central hypothesis that 
semantic knowledge is organized into domains, presents a model of domain- oriented 
language acquisition. He defines a domain as a set of integral dimensions separable 
from all other dimensions. Basic domains are cognitively irreducible representa-
tional spaces or fields of conceptual potential. The author proposes conceptual 
spaces as appropriate tools for modeling the semantics of natural language. A con-
ceptual space is defined by a number of perception-based quality dimensions that 
represent perceived similarity.
He offers linguistic evidence for the hypothesis that it becomes easier to learn 
new words within in a domain once it has been established. During the first  formative 
years of life, a child acquires semantic knowledge prior to syntactic knowledge. 
Once the child has learned a word designating a color, for instance, other color 
words will be learned soon after. It is easier to explain to a 4-year-old the meaning 
of the color term mauve than to explain abstract monetary terms like inflation that 
are not yet within the child’s semantic reach. The author explains why grasping a 
new domain is a cognitively much more difficult step than adding new terms to an 
already established domain.
A central hypothesis of Gardenförs’s chapter is that many of these domains are 
closely connected to the development of intersubjectivity. The author defines inter-
subjectivity as “the sharing and representing of others’ mentality.” If somebody 
shares the emotions, attention, desires, intentions, beliefs, and knowledge of others, 
the exchange of knowledge is relatively unproblematic.
Ariane Berthoin Antal and Victor Friedman—both experts on organizational 
learning with an interest in artistic intervention—investigate the relationship 
between physical space and processes of creative thinking and action. They point 
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out that the importance of bodily ways of knowing has long been obvious to artists 
and neuroscientists but that organizational researchers misplaced corporeality for 
many years and have only recently begun to retrieve it by drawing on notions of 
aesthetics. The aesthetic approach to studying human behavior can reveal the roles 
the body plays in reading a context. The authors argue that connecting aesthetic 
approaches to the analysis of the construction of social space enriches the under-
standing of the relational processes of generating shared meaning and agreeing on 
how to behave in the current situation. They stress that people use all their senses to 
seek cues to make sense of and orient their behavior and that the body thereby also 
participates in deciding and signaling to others which rules of the game to adopt for 
the situation at hand (Edenius & Yakhlef, 2007).
This study was set in a region characterized by chronic socioeconomic underde-
velopment and deep intergroup divisions, especially between Jews and Palestinian 
Arabs. Berthoin Antal and Friedman were interested in promoting a process in 
which people could (a) bring up problems, ideas, and visions, (b) meet others with 
whom to learn and to collaborate on issues of common concern, (c) work together 
to create innovative, viable projects and enterprises to meet human and economic 
needs, and (d) create and enact shared visions of regional development that pro-
motes inclusiveness and interdependence rather than competition and divisiveness. 
In a series of videorecorded action experiments28 conducted in a fine-arts studio, the 
two researchers asked the participants to think about how they would use the space 
of the studio to combine processes of social entrepreneurship, conflict engagement, 
and the arts in ways that would connect the college with the community and contrib-
ute to regional development.
The analysis of the video recordings illustrates how physical space becomes a 
part of social space by entering human perception and then being acted upon and 
shaped by people. The authors identified seven distinct configurations29 of social 
space that changed over time as the participants engaged in the task. One of the 
striking outcomes of their video analysis was that commonalities existed across the 
sessions in terms of the knowledge-production processes. The fundamental struc-
tural similarity of the configurations allows the authors to formulate key insights 
into the relationships between space, action, and knowledge generation. The study 
confirms the value of separating visual from verbal analysis.
The final two chapters investigate knowledge (cognitive capacities, rationality) 
and mobility in space. Thomas Widlok—a social anthropologist—studies the rela-
tionship between rationality and action in a hunter–gatherer society. The prime cog-
nitive challenge in this context is human practical reasoning about movement: the 
28 By the term action experiments they mean having participants develop and actively try out ideas 
together in a given space, recording the process, then analyzing it as a basis for ensuing steps.
29 They use the term configuration in four senses: (a) the participants’ positions in the room and 
relative to each other during a specific period of time, (b) the observable interactions of the partici-
pants among each other and with materials in the room, (c) the observable application of behav-
ioral rules, and (d) the creation of shared meaning (to the extent it can be inferred from the group’s 
observable behavior and outputs). The seven configurations they identified were Orientation, 
Meeting Mode, Expansion, Creation, Reflection, Exhibition, and Rehearsal.
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decision to go or to stay. Based on ethnographic work with various groups of mobile 
hunters and gatherers in southern Africa and Australia, the chapter presents an 
investigation of rationality and action from the standpoint of human mobility in 
space. It begins with a critical assessment of probabilistic rational choice models of 
mobility and decision-making and suggests that more promising approaches are 
informed by work on the pragmatics of dialogues and on abductive reasoning. 
Rationality in that view is no longer a purely mental phenomenon, for it is distrib-
uted across social practice and is partially contained in features of the environment 
that western philosophy has long dismissed as irrelevant for understanding human 
rationality.
The psychologists Heidrun Mollenkopf, Annette Hieber, and Hans-Werner Wahl 
document that relations between intention and action (mobility in space) are not 
immutable in the course of a person’s life cycle. Age, mental and physical handi-
caps, personal resources, environmental conditions, and other factors can separate 
actions from intentions. The authors study this issue by interviewing older adults 
about their out-of-home mobility three times over 10 years. They analyze the sub-
jective meaning of mobility over time; perceived changes in mobility and perceived 
reasons for such change; the course of satisfaction in various mobility domains and 
with life in general; and interindividual variation. Perceived changes point to expe-
riences of major loss in the array of mobility and decreasing satisfaction with mobil-
ity possibilities, out-of-home leisure activities, and travel. At the same time, the 
authors find that satisfaction with public transport is increasing among older adults. 
The findings of this study confirm that out-of-home mobility remains of utmost 
importance when people move from late midlife into old age.
 Conclusion
The chapters in this volume illustrate the enormous breadth of the implications that 
the spatial dimension has for action, the production and dissemination of knowl-
edge, the application and understanding of knowledge, and the generation of socio-
cultural and economic realities. They also reveal the large number of open or 
contested research questions to be answered by future research. For obvious rea-
sons, action theory figures prominently in our introduction, but the work presented 
in the following pages indicates how many more theoretical concepts of various 
disciplines could contribute to improve the understanding of the relations between 
knowledge and space on various scales of analysis.
From a geographical point of view, certain key questions are not discussed in this 
volume: How are epistemic authority and competencies construed and evaluated in 
nonwestern or acephalous societies in which individuality and rationality are sec-
ondary to collective values? In which way will new digital technologies change the 
organization and coordination of decision-making in complex organizations? To 
what extent will new digital technologies change communication, interaction, 
supervision, knowledge storage, and social-spatial relations? Will these changes 
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mainly support and strengthen existing power structures or alter them 
substantially?
Taking into account how deeply rooted the spatial dimension is in human exis-
tence with its manifold facets, we can imagine how deep the social changes will be 
upon implementation of changes in social-spatial relations through digitalization 
and with the subsequent changes in the form of communication, interaction, and 
knowledge storage. It is therefore vitally important to include space in social theory 
in general and in action theory in particular. It looks as though Foucault’s (1984/2002) 
prediction quoted at the outset of this introduction is likely to be confirmed, possi-
bly even beyond the issues he raised.
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Chapter 2
Action, Knowledge, and Social Relations 
of Space
Benno Werlen
Contrary to still well-established understanding, geographical conditions of human 
actions are to be seen from a sociogeographical point of view, that is, primarily as a 
social product and only secondarily as a biophysical condition. This ontological 
status of the age of anthropocene means that geographical social transformations 
are highly important for all forms of geography-making, which, in turn, are funda-
mental to social change and transformations. In other words, the constitutive pro-
cesses of geographical realities are fundamental to a wide range of formative 
processes of social and cultural realities.
To grasp geographical realities as understandable realities, it is necessary to let 
go of most received geographical notions, from traditional regionalistic ones and 
colonial interpretations to present geographical concepts formulated in the after-
math of the spatial turn of the social sciences, cultural studies, and the humanities. 
But this change in perspective is not only scientifically crucial. It is even more so 
with respect to everyday practices, especially political actions. With the steady 
weakening of all-encompassing forms of national territorialization through the 
Digital Revolution and with the formation of supranational communities, the domi-
nance of the nation-state in nearly all domains of social life is at stake. Just as the 
territorial organization of social life replaced feudal logic, the territorial principle 
itself is now at risk in many senses.
It is little different when it comes to the interrelation of knowledge and spatial 
conditions. The Digital Revolution—the end of distance for a wide range of human 
activities, and accelerated social change—is establishing what I call “new social 
relations of space.” By that I mean, as elaborated on in this chapter, a new way of 
relating to preset and spatially distant circumstances that are relevant to one’s action. 
And social relations of space have a strong impact on the production, dissemination, 
and incorporation of knowledge and information. Of course, I do not mean that 
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supranational trends and globalizations are effacing the local and regional. 
Globalization also accentuates places and regions as distinctive forums of human 
action. In one way or another all human actions remain regionally and locally con-
textualized. But to grasp the social significance of spatial constellations, scientific 
research has to proceed from social actions and practices to the regional and spatial 
realm and not vice versa.
 The Relevance of the Spatial Dimension and the Spatial Turn
From the perspective of geography-making, which begins with the premises that all 
socially and culturally relevant geographies are constructed realities, the spatial 
conditions and spatial relations of individual actions are fundamental to the forma-
tion and structuration of social realities. A prime example is the current globaliza-
tion affecting various aspects of everyday life. Systematic social theories have 
largely ignored the spatial dimension of social life. The reasons for this omission are 
profound and require thorough reconstruction of the underlying modes of thought. 
Without such analysis, one runs the risk of importing the traditional spatial perspec-
tive into the social sciences and cultural studies. The fact that such uncritical adop-
tion of the conventional spatial perspective is neither productive nor insightful is 
exemplified by the “spatial,” or “geographical,” turn in the social sciences, cultural 
studies, and the humanities (see Döring & Thielmann, 2008; Foucault, 1999; Levy, 
1999; Günzel, 2009; Schlögel, 2002; Soja, 1989; Warf & Arias, 2008).
The absence of the spatial dimension in social and cultural theorizing contrasts 
with the spatial obsession characteristic of early studies in human geography, a field 
that emerged in the late nineteenth century as a space-centered science applying to 
the study of human individuals and societies. This orientation and the way of think-
ing underlying it have significant ramifications for geography as an academic disci-
pline and entail problematic political implications.
Traditional human geography’s rather simplistic focus on space and distance as 
determining dimensions of behavior results in an emphasis on the individual as part 
of the human species and neglects his or her capacity to perform social actions, 
which is fundamental for the meaningful construction of social and cultural reali-
ties. Arrival at this perspective needed a theoretical and not always successful debate 
lasting more than a century. The insights it has contributed greatly help the current 
debate about the spatial turn in the social and cultural sciences, identify its implica-
tions (some of which are problematic), and detect its shortcomings on the back-
ground of the history of geographical research.
Observed from the current theoretical debates, the first turn from human geogra-
phy to social geography as of the early twentieth century was theoretically unin-
formed about social science and showed that merely integrating the social dimension 
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into a space-centered perspective was insufficient for adequately theorizing about 
social action and societal dynamics. What was required instead was a reformulation 
and restructuring of theoretical categories and classifications in order to move from 
a society-oriented spatial science to a space- and place-oriented social science. This 
requirement applied to the social sciences and geography alike.
Social science’s traditional geographical or spatial descriptions of the world, 
such as “space is a relational order or arrangement of living organisms and social 
goods, of living organisms and things that have a social meaning” (Löw, 2001, 
p. 157, my translation), insufficiently distinguish between the ontological status of 
physical, subjective, and sociocultural conditions. Such postulations are intended to 
reestablish a sociology of space and are not too distant from the Chicago School of 
sociology in the 1920s. However, all they appear to do is help create “ontological 
slums” (Hard, 1998, p. 250). In fact, sociologies of space that draw on the above 
ontological premises revert to the state of geography prior to its overhaul by the 
social sciences.
The challenge of integrating the spatial dimension into the social science per-
spective—and vice versa—results most of all from ignoring the fact that geographi-
cal “space” is a theoretical concept. Rectifying this lapse requires one to adapt the 
concept’s use to an ontological focus of study. It is not possible to apply just any 
theory and its specific vocabulary to just any context.
Inadequate adaptation of the theoretical term space yields contradictions, as 
Bourdieu’s shows in his work on social space. According to Bourdieu (1985), geo-
graphical space is not a condition of the social world. But he claims that the social 
sphere can be located in geographical space. The included containerization of social 
reality contradicts the theory of the social production and construction of reality 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Giddens, 1984; Schütz, 1932, 1981). That way the 
social is just part of a material, pregiven space preceding all social praxis. 
Consequently, the containerization of the social implies the transformation the 
social into a materiel fact. As already implied, similar problems of reducing the 
social dimension to geographical space are also evident in the Chicago School’s 
theory of urban sociology, which adapted Warming’s ecology—his botanic geogra-
phy (1895) and geography of “plant communities” (1909)—to urban development. 
Park (1952) and his disciples (Park, Burgess, & McKenzie, 1925) even went so far 
as to say that social distance can be measured in spatial distance. Even Giddens’s 
(1984) theory of structuration is, to a certain extent, prone to similar shortcomings 
when it takes the Newtonian container space of Hägerstrand’s (1970) time geogra-
phy as a basis for the social analysis of routines in everyday life. Similar contradic-
tions are detectable when geographical space is included in theories of history, as in 
Braudel’s (1949) concept of the longue durée (long term), which—unlike “event” 
or “economic cycle” is thought to be spatially determined. In an outline of social 
history, Koselleck (2000) vehemently argued against the reification of time but 
remained silent on the reification of space.
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 The Gaps in Social Theory
Geographical conditions and spatial relations of human action—in short, spatial-
ity—are central to the shaping, or more precisely, the generation of social life and 
social relationships. Solving the “problem of space” in social theory is therefore a 
key task despite (or perhaps because of) its significant challenges. Globalization and 
acceleration affect the conditions and circumstances under which everyday actions 
are performed. It is against this backdrop that the problem of space in social the-
ory—and its solution—are of utmost importance, not least because of its sociopo-
litical relevance. Spatial configurations or arrangements of material objects are by 
no means merely “data…that has to be taken into account” (Weber, 1922/1980, 
p. 3). They are key conditions for the performance of social actions, hence, for the 
generation of social realities, and are consequently vital to research in the social 
sciences.
Space (or the spatial dimension) has an epistemic relevance that differs from the 
one attributed to it by Max Weber, the founder of the interpretative, action-centered 
social theory. To Weber (1924/1988), “purely geographic aspects” (p. 462) (i.e., 
physical features such as climate and terrain) shall not be part of the realm that is 
accessible via Verstehen (i.e., the “interpretive” inquiry into social phenomena). For 
this reason they ought to be excluded from the problems examined by interpretive 
sociology specifically and interpretive social sciences more generally (see, for 
example, Giddens, 1979, p. 202). Without exaggeration, this alignment of interpre-
tative social theoretical thinking—and consequently of social policies—is arguably 
one of the core reasons for the emergence of modern societies’ extreme ecological 
problems. The exclusion of the geographical aspects of action-centered social the-
ory is pivotal in the current situation, as is the exclusion of meaningful social reality 
through excessive biologization of the social dimension in both functionalist think-
ing (Durkheim, 1893, 1957; Parsons, 1952, 1961) and ecological reasoning from its 
outset in Haeckel (1866) to the Brundtland report (World Commission on 
Environment and Development, 1987) and subsequent UN environmental policies.
Unlike Max Weber’s position (its basic fostering of meaning-oriented modern 
social theory as opposed to the biological-reductionist and functionalist versions of 
social theory of his time), my argument in this chapter is that the generation of 
sociocultural realities always points to specific spatial relations and, hence, to spe-
cific society–spatiality relationships and society–nature relationships. This proposi-
tion ought not be mistaken as an attempt to revive environmental or geographical 
determinism—quite the opposite. However, failure to recognize the relevance of 
societies’ spatial relations may bring about profound political and ecological 
conflicts.
The words space and nature refer to each other (Werlen, 2000, pp. 40–90). To 
avoid unnecessary, highly problematic confusion, one must first clearly differentiate 
them. A spatial constellation of material or natural things and objects is not the same 
as a physical space. This type of equating is reminiscent of geography as a nascent 
scientific discipline. Conceiving of space and nature as one, as a single unit, results 
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in a geo- or space-focused environmental policy (with its attendant concepts of 
sustainability), which is still fashionable in current environmental research pro-
grams and policies. That kind of policy posits the earth sciences as the bodies of 
knowledge most competent for addressing the resulting problems, so they are tasked 
with the development of solutions to sustainability problems. Such an approach, 
however, overlooks the point that sustainability problems ultimately arise from 
human actions, not from space or nature. It is time, therefore, to reassess disciplin-
ary competence and authority.
Notions of space are important not only for the biophysical realm but also for the 
manner in which one conceptualizes the social dimension. As a kind of “deep ontol-
ogy” (Werlen, 1995, p. 2), they also influence the way social realities are constituted 
and perceived, especially with respect to sociopolitical debates. The implications of 
such a deep ontological linkage between space and society is most evident in 
Heidegger’s (1933/2000) scathing critique of the work of neo-Kantian philosopher 
Richard Hönigswald. By arguing for liberal society, wrote Heideggar, Hönigswald 
would make himself a “servant of an indifferent, universal world culture” (p. 132) 
and would distract from the “historical rootedness and ethnic [völkisch] tradition of 
the origin in soil and blood” (p. 132, my translation) and thereby compromise the 
German population. In brief, anyone rejecting the notion of spatial rootedness in the 
sense of the biologically determined nexus of blood and soil, geographical origin, 
and tradition was an enemy of the biologically justified soil-bound society, the pop-
ulation. In keeping with the assumed deep ontological unity of equating not only 
space and nature but also space and society, such heretics are to be kept out, expelled, 
or exterminated. Such a biologically determined space–society combination is char-
acteristic of ethnic nationalism that is still a common foundation of highly problem-
atic political reasoning and comes very close to that other biological typification of 
the socioculture: racism.
This example semantically illustrates the meaning of the statement that space has 
profound implications for what is meant by society, and vice versa. In other words, 
space and society are discursively constructed images that are influence each other. 
This relationship certainly holds also for constellations unrelated to ethnic ideas. 
However, the significance of the mutually referential relationship between society 
and space has thus far been largely neglected, the reason being that sociology and 
geography have had their specific blind spots for a long time—and to a certain 
extent still do. Sociology used to offer an only insufficiently reflexive concept of 
spatial reference (see Bourdieu, 1985; Giddens, 1979, 1984, 1993), and geogra-
phy’s understanding of society long remained undertheorized. The nexus of space 
and social theory is still mostly rather superficial. It does not seriously take account 
of the deep implications that concepts of space have for the generation of society 
and that the relevance of social realities has for the theoretical conceptualization of 
space in the history of science, particularly the history of geography.
This is the basis on which ontological slums are flourishing. They result mainly 
from reified everyday concepts being reproduced in a nonreflexive way at the scien-
tific level as meaningful spaces or biomaterial social worlds. The implications of 
such “slum” reproduction in scientific (dis)guise should be examined in the spirit of 
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science’s noblest task: critical doubt. One promising way to approach it is to recon-
struct the historical development of geography as an academic discipline in its 
sociocultural context.
 Social Conditions of Scientific Research and the History 
of Space
Historically, geographers have conceived of space as a three-dimensional earth 
space, also called geographical space (Werlen, 1993a; 2000). It has been the pri-
mary focus of their research. In the mid-nineteenth century, at the beginning of 
geography as an academic discipline, their foremost task was to classify all manner 
of phenomena on the earth’s surface on the basis of a metric (discrete) concept of 
space as defined by cartographic coordinates. To produce such “measuring of the 
world” (Kehlmann, 2007) and the associated spatial-cartographic conception of the 
world to derive scientific descriptions was customary practice in academic geogra-
phy at that time. That approach assigned a particular area or space to material 
objects and immaterial phenomena, laying the groundwork for the further develop-
ment of geography as a spatial science.
Academic geography moved from being a descriptive and classificatory disci-
pline concerned with nature and the Earth in a biophysical sense to a methodologi-
cally inclusive endeavor aimed at discovering causal relationships. That is, scholarly 
geography changed in its focus (which was established by Alexander von Humboldt 
and Carl Ritter) from the cartography of objects and a description of the Earth’s 
surface (chorography) to a causal and integrative geography, or spatial science (cho-
rology). In this approach, space was thought of as a container. It thus represented a 
specific form of the theoretical concept of space developed by Isaac Newton for 
mechanics and later transferred to biology by Ernst Haeckel, who referred to it as 
lebensraum.
One of the most important historical conditions of this development in geogra-
phy was prepared by Isaac Newton (1687) in Philosophiae Naturalis Principia 
Mathematica, the conceptualization of space as absolute. In Opticks Newton 
(1704/1952) defined space as a three-dimensional container space, containing 
everything material as an object and “God’s Sensorium” (p. 125). With the underly-
ing mechanical view of the natural world, Newton conceives of this container as 
material and absolute and as having a causal effect on everything contained in it. 
This definition of the absolute container space constitutes the basis of mechanics 
and the beginnings of the modern natural sciences. Despite being intended for mod-
eling three-dimensional material—but not ideal, immaterial phenomena—this con-
cept of space came to be applied far beyond the realm of mechanics. It became the 
foundation for an all-encompassing mechanistic world view and provided the ratio-
nale for positing universal laws of nature that claim validity for all parts of reality, 
including consciousness, society, and culture.
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In the first development and conceptualization of ecology, Haeckel (1866) gave 
space a connotation similar to that in Newton (1704/1952). Space appeared to be a 
container or, more precisely, a container for all forms of life (Weingarten, 2009), as 
a lebensraum, a living space. At the same time, the lebensraum is also thought of as 
a sort of antagonist that every life form must contend with if it wishes to survive. 
The availability of a lebensraum was thus considered a necessary condition for the 
existence of all life forms and was at the same time a key evolutionary selection 
mechanism. In other words, the lebensraum in Haeckel’s conceptualization and 
beyond had a causal effect in the sense that it distinguished successful from unsuc-
cessful life forms and selected the former. From this reified and causally productive 
“authority” lebensraum one can derive a normative principle for life forms. It holds 
that only the fittest species will survive in a specific lebensraum. More important, 
the underlying tenor is that these fitting species will not only be able to survive but 
are the only ones that should survive. It is obvious at this point that a premise assum-
ing a nexus of life and space (or blood and soil) also serves as a basis for ideas of 
racial hygiene and the legitimation of spatial hygiene or ethnic cleansing.
Trained as a zoologist, the founder of academic human geography Friedrich 
Ratzel (1891, 1897) conceived of space much as his teacher Ernst Haeckel had: as 
the determining life container of anthropos, or humanity. Thus, the human leben-
sraum was seen as the cause that determines a population’s characteristics (“races” 
and “peoples”), and it became a determining frame for political processes—or, fur-
ther, an agent of human history. According to this logic, cultures (social and eco-
nomic forms) are the result of biological—that is, spatially determined—life forms. 
Natural conditions become natural spatial relations. These biologically interpreted 
spatial relations determine life and, hence, the specific features of cultures and 
societies.
Such a reduction of the social dimension to the biological level conceptually and 
methodologically disregards the interpretive dimensions of social actions and the 
relevance of interpretive patterns in dealing with natural conditions. The premise of 
lebensraum and the biologistic reduction it implies are the foundation on which the 
research program of an early human geography is built. It aims to prove spatial 
determinism as environmental determinism of cultures, societies, and economies. 
The geographical world view is thus from the outset a mechanistic world view 
established by Newton, then transferred by Haeckel to biology and by Ratzel to the 
field of geographical research.
As for methodology, academic geography morphed at the end of nineteenth cen-
tury into a causalistic science. It aimed to show empirically the natural space’s 
determining effect on human actions and subsequently offered corresponding geo-
graphical explanations for the observed forms of cultural and economic realities. 
Geography’s adaptation of the mechanistic world view as an ideal for scientific 
inquiry not only enhanced the discipline’s scientific reputation and its political 
influence but thenceforth also served as the point of reference for the formation of 
the social science perspective on geography. In the context of traditional regional 
geography, for example, Max Weber (1924/1988) identified the relevance of the 
geographical point of view as establishing “in any given case which of the specific 
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components of cultural phenomena are attributable to climatic or similar, purely 
geographic aspects” (p. 462).
Politically, the alleged proof that cultures and societies are environmentally 
deterministic is connected to the normative claim of identifying the correct spatial 
expanse of nations by identifying their natural boundaries and uncovering the “com-
mandments of the soil” (Ratzel, 1891, p. 48; my translation). In this way, “geo-
graphical facts” (Hettner, 1927, p. 267; my translation) are understood as the actual 
constitutive aspects that are to be uncovered as the true forces shaping social and 
cultural realities. Alfred Hettner, one of the important representatives of causal 
geography in the first half of the twentieth century and the leading figure of regional 
geography, pithily summarized this program: “By passing over human volition, we 
ascribe the geographic facts of humans to the environmental conditions present in 
their respective countries” (p. 267; my translation).
Understanding space as a fact that precedes all human actions opens the door to 
a line of reasoning that culminates in the idea that the structuring and organization 
of cultures and societies could be influenced through spatial planning. Geopolitics 
thus becomes a key concern for politics. Denying human individuals the possibility 
of making their own decisions and shaping social reality are the key anti- 
Enlightenment views in the geopolitical world view, especially in its National 
Socialist hue.
To sum up, the elements of the space–society combination discussed thus far are, 
first, a substantialist container space; second, a biological concept of life; and third 
(as a merger of the previous two), a concept of lebensraum as something that deter-
mines life forms located in it. Notions of the social dimension as being somehow 
determined by such a lebensraum imply a naturalistic or biologistic reductionism, 
that is, a reduction of the social dimension to the biological category “life.” The 
notion of society thus turns into a biologistic one, so it is frequently replaced by 
“population.” The constitution of subjective meanings on basis of the stock of 
knowledge at hand, subjective interpretations, and symbolic appropriations are not 
considered subjects of scholarly research in general or of the dominant mainstream 
geographical research in particular. As a result, the interpretative social and cultural 
sciences can be removed from the catalogue of scientific disciplines; biology and 
traditional geography are then sufficient for researching societies and social 
phenomena.
For sociocultural realities to be suitably investigated and characterized, one may 
invert the space–society combination, recast it as a society–space logic so as to put 
society first and consider the spatial dimension as an element of social realities but 
not as its determinant. Attempts to avoid the geodeterministic logic within the 
space–society paradigm—particularly those efforts made within geography’s spa-
tial scientific program (Bartels, 1968; Bunge, 1962; Harvey, 1969)—have been 
unsuccessful. The spatial turn in sociology resulted in a “sociology of space” 
(Simmel, 1903) that delved primarily into the research on the “constitution of 
space” (Löw, 2008, p. 25) and the structuration of spaces instead of the structuration 
of society. Such a line of inquiry is consistent with the spatial scientific approach in 
traditional geography and, consequently, becomes trapped in these outdated 
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 concepts of space—despite rhetoric that seems to suggest otherwise (Lippuner & 
Lossau, 2004). To be fair, Lefebvre (1974)—a key reference in the sociology of 
space—bypassed these problems. Yet his notions of perceived, conceived, and lived 
spaces call into question spatial practice in spatial terminology (Schmid, 2005, 
p. 18) instead of helping one regard space an abstract, conceptual element of social 
practice.
From the preceding discussion it can be concluded that spatial scientific attempts 
to approach the social dimension ultimately leads to naturalistic reduction of mean-
ingful sociocultural realities. Even more recent attempts to establish a society- 
oriented spatial science or a spatioscientific sociology end up reducing the social 
dimension to the geographical space. And because the three-dimensional geograph-
ical space permits only the localization of three-dimensional material facts, this 
procedure leads (at least implicitly) to a reification of nonmaterial established facts. 
A nonreductionist inclusion of the geospatial dimension in an interpretative analysis 
of socioculturally constructed realities requires one to differentiate the various 
dimensions of human action by their ontological status. Only then can the ontologi-
cal slum be avoided. Perhaps more precisely, only then can the ontological swamp 
be drained of the sewage of geospatial reductionisms.
 Different Spaces for Different Worlds
A sufficiently detailed ontological differentiation is essential in order to give due 
consideration to both society and space. The flawed arguments put forward by spa-
tially ignorant social sciences and socially ignorant geography are to be avoided, 
and human geography is to be reconstructed as an interpretative, constructivist, and 
socioscientific geography, such as a social geography. Such ontological differentia-
tions should make it possible to overcome the kind of reductionism that spatializes 
social and cultural aspects and to develop alternative approaches.
Social practices can be seen as being composed of three ontologically different 
dimensions: the corporeal (biophysical), the mental (cognitive), and the sociocul-
tural (Popper, 1972; Schütz, 1981). Subjecting these dimensions to the same kind of 
analytical procedure would therefore seem improper. Accordingly, social practices 
can first be distinguished into physical conditions and thought content. The former 
are characterized by their material substance, which has a spatial extent and can be 
described in terms of height, width, and depth. The physical realities refer to all 
material conditions and states, including actors’ bodies, and exist independently of 
the subjects’ thought content. The mental dimension refers to a person’s knowledge 
and experience. It includes not only the reflexive (or discursive) but also the uncon-
scious and the practical (or tacit) consciousness and related states of mind and forms 
of knowledge. The practical (or tacit) consciousness describes those elements of 
knowledge that subjects competently draw on when acting but that they cannot ver-
balize (at least not easily).
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Concerning the distinction between the physical and the mental world, action- 
and practice-centered approaches stress that the meaning of material objects depends 
on subjects’ constitution of meaning on the basis of the stock of knowledge at hand. 
According to Schütz (1981, p. 92), the human body is the epitome of mediation 
between these two worlds. The body simultaneously is the center of immediate 
experience, the medium of actions, and a field of expression of subjective meaning. 
Furthermore, the mental world cannot be analyzed in isolation from the sociocul-
tural world; the former is always—through socialization processes—embedded into 
the latter. Individuals are initiated into the sociocultural world through socialization 
or their action (Berger & Luckmann, 1966).
Ontologically, the sociocultural world is identical with neither the physical nor 
the mental world. Neither is it merely a combination of the two. The sociocultural 
world includes the intersubjectively accepted and applicable social norms and cul-
tural values and the institutionalized patterns of action in the economic, legal, reli-
gious, and other realms. The meanings of these norms, values, and societal action 
patterns transcend the mental world of individual subjects and are therefore assigned 
a separate ontological standing.
 Action, Knowledge, and Space—Space, Knowledge, 
and Action
Any definition of space has to take into account that the word has different mean-
ings, depending on the meaning and situation of the action under consideration. 
Depending on the type of action, both the formal and the classificatory aspect 
acquire a specific connotation. That is, both aspects are contingent on the specific 
interests pursued by the actor.
The nomenclature of the spatial dimension changes with the model of action: 
instrumentally rational action, norm-oriented action, and meaning-oriented action. 
The shift of the spatial dimension’s nomenclature occurs or, more precisely, is nec-
essary because relations with the body change depending on the orientation (or 
model) of action gives an overview of the characteristic attributes of each dimension 
(see Table 2.1).
Table 2.1 The characteristic attributes of action and space
Attributes Formal Classificatory/relational Examples
Instrumentally 
rational
Metric Classificatory calculation Land market, real 
estate




Nation-state, front and 
back region
Meaning oriented Body centered Relational signification Motherland, homeland
From Werlen (2013, p. 9)
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In the instrumentally rational model both orientation and classification are 
closely related to what Max Weber called “disenchantment of the world” (Weber, 
1922/1980, p. 308). Giddens (1990) characterized this pithily as “emptying of 
space” (p. 18) and “emptying of time” (p. 18). Such disenchantment and emptying 
of formerly stable and invariable meanings convey the formalization of the interpre-
tation of reality. This formalization builds upon the metrization of spatial expanse 
and thus facilitates classification and calculation. Formalization and metrization 
(e.g., longitude and latitude) are the basis of modern cartographic representations of 
the earth’s surface and their use as an orientation for action. If the spatial dimension 
is included in the course of action in the instrumentally rational model, it is only as 
purely formal aspects of action; substantively, however, the spatial dimension is no 
longer tied to specific actions in a general, invariable way.
With regard to norm-oriented day-to-day activities, spatially bound prescrip-
tions—the relation between norm orientation and spatial expanse—are key. When 
relating to the physical world, actors apply, hypothetically, a classificatory criterion 
and a relational criterion to orient their actions. Using the classificatory criterion, 
they apply specific criteria (e.g., park) to categorize (e.g., public/private) the cir-
cumstances that are relevant to their actions. Using the relational criterion, actors 
attribute a relation to these categories (e.g., accessible/inaccessible) according to 
certain social or legal norms and cultural values.
Of particular societal relevance are relations with normative-prescriptive spatial 
connotations, such as permitted/prohibited or, “You are allowed to do activity X 
here but not there.” Such attributions result from processes of territorialization 
based on clearly measurable delineations. Control over people and the means of 
violence are organized via action-related territorialization, with the human body 
being the pivotal element. The combination of norm, body, and spatial context is 
exemplified by the modern nation-state with its territorially bound law and 
jurisdiction.
The spatial connotation of understanding rests on a distinctive focus on the body 
as the central element of interaction and communication. The significance of the 
body (Körper) for the spatial connotations becomes obvious as soon as the body is 
understood as the “particularly suitable link” (Schütz, 1981, p. 41, my translation) 
between the subjective and the extended, spatial physical world. From this perspec-
tive one can understand the body as a kind of a “functional link” (Werlen, 1993b, 
p. 75), switching element, or mediator for subjective biographical knowledge and 
symbolic appropriation of physical elements of contexts of action. Assuming that 
the meaning of the circumstances deemed relevant to someone’s actions depends on 
the person’s available knowledge, then the way meaning is attributed arguably 
depends on that hitherto acquired knowledge.
A decisive factor bearing on the formation of the knowledge stock is the bodily 
relation in the sense of presence/absence, in other words, the relation between direct 
and mediated experiences of the world. The significance of copresence—the shar-
ing of corporeality in the here and now—is based on the direct experience of the 
world through one’s senses. The significance lies in having seen something with 
one’s own eyes and having heard something with one’s own ears and having gained 
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the attendant intimate knowledge. This relationship between the physical senses 
and the world contrasts with mediated ways of acquiring information and knowl-
edge, which are characterized by a much lower level of intimacy.
The distinction between direct and mediated forms of knowledge acquisition 
underlies the generation of meanings and the production of significative relations to 
the world. In much the same way as prescriptions are the basis for territorialization 
in the norm-oriented model of action, emotive relations are the basis for classifica-
tory significations as emotional/symbolic relations to specific places. They are 
expressed in regions of meaning attached to material entities and described by 
words such as homeland, sacred site, landmark, and image. In this form they fre-
quently become unquestioned elements of social communication.
Hypothetically, the more these relations are based on immediate experience (inti-
mate knowledge) and bodily everyday practice, the more they elude reflexive con-
trol and become linked to hypostatization and reification, eventually eliminating the 
difference between nomenclature (signification) and the named objects and circum-
stances (materiality). The represented meaning and the vehicle of representation 
become one and the same despite all existing ontological differences. As a result, 
homeland does not register as the expression of emotional, symbolic classification 
of a clearly delineated section of the world through which embodied experiences are 
represented. Instead, homeland “is” also experience, much like sacred site “is” itself 
the sacred. The more the basis for the signification is mediated—for example, via 
advertising’s instrumentally rational, conceptualized images of places—the more 
they are hypothetically subject to reflexive control. In both cases these relations 
become elements of communication and can orient normative-political action (e.g., 
nationalism, regionalism) as well as instrumentally rational consumptive action and 
productive action (e.g., tourism, place image, place reputation).
Accordingly, physical objects in a certain constellation or arrangement as a situ-
ation of action can only carry or convey meaning, but they can never be the mean-
ing. Physical objects are the media of symbolization; they are always mere vehicles 
that transport meaning. Hence, there can be a spatial order of vehicles but not of 
meanings. A distinction must be drawn between symbolic space and the spatial 
arrangement of symbolizing vehicles. Meanings are always located on the side of 
the subject and never on the side of the object. Meanings are attributed, and the 
practice of attributing meaning is a way of establishing relations and bonds.
The distinction between three different models of action (instrumentally rational 
action, norm-oriented action, and meaning-oriented action) and their corresponding 
terminologically defined appropriation of spatially expansive physical objects hint 
at the meaning that relations and bonds in these realms of everyday practice may 
have. At the same time, they illustrate that the relations to space are dependent on 
the type of action undertaken. Subscribing to this view implies conceptualizing 
social geography as an investigation of different forms of everyday action-related 
geography-making, of geographical practices.
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 Incorporation of the World and the Construction 
of Geographical Realities
From a world view, a geographical imagination that puts the cognizing, knowing, 
and acting subject at the center results in a dynamization of the geographical per-
spective on and understanding of the world. The focus shifts from the question of 
where objects and people are located in space to the question of scholarly examina-
tion of forms of everyday geography-making. In short, attention turns to the inter-
pretation of meaningful constructions of geographical realities, including the 
meaningful appropriation of objects, places, and spaces.
For this purpose a quite substantial part of geographical terminology needs to be 
redefined. One, if not the, key word is regionalization. From traditional to spatial 
scientific geography as well as in Giddens’s (1984) theory of structuration, region-
alization referred to the subdivision of given spaces (in whatever way it was deter-
mined). From the subject-centered new perspective, however, “regionalization” is 
understood to denote an everyday practice of establishing ties to the world in a 
specific manner. By emphasizing the spatial and temporal aspects of these specific 
relations, one can call them “world relationship” (Weltbeziehung, Werlen, 1996, 
p. 112) or “world-binding” (Weltbindung, Werlen, 1997, p. 215), the act of defining, 
shaping, or establishing one’s own ties to the world. I would now like to call that act 
of geography-making “world incorporation.” World incorporation refers to the 
social mastering of spatial and temporal relations in order to monitor and control 
one’s own actions and those of others. It refers to the way subjects relate to the 
world; it constitutes one’s relations to the world.
In the context of everyday regionalizations, space is a conceptual tool and a 
medium for action with which the various forms of world incorporation are imple-
mented. The constraining and enabling component of power is particularly impor-
tant in this respect. Its various manifestations are reflected in the varying degrees of 
capability and spatial range of world incorporation. Hence, in the subject-centered 
reconceptualization of geography, the space-centered question of power over space 
is replaced by the question of the efficacy of the available spatioconceptual media 
that are used to exercise power over and surveillance of practices.
The capability of shaping—which is inherent in social practices and does not 
exist outside them—is characterized, on the one hand, by the spatial and temporal 
range of one’s actions. In this sense power is reflected in the transformative capacity 
of human action. On the other hand, this capability also depends on the ability to 
integrate absent subjects and objects into the realization of one’s own aims and 
objectives. In the sense used by Giddens (1984), capability can be understood as 
consisting of resources and rules of action. According to him, the capability of 
monitoring and controlling the access to and the appropriation and use of natural 
resources and the world of material objects can be conceptualized as meaning that 
one has allocative resources at one’s disposal. This capability exists in all forms of 
societal organization and relates to control over material resources, material  artifacts 
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used in the transformation of these resources, and material goods produced in this 
transformation.
Within the frame of world incorporation, the terminological means with which 
access to allocative resources is granted is the notion of measured extension as met-
ric space divested of all other symbolic attributions. This notion of space is the one 
implicit in cost calculations having to do with the distance and scale of transport at 
the beginning of the production line (e.g., shipping raw materials to the factory) and 
at its end (e.g., distributing to various retailers the goods produced from those raw 
materials). In combination with the notion of standardized metric time, it is possible 
to calculate the parameters for acting over distance. Such calculations facilitate 
planning of economic activities in both production (including work processes and 
commodity flows) and capital accumulation (Harvey, 1982) via world incorporation 
processes in global contexts.
The capability of acquiring and maintaining control and governance over 
actors—even in one’s physical absence—is called authoritative resource. Such a 
capability of controlling and governing is based on direct or indirect access to the 
bodies of those being monitored, controlled, or governed, or on direct or indirect 
access to body-related ways of authorizing or preventing actions and of maintaining 
those actions over time.
World incorporation via authoritative resources is represented in the term terri-
tory, which prescriptively connects normative tenets to spatial expanse. These nor-
mative tenets (and their legal enforcement strategies) can be called upon in cases 
where human bodies enter or use the territory. The property rights connected to 
these normative prescriptions authorize or prevent access by others and facilitate 
maximum control over people and over the use of areas and material artifacts 
(means of production). Therefore, the resource-related aspects of incorporating the 
world refer to economic, social, political, juridical, and other dimensions. 
Authoritative resources are usually superimposed onto allocative resources, but the 
mobilization of authoritative resources always requires allocative resources (e.g., to 
ensure that one’s own actions prevail).
However, the structuration of human action and, hence, of all forms of world 
incorporation does not rely on resources alone. According to Giddens (1984), rules 
are the second important aspect. They include specific semantic and moral rules that 
can form powerful interpretive schemes and can regulate courses of action in a 
value-specific manner. Actors use these interpretive schemes to interpret (in line 
with the rules) and symbolically organize practice-specific realms of reality. 
Interpretive schemes are the most comprehensive form of the structuration of human 
action and, consequently, of the constitution of society or sociocultural realities.
Rule-specific aspects are key for types of action oriented to intersubjective 
understanding. These aspects underlie all types of symbolic relations to the world. 
The vocabulary used for such emotionally charged, significative classifications of 
relations to places and objects includes sacred site and homeland.
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 Regionalizations and Regions of Meaningful Geographical 
Realities
The programmatic research areas concerning meaningful geographical realities are 
derived from the three already mentioned types of action theories: instrumentally 
rational, normative, and meaning oriented. Depending on research interests, empiri-
cal investigations might focus on socioeconomic aspects (consumptive-productive 
types of world incorporation), sociopolitical aspects (political-normative types of 
world incorporation), or sociocultural aspects (informative-significative types of 
world incorporation). Everyday actions feature all three dimensions simultaneously. 
In addition, each of these dimensions is interpreted differently by different subjects; 
that is, it is idiosyncratically relevant to one’s actions (see Table 2.2). Therefore, 
geography turns into everyday geographies.
Research on the economic type of world incorporation revolves around three 
main questions: (a) How do producers bring under their control the raw material 
used in the production process and the labor force? In other words, how do they 
relate to the world (or bind the world to themselves)? (b) How do consumers decide 
what to buy? That is, under which conditions and with which medium or resources 
do they make which decisions? (c) What is the relationship between the productive 
and consumptive types of world incorporation?
Production-related types of world incorporation involve, first, deciding on a site 
or location at which to produce. Such decisions are typically made by drawing on 
the locational focus of production-related activities and commodity flows that are 
directly mediated by the body. Decisions on where to produce and on the corre-
sponding arrangements generated as a result of such decisions are elements of eco-
nomic world incorporation. They are always tied to allocative resources and the 
notion of metric space. The analytical lens of world incorporation (everyday actions 
yielding multiple everyday geographies) enables one to describe systematically the 
establishing of global relations pertaining to productive types of world incorpora-
tion, especially in times of digital or virtual capitalism, when capital accumulation 
no longer requires activities involving the body or other matter. In addition, the 
perspective of world incorporation makes it possible to analyze the varying 
 capabilities of control over resources, material goods, means of production, and the 
resulting power and power relations.
Table 2.2 Types of world incorporation
Main types Subtypes
Productive-consumptive Geographies of production
Geographies of consumption
Normative-political Geographies of normative appropriation
Geographies of political control
Significative-informative Geographies of information
Geographies of symbolic appropriation
From Werlen (1997, p. 274)
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Consumption decisions largely depend on available financial means (i.e., alloca-
tive resources) and lifestyle (traditional or individual). The relevance of consump-
tion decisions is expanding along with people’s increasing reflexivity with regard to 
consumption decisions and intensifying globalization. Consumption decisions 
reflect subjectively constituted cultural and life worlds because late-modern life-
styles are largely shaped by subjective decisions. (In traditional ways of life, by 
contrast, collective constraints are the dominant factor determining the course of 
actions). Accordingly, consumption is embedded in the processes through which 
people develop their subjectivity. This embeddedness also leads to the continuing 
dissipation of the territorial logic in both the economic and the cultural realm. 
Against this backdrop it becomes clear why geoscience-based environmental 
policy- making is doomed to fail. What is needed instead in this context is a practice- 
centered ecocritique and ecopolicies. Because the local and the global are interwo-
ven, lifestyle-specific consumption for the purpose of moving toward moral and 
ethical consumption and global sustainability is becoming negotiable in public dis-
course (Werlen, 2012, 2015).
Research on social and political types of world incorporation currently focuses 
on geographies of normative appropriation and political control. Prescriptive- 
normative appropriations prevent or facilitate access to spatial contexts of action. At 
the same time, they serve to socially regulate types of action within these spatial 
contexts. In addition to formal political regionalizations such as the nation-state, 
federal states and counties, important informal normative regionalizations with 
respect to age, social status, role, and gender are regulating access to and exclusion 
from certain spatial contexts of everyday life. Goffman’s (1959) distinction between 
front and back region also belongs to this category. His approach usefully highlights 
the relevance of both the reference point of interaction and the setting for the way 
interactions are performed.
Thus far, I have informally described negotiated regionalizations. They have to 
be distinguished from formal, legally recognized, institutionally established, and 
bureaucratically organized regionalizations. Such formal regionalizations make 
command and power over others possible in absentia, meaning that physical copres-
ence of the rulers and the ruled is not required for power to be exercised. At the 
same time, formal regionalizations play a key role in identifying and categorizing 
classes of rights (e.g., constitutional, administrative, and criminal law; contract, tort, 
and property law). Research on formal regionalizations also encompasses the rela-
tion between public and private space, including surveillance and its legitimacy in 
public areas.
From the action- and practice-centered perspective proposed here, regionalist, 
nationalist, or ethnic movements can be seen as forces of everyday geography- 
making that oppose existing forms of authoritative control. A practice-centered per-
spective suggests that command and power over territories is actually command and 
power over subjects. This interpretation highlights the difference between a practice- 
centered and a traditional geopolitical perspective: The former focuses on subjects 
and their different way of making geography (and power); the latter, on the way that 
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power over space supposedly translates into power of space. The fact that regional-
ist and nationalist movements usually follow the traditional geographical and geo-
political logic exposes their Janus-faced character in the light of modernity: claiming 
the right to self-determination within a spatial-material logic when there is actually 
no self.
Informative-significative types of world incorporation or regionalizations are 
also closely tied to the corporeality of subjects. In the absence of the physical body, 
communication media serve as extensions of the body. Significative regionaliza-
tions (in the form of symbolic appropriations) are the most comprehensive and 
arguably the most powerful processes in the construction of meaningful geographi-
cal realities.
Research on the geographies of information focuses on the preconditions and 
processes of acquiring information and knowledge. With respect to the sender, 
research has to clarify the preconditions for generating and linguistically steering 
the potential appropriation of information via different information media. In his-
torical order the starting points include the dissemination of information through 
writing (e.g., books and other print media), the electronic (radio, TV), and digital 
media (internet-based communication). Of particular interest are the globalizing 
consequences of the production and use of these media and the resulting tensions 
between the unfamiliar and familiar, between mediated information and unmediated 
experience. The implications of those consequences are observable in the context of 
cultural integration, for example.
Symbolic appropriations (and the symbolic geography-making that they stand 
for), the production of symbolic structures of spatially locatable phenomena and 
objects, are key dimensions of cultural representation. Hypothetically, one can 
assume that such symbolic appropriations are relevant in communication and as 
media for social integration and regulation (of economic actions). Attributing mean-
ing to material contexts of action through the use of particular terms reflecting the 
relevant notion of space is always done via practices and usually in the form of 
routines used to manage standard situations.
Action and practice-centered geographical research should also inquire into the 
stock of knowledge-based interpretive schemes, rules of interpretation, skills, moral 
rules, and emotional dispositions that substantiate the different types of appropria-
tions conducted as classificatory significations. Clarification of the following ques-
tions is required, too: Which subject-related geographies of symbolic appropriation 
are being produced in which communicative contexts? What do the symbolizations 
represent and with what consequences? How are the symbolizations enforced? A 
further important area of research is the empirical identification of the transforma-
tive potential that symbolic appropriations of places and material contexts of action 
can have for economic and political practices. The reconstruction of the processes 
constituting everyday “mythologies” (Barthes, 1957) and of their underlying reifi-
cation techniques (“chosification” p. 112) are particularly important in this context, 
not least because they have been in the focus of traditional geographical research.
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The six main types of world incorporation—the ways of defining, shaping, or 
establishing one’s own ties to the world—are connected in manifold ways. 
Consumptive actions, for example, belong primarily to the economic field and are 
linked to allocative resources. However, they are also embedded in normative stan-
dards and might have a strong cultural-symbolic and/or lifestyle-related connota-
tion. Particularly with globalization processes, the traditional combinations of a 
given type of action in only one field or type of resource—which have long been 
deeply ingrained, not least because of the unchallenged hegemony of nation-state 
institutions—are not only questioned but put into a new “order.”
 Social Relations of Space
Processes of world incorporation are both structured and structuring; they are in the 
focus of practice-centered geographical research. This perspective makes it possible 
to reformulate the question about the relationship between society and space: Given 
that the spatiality of actors derives from their corporeality and necessitates world 
incorporation, what significance does that spatiality have for the generation of soci-
etality? How has this basic challenge of spatiality been coped with over the course 
of history?
These questions broaden the horizon of social science geography and draw atten-
tion to two issues: (a) the process of relating social action to the implications of 
corporeality, and (b) the relevance of these relations for the generation of social 
realities. In a nutshell, it highlights just how essential society–space relationships 
are for societality. Research on these relationships should therefore be the macro-
analytic complement to the microanalytic level of subjective world incorporation 
processes in geographical social science research. Together they form the core of 
social science geography and are an extension of theories of society and of culture.
As the spatial turn in the social and cultural sciences suggests, the concept of 
society–space relationships takes account of the fact that it is insufficient to include 
the spatial aspect in social theory as a kind of spatialization of the social dimension. 
What is needed instead is a reconceptualization of social theory as a theory that 
refers to the geographical shaping of social realities without relapsing into material-
istic or spatial reductionism. It must systematically take into account the implica-
tions that the corporeality of the actors and the material basis of many social 
institutions have for the subsequent spatiality of the social dimension for communi-
cation, interactions, socialization, learning situations, and care-giving.
A first important step for highlighting the relevance of spatiality was the con-
trasting of social relations and spatial structures (Gregory & Urry, 1985). It focused 
on pointing out the spatial manifestations of social reality with respect to the spatial 
structure of settlements and transport networks, the spatiotemporal paths of social 
reproduction, and social inequalities in the sense of regional disparities, for instance. 
Focusing on society–space relationships reverses the perspective: Research efforts 
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are no longer directed to the spatial structures of societal relationships but rather to 
the significance that spatial relationships have for the meaningful construction of 
sociocultural and geographical realities.
With spatiality being understood as describing actors’ corporeality, this new per-
spective raises the question about the role that this spatiality and the ways of coping 
with it play in co-determining the shaping of sociocultural realities. In this context 
the ways in which people act over distance are profoundly important. Distance is 
understood in both a social and the physical sense. According to Tönnies 
(1887/2001), it is regarded as a core element of the difference between community 
and society. Consequently, the concept of society–space relationships includes con-
sideration of the ways to cope with one’s spatiality and, hence, with spatial distan-
ciation as constituent of society.
 The Times They Are a-Changing: From Territorial to Digital 
Social Realities
As noted in this chapter’s introduction, the expression social relations of space 
refers to the historically and socially established ways of relating to given and spa-
tially distant circumstances relevant to one’s action. Social relations of space (spa-
tial relations) are determined by the means and tools available for coping with 
spatiality for the purpose of creating social realities. Accordingly, the dominant 
spatial relations can be identified best by examining the available means and tools. 
Social relations of space are in this sense grounded in the sociohistorically created 
conditions, means, tools, and media of acting over distance, that is, in the forms and 
options for coping with the everyday world’s spatiality with respect to all forms of 
social practice, social interaction, and communication. Therefore, social relations of 
space are evident in the current and historical possibilities and impossibilities of the 
sociogeographical conditions of social coexistence. Because the aforementioned 
ways of incorporating the world on the basis of terminological media are embedded 
in the historical development of the technological media of acting over distance, the 
analysis has to complemented by a diachronic perspective.
The scope of daily geographical practices is limited by the manifestation of the 
social relations of space in each form of world incorporation. The media for master-
ing spatiality have advanced in revolutionary steps. The Neolithic Revolution and 
Industrial Revolution were, in this sense, also revolutions of society–space rela-
tions. Another reconfiguration of these society–space relations is taking place as the 
Digital Revolution. Each of these revolutions can (hypothetically) be characterized 
by a distinctive range of options for the formation of societality.
Social relations of space determine the modi operandi (for acting over distance), 
based on which the corporeal social practices that construct sociocultural realities 
can take place. The historically available means, tools, and media are therefore con-
stitutive of all forms of societality. I contend that these means, tools, and media are 
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constitutive of social realities in much the same way as the Marxian relations of 
production are.
Social relations of space are, however, distinct from relations of production and 
modes of production. According to Marx (1867, p. 792, 1847/1983, p. 130), societal 
history progressed from primitive society to slave society (or ancient slave society) 
to feudal society, bourgeois society, and, finally, communist society. Marx assumed 
these different societal formations to emerge as the result of changing relations of 
production. That is, he considered social change to be determined by the respective 
relations of production. If his analysis can be considered as almost accurate for the 
period of industrial revolution, it can certainly not be seen as an all-encompassing 
formula for explaining the social world and its transformation. However, societies 
can also be classified according to the dominant mode of production and economic 
sector into agrarian, industrial, service, or information societies. By contrast, soci-
ety–space relationships focus on the technological media for coping with distance 
and time. After the Neolithic Revolution they included the wheel; script (cunei-
form); plant and animal breeding; irrigation; and storage capacities for food, seed, 
and water. The Industrial Revolution brought changes in the form of mechanics, 
metrization, mechanical drivetrain, and electricity, for instance. In the course of the 
Digital Revolution, numerical data storage and telecommunication in real time have 
become new technological media for coping with distance and time.
Modern nation-states can thus be viewed as the manifestations of thinking in 
terms of actions that expand linear reach, territorialization, clearly measurable ter-
ritorial scope of social norms (state borders), bureaucracy, and communication via 
the medium of text (as opposed to orality) produced by printing technologies. The 
key question is, then, what the dissolution of the territorial nexus means for societal-
ity in the Digital Age. Further social science research would usefully investigate 
how to move beyond “methodological nationalism” (Beck & Sznaider, 2006, p. 3) 
or, more precisely, ontological nationalism, if the differentiation between method-
ological and ontological is used systematically (Werlen, 1987, p. 78, 1993b, p. 40). 
Such research would need to take account of the fact that geographical and social 
realities are based on specific modi operandi concerning the manifold ways in 
which people are coping with their spatiality.
These modi operandi are always imposed upon actors and formally specify the 
possibilities (or impossibilities) of acting over distance. In other words, modi ope-
randi can be understood as sets of rules governing the ways in which the available 
means, tools, and media can (or cannot) be used by actors. A specific modus ope-
randi therefore allows for a specific spatial and temporal reach of people’s actions 
and, by implication, also for particular forms of societality, socialization, and com-
munication. For example, pre-Neolithic tribal societies characterized by the pri-
macy of the present and of orality (which, in turn, requires bodily copresence) 
arguably operate in the synchronic/present mode. By contrast, nation-state forms of 
societality draw on analog written communication and the availability of the past 
and therefore operate in the diachronic/distanced mode. I conjecture that the hith-
erto undetermined societality of the Digital Age—based on numeric digitality—
will take the synchronic/distanced modus.
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 Implications: From Space to Action and from Action 
to the Spatiality of Action
The approach suggested in this chapter opens up an alternative perspective on many 
current societal issues, including the global financial crisis, global migration, and 
sociocultural integration. They can be understood as consequences of the at least 
potential, continuing, spatiotemporal disembedding of social, cultural, and eco-
nomic realities in the course of the Digital Revolution. The spatial ties of social 
practices are at least selective and no longer of the same encompassing nature as 
those in the predigital age. They are the result of practices of appropriation and 
socially produced spatiality rather than a quasi-natural condition.
The aforementioned societal issues can be interpreted as manifestations of the 
mismatch between the spatiotemporal shaping of societality and the logics of con-
trol governing that societality. In other words, the above societal issues arise when 
society–space relationships have changed or are in the process of changing to a new 
modus operandi while politics is still operating according to the logics established 
in the previous modus operandi. The increasing disintegration becomes evident in 
the continued use of territorial strategies (e.g., territorial wars or national financial 
policy) to dispel problematic consequences of a-territorial networks with fluid 
place-bound nodes (e.g., terrorism or digital financial capitalism).
Analyzing sociocultural realities from the geographical perspective outlined in 
this chapter emancipates the spatial from the temporal dimension. Hägerstrand’s 
(1970) time geography has shown that the time required to perform corporeal 
actions correlates with spatial order. In other words, new society–space relation-
ships always imply new society–time relationships, and society–space relationships 
therefore also represent space–time relationships.
Including actors’ corporeality and the physical conditions of actions in the ana-
lytical perspective means that time no longer takes precedence over space. The 
acceleration of social life is thus an expression of the altered conditions of coping 
with spatiality and ultimately leads to action in global contexts in quasi simultane-
ity. The space–time relationships are at the basis of a reconceptualization of social 
theory.
In order to understand the significance of the revolution in the spatial and tempo-
ral conditions of the social dimension—or of globalization and acceleration (Rosa, 
2013) with regard to the circumstances relevant to everyday action—they are to be 
thought of as two sides of the same coin. Whereas globalization denotes the spatial 
reach of one’s action in real time, acceleration refers to its consequences for the 
frequency of decisions in social interaction. Thinking of globalization and accelera-
tion as two sides of the same coin enables one to track the societal consequences of 
reshaping society–space relationships.
This geographical perspective opens up new approaches to issues of sustainabil-
ity and the analysis of human practices according to ecological criteria. The notion 
of life and society being literally contained in biological habitats can be overcome 
with the concept of world incorporation. The a priori container space that was 
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 conventionally assumed to exist independently of human experience and social 
practice—from Haeckel and the ecopolicies based on his ideas to the UN sustain-
ability policies à la the Brundtland Report (World Commission on Environment and 
Development, 1987)—no longer has to be the criterion for survival or extinction and 
for calculations of so-called carrying capacity. Focusing on world incorporation 
means turning the perspective upside down: Human action is privileged above habi-
tat (Earth), so sustainability politics and ecopolitics can be rid of biologistic think-
ing, which usually puts them in the vicinity of traditional geopolitics. This 
accounting for society–space relationships makes it possible for an original approach 
without naturalistic reductionisms to be developed (Becker & Jahn, 2006) with eco-
logical practices (Gäbler, 2015) rather than ecotopes at its center. Such reorientation 
is a consequence of the geographical turn from space to practice.
 Conclusions
The scientific investigation into the shaping of spatial relations in a society can be 
seen as an important thematic field for holistic study of social, cultural, economic, 
and political matters, research that is generated by a spatially grounded perspective 
without ensnarement in natural or spatial determinism. With the recognition of the 
importance of society’s spatiality, sociospatial conditions will identifiably become a 
part of the social sphere. For example, they will indicate the fundamental conditions 
for establishing social relations over distance, which are currently enabling many 
social actors to sustainably shape socialization and power without being physically 
copresent.
The dissolution of former principles of sociospatial conditions and the revolu-
tionary establishment of new ones are resulting in new social arrangements and 
issues. As an already apparent reaction to this situation, there is a new (and highly 
problematic) tendency to address these changes by relying on well-known structural 
principles and established interpretational frameworks, such as the increasing 
nationalization of European or global issues. Yet continued deterioration in spatio-
temporal conditions limits the potential success of such territorial solutions. In 
essence they can, hypothetically, be seen as attempts to illustrate how conventional 
conceptions of the world, regarded as the all-embracing, ingrained, and only possi-
ble interpretation, are eventually adapted to newly established spatiotemporal con-
stellations. However, these constellations lay the claim for applying national or 
territorial logics of societal coexistence to increasingly deterritorialized living con-
ditions rather than simply territorially regulating them.
One of the most important contemporary tasks in social and cultural studies is 
the establishment of and elaboration on new conceptions of the world that bring 
about not only the sociocultural spheres but also the attendant political and every-
day frameworks. This endeavor, however, also implies the uncoupling from tradi-
tional and trusted conventions. Thus, the first and foremost goal is to dismantle and 
discard ideas and understandings of container space and to spatialize social and 
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cultural realities as the basic principles of world conceptualizations that have been 
all-encompassing for several centuries. It is not to promote practice-centered views 
and illustrate how actors relate to the world with and within the conventions of their 
actions.
Relating to this shift in perception, other urgent issues such as sustainability and 
the evaluation of human activities involving ecological questions will also have to 
be renegotiated. Besides the consideration of social issues, the matter of decontain-
erization will be essential to this process. In this respect, the nomenclature and 
concepts of space and place and of nature and landscape cannot be regarded as logi-
cally separable or independent.
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 Chapter 3 
 Rationality and Discursive Articulation 
in Place-Making 
 Huib  Ernste 
 Late-Modern Action-Theoretic Approaches and “Rational” 
Interventions 
 Rationality is the ability to design, follow, and have knowledge about a systematic 
procedure for the redemption of validity claims. In classical philosophy the term 
denotes the ability of the mind in terms of reason ( nous, intellectus, Vernunft ) and 
rationality ( logos, ratio, Verstand ) (Mittelstraß,  1995 , p. 470). The  logos provides 
the argumentation for the views one holds. Logos is the capacity not just for making 
statements but also for providing their proofs, and a statement is proven by being 
derived as a conclusion from premises (Welsch,  1999 ). But these premises them-
selves cannot be secured through argumentation. It is here that reason comes in. 
Traditionally, reason is therefore conceived of as the faculty capable of guarantee-
ing these fi rst premises, by intuition (Plato) or induction (Aristotle). One could say 
that reason provides the specifi city of the situation at hand, the context from which 
rationality is supposed to draw its conclusions. 
 It was the paradigmatically modern philosopher Immanuel Kant who, with his 
Copernican turn, stated that it is actually the other way around, that rationality pro-
vides the constitutive categories and principles of cognition and that reason pro-
vides only regulative ideas, through which one experiences particularities as parts of 
a destined whole. 1 In modernity, therefore, rationality is regarded as the most impor-
tant ability, and reason can ultimately be done away with (Feyerabend,  1987 ). Seen 
in this way, rationality autonomously establishes its own principles, methods, and 
1  In Kant’s terminology the idea of a  soul prescribes us to link particular psychological appearances 
to a whole; the idea of a  world prescribes us to connect all our singular observations to a unity 
called world; and, fi nally, the idea of  God urges us to see things as result of a causal chain. Together 
these ideas create a systematic unity in our perception (Störig,  1989 , p. 404). 
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perspectives. In modernity it is also recognized that there is not just one single type 
of rationality but different types, which cannot be reduced to each other. Each type 
determines its own principles. Developing Kant’s ideas about theoretical, practical, 
and aesthetic rationality further, Habermas ( 1984 ) paradigmatically distinguished 
between cognitive, moral, and aesthetic rationality. Habermas built not only on 
Kant’s work but also on that of Max Weber, who fi rst made rationality a key concept 
in modernistic thinking and used the term specifi cally in the sense of purposive 
rationality or economic rationality, the meaning it is also often has in colloquial 
language. It thereby denotes the strategic choice of the best means to reach a certain 
goal. In this way rational decision-making became of central interest and positioned 
rationality and action theory as core concepts in high modernity. Weber elaborated 
the role of rationality for individual everyday actions and called attention to the 
tendency toward disenchantment, that is, toward continuous differentiation and 
rationalization. 
 Rationalization in this sense designates a historical drive toward a world in which 
“one can, in principle, master all things by calculation” (Weber, 1919/ 1946 , p. 136), 
by rational decision-making. This process of rationalization was not limited to the 
economic sphere but was extended with its own rational logics also to law and 
administration, the social and political spheres, and other domains. As a prerequi-
site, a peculiarly rational and intellectual type of personality or person of vocation 
was presupposed. Modern scientifi c and technological knowledge slowly pushed 
back the germinating grounds of human knowledge, such as religion and metaphys-
ics, and created a culture of “objectifi cation” ( Versachlichung ). At the same time, 
there was a loss of substantive-value rationality, the emergence of a polytheism of 
value fragmentation, and the related tensions between these two developments, in 
other words, rationality without reason in practice. 
 It is in this framework that one must also situate geographical action theory as 
put forward by Benno Werlen (Chap.  2 , in this volume or  1987 ,  1995 ,  1997 ) in the 
phenomenological tradition of Alfred Schütz ( 1932 ). According to this school of 
thought, the internal mental intentionality directed to outer objects is what ascribes 
meanings to these objects, as people do through their everyday place-making and 
everyday spatially differentiated actions. This geographic action theory can be 
interpreted as the subjectivist version of what Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina, and Savigny 
( 2001 ) and Reckwitz ( 2002 ) designated as the mentalist paradigm in social theory. 
This approach contrasts with the objectivist version of mentalism, which stems 
from classical structuralism as exemplifi ed by de Saussure (1916/ 1972 ) in linguis-
tics, Lévy-Strauss ( 1969 ) in anthropology, Althusser (1965/ 2005 ) and Emerson 
( 1984 ) in Marxist economics, and Piaget ( 1970 ) in psychology. One could also add 
the more contemporary version of psychological structuralism (Lacan,  2002 ); 
behaviorist psychology (Skinner,  1938 ; Watson,  1913 ); and cognitive psychology 
(e.g., Broadbent,  1987 ), including cognitive linguistics (Fauconnier,  1999 ). The 
approach diverges from behavioral geography (Golledge & Stimson,  1996 ) as well, 
for which human behavior is an effect of structures in the unconscious mind in rela-
tion to structured situations and is thus part of the objectivist mentalist tradition. 
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 In geographic action theory, on the other hand, the assumption is that the active 
mind is in charge. In this case, however, the sources of spatial structurations are not 
unconscious cognitive structures in hard-wired reaction to external structures but 
rather the sequence of intentional acts as conscious decisions. The aim of analysis 
from the angle of this social phenomenology is to describe the voluntarist subjective 
act, mental interpretations of agents and subjective logics, and rationalities of 
decision- making and behavior. This intentional goal-oriented kind of geographic 
action is thus clearly related to the late-modern project based on Weber’s ideas of 
rationalization as a purely subjective mental process and individual rational inter-
ventions in the surrounding world. Even in Schütz’s ( 1932 ) version of social phe-
nomenology or Mead’s ( 1934 ) social behaviorist approach, in which meanings are 
grounded in social relations, the individual subjective mind is still the seat of judg-
ment and rational choice. Mental structures and mental activities, therefore, are 
treated as an incontestable “center” of social and spatial structuration (Reckwitz, 
 2002 , p. 247). 
 Habermas’s ( 1984 ) stance on rationalization differs in this sense from Werlen’s 
approach in that Habermas partly decenters rationalization from the individual sub-
ject to the pragmatics of social interaction. “In speech acts, the agents refer to a 
non-subjective realm of semantic propositions and of pragmatic rules concerning 
the use of signs” (Reckwitz,  2002 , p. 249). For geography, this language-pragmatics 
approach was detailed by Zierhofer ( 2002 ) and Schlottmann ( 2007 ). This approach 
can be seen as a critique of the pure mentalist program but does not reject it entirely, 
for there are still interacting agents endowed with minds (Reckwitz,  2002 , p. 249). 
In that sense one can speak of a further development in action theory or of late- 
modernist views on rational action and intervention, where agency is partly decen-
tered from the individual actor to external pragmatic procedures of interaction 2 and 
structural relationships within whose framework these interactions occur. Reckwitz 
( 2002 , p. 249) and Moebius ( 2008 , p. 67) call these intersubjective performative 
approaches  intersubjectivism . A third stream of social theory in their systematics is 
based on poststructuralist thinking. 
 Poststructuralist Theories of Practice and “Critical” 
Interventions 
 With the advent of poststructuralist thinking, there has been great reluctance to con-
ceptualize human behavior as conscious rational actions, and in most poststructural-
ist literature the term  action is generally avoided. Systematic content analysis would 
probably reveal a shift in the discursive use of the term even in those poststructural-
ist writings that do not explicitly address this change in conceptualization. Foucault’s 
early work, for example, shows a preference for the term  practice rather than the 
2  This understanding of rationality is not restricted to purposive economic rationality; it is refi gured 
as a  praxial (pragmatic) form of rationality and rational critique (Schrag,  1992 , p. 57–59). 
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term  action . In a seminal paper on this change, Schatzki et al. ( 2001 ) even coined 
the expression  practice turn . Talking about practice instead of action indeed amounts 
to a novel picture of human agency and rationality (Reckwitz,  2008 , p. 98) and 
opens up a certain way of seeing and analyzing social phenomena, which inevitably 
also imply a certain political and ethical dimension. For lack of a better word, 
Reckwitz, writing about theories of practice, describes this poststructuralist 
endeavor as  textualism . In contrast to Benno Werlen, with his subjective mentalist 
approach of geographical action theory, and to Zierhofer ( 2002 ), who advocated the 
language-pragmatics approach in geography, poststructuralist thinkers do not tend 
to place structures inside the mind or in pragmatic procedures of interaction but 
rather “outside” it—in chains of signs, in symbols, discourse, or text. The subject is 
thereby decentered even further, that is, into discourses about sign systems. These 
discourses are seen not as mere representations of mental qualities behind them but 
as a sequence of external events from which symbolic structures are manifested. In 
a similar way, but with different arguments, Geertz’s ( 1973 ) symbolic anthropology 
and Luhmann’s (2002/ 2013 ) constructivist theory of social systems also focus on 
the structural aspects of society outside the subject. What all these textualist 
approaches have in common is their critical perspective on the essentialization of a 
universal and fi xed principle of rationality and their celebration of the contextually 
and historically dependent logics of structuration and discursive meanings. But that 
is then their only critical thrust, and one could ask whether it spells the end of criti-
cal rational deliberations or what will be next? To a certain degree the view of post-
structuralist thinkers is not that different from the late-modernist view of action 
theory or from language pragmatics. The poststructuralists proceed along the same 
line, only going a bit further. They, too, advocate a plurality of kinds of rationality, 
and list a wide range of possible frames for action but do not describe them as types 
of rationality but rather as systems of meanings and logics of structurations of 
power. Furthermore, poststructuralists emphasize that there is no single standard 
version of a given rationality, that each rationality contains multiple paradigms, 
each establishing its own set of principles, institutions, and lines of confl ict that 
need to be taken into account. 
 In this context it is important to be aware that relationships between different 
players within this language game are described only in terms of power relations, 
which make it diffi cult to imagine some kind of metarationality regulating this plu-
rality of differences. The relational sense in which Foucault and most of his post-
structuralist followers use the concept of power makes clear that power is everywhere 
and that it is not an attribute of individuals. Yet that understanding subsumes almost 
all relational issues under the highly ambiguous concept of power, reducing it to a 
merely descriptive term and sapping most of its critical potential. Both late-modern 
and poststructuralist approaches thus lack of a metanarrative. 
 However, what started as a reconceptualization of human actions as practices—a 
change that began in early poststructuralist approaches in order to counterbalance 
the mentalist roots of action-theoretic approaches—ultimately overstated structural-
ist effects of discursive systems of meaning and obscured rationality’s critical 
potential to solve struggles of difference. Full-fl edged theories of practice as 
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 discussed by Schatzki et al. ( 2001 ) and Reckwitz ( 2002 ) are bids to fi nd a real bal-
ance between body and mind, things and knowledge, discourse and language prag-
matics, structure and process, and the agent and the individual. 
 Current theories of practice constitute an effort to reformulate the Aristotelian 
conception of phronesis, which implies that practice is seen as the basis and purpose 
of theoretical knowledge (Flyvbjerg,  2001 ). That conception also implies an escape 
from the dualism of the subjective and objective (Bernstein,  1971 ; Stern,  2003 , 
p. 185). Schatzki is seen as one of the leading thinkers in this approach, and he bases 
his practice theory on a new societal social ontology in which the dualism of onto-
logical individualism and holism is overcome (Schatzki,  2006 ). He calls his new 
ontology  site ontology , defi ning  site as a type of context in which human coexis-
tence takes place and which also includes the social entities themselves. Social 
events can thus be understood only through an analysis of this site. The close rela-
tionship between this concept of site and the geographic concept of place (Tuan, 
 2001 ) is evident:
 Practice theory places practices at the center of the socio-human sciences instead of tradi-
tional structures, systems, events, actions. None of the practices can be reduced to a sum of 
its elements, which are of a complex character: they are mental and material, factual and 
relational, human and material, individual and supra-individual, etc. This conception also 
overcomes the dualism action/structure,…Each practice then operates in a typical regime, 
according to particular scenarios, it has its inherent normativity, etc. (Višňovský,  2009 , 
p. 391) 
 Because these particular practices are interlinked and intertwined, there arises 
the issue of how one can rationally deal with this host of situations. With this ques-
tion in mind, it is worthwhile to explore some of discourse theory’s new develop-
ments that may be able to offer important answers. 
 Discursive Articulations and the Return of “Rational” 
Interventions 
 In a review of different theoretical approaches to analyzing the restructuring of 
space and place in urban regions in Hungary and England, Varró ( 2010 ) shows the 
genealogy of what she called a “Politics of Space Approach” (p. 59) based on appli-
cation of discourse theory to the analysis of spatial change. Focusing chiefl y on 
discourse theory, she refers to the work of Laclau and Mouffe ( 1985 ; see also 
Andersen,  2003 ). Laclau and Mouffe draw on Gramsci’s ( 1992 ) concept of hege-
mony, which denoted the capacity of the ruling class to eliminate oppositional 
forces by incorporating them into a collective will based on a shared system of 
meanings (values, attitudes, beliefs, and morality). “Laclau and Mouffe acknowl-
edge, and carry forward, Gramsci’s proposition to see collective will as formed 
through the articulation of various identities, i.e., processes where identities are 
‘brought together’ and mutually modify each other” (Varró,  2010 , p. 46). But they 
disapprove of Gramsci’s ( 1992 ) class reductionism and the assumed dominance of 
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economic relations in the making of space. Social and spatial identities are thus 
fundamentally “unfi xed” (p. 88) and are only partially fi xed through hegemonic 
practices of articulation. Discourse becomes “an attempt to dominate the fi eld of 
discursivity, to arrest the fl ow of differences, to construct a centre” (Laclau & 
Mouffe,  1985 , p. 112). Discourse can therefore be seen as the totality of an act of 
performance, including linguistic and nonlinguistic elements (Laclau & Mouffe, 
 1987 ). This inclusiveness brings in an element of political, strategic, or deliberative 
interaction and thus opens room for the process of rational deliberation, though 
Laclau and Mouffe ( 1985 ,  1987 ) refrain from using the qualifi cation  rational for 
this inherently political process of radical democracy. Jessop ( 1990 ) and Howarth 
( 2004 , p. 271) have criticized Laclau and Mouffe ( 1985 ,  1987 ) for not illustrating 
how such a radical democracy can be characterized and institutionalized. Mouffe 
( 2005 ) does not get much further than stating that the crucial issue for democratic 
politics is not the eradication of confl ict via consensus but rather the legitimation of 
a multiplicity of opinions, attributions of meaning, and identities—in short, the 
legitimation of confl ict or a consensus on difference. His observation seems to 
imply that the potential hostility and  antagonism of political forces is turned into 
 agonism , where opponents are seen not as enemies to be destroyed but as legitimate 
adversaries whose ideas can be countered (Mouffe,  2005 ). As Jacob Torfi ng ( 1999 ) 
observed,
 post-structuralist insights might help to sustain an  agonistic democracy that is capable of 
transforming enemies into adversaries....the nomadization and hybridization of identity 
might contribute to the dissolution of antagonistic frontiers (Mouffe,  1994 , pp. 110–111). 
Nomadization refers to the attempt to undercut the allegiance of a specifi c identity to a 
certain place or a certain property, and thereby to show that all identities are constructed in 
and through hegemonic power struggles. This will tend to denaturalize social and political 
identities and make them more negotiable. Hybridization refers to the attempt to make 
people realize that their identity is multiple in the sense of constituting an over-determined 
ensemble of identifi cations. (p. 255) 
 In Laclau and Mouffe’s thinking this idea of an agonistic democracy is also extended 
to their own normative claim for radical democratization, as the very nature of the 
process of radical democratization is itself part of an agonistic debate and depends 
on a contingent, but at least largely shared, symbolic space (Mouffe,  2005 , p. 121). 
This extension, however, still does not explain how such a political debate or delib-
eration takes place and what the radical democratic politics look like in action, not 
just as a starting point or outcome. At this juncture the interactionist outlook seems 
to be more useful. In general it is clear how the different traditions of social theory, 
ranging from mentalist and interactionist to textualist points of view, each address 
different complementary aspects of the political praxis put forward by Laclau and 
Mouffe ( 1985 ). 
 To develop this approach to praxis theory further, it is essential to rethink con-
cepts of reason and rationality so as to create space for pluralistic forms of rational-
ity and for transversal refl ections (Welsch,  1999 ), even for rational interventions. 
This space seems to have been obscured thus far by the concepts used by Laclau and 
Mouffe ( 1985 ), which were inspired mainly by Marxist and poststructuralist 
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 thinking, and by some misinterpretation of the original concept of rationality in this 
context. Varró ( 2010 ) noted a similar misunderstanding with respect to the concept 
of discourse between critical realist thinkers and discourse theorists. 
 In the de-essentialized and dynamic, but nevertheless highly structuralist and 
imprisoning, interpretation of discourses and practices reminiscent of early Foucault 
( 1972 ) and the practice turn (Schatzki et al.,  2001 ; Višňovský,  2009 ), there seems 
little space for rationality or reason in the traditional modernist sense. In this frame-
work, politics—and thus also spatial politics—seems to be defi ned primarily as 
authority and power and seems to deal only with the effects of power relations and 
not with the structure of the deliberations that take place in the framework of these 
relations. 
 As part of the misunderstanding of rationality, rationality is seen only as a foun-
dational universal concept, for it was forwarded by enlightenment at a time when 
reason had actually been expelled from the view of the human being’s abilities to 
deliberate about the world. However, Welsch ( 1997 ,  1999 ) prompted the question of 
how to differentiate and judge the various systems of meaning and logics, or the 
various forms of rationality involved, without some all-embracing perspective. 
Distinctions and judgments based on any one of these types or paradigms of ratio-
nality would necessarily misrepresent the others. Welsch suggested that there must 
be a different type of functioning that underlies human refl ective capacity. It is this 
type of refl ection that he reintroduced as reason, enhancing rationality—or better, 
enhancing rationalit ies . In a seminal book written in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, 
Schrag ( 1992 ) took up and endorsed this very specifi c kind of reason. Both scholars 
called it  transversal reason (Schrag,  1992 , p. 148; Welsch,  1997 , p. 315). Because 
transversal reason relates geographic realities and geographic differences to each 
other, it is crucial for the geographic perspective as well. As the refl exive ability to 
recognize and clarify the differences as well as the relationships between the vari-
ous forms of rationality, transversal reason is actually a necessary condition for the 
theory of plurality and difference. 
 Related to the current situation of plurality and hybridity, this kind of transversal 
reason is not a new invention but rather a skill that is increasingly used consciously 
or unconsciously in everyday practice and that is becoming more and more an inner 
constituent of people’s reasoning and life designs. The present age is not one seem-
ingly bereft of rationality but rather one in which reason and rationality are reunited 
as a mental and refl ective activity operating at every step of rational deliberation on 
discursive articulations.
 Reason and rationality are not two separate faculties, and in a sense are not faculties at all, 
but rather signify different layers and functional modes of our refl ective activity. ‘Reason’ 
refers to the basic mechanism, ‘rationality’ to the various concrete, object-directed [or place 
related] versions of this activity. (Welsch,  1999 , Pt. III, sec. 5, par. 2) 
 From this standpoint geography is primarily about developing these skills of 
reason and rational deliberation in a situation characterized by social and geograph-
ical diversity. The latest advances in social theory and in their operationalization in 
human geography—possible to outline only very tentatively in this chapter—yield 
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a research program on human geography that combines several schools of thought 
with that discipline’s political commitment to create a knowledge base and refl ec-
tive skills for subsequent rational interventions. 
 Conclusion 
 To conclude this chapter, I offer a summary of the main steps in my argumentation. 
First, I have tried to show that rationality was separated from reason during the 
philosophical development of modernity and that it assumed a universal and fi xed 
principle of rationality. In late-modern times this discernment led to recognition of 
different types of rationality, each with its own logics of deliberation and argumen-
tation. Second, I have shown how these views are intricately involved in late- modern 
geographical theories of action and in language-pragmatic approaches in geogra-
phy. At the same time, I have pointed out the mentalistic inheritances of this 
approach. Third, I have noted that proponents of poststructuralist theories, in a quest 
to emphasize the structural aspects of discourses, seem to have totally done away 
with rational deliberations. However, advocates of full-fl edged theories of practice 
do not go that far and really seek a middle road. Fourth, I have tried to show that 
newer forms of discourse theory in the tradition of Laclau and Mouffe ( 1985 ) seem 
to offer this space for a real theory of practice and seem to reopen an opportunity for 
refl ective political deliberations in the different fashions of discursive articulation. 
Finally, I argued that combining Laclau and Mouffe’s discursive approach with new 
forms of rationalization that include transversal reason (Schrag,  1992 ; Welsch, 
 1997 ) might result in a framework for a rational approach to the politics of space as 
a core business for human geographers. 
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 Chapter 4 
 Thought-in-Action/Action-in-Thought 
 Gunnar  Olsson 
 An entire volume devoted to the theme of knowledge and action! What a gift and 
what a wonderful opportunity to return once again to the Olsson Laboratory of 
Epistemology and Ontology, to the company of the twin sisters of rhetoric and dia-
lectics, to the mutating banana fl ies that by now have been with me for more than 
half a century. And what a fascinating, non-ending, and interesting adventure those 
years have been, from beginning to end an attempt to understand how we under-
stand, every day steeped in the hope of catching a glimpse of how we become what-
ever we become. 1 
 But wait! What is it to be interesting, and where do I go to fi nd it? As so often 
before, the answer lies in the word itself, for the English term  inter-esting stems 
from the Latin  inter esse , literally  in-between-being . To be interesting is, conse-
quently, to dwell in the razor-sharp limit between categories, to explore the trenches 
of the no-man’s land of the excluded middle. Now, if I am courageous enough to 
enter that crater-strewn wasteland, and if I am curious enough to keep my eyes and 
ears open, then I will eventually encounter a troupe of traveling magicians who to 
great applause are performing their magic tricks of ontological transformations, an 
antiphony of voices, some divine some other human. As the angels keep chanting 
1  In what follows I will draw freely on the history of my own works, occasionally even quoting 
without quotation marks. In addition to the texts listed toward the end of this chapter, there is much 
to learn from  GO: On the Geographies of Gunnar Olsson , a remarkable anthology edited by 
Christian Abrahamsson and Martin Gren ( 2012 ). It contains not only a representative selection of 
facsimile reproductions of some of my own articles from 1967 to 2010 but also some brilliant 
illuminations set off by a long list of fi rst-rate pyrotechnists: Christian Abrahamsson, Trevor 
Barnes, Alessandra Bonazzi, Michael Dear, Marcus Doel, Franco Farinelli, Reginald Golledge, 
Martin Gren, Jette Hansen-Møller, David Jansson, Gunnael Jensson, Ole Michael Jensen, Tom 
Mels, Chris Philo, Michael Watts. And I who always fancied myself as a Wittgensteinian solipsist! 
Stand corrected, identity crisis in the making, Paulus Gunnarius on the road to Damascus. 
 G.  Olsson (*) 
 Department of Social and Economic Geography ,  University of Uppsala ,  Uppsala ,  Sweden 
 e-mail: Gunnar.Olsson@kultgeog.uu.se 
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their wor(l)ds of “Let there be—and there was,” the plebeians respond that “ Verum 
factum —the true is the made,” indeed that to them something is true because they 
have made it themselves. And in that perspective both Jahweh and Giambattista 
Vico come out as what they really are—expert jugglers of worlds which from one 
viewpoint are and from another are not, true creativity in both cases nothing but a 
speech act through which the powerful can claim that something is something else 
and be believed when they do so. Knowledge is by defi nition an exercise in 
translation. 
 “What, then, is truth?” asked Nietzsche in his essay  On Truth and Lie , immedi-
ately replying that truth is
 a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms—in short, a sum of 
human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and 
rhetorically, and which after long use seem fi rm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: 
truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are; metaphors 
which are worn out and without sensuous power. (Penguin edition, 1976, pp. 46–47) 
 Whereas the self-declared LORD created the world by uttering it—light and 
darkness, mountains and rivers, you and me, everything fl owing out of his mouth—
the humpbacked Vico was a Neapolitan professor of rhetoric it is not only to 
American pragmatists that meaning lies in practice and the paradigm of informative 
truth in the fi nger-pointing index of  a = b . The Kantian  as-if at work. Yet we must 
never forget that although words may well change people, to things they do 
nothing. 
 What follows will be structured as a retracing of routes taken, essentially a col-
lage of vistas glimpsed in the distance. Nothing new, merely a dose of coherence 
dashed into a cocktail which to the afi cionados has been a source of intoxicating 
enlightenment, to the doubters a drug of impure ingredients and frightening side- 
effects. The recommended antidote is a product of the Nicomachean Pharmacy, 
delivery a mouse-click away:
 It is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as 
the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning 
from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientifi c proofs. 
 Now each man judges well the things he knows, and of these he is a good judge. And so 
the man who has been educated in a subject is a good judge of that subject, and the man who 
has received an all-round education is a good judge in general. Hence a young man is not a 
proper hearer of lectures on political science; for he is inexperienced in the actions that 
occur in life, but its discussions start from these and are about these; and, further, since he 
tends to follow his passions, his study will be in vain and unprofi table, because the end is 
not knowledge but action. And it makes no difference whether he is young in years or 
youthful in character; the defect does not depend on time, but on his living, and pursuing 
each successive object, as passion directs. 
 [These] remarks about the student, the sort of treatment to be expected, and the purpose 
of the inquiry, may be taken as our preface. (Aristotle, trans.  1941 , Book 1, Chapter 3, 
1094b and 1095a) 
 ***  
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 Beware though, for the fact that the young man is young does not mean that he is 
a  tabula rasa . On the contrary, because like everyone else he is a product of his own 
upbringing: a palimpsest of impressions, layers upon layers of indicatives and 
imperatives; a ceaselessly over-painted canvas onto which the world is casting 
whatever it is casting; a self-referential story composed in a mixed code of genetics 
and socialization, its nonachievable purpose to make us obedient and predictable, to 
turn you and me into exchangeable, yet unique, pieces in the ongoing game of one 
against many, us versus them. It is these traces of the taken-for-granted that function 
as an invisible map of the invisible, a library of the unconscious, a nontouchable 
guide that leads me through the unknown, rewards and punishments distributed 
along the way. And as the explorer now moves on, (s)he gradually realizes not only 
that the fi rst-person singular is the linguistic shifter par excellence but that this same 
 I is the cartographers’ fi x-point of fi x-points. Little wonder, therefore, that the world 
refuses to sit still, for when pushed to the interesting limit of in-between-being I 
discover that I am one with my own map, its coordinate net constructed as the asym-
metric body of Leonardo’s Vitruvian man, head up and feet down, eyes in front and 
arse in the back, left hand to the left, the right to the right. Thus, therefore, spake 
Zarathustra: “You say ‘I’ and you are proud of this word. But greater than this—
although you will not believe in it—is your body which does not say ‘I’ but per-
forms ‘I’” (Nietzsche  1976 , p. 146; my rendering, Olsson,  1991 , p. 122). Body 
politics undressed, for most will agree that it is more honest to preach as you live 
than to live as you preach. 
 A circling tale of no beginning and no end, the taken-for-granted present every-
where, visible nowhere. Thus it would indeed be strange if not I too were a product 
of my own time and place, in this case the Swedish welfare state of the postwar 
decades. And even though by heritage, choice, and inclination I was never drawn to 
the Social Democratic Party per se, it is impossible not to be impressed by its vision 
of equality and social justice, including the idea that the bright new world should be 
erected on a foundation of causal theories and well-calibrated models. Such were 
the 1950s and early 1960s: the high noon of social engineering, the dream of a 
happy marriage between scientifi c knowledge and political action come true, the 
maximizing principles of utilitarian ethics institutionalized, Alva and Gunnar 
Myrdal the high priests in a congregation of politically anchored experts who took 
it as their mission to turn Sweden into a People’s Home, a state of rationality in 
which the physical infrastructure (not least the architecture of the living quarters, 
especially the kitchens and the communal washing-rooms) was designed to ensure 
that the users would have no choice but to behave accordingly, at bottom a positivist 
belief that the road to mental hygiene and proper thinking goes via the body, an 
ideology well captured by Axel Hägerström’s ( 1911 ) rejection of metaphysics and 
his advocacy of value nihilism—his well-known motto  praetera censeo metaphysi-
cam esse delendam , a paraphrase of Cato’s “Carthage must be destroyed.” But not 
everyone was born with genes deemed good enough for the future, an argument 
which was readily extended to the widespread practice of forced sterilization. 
 Zeitgeist is the term, in the same breath an excuse and an accusation, for “when I 
obey a rule, I do not choose. I obey the rule  blindly ” (Wittgenstein,  1953 , p. 219). 
4 Thought-in-Action/Action-in-Thought
70
 To the budding geographer the time-bound message could not be misunderstood: 
Capture the power of social relations in a net of scientifi c laws and then, like your 
friends in physics, chemistry, and medicine, you too will have acquired the means 
not merely for understanding the world but for changing it as well. If the natural 
scientists know how to construct rockets that take them to the moon, if they know 
how to generate energy by enriching uranium, if they know how to save lives by 
transplanting hearts, then your duty as a social scientist is to discover similar tech-
niques for eradicating poverty! Before you accept that challenge, though, be sure to 
ask yourself fi rst why no one now reads Plato and Aristotle for what they had to say 
about physics or medicine, then why so many continue to return to the plays of 
Sophocles and Shakespeare for their insights into the human condition of hopes and 
fears, love and hate. How does the circumstance that we have accumulated knowl-
edge in some areas and not in others relate to Aristotle’s remark that we should look 
for precision in each class of things just as far as the nature of the subject admits and 
that it would be equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician 
as to demand scientifi c proofs from a rhetorician? 
 No small order given to a young man inexperienced in the actions that occur in 
life and therefore prone to pursue each object as passion directs. And yet, how could 
I possibly have ignored the challenge? GO ON, GO ON.
 *  
 The list of required readings included the classics of location theory, cognitive 
science, decision theory, systems analysis, matrix algebra, probability theory, spa-
tial statistics, and a sprinkle of historical geography, all of it somehow yoked 
together in Walter Isard’s conception of Regional Science and its extension into 
Peace Science, the latter fi rmly anchored in the Quaker-thin interface of scientifi c 
knowledge and political action, John Dewey’s pragmatism and the collections of the 
Barnes Foundation never far away. A formative experience it was, the handsome 
fellowship that in 1963–1964 took me to North Armorica and the intellectual hubs 
of the Wharton School, Berkeley, and Northwestern. 
 Great. Yet, in hindsight, the seeds might well have been planted 10 years earlier 
by the odd gymnasium teacher who did whatever he could to introduce his rowdy 
pupils to the concentric rings of von Thünen’s isolated state and the cost curves of 
Alfred Weber’s isodapanes. Perhaps I was the only one to pay attention, but the truth 
is that I can still feel in my body the boy’s excitement when he literally  saw why 
there were so many gauchos on the Pampas and so many steel mills along the Ruhr. 
The rhetorical power of geometric construction on the high wire, von Thünen’s 
agricultural landscape depicted as an archer’s target with the bull’s eye as the central 
city on a homogeneous plain (more correctly the Junker’s own estate), Weber’s fac-
tory fi nding its place of least cost, the Archimedean point that is located at the center 
of a Euclidean triangle whose corners are the concepts of transportation, labor, and 
agglomeration. Deep roots it has, the subsequent defi nition of geography as a geom-
etry with names, essentially an exercise in the drawing and baptizing of points, 
lines, and planes. Picture and story merged into one. 
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 So there it is, the glue of socialization decomposed: Vico’s  verum factum —the 
true and the made are convertible—long before I knew the name; Wassily 
Kandinsky’s abstract expressionism as a social scientifi c practice years ahead of my 
fi rst visit to Dessau; Euclid’s  Quod Erat Demonstrandum overruled by his  Quod 
Erat Faciendum —that which was to be demonstrated overruled by that which was 
to be shown—the beliefs of the former lodged in the socialized mind, the convic-
tions of the latter in the individual body. These fi x-points revealed, I can now better 
understand why once upon a time every Swedish school room was equipped with a 
blackboard, a ruler, a compass, and a square, these four implements serving as the 
teacher’s pedagogical tools par excellence, to every generation after Plato the very 
key to understanding how we understand. In that context of knowledge creation, it 
should also be added that Immanuel Kant— the philosopher of limits—often referred 
to his own work as a form of architecture. In my mind the three Critiques may prof-
itably be read as a report from the masterbuilder’s experiments with different con-
struction materials, one cement for the palace of pure reason, another for the house 
of practice, a third for the court of judgment. 
 And this interplay of reasoning modes is exactly why August Lösch’s  Die räum-
liche Ordnung der Wirtschaft (1943/ 1954 ) is such a groundbreaking book and why 
he himself was such an exceptionally interesting person, the confl ict between 
Jahweh and Vico embodied. As the 33-year-old put it in the fateful autumn of 1939:
 The natural equilibrium of economics differs from the equilibrium of nature exactly as the 
moral differs from the mechanical. Nature works according to laws, but man acts according 
to his  idea of laws. In other words, nature  must , man  may , act correctly. In order to do so he 
must have some conception of how he shall act. As to economic equilibrium this means that 
 in order to guide his activities he needs insight into the conditions of this equilibrium . This 
is especially true for the lawmaker, since all others are bound by his precepts even though 
unable to perceive their rationality. (p. 93, emphasis in the original) 
 With that link between knowledge and action fi rmly established, Lösch then pro-
ceeded to the formulation of a general theory of location, a derivation based on the 
principle of profi t maximization rather than cost minimization, the lattice of nested 
hexagons its most spectacular outcome. As he put it in the book’s preface, the math-
ematical calculations are there “because it is reprehensible not to trust reason and 
rest content with vague words and hazy statements” (p. xv). Heaving a sigh of relief 
that the number of equations coincided with the number of unknowns, he neverthe-
less exclaimed: “If only we had a method that combined the generality of equations 
with the clarity of geometrical fi gures!” (p. 100) 
 The rhetorical point is well taken: If I want to be believed, it is not enough to tell 
a trustworthy story, I must also know how to paint the picture that goes with it. 
Rephrased, the credibility of a given argument is immensely increased if it is 
expressed not only in one but in both of the major modes of communication. 
Therefore,
 theory may be compared with reality for various ends, according to the sort of theory held. 
If it is to  explain what actually is, the examination attempts to discover whether it started 
with a correct idea of its subject and arrived at an explanation that not only seemed possible 
but also corresponded with reality. On the other hand, if theory is to  construct what is 
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 rational, its assumptions may still be tested by facts, but not its results. Its author can dis-
cover from an examination of the facts whether he has built on adequately broad experi-
ence, whether he has taken all objective or subjective essentials into consideration. His 
procedure resembles the preliminary work of an architect, who cannot lightly neglect the 
characteristics of a site, the laws of nature, and the wishes of the owner. But a comparison 
with existing structures will not show whether his blueprints are accurate; in our case, that 
is, whether the theoretical structure has been properly erected. For the existing structure 
may be as faulty as the projected one. No!  Comparison now has to be drawn no longer to 
test the theory, but to test reality! (Lösch, 1943/ 1954 , pp. 363–364, emphasis added) 
 German idealism lodged in a thinker who has been described as
 a combination of rare strength of character, intellect, and warmth of personality, [a man] 
who died shortly after the end of the hostilities on May 30, 1945, at least partially as the 
result of that very strength of character which forbade him to make any compromises with 
the National Socialist regime. (Hoover in Lösch, 1943/ 1954 , p. vii) 
 His hands tied, it was the mind that carried him back to the place where his uncon-
scious had been formed. In Lösch’s own words:
 It was not easy for me largely to forego the attractive task of applying what has thus been 
tested to our more complicated German conditions and analyzing the pertinent facts. But 
apart from all foreign studies [mainly based on U.S. data] and the wide applicability of the 
resulting ideas, my youthful experiences in a little Swabian town constitute the real back-
ground of this book. [To] have my original experiences there confi rm my fi nal theories 
gives me a real sense of security, and so I dedicate this book to the land of my birth, the land 
that I love. (Lösch, 1943/ 1954 , pp. xv–xvi) 
 It is diffi cult not to cry, especially if one compares the fate of Lösch’s life and 
work (1906–1945) with that of Walter Christaller (1898–1969), the fi rst edition of 
Lösch’s  Die räumliche Ordnung der Wirtschaft appearing in 1940, the second edi-
tion in 1943, Christaller’s  Die zentralen Orte in Süddeutschland in  1933 . In the 
present context of thought-in-action, it is simply impossible to ignore the fact that 
whereas Lösch paid a high price for his refusal to swear a personal oath of alle-
giance to the Führer, Christaller’s political views (hence by extension his built-in 
attitudes to intentional action) were fl uttering in the wind, like the LORD himself 
consistently inconsistent. The record is there for anyone to inspect. First, the 
trenches of World War I turned Christaller into a card-carrying Social Democrat. 
Second, in the summer of 1934, when that party had been banned, he fl ed on his 
bicycle to the liberty of France, from where he was promptly lured back to a job 
offered him by Konrad Meyer, an SS professor of agronomy, who already at that 
stage was working directly under Heinrich Himmler. Third, in the summer of 1940 
Christaller joined the National Socialist Party (membership number 8 375 670). 
Fourth, immediately after the war that same(?) person enrolled as a member of the 
West German Communist Party and in 1953 was accused of collaborating with his 
comrades in the DDR. Fifth, after 14 years as a Communist he resurrected himself 
as a Social Democrat, just in time for his plenary lecture at the historic meeting of 
the International Geographical Union Symposium in Urban Geography in Lund, 
Sweden, in August 1960. To only partial avail, however, for even though the conver-
sion might have paved the way to an honorary doctorate at Lund, it failed to get him 
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the visa that would have taken him to the United States and the lecture tour of his 
life. Broken was the icon when the young man met him about 5 years before he 
passed away, the sadness of his eyes forever etched into my memory. 
 Water in water, a palimpsest hard to decipher, a mille-feuille bound to cause 
indigestion. But who am I to judge? What does a Swede born in 1935 know of blar-
ing sirens, exploding bombs, ruins, terror, death camps, starving children without 
shoes? As so often before, I am once again drawn into Wittgenstein’s struggle with 
solipsism:
 I am my world. There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas. If I 
wrote a book called  The World as I found it, I should have to include a report on my body, 
and should have to say which parts were subordinate to my will, and which were not, etc.,… 
The subject does not belong to the world: rather it is a limit of the world.... There is no  a 
priori order of things. (Wittgenstein, 1921/ 1961 , 5.63–5.632, 5.634) 
 ***  
 Drawing the limits of the world is exactly what the joint history of human geog-
raphy and regional planning is about. And in that essentially political enterprise 
references to central place theory have often been used to legitimate some drastic 
intrusions into the daily lives of entire populations. All for their own good, of course. 
 For understanding these connections between text and context, it is important to 
know that Christaller’s and Lösch’s shared goal was to detail how a given area is 
colonized or settled, especially how a set of hierarchically nested and hexagonally 
distributed centers are (or, more accurately,  should be) tied together into a func-
tional whole. In that sense they were more immediately concerned with the geom-
etry of the stage than with the actors’ movements across it, more focused on 
scenography than on dialogue. The outcome was in both cases a script of power. 
And for that reason the critic should never forget that
 what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is that the architect raises his 
structure in the imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every labor-process, 
we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the laborer at its commencement. 
He not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works, but he also realizes 
a purpose of his own that gives the law to his modus operandi, and to which he must subor-
dinate his will. (Marx, 1867/ 1967 , vol. I, p. 178) 
 An outstanding example comes from the Dutch polders, lands reclaimed from 
the sea and therefore at constant risk of being fl ooded. That likelihood must, of 
course, be carefully controlled and the condition of the dikes and pumps minutely 
monitored, a duty which since the eleventh century has been entrusted to an espe-
cially elected local authority appropriately called the  Hoogheemraadschap . By law 
a modus operandi to which everyone must subordinate their will, the oldest demo-
cratic institution in the country. 
 These newly reclaimed lands are obviously both fl at and nonpopulated, hence as 
close to the theoreticians’ conception of a homogeneous plain as any social engineer 
could ever dream of. And exactly as the Marx quotation suggests, the planners actu-
ally  did raise the structure of the new villages, towns, and cities in their imagination 
4 Thought-in-Action/Action-in-Thought
74
before they erected them in reality, a wonderful illustration of how the abstractness 
of Platonic forms is turned into the concreteness of visible objects. Seemingly a 
textbook application of practical reason, the intentionality of the plan preserved in 
the materiality of physical structures. Only seemingly, though, for in the case of the 
early Zuiderzee polders the impact of technological change was seriously underes-
timated. To make a long and complicated story short and simple, the constructed 
places proved to be too many, too small, and too closely packed, the location of the 
brick-built stores, schools, police stations, and hospitals obsolete before the mortar 
had dried. In addition, and because roads and houses are costly both to build and to 
tear down, the spatial nonoptimality tends to stick.  The Achilles-heal of every opti-
mizing location theory. 
 Lösch’s remarks about the comparison between rational theory and faulty reality 
come readily to mind, Hegel’s epistemology of self-conscious reevaluation as well. 
The reason is that the planning of the later polders, especially the Oostelijk and the 
Zuidelijks Flevolands, has become increasingly sophisticated. But that development 
rather heightens than lessens my surprise that Christaller’s static, deterministic, and 
inelegant theory was used at all. The only excuse I can think of is that we are all 
children of our own time and place, the Dutchmen of 1930 as much as I at eighty. 
And what a happy circumstance that is. For what saved the subjects of the great 
polder project was not the machinations of social engineering but the circumstance 
that Holland is an open society, its citizens free to design their honeycombs as their 
fancy fancies. 
 In that respect the Third Reich was obviously different. But what richer pasture 
could the likes of Konrad Meyer and Walter Christaller have wished for than the 
newly conquered  Lebensraum (living space) of Eastern Europe, a vast area show-
ered down on them as a gift from the Führer’s heaven. Like the Dutch polders, also 
the territory that the  Reichskommissariat für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums 
(Reich Commission for German Resettlement and Population Policy) was commis-
sioned to settle had the characteristics of a homogeneous plain, the techniques of 
ethnic cleansing as merciless in Poland, Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine as any-
where else. The clearing of suffi cient living space in the East was de facto  the cor-
nerstone of Nazi foreign policy, the very precondition for the Germanization that 
was meant to follow, the  Entfernung (removal) of foreign elements setting the stage 
as effectively as the digging of the dikes in Holland. As an amateur artist, Hitler 
surely knew that without a properly prepared canvas there will never be any paint-
ing. And as the Leader of a populist movement he was well aware that no political 
battle is more decisive than that about the boundary between identity and difference, 
one and many, us and them, me and you. Such was consequently also the purpose of 
the charts, tables, and maps that came out of Meyer’s offi ce: the utopia of a totalitar-
ian  Herrschaft (rule) projected into optimally located settlements, everything and 
everyone in its proper place. Seventy-fi ve years later the whole affair strikes me as 
a Dadaesque blend of Kandinsky’s Bauhaus, Malevich’s suprematism, Picasso’s 




 The outline of this new world was drawn in  Generalplan Ost (General Plan for 
the East), a strictly confi dential document prepared in the period 1939–1942, delib-
erately destroyed in May 1945 lest it be used as incriminating evidence, by later 
historians eventually pieced together again. It consisted of two parts, the Small Plan 
which covered actions to be taken during the  Blitzkrieg , and the  Big Plan which 
outlined what was to follow in the 30-year period thereafter. The text of the latter is 
simply too much for sensible analysis (a total of 31 million undesirables to be 
moved to West Siberia, the remaining to be treated as slaves), but the fi gures of the 
former are even more staggering. (Between October 12 and December 31, 1939, 
about 1,700,000 Jews and Poles were actually deported to places with names now 
well known, another fi ve million classifi ed as unsuitable for assimilation.) The 
machinelike horrors of the  Entfernung set the stage not merely for what was  meant 
to come but for what actually  did come. 
 It is now well established that Walter Christaller was directly involved in the 
German settling of Warthegau, the Polish territory occupied by the German forces 
in September 1939—a story forcefully told by Barnes ( 2015 ) and much elaborated 
in the works of Bauman ( 1989 ), Kamenetzky ( 1961 ), Madajcyk ( 1994 ), Rössler 
( 1989 ), and many others. A moment of truth for any theoretician eager to see his 
abstract imaginations metamorphosed into concrete reality. Yet nothing compared 
to what was to come with Christaller’s appointment to the staff of Konrad Meyer, 
the mentor who under Himmler’s personal supervision was charged with the task of 
fi nalizing the plans for the still unconquered  Lebensraum . Included in the directives 
was the megalomaniac idea of a fortifi ed string of SS garrisons and “pearl settle-
ments” that would run all the way from Arkhangelsk on the Northern Dvina River 
to Astrakan in the Volga delta, the  Übermenschen (superior humans) in the west 
securely separated from the  Untermenschen (subhumans) in the east. The surviving 
records occasionally refer to Christaller’s theory, but there is no explicit mention of 
any detailed plans; who knows, perhaps they were not Aryan enough. Crucial 
indeed, for every judgment of guilt and punishment should be based on the here- 
and- now of particular circumstances, not on the there-and-then of general princi-
pals. On the surface a matter of alternative descriptions, deeper down an entangled 
skein of modal logics. 
 It is the struggle with the latter that now brings me to the intricacies of the word 
 can , like all modal verbs of vital importance to any critique of power, by extension, 
to any worthwhile understanding of the relations between knowledge and action 
(Ofstad,  1961 , pp. 328–337; see also Olsson,  1980 , pp. 118b–115b). The reason is 
that the “all-in can” (forty-seven of them) is essentially a combination of two “sub- 
cans,” one denoting ability, the other opportunity. For instance, there is no doubt that 
Walter Christaller already in 1933 knew how to deduce an optimal settlement pat-
tern from a set of (un)realistic assumptions, but it was only after Hitler’s  Drang 
nach Osten (drive toward the east) that he got a chance to apply his knowledge and 
in that manner show the world who he really was. Hand in glove, a temptation hard 
to resist, a mixture of pleasures and nightmares, a situation he shared with many 
others, Martin Heidegger most prominent among them. The pivotal question is, of 
course, whether, given the circumstances, he could have acted otherwise. If not, he 
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should not be held responsible, regardless of his political (in)stability. Purgatory has 
many chambers, and in some congregations you get to Paradise because of your 
beliefs, in others because of your deeds. “In this connection,” wrote Albert Speer 
(1969/ 1970 ) in a passage of direct relevance for the assessment of spatial 
planning,
 I must mention [Hitler’s] plan for founding German cities in the occupied areas of the 
Soviet Union. On November 24, 1941, in the very midst of the winter catastrophe, Gauleiter 
Meyer [Alfred, not Konrad], deputy of Alfred Rosenberg, the Reich Minister for the occu-
pied eastern territories, asked me to take over the section on ‘new cities’ and plan and build 
the settlements for the German garrisons and civil administrations. I fi nally refused this 
offer at the end of 1942 on the grounds that a central authority for the city planning would 
inevitably lead to a uniform pattern. I insisted instead that the great German cities each 
stand as sponsor for the construction of the new ones. (p. 182) 
 For Oberführer Konrad Meyer-Hertling the situation was less clear. Like Speer, 
he too was convicted at Nuremberg, but unlike the genius of organizational dynam-
ics, his crimes were deemed so small that immediately after the trial he was set free 
for time served, a whitewash paper written by Walter Christaller being part of the 
evidence. In the judges’ opinion Meyer’s contribution to  Generalplan Ost was “a 
strictly independent scientifi c study” (Rössler,  1989 , p. 427)—in Marx’s dialectics 
something imagined that never made it into reality; in my own terminology, an 
ontological transformation aborted. 
 No serious wrong-doing proven and in 1956 the University of Hanover appointed 
Meyer Professor Ordinarius (full professor) of Land Planning, a post he occupied 
until his retirement. The pragmatism of expert knowledge and political action 
undressed, H. C. Andersen’s emperor as he must have appeared to the lackeys, who 
continued to carry the fabulous train that did not exist. The boys in the gutter saw it 
differently. For even though they had never attended Meyer’s and Christaller’s alma 
maters, they still knew that ethics is the only ordered discourse that has thought- 
and- action as its defi ning subject matter. In addition, they were soon to learn the 
Foucauldian lesson that it is in the prison and madhouse that we discover what is 
normal, indeed what it means to be human. As Arendt ( 1977 ) put it, there are strong 
streaks of banality in evil; the institutions of modernity a precondition for the 
Holocaust. It is telling that Heidegger’s postwar critique of technology paid much 
attention to the verb  can and its tendency to turn into a  may , the  may into an  ought , 
the  ought into a  shall , the  shall into a  must .
 ***  
 Mind-boggling are the German vignettes, the offered interpretations part and 
parcel of the same epistemology of extremity that for 50 years has served me so 
well. Come to think of it, it may well be that same attitude that has made me less 
responsive to the political calls for changing the world and more focused on the hid-
den in my own taken-for-granted, the latter the only critique that to my solipsist 
mind is honest enough. That remark is obviously not an excuse for the shallowness 
of what I have just written about Hitler, Himmler, Meyer, and Christaller, merely a 
way of saying that it is by detecting the beam in my neighbor’s eye that I become 
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aware of the mote in my own. And what a painful experience that is, learning to roll 
with the punches, a technique which Marlene Dietrich practiced to perfection:
 It’s not cause I wouldn’t 
 It’s not cause I shouldn’t 
 And you know it’s not cause I couldn’t 
 It’s simply because I’m the laziest gal in town. 
 In that mood I shall now proceed to the spatial set-up of the Swedish welfare 
state. As Shakespeare (1602/ n.d. ) put it in  The Merry Wives of Windsor , “the world’s 
mine oyster, Which I with sword will open” (Act II, Scene II, 2–3).
 *  
 The story goes a long way back, not least to Gustav Eriksson Vasa, the guerilla 
leader who in 1523 threw the Danes out, united the Swedes into one country, and let 
himself be elected king to crown it off. Once that goal had been achieved, he faced 
the problem of paying back the money he had borrowed to fi nance his campaign, a 
problem he solved by confi scating the riches of the Church, converting to the 
Lutheran faith, and translating the Bible in the process. An expert in Machiavellian 
rhetoric and the logistics of tax collection, he penetrated so deeply into the minds of 
his subjects that a Swede of the twentieth century readily recognizes the similarities. 
 Allt förändras, allt förblir ändå det samma , or, as the French have it,  Plus ça change, 
plus ça reste la mȇme chose , alternatively, the more things change, the more they 
stay the same. In the farewell speech Gustav gave to Parliament on June 16, 1560:
 I know that in the minds of many I have been a harsh king. But the times shall come when 
the children of Sweden will want to tear me up from the ground, were that within their 
might. I also know that the Swedes are quick to agree and late to question. I predict that 
many pretenders and false prophets will be forthcoming. Therefore I beg and advise you: 
Stick fi rmly to God’s words. Listen carefully to your superiors and stand united together. 
My days will soon be gone. For telling me that I need neither stars nor any other sorcery. I 
feel in my body the signs that I will soon be taken away. Follow me then with your sincere 
prayers and, when I have closed my eyes, let my body rest in peace. (Retrieved November 
10, 2015, from  http://sv.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vasakoret , my translation) 
 Quick to agree and late to question, well organized by their superiors. 
 Following in his grandfather’s footsteps was Gustavus Adolphus, in 1632 killed 
in the mist-enveloped battle at Lützen, his military forays clearly proving that 
Sweden from then on was a power to reckon with. The road to success was forged 
by his genial chancellor, Axel Oxenstierna, the man who invented the administrative 
set-up that made it all possible, its basic outline still with us. 
 It is this historical stickiness that now prompts me back to the 1950s and some 
fundamental problems which Christaller’s theory was then called upon to settle. To 
put it very simply, the old parishes and communes—often with boundaries 
unchanged since Oxenstierna’s time—was a harness too small for the expanding 
welfare state. Something had to be done, and on January 1, 1952, the number of 
rural communes was cut from 2281 to 816. Not enough, however, and 10 years later 
a new and wider reform was set in motion, the number of communes (including the 
towns and cities) presently down to 290. 
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 These administrative reforms have had a revolutionary impact on the daily life of 
every Swede, the redrawing of the political boundaries directly related to the where, 
when, and how you happen to be born; to the when, where, and how you will even-
tually die; to every whatever that may or may not lie in-between. The underlying 
ideology is, of course, that just as all citizens should have equal rights regardless of 
whether they are rich or poor, so the same should hold regardless of where they hap-
pen to live. No small deal but a tacit admission that the whereness of spatial form 
bears directly on the whatness of social relations. Whether form follows function or 
function follows form is in that perspective a moot point, the geographer’s inference 
problem when it matters. 
 The blueprint of this brave new world was drawn by a politically appointed com-
mittee supported by a set of experts, the result submitted to the Minister of the 
Interior as number 1961:9 of  Statens Offentliga Utredningar —The State’s Offi cial 
Investigations. The pivotal parts of this document were written by Sven Godlund 
and Torsten Hägerstrand, two up-to-date geographers who explicitly anchored their 
reasoning in Christaller’s theory. Their basic argument was that whereas the drastic 
changes in transportation technology had led to novel forms of shopping behavior 
and thereby to the spontaneous establishment of larger market areas, the administra-
tive units were legally sanctioned leftovers from a previous era—the commercial 
system was effi cient, open, and modern; the legal was outdated, closed, and obso-
lete. The committee therefore recommended that the boundaries of the latter should 
be redrawn to coincide with the hinterlands of the former. And in that twist from the 
economist’s  is to the politician’s  ought , the play was changed in the middle of the 
act, the utopian dreams of justice disappearing in the wings, fatally stabbed by the 
reality it was supposed to replace. Exit man with his precious visions, hopes, and 
fears. Enter the Thiessen polygons with their crude distance minimizations and 
cost-benefi t ratios. Ideology and methodology in profound and irresolvable 
confl ict. 
 The root of the problem lies in the social gravity model, a formulation which in 
the heydays of the 1960s lay at the frontier of quantitative geography, the page- 
turner of my own conception of thought-in-action and action-in-thought. Although 
originally conceived as an analogue to Newton’s law of gravitation—the interaction 
between two objects directly proportional to the size of their masses and inversely 
proportional to the square of the distance between them—its social science applica-
tion a special case of Vilfredo Pareto’s optimality principle, the latter a sociological 
generalization with deep roots in the mathematics of the negative exponential (see, 
e.g., Arrow,  1951 ; Sen,  1993 ). The irony is that even though Pareto, Hägerstrand, 
and Godlund knew perfectly well that they were describing the world as it was, 
Italian fascists and Swedish democrats read their texts as recipes for how a better 
world could be constructed. As Marx put it, the philosophers have hitherto only 
interpreted the world, the point is to change it. This (mis)reading was in no way 
inevitable, for Pareto argued very explicitly that observed behavior belongs to the 
same category of “logical action” as economic profi t maximization, Machiavellian 
politics, and scientifi c work. But to sanctify observed behavior as logical action is 
nothing but a rhetorical technique for legitimating the status quo. The history of the 
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social gravity model provides an excellent example, for although in the beginning it 
was treated as a formulation of great explanatory power, later generations have 
come to see it as an expression of autocorrelation. As Tobler’s ( 1970 ) fi rst law of 
geography has it, “everything is related to everything else, but near things are more 
related than distant things” (p. 236). A planning tool tailor-made for unintended side 
effects. 
 In that perspective Pareto’s conception of logic appears just as narrow as the 
dogma of any other religion. Rather than perpetuating the belief that the reasoning 
rules represent objective and unassailable a priori principles, we must therefore con-
stantly remind ourselves that they are neither ethically nor aesthetically neutral. If 
we are prepared for that volte-face, then we too, like Vico, Nietzsche, and Heidegger 
before us, will discover how it is grammar that tells us what kind of object anything 
is, not the other way around. As a consequence, we will then understand that the 
role of all languages, deductive logic included, is not to furnish labels for the objects 
we are talking  about but to shape the categories we are thinking and talking  in . And 
thus it is by no coincidence that the tautological  a = a is the linchpin of conventional 
logic just as the evasive  I am who I am is the self-proclaimed name of God the 
Father. And so it is that every concept is a tool of human making, intelligible only 
in the context of our personal and social lives. 
 If we dare not admit that our analytical languages have these characteristics, then 
we run the risk of imposing on reality a strictness that it neither has nor ought to 
have. And if in our many-facetted roles as experts, citizens, and social engineers we 
choose to ignore this hallmark of critical theory, then we will inevitably produce a 
society that both mirrors the techniques by which we measure it and echoes the 
languages in which we talk about it. By extension a dystopia of human puppets with 
no dreams to dream and nothing to be sorry for. And thus it is that Pareto’s  ought 
cohabits with the  is of the elite, exactly as it was propagated in the ethical theory of 
Hägerström ( 1911 ; see also Marc-Wogau,  1968 ) and the legal principles of 
Lundstedt ( 1932 –1936) and Olivecrona ( 1942 ), legitimating shapers of Swedish 
ideology. The outcome is that the law of large numbers rules supreme, the emerging 
relations between individual and collective a classic case of double bind. And in that 
sense the negative exponential serves the purposes of populists and elitists alike. 
The utilitarians should be more cautious, for it is the very kernel of their ethics that 
every act should be judged in terms of its consequences, not in terms of the inten-
tions behind it.
 *  
 The statistics are equivocal, especially when it comes to education and health 
care, by all accounts key ingredients of any welfare system. Thus, there is general 
agreement that the Swedish school system is in deep crisis, the results no longer at 
the top of the evaluations generated by the OECD’s Programme for International 
Student Assessment (PISA) but regularly below average and steadily sliding; among 
the 40 countries listed in the 2013 evaluation, Sweden is ranked as number 36 in 
reading and 38 in mathematics. Little wonder that in a press release (May 4, 2015) 
the OECD concluded that
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 Sweden has failed to improve its school system despite a series of reforms in recent years. 
A more ambitious, national reform strategy is now urgently needed to improve quality and 
equity in education....No other country taking part in PISA has a steeper decline. (Retrieved 
November 10, 2015, from par. 1–2,  http://www.oecd.org/Sweden/Sweden-should-urgently- 
reform-its-school-system-to-improve-quality-and-equity.htm ) 
 Much to mourn but most alarming are the fi gures that Swedish eighth-graders’ 
command of mathematics is now at the same level as that of seventh graders’ a 
decade earlier and that one quarter of the boys fail to comprehend what they are 
reading. The social and economic inequalities are following suit, a new class of 
unemployables growing up, a development most pronounced in the ethnically seg-
regated areas of Malmö and Stockholm. Counterfi nality is the term for the mis-
match between intentionality and consequence, the infected sore of utilitarian ethics 
and the source of an intense debate with immediate ties to the administrative reforms 
of the 1960s. The turning point came in 1991 when the political  cum administrative 
responsibility for the schools was shifted from the state to the local municipalities, 
a reorganization that in one stroke—and very deliberately—lowered the status of 
the teachers. The result is that more than half of them are offi cially unqualifi ed for 
their jobs! An ocean liner to turn around, the  Titanic heading for the iceberg. 
 In the meantime the health-care system is struggling with an attitudinal problem 
of its own. To be precise, the 2011 Commonwealth Fund International Health Policy 
Survey of eleven comparable countries placed Sweden at the bottom of the list in 
terms of health-care availability. Similar fi gures hold for the sense of dignity, 
respect, and empathy that the patients thought they had the right to expect but did 
not receive, one third of the doctors demonstrating that they knew little or nothing 
about their clients’ medical history. Since with growing age we tend to forget fi rst 
what we learned last, many immigrants from the 1950s, now in nursing homes, have 
lost their Swedish and are therefore, unbeknownst to themselves, reverting back to 
their mother tongues, idioms typically unknown to their helpers. Sadder than sad, 
the art of dying a question of  chairos rather than  chronos , an issue of the right 
moment rather than the orderlies’ work schedule. But just as eugenics is not eutha-
nasia, so euthanasia is not suicide. 
 In the meantime all surveys agree that although everyone considers the level of 
expert medicine to be outstanding, the proportion of patients who doubt that they 
are receiving the best treatment available is higher in Sweden than in any of the 
comparable countries, the sense of shared trust no longer what it used to be. To put 
it bluntly, Swedish health care sees a diagnosis, not a human being. Political dyna-
mite, not least because the degree of (dis)satisfaction varies between socioeconomic 
groups—the higher the education, the higher the trust, the professors of geography 
and anesthesia the best of friends. Human, all too human. Gustav Vasa echoes back: 
Listen carefully to your masters, be quick to agree and late to question. But there is 
an echo of  The Phenomenology of Mind as well, for
 just as lordship shows its essential nature to be the reverse of what it wants to be, so too, 
bondage will, when completed, pass into the opposite of what it immediately is: being a 
consciousness repressed within itself, it will enter itself, and change around into real and 
true independence. (Hegel, 1807/ 1967 , p. 237) 
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 Hegel’s remarks notwithstanding, the empirical truth remains: The values of the 
strong today are metamorphosed into the facts for the weak of tomorrow. The point 
is not that the Swedish welfare state  is a tragedy but that it is  structured like a trag-
edy: everything beautifully right in the beginning, everything horribly wrong at the 
end, no one to blame in between. To understand human action is therefore not to 
blame but to see that actors are so entrenched in their roles that they take the shadow 
play for reality and reality for the play. It is indeed an integral part of all internal 
relations (logic and money being paradigmatic examples) that we obey their com-
mands without hearing them and without knowing where they come from. And for 
that reason I am eternally grateful that I was born in Per Albin Hansson’s Sweden 
and not in Adolf Hitler’s Germany or Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Union. But this fortu-
nate circumstance must not keep me from realizing that everything comes with a 
price, the politics of the welfare state included. For instance: How do I insult a 
power which is so powerful that it is faceless? How do I learn about difference when 
difference is defi ned away? How do I topple a regime that has no statues erected in 
its honor? How do I fi nd my way in a jungle of paragraphs? How do I live in a cul-
ture so proud of its penis that it is unaware of its Phallus? Why is it so hard to detect 
the relations between the  Nom-du-Père and the  Non-du-Père ? 
 Servitude and (in)equality exposed, King Oedipus blood-soaked before us.
 ***  
 On my reading, Sophocles’  Oedipus Tyrannus (ca. 440 BC) is a paradigmatic 
example of Bertrand Russell’s theory of proper names and defi nite descriptions, his 
formula for how a given statement can at the same time be both true and informa-
tive. And in this sense the tragedian and the atheist are alike that both were driven 
to truth by their ignorance of truth, their engagements a relentless pursuit of knowl-
edge no matter where it would lead them. From beginning to end a struggle with 
tautology, the latter by defi nition always true but never informative. 
 In the play’s prologue, Oedipus, the king with the swollen foot, he who once had 
saved the city from the sphinx, is asked to become what he had once been before. In 
the petitioner’s words:
 You are not one of the immortal gods, we know; 
 Yet we have come to you to make our prayer 
 As to the man surest in mortal ways. 
 [Once], years ago, with happy augury, 
 You brought us fortune; be the same again! 
 (Sophocles, trans.  1949 , pp. 4–5) 
 On this occasion the charge is to save the city from the plague. But whereas solving 
the riddle of the Sphinx had led him to the dignity of man, solving the problem of 
the plague will take him to himself. In his search he is pushed to truth by his blind-
ness to truth, and, when he fi nally sees it, he blinds himself, thereby to see more 
clearly. At the end he saved the city but destroyed himself, neither result on purpose, 
even though everything started with a purpose. All is fate, except that each step 
along the way could have been avoided. Freedom and necessity are mixed, the 
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forces of certainty and ambiguity embracing each other. In the beginning everything 
is right, in the end it shall all be wrong. Be the same again! 
 Once the stage has been set, the crucial question: “Who were my parents?” The 
chorus replies:
 Bewildered as a blown bird, my soul hovers and can not fi nd 
 Foothold in this debate, or any reason or rest of mind. (Sophocles, trans.  1949 , p. 25) 
 After a row of excruciating interrogations, the bewildering ambiguities fi nally 
spring into unquestionable certainty. When that happens Jocasta can no longer con-
tain herself, no longer equate the name “Oedipus” with any of the alternative 
descriptions, “my king,” “my husband,” “father of my children.” First praying “May 
you never learn who you are!” she cries out:
 Ah, Miserable! 
 That is the only word I have for you now. 
 That is the only word I can ever have. (Sophocles, trans. 1949, p. 56) 
 In the new context any other word would be false. And she exits into her apartment, 
her hair clutched by the fi ngers of both hands, closing the doors behind her. A long 
scene later, when also Oedipus has convinced himself that logic had run its course 
and that all his premonitions had been right, he breaks the door open and rushes in. 
As a messenger reports,
 And there we saw her hanging, her body swaying 
 From the cruel cord she had noosed about her neck. 
 A great sob broke from him, heartbreaking to hear, 
 As he loosed the rope and lowered her to the ground. 
 I would blot out from my mind what happened next! 
 For the King ripped from her gown the golden brooches 
 That were her ornament, and raised them, and plunged them down 
 Straight into his own eyeballs, crying, “No more, 
 No more shall you look on the misery about me, 
 The horrors of my own doing! Too long you have known 
 The faces of those whom I should never have seen, 
 Too long been blind to those for whom I have been searching! 
 From this hour go in darkness!” And as he spoke, 
 He struck at his eyes—not once, but many times; 
 And the blood spattered his beard, 
 Bursting from his ruined sockets like red hail. (p. 67) 
 Millennia later we keep returning. And as times go by, as they eventually did for 
Oedipus too, we come gradually to understand that in every already there is always 
a not yet, in every not yet always an already. Finding out who he was may or may 
not have rid the city of the plague; Sophocles never bothered to say. What he did tell 
us, though, is that at the crossroads, the place where Laïos was killed, nobody knew, 
in the palace, where the truth was revealed, nobody rejoiced. Honesty is in pursuit 
and pursuit in tragedy, life itself a game of dice played by men and watched by gods. 
 As the tragic hero eventually understood and accepted, whatever fate there is we 
bring onto ourselves. To do otherwise would be to be dishonest to oneself, to break 
the rules of one’s own game, to be utterly lost. In the long run that is impossible. For 
everyone is one with his own map.
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 ***  
 And for that cartographic reason I must now briefl y turn to the sculpture  Mappa 
Mundi Universalis (Olsson,  2007 , pp. 411–437; Jensson,  2015 ; see also Jensen, 
 2012 ), in the same expression a mapping of power-and-knowledge and a self- 
referential presentation of the fi x-points, sight lines, and projection planes of under-
standing, in every respect the joint effort of myself and my friend and former student 
Ole Michael Jensen. So close was in fact our cooperation that in the end we reported 
our fi ndings not under our individual names but under the amalgamated imprint of 
Gunnael Jensson. Seemingly not a map at all, just a tetrahedron of transparent glass 
grown out of a square slab of granite (Fig.  4.1 ). Not much, yet enough to last us for 
a lifetime.
 To understand why, imagine how a long time ago a drama was set in motion. The 
stage-fl oor is a fl at rock that gently slopes into the sea, the actors some strange crea-
tures that emerge out of nowhere, aimlessly spreading across the homogeneous 
plain. A foot gets stuck in a crevice and for the fi rst time ever there is a difference 
different enough to make a difference. The others notice, they point and they mutter, 
every gesture an attempt to force the bothering difference into graspable identity. 
An event of tremendous consequences, for what we are now about to witness is the 
very fi rst sacrifi ce,  the act through which the indefi nable creatures are changed into 
human beings, a species whose individuals are held together and kept apart by their 
use of signs, every sign an ironic expression of Signifi er and signifi ed merged into 
one. 
 When the foot is pulled out of the rock, a well of blood springs up, a constant 
reminder of what happened when the original deviance was turned into a nonwilling 
scapegoat, the baring of the navel of what it means to be human. In the materialized 
 Fig. 4.1  Gunnael Jensson, 
 Mappa Mundi Universalis . 
Glass tetrahedron on 
granite base, 25 × 25 × 
19¼ in. Mixed media 
(Kalmar granite, 
Weissglass, gold, ruby). 
Museum Gustavianum, 
Uppsala. First exhibited in 
the Uppsala Cathedral, 





version of Jensson’s sculpture, the place of this remarkable event is shown by a red 
ruby, a godly symbol which in the accompanying text is called  a. Not because it  is 
 a but because the semiotic animal must call it something. 
 In the defi nitional struggle that now follows the mute difference is transformed 
into a set of communicable identities, like every translation an act of violence. More 
precisely, the foot in the crevice splits into a trinity of reformulations, a set of pro-
visional reincarnations that in due course, and after much swirling around, fi nd their 
positions in the corners of an equilateral triangle. Subsequently, each of the cor-
nered aliases adopts a name that refl ects the pain with which it was born: the shad-
owy  a ; the tautological  a = a , the informative  a = b . Atoms of understanding 
captured in a mushroom cloud of perpetual fi ssion. 
 When the tension reaches its limit, the rock bursts and out of the lava grows a 
glass tetrahedron, a crystal palace sometimes known as the crucible of man, some-
times as the prison house of language. The fl oor and the three walls of this enchant-
ing structure are all built as equal-sized equilateral triangles, the walls transparent, 
the foundation sunk into the granite ground, the ruby-covered well at its center. In 
a twist of cultural survival, the three reformulations ( a ,  a = a ,  a = b ) now rise from 
the base, stretch upwards, and meet again at the tetrahedron’s top, the multitudes 
of Greek polytheism converging in the singularity of Abrahamic monotheism. 
Like every mapping, also this one is a triangulation, the  a and its three restate-
ments coming together in the vanishing point of the pinnacle, the locus of a tauto-
logical entity that by defi nition is what it is— a = a = b —a contradictory 
condensation of difference and identity, God’s name (if a name it is). And from its 
inception this Absolute speaks.  Let there be! And there is. A universe fl owing out 
of the creator’s mouth, in James Joyce’s conception a commodious vicus of (p)
recirculation. 
 In the coolness of the evening, the utterer listens back to what he has heard his 
tongue say, claiming fi rst that it is very good, then that he alone has the right to 
judge. Tolerating neither idols nor false prophets, he declares that all usurpers will 
be killed and that every critique will be censored. Hereafter, there shall be neither 
pictures nor stories, hence no maps either. Impressed by his own achievements, he 
proclaims a day of rest, a Sabbath without work, 24 h devoted to the glorifi cation of 
himself and his faithful. 
 Such is the subjection of subjects. Such is the structure of power. Such are the 
techniques by which we are made so obedient and so predictable.
 *  
 The crystal palace is a well-guarded castle, its ruling resident the tyrant of tyrants. 
Admittedly a rhetorical exaggeration, for no Absolute is absolutely absolute, no 
crook crooked enough to live on forever. 
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 But the palace is also a marvelous movie theater, one projector in each of the 
basement corners, golden rays carrying the alternative translations from the machine 
rooms to the screens of the opposite walls: the glass of Marcel Duchamp’s  La 
mariée mise à nu par ses célibataires, même (1914) (The Bride Stripped Bare by 
Her Bachelors, Even); the limestone wall of Plato’s cave; the wood panel of Fra 
Angelico’s  Annunciation; all found again in the  mappa of cartographic reason. And 
when the projections of the imagined identities hit the sheets of glass, they miracu-
lously change into a set of Peircean signs, no longer the private fantasies of their 
inventor but communicable bits in an evolving discourse. To be technical, the  a 
becomes the symbol of  a , the  a = a the icon of  a = a , the  a = b the index of  a = b . 
But just as the painter’s canvas must be properly prepared for the paint not to crack 
or run off, so must our minds be indoctrinated to ensure that all that is solid does not 
melt into air. Three grand institutions have risen to the task: religion (with its belief 
in the  a of shared conventions), art (with it’s  a = a striving for perfect resemblance), 
science (with it’s  a = b , the  as-if knowledge of provisional truth). Each mode of 
understanding entrenched within its own self-supporting power structures, rituals, 
rules, and regulations. 
 If these rituals could be perfectly performed, then the projection lines would 
strike the screening planes at 90° angles, every message going straight back to the 
cornered restatement it came from, nothing learned in the process. But even though 
the Saussurean/Lacanian sign is steeped in mimetic desire, the diverse ontologies of 
Signifi er and signifi ed guarantee that this perpetual urge can never be satisfi ed. 
Hence the fortunate consequence that no translation can ever be perfect. It follows 
that in actuality the inclination of the (en)lightening rays is never  right on and that 
the projections, instead of returning to the original identities unchanged, they begin 
to bounce between the walls. In turn, this slight defl ection means that whatever I 
happen to think, say, and do is never pure and simple but always a nondissolvable 
blend of religion, art, and science. And suddenly I see where the trigger of tragedy 
lies: in the purifying spirit of the right angle, in the hatred of the other which is built 
into the desire of every identity formulation. Hitler’s  Lebensraum, Stalin’s  Gulag , 
the Rwanda genocide, the iconoclastic controversy,  Jyllands-Posten ’s Mohammed 
pictures—all of them variations on the same theme. Murderous is our history, murky 
the connection between knowledge and action. 
 In turn, this analysis explains why for 40 years tragedy has occupied such an 
important place in my own conception of what it means to be human, indeed why I 
take it to be the most insightful of all available conceptions of thought-in-action and 
action-in-thought. The original setting is crucial, for Sophocles—a Janus-like fi gure 
who with one eye was scanning the old, with another was imagining the future—
lived his long life in the abyss between the  mythos of Homer and the  logos of Plato. 
What he then discovered was that the greatest tension of his time lay in the attitudes 
to predicament, for while the archaic poets had taken a person’s social standing to 
refl ect his or her ability to handle contradiction, the new philosophers defi ned 
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 paradox as the greatest threat to the cohesion of human reason, an enemy to be 
fought by all means. As Wittgenstein (1921/ 1961 ) later put it, “without philosophy 
thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task to make them clear and to 
give them sharp boundaries” (4.112). But in Sophocles’ eyes religion itself was 
nothing but a human invention designed to keep people in place, like other laws 
issued by the humans of the polis, not by the gods of Olympus. 
 In my mind this pre-Christian circumstance explains both why the tragedians 
assigned such a crucial role to the chorus and why the recurring convulsions of the 
late twentieth and early twenty-fi rst centuries are essentially a political crisis, an 
orgy in promises that cannot be kept and therefore should never be given, the elec-
tion results bought with junk bonds issued in the voters’ own names. Whereas the 
problem for the tragedians was the exact drawing of the boundary between the 
humans and the gods, the problem for the postdemocrats is that although all animals 
are equal, some pigs are more equal than the others. In my readings it is exactly 
these relations between religion, arts, and science that permeate also the cascading 
refl ections of writers like Giorgio Agamben, Alain Badiou, Peter Sloterdijk, and 
Slavoj Zizek. Getting crowded is the crystal palace, the prophets moving in.
 ***  
 In the history of the  longue durée , the examples of Swedish welfare, central 
place theory, geography, and planning deserve little but a footnote. Yet they too 
spring from the tension of trust and verifi cation that lies at the heart of European 
culture, perhaps of all cultures, the tales about Oedipus’ foot and Odysseus’ scar 
pulling in one direction, the paragraphs of Moses’ fi rst stone tablet in the other. In 
the cleft in-between hides everything inter-esting, including the scientist’s testable 
theory and operationalized model, in the same breath a reifi ed deifi cation and a dei-
fi ed reifi cation, the potentially informative  a = b turning into the tautological 
 I am who I am . In that context the lawmakers’ grasp of human action as a magic 
game of ontological transformations is truly remarkable: “Thou shalt not make unto 
thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that 
is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth; Thou shalt not bow 
down thyself to them, nor serve them” (Exodus 20:4–5, Deuteronomy 5:8–9, King 
James Version). 
 Well decreed. For in the empirical now-here of the utopian No-where, nothing is 
more inhibiting than our inability to be abstract enough. As Abraham responded on 
his way to the  akedah (Genesis 22:1, King James Version): “Here I am.” And the 
two went on together, world literature’s most pregnant silence. 
 The spiral is closing in, every thought emitting a throw of dice. Hazerdous is the 
hazard. In the Vico-inspired language of Norman O. Brown’s ( 1974 )  Closing Time :
 The true ( verum ) and the made ( factum ) are convertible 
 Verifi cation is fabrication 
 Homo faber 
 Man the forger; at his forge 
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 Chapter 5 
 Perverse Expertise and the Social Unconscious 
in the Making of Crisis 
 Richard  Peet 
 This chapter stresses the social construction of the knowledge guiding social action. 
I focus on social construction as opposed to the individual’s psychology of knowl-
edge. The individual always has his or her own mentality, but what matters in the 
making of history are the broad social and cultural trends in thought, imagination, 
and comprehension. Further, I discuss social construction as it is meant in the criti-
cal tradition—Marx’s ideology, Gramsci’s hegemony—whereby class forces lead, 
direct, and control the production of knowledge. Knowledge production serves a 
class interest. As Marx and Engels (1845/ 2004 ) put it,
 The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the 
ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class 
which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over 
the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who 
lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more 
than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material 
relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the rul-
ing one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. (p. 64) 
 If the problems that beset capitalism result from the actions of capitalists—if the 
fi nancial crisis that began in 2007 was caused by speculation by fi nance capital-
ists—then, the dominant interpretations will be those of the causal agents. 
 The rush of contemporary events is thus testing the ideas available for under-
standing them. This testing holds for the ideas developed to think through the imme-
diate onslaught of rebellions, crises, and catastrophes. It also holds for the concepts 
needed to guide a more long-term movement into a different kind of society. 
Narrowly economic categories are insuffi cient for thinking about society as a whole. 
At the least, political-economic-cultural ideas are needed. Clearly, one cannot just 
regard a single country to be a  society and must therefore consider geoeconomic or 
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geopolitical notions—or rather, geopolitical-economic concepts—adequate for a 
globalized existence. A new, critical conceptual apparatus is needed. But this criti-
cal conception is prevented by hegemonic control that a combination of perverse 
expertise and mass social unconsciousness exerts over imaginaries. At the juncture 
between modern knowledge and practical action lies expertise. When the mass mind 
loses its capacity to think rationally, the outcome is social unconsciousness. The 
elite practice perverse expertise, and the masses respond unconsciously. This mind-
set moves capitalist society into an era of perpetual crisis. 
 Neoliberalism, Finance Capitalism, and Crisis 
 I offer a proposition worthy, perhaps, of consideration. Several major, powerful 
blocs of countries have changed from societies with economies characterized by 
industrial capitalism to a new kind of society one might call  fi nance capitalism . In 
the United States, the timing of this transformation is clear. Profi ts from manufac-
turing were far larger than profi ts from other corporate sectors until the 1980s, when 
profi ts in FIRE corporations (fi nance, insurance, and real estate) all of a sudden 
grew rapidly. They overtook those in manufacturing in the 1990s and have remained 
greater ever since. Financial corporations are now the dominant economic institu-
tions in capitalist societies that have transitioned from production to the provision 
of services, especially fi nancial services (Peet,  2011 ). 
 This transition results from secular change in the distribution of income. 
Figure  5.1 , derived from U.S. income-tax statistics computed by Emmanuel Saez 
from the University of California, shows that the 1 % of the U.S. population at the 
highest end of the income scale received 15–25 % of total income in the Liberal 
period of U.S. capitalism (1917–1941). For the subsequent 40 years under Keynesian 
capitalism, that group received a fairly steady 10 %, a fi gure that began to rise suddenly 
in the early 1980s, under Neoliberalism, reaching 20–24 % in the 2000s. Economic 
growth since 1980 has almost exclusively produced higher incomes for the already 
rich (Piketty & Saez,  2003 ). At the other end of the class spectrum, real incomes 
have fallen for the poor and have remained steady for just about everyone else. 
Increasing inequality is the central socioeconomic characteristic of fi nance capitalism.
 Finance capitalism exercises power by controlling access to the markets through 
which capital accumulations become investments, directing fl ows of capital (e.g., 
equity purchases, bond sales, and direct investment) to places and users approved by 
the fi nancial analytic structure of the banks, investment fi rms, and bond sellers on 
Wall Street and in the City of London. In terms of expertise, it is the investment 
analyst’s global gaze, representing the confi dence of the market, by which societies 
and economies are ordered, ranked, and adjudicated. Although investor confi dence 
is presented by the business media as a neutral, technical, and necessary factor—in 
everyone’s best long-term interest—it is actually a committed, fi nancial capitalist 
interest based on utterly biased knowledge. An instructive example is the global 
bond market. The interest paid on sovereign bonds is determined by the risk of 
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default, with experts employing formulae stemming from long experience measured 
statistically—apparently scientifi c and necessary. Yet it is actually a few thousand 
experts representing the interests of accumulated capital who tell governments how 
to run their economies. At the very least, they represent undemocratic expertise. 
 At the confl uence of knowledge and action lies expertise, by which is meant 
high-quality, specialized, theoretical, and practical knowledge. The process that 
produces sophisticated, but inimical, knowledge is what I call  perverse expertise . It 
is expertise in that some of the world’s fi nest minds, such as professional econo-
mists, do the intellectual and practical modeling and are well paid and respected for 
doing so. The process is perverse because knowledge is accumulated in order to 
continue augmenting the incomes of already wealthy people, the capitalist class. 
The only valid economic reason for gross distortions in income distribution of the 
kind that characterizes neoliberal, fi nance capitalism is that wealthy people are so 
rich that they cannot possibly spend all the money they receive and are therefore 
forced to save. The resulting vast accumulation of saved incomes becomes the main 
source of investment capital. Properly invested, capital can be used for research and 
innovation that results in more productive or sustainable economies. Badly invested, 
capital can be used for speculation that results in unstable economies. Knowledge 
and expertise make the difference. 
 Accordingly, Neoliberalism is a way of running the economy that produces dra-
matic price rises on the stock exchange, where the rich put their money to make ever 
more of it. But stocks and shares are a relatively safe bet compared to Neoliberalism’s 

































































 Fig. 5.1  Percentage income (including capital gains) going to the three highest income groups, 
United States, 1917–2008. (Source: Designed and drawn by the author. Statistical data from 
Alveredo, Atkinson, Piketty, & Saez ( 2011 )) 
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swollen credit market. Disaster strikes when, as in 1929 and 2007, the amount of 
money going to the 1 % superrich approaches 25 % of total income generated in the 
country, far exceeding requirements for productive investment and  necessitating 
speculation to enhance returns. For the price of high returns is eternal risk. Any 
investment fund that does not generate quick and large returns and that thereby 
avoids extreme gambles suffers disinvestment in highly competitive markets, where 
money changes hands in a computer-aided fl ash. There is thus a competitive com-
pulsion for experts to be ever more daring as they seek to maximize returns that 
temporarily attract investment. Financial managers, who oversee capital accumula-
tions, compete for control over assets by promising these high returns. Those who 
fail to deliver high profi t rates disappear to be replaced by even more aggressive 
investment analysts. Debt, speculation, hazard, and fear are thereby structurally 
endemic to fi nance capitalism in what Walks ( 2010 ) calls “Ponzi Neoliberalism.” 
Fear itself becomes the source of further speculation, as with buying gold or futures. 
Debt and gambling spread from Wall Street into all sectors of society—house prices, 
state lotteries, casinos, numbers games, bingo at the church hall, sweepstakes, and 
Pokemon cards. Everyone gambles, even children. Production, consumption, econ-
omy, culture, and the use of environments are subject to an ever more removed, 
abstract calculus of power in which ability to contribute to short-term fi nancial 
profi t becomes the main concern. The structure of the system compels expertise into 
perversity. The particular thinker, with his or her own psychological structure and 
thinking processes, has little to do with structural compulsions in the relations 
between knowledge and action. 
 The interlocking of these speculations is the source of their intractability. The 
fi nancial crisis that began in 2007 was thus marked by vastly overpriced housing, 
particularly near booming fi nancial centers; competition among fi nancial institu-
tions to offer easy credit that made many people hopelessly indebted; the bundling 
of home mortgages and other debts into tradable paper; exorbitant levels of leverag-
ing; and the use of assets whose value can disappear in an instant to securitize other, 
even chancier investments. It was not just that crisis spread from one area to another. 
It was that crisis in one area (such as the inevitable end to the housing price bubble) 
had exponential effects on the others (investment banks that were overextended into 
high-risk speculation) to the degree that accumulated losses tested the capacity of 
even client states and governance institutions to rescue the situation. In a nutshell, 
inequality is not merely unethical, it is dangerous. The combination of debt and 
speculation, deriving from inequality, produces an inevitable tendency toward 
repeated fi nancial crises. 
 Buying the State 
 Why are the colossal incomes of the already rich not taxed out of existence? How 
can extreme inequality survive in democracies where people are, at least apparently, 
free to vote for anyone they choose? The main thing about so-called free elections 
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is that they are not free. Elections are expensive. Public opinion is made by media 
persuasion. Political images are costly to produce, in part because sharp minds pon-
der every persuasive aspect, ransack each emotion, and raid the collective memory 
to sell candidates for offi ce. Such images are expensive to distribute, especially 
because the image of the politician has to compete with images of other commodi-
ties that taste nice and look even better than the politician. Politicians therefore have 
to raise a great deal of money to run for offi ce when elections are decided almost 
exclusively by image projection in Fordist societies. 
 In 1976 and 1980, the last U.S. elections under Keynesian capitalism, presiden-
tial candidates collectively raised and spent about $1.75 billion per election. As 
Neoliberalism took hold, the cost of elections soared. In the 2008 U.S. presidential 
election, candidates collectively raised ten times more—just under $17.49 billion, 
with the total cost of the election amounting to just over $5.28 billion. In the 2010 
midterm elections, congressional candidates raised $ 1.08 billion—and senatorial 
candidates, $ 742 million—in an election fought almost entirely on the basis of 
attack ads (data from Center for Responsive Politics,  n.d. ). The 2012 presidential 
elections made even these enormous amounts seem like pocket money. In the few 
months of the early presidential campaign up to the end of June 2012, and before 
things really intensifi ed, President Obama spent $400 million, and eventually $1 bil-
lion. In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Citizens United vs. FEC ( 2010 ), ruled 
that under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (which deals with the free-
dom of speech) the government could not restrict the size of corporate donations to 
Super Pacs (Political Action Committees) that indirectly support candidates for 
public offi ce by supporting causes that they stand for. A billion dollars is needed to 
run a high-level campaign. 
 Where does one acquire a billion dollars to run a campaign or support a cause? 
Answer: from people who have a billion dollars. About one tenth of 1 % of the U.S. 
adult population (231,000 people) donate over $2000 each to political campaigns, 
and these donations make up 75 % of the total contributions; a mere 26,000 people 
donate 36 % of total contributions (Center for Responsive Politics  n.d. ). In other 
words, a candidate must raise hundreds of millions of dollars from 200,000 rich 
people to be able to run a campaign. Candidates who do not appeal to the rich or 
who are not wealthy themselves never have a chance. They raise a few million dol-
lars at most (independent candidate Ralph Nader raised $4 million in 2008), they 
cannot run television ads, they are not present at media debates, and most of the 
electorate never hears of them. Rich people choose the political candidates who run 
for offi ce. Under fi nance capitalist democracy, the electorate decides which rich 
people’s candidates are elected to offi ce. And the information spread by costly 
advertising? Most messages are attack ads presenting unfavorable information 
about the candidate or cause they oppose. Most of the rest are image ads presenting 
favorable pictures of the candidate they support. The real content, by which I mean 
substantiated and sustained information about a candidate’s positions and policies, 
hardly appears. Images, attack ads, and the like constitute perverse political knowl-
edge produced by perverse expertise. It produces perverse democracy. 
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 Once in offi ce, politicians are kept in line by lobbying. Companies, labor unions, 
and other organizations, in addition to making campaign contributions, spend 
$3.5 billion each year on efforts to infl uence the U.S. Congress and federal agen-
cies. In the period between 1998 and 2010, the insurance, business association, and 
securities sectors spent $33.6 billion on lobbying, whereas labor spent about 
$30 million a year. Some 130 former members of congress are lobbyists, and lob-
bies employ nearly half the politicians and congressional aides who return to the 
private sector. Such money and connections do not spread scientifi c or factual 
knowledge. They project information based on superfi cial, biased knowledge 
thought up to support powerful interests. Lobbyists are yet another example of per-
verse political expertise. 
 Finance Capitalism and Environmental Crisis 
 During the unusually hot summers of 2010, 2011, and 2012, capitalist society fell 
prey to two crises: an economic depression that states or markets could not end and 
a sequence of environmental tragedies brought on by global warming. Did the two 
crises coincide by mere chance? Or did they stem systematically from the same 
structural causes? The answer might seem obvious were it not for media that must 
confuse on causation as they inform on details. Both economic depression and envi-
ronmental catastrophe result from the extreme risks that must be taken by prominent 
actors under fi nance capitalism—meaning that anyone who does not stake every-
thing is eliminated from power. Crises that threaten humanity are structurally 
endemic to fi nance capitalism. 
 Financial and economic crisis lead to periodic recessions, depressions, and 
downturns punctuated by hopelessly optimistic upturns in the  markets , bringing on 
the terrible social outcome of millions of people losing their jobs, homes, and dig-
nity. But the worst is yet to come as the environment strikes back. The hazards 
endemic to fi nance capitalism extend to precarious environmental relations. The 
bearers of capitalist culture become risk-ridden, short-term in memory and anticipa-
tion, and careless about consequences. They live for the moment, without regard for 
the environmental future. Production, consumption, the economy in general, and 
the use of environments are subject to a remote, abstract calculus of power wherein 
the ability to promote short-term fi nancial profi t becomes primary and long-term 
impacts are not so much ignored as glossed over through sophisticated corporate 
advertising, think-tank excuses, and pseudogreen propaganda (“We, too, care about 
the environment”). By generating above-average profi ts, corporate leaders who 
make environmentally perilous decisions—to drill in deep water, for instance—win 
the investor confi dence that enables them to borrow, invest, and expand and allows 
them to pay their upper management well. CEOs who demonstrate an environmen-
tal conscience do not win the market’s confi dence. Environmental risk (mitigated by 
quality public relations to excuse the occasional mistakes) represents the frontier in 
profi t-making and business success. Every time a disaster such as British Petroleum’s 
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2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico is cleaned up, excused, and forgotten, the agents 
of the risk business just become more knowledgeable and slicker at its politicocul-
tural operations. As BP was restoring investor confi dence in the summer of 2010, 
the company announced that it was selling its onshore drilling operations to concen-
trate even more on deep-sea drilling. The danger that produces economic catastro-
phe also creates environmental crises. 
 The neoliberal globalization that has deindustrialized the First World and indus-
trialized parts of the Third World—Brazil, South Korea, China, and India—has 
resulted in a spectacular globalization of environmental destruction. Globalization 
of this neoliberal, fi nancial kind means that economic growth rates slow in the dein-
dustrialized center but accelerate rapidly (rates of 8–10 % a year) in some peripheral 
industrializing countries. China’s economy grew 14-fold between 1980 and 2006 to 
the equivalent of a GDP of $4.4 trillion, and India’s economy grew sixfold, to 
$1.2 trillion, with carbon dioxide emissions increasing proportionately. China’s car-
bon dioxide emissions from burning fossil fuels amounted to 407 million metric 
tons in 1980 and nearly 2.25 billion in 2010; India’s went from 95 million metric 
tons in 1980 to 564 million in 2010 (Boden & Blasing,  2012 ). 
 Much of this production and pollution is connected to consumption in the First 
World. Some 40 % of China’s product is exported, as is 20 % of India’s, and both 
economies have become dramatically more export oriented. These statistics show 
the globalization of an economy still centered on consumption in the high-income 
countries. This fi xation has led to an intensifi cation of pollution’s globalization, as 
evidenced by carbon dioxide emissions. In 2010 global fossil-fuel carbon emissions 
amounted to 9.13 billion metric tons of carbon. In global terms, more than 500 bil-
lion metric tons of carbon have been released into the atmosphere from the burning 
of fossil fuels and cement production since 1750, and half of these emissions have 
happened since the mid-1970s, when it was already known that greenhouse gasses 
caused global warming—perverse environmental knowledge. 
 The point is that environmental pollution is driven by economic necessity under 
capitalism. It is necessary to pollute so that money can be made. Within the existing 
politicoeconomic context, only economic recession can bring about a drastic 
decrease in pollution. Indeed, global carbon dioxide emissions from burning fossil 
fuels temporarily declined by 5.9 % from 2008 through 2009. This reduction came 
about because of a 2.5 % fall in global GDP, a decrease of 11.5 % in the manufactur-
ing production index, and a reduction of 40 % in raw steel production. Yet it is politi-
cally impossible for parties or governments to suggest, in effect, that the necessary 
price of ending environmental destruction is a declining economy. The solution is to 
elevate discussion from the national to the international scale. Upward displacement 
in the environmental discourse necessarily takes the form of UN conferences, Earth 
summits, and unenforceable protocols. Economic necessity produces endless politi-
cal evasion of the environmental issue. Yet under Neoliberalism the signifi cance of 
government regulation of development—and development’s relations with the envi-
ronment—is diminishing because of the intensifi cation of neoliberal and mass 
beliefs, including mass beliefs, about government, markets, and policies. Hence, the 
Tea Party movement in the United States is founded on the idea of reducing the size 
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and interventional zeal of government at a time when state intervention through 
environmental regulation is all that exists in the way of collective response to the 
destruction of nature. 
 In brief, environmental knowledge has escalated as environmental destruction 
has intensifi ed. It is a case of perverse knowledge. 
 Social Unconsciousness 
 Were these issues the only ones, the world’s people might still survive to criticize 
the system yet again. The business–state–media power complex, led by fi nance 
capital and driven by the quest for superprofi ts and fantastic incomes, cannot be 
opposed with any degree of success except by social movements arising from an 
informed, enraged, and rational populace. There has to be a critical, rational, activist 
We-for-Us-to-save-the-world. Yet the other, popular side of fi nance capitalism is 
consumptive excess enabled by the cheap commodities that fl ood in from globalized 
production. The priority of social reproduction shifts from socializing people to 
become workers to socializing people to become consumers. A new type of human 
being is emerging, the consumptive person. The culture of overconsumption pro-
duces mass, popular apathy ( I like , rather than  I think ). Overconsumption is a social 
addiction, a radical, selfi sh individualism that I characterize as the social uncon-
scious. It is  unconscious in that conscious awareness is missing, has not been con-
structed, has not been allowed to develop even from the interpretation of everyday 
experience (common sense), and it is  social in that many people share similar char-
acteristics. The culture of overconsumption is not so much a case of deliberately 
producing mass stupidity, although mass advertising comes close to a corporate 
conspiracy. It is more that the trivialization of everyday life produces unconscious-
ness. Utter trivialization gives rise to a new kind of soft, shallow, compliant person-
ality encased in the kind of fat body that results from total absence of 
self-control—35.7 % of American adults are obese, as are 17 % of American chil-
dren ( Adult Obesity Facts ,  2013 ). Reality is a show. Entertainment is all that is. 
Because every commodity must have a body to bear its message and because every 
service is energy-intensive, overconsumption, overproduction, and the concomitant 
overuse of resources create environmental risk for society as a whole. 
 Essentially, the ability to respond in a radical, collective, socially rational way—
to control an activist, interventionist state democratically, for instance—has been 
consumed away in vast segments of the population living in the global centers of 
power. And the leading ideas produced by experts in the service of power are ideo-
logical diversions rather than means of collective rational intervention. 
 My conclusion is that the intersecting economic and environmental crises will 
continue  ad infi nitum because the existing hegemonic knowledge cannot guide 
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Chapter 6
How Much Knowledge Is Necessary 
for Action?
Joachim Funke
How much knowledge is necessary for action? This question is fundamental because 
it suggests that the link between knowledge and action is debatable, that there is no 
given, fixed causal relationship between knowledge and action. In addition, there 
seems to be no fixed causal direction. Knowledge can be a prerequisite for action 
but also a consequence of an action. My opening question relates two key words in 
psychology. One of them is knowledge, about which a large body of knowledge 
exists (e.g., Halford, Wilson, & Phillips, 2010)—about its different types (e.g., pro-
cedural, declarative), styles of acquisition (implicit, explicit), and degrees of acces-
sibility (conscious, subconscious, unconscious). The other word is action, about 
which there are various theories describing human behavior with respect to inten-
tion (e.g., Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). In this introductory section I try to give an 
overview of these conceptions and of the relation between knowledge and action.
The issues around the keywords knowledge and action—which constitute the 
title of a book by Frey, Mandl, and von Rosenstiel (2006)—are captured by the fol-
lowing four main aspects, which generate corresponding questions.
 1. The relation between knowledge and action. From the perspective of the psy-
chology of knowledge (e.g., Strube & Wender, 1993), knowledge is a compe-
tence for action, a precondition. What is known about the relation between 
knowledge and action and what is not known? How much of human action is 
governed by routines, experience, intuition, and knowledge? What is the trade- 
off between taking action and improving knowledge?
 2. Types of knowledge and different phases. To what extent do various types of 
knowledge (e.g., implicit or explicit) influence the steps from cognition to action 
(e.g., aspirations, attention, decision-making, problem-solving, the evaluation of 
situations, the search for alternatives, and the implementation of intentions)?
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 3. Rationality and knowledge. What categories of rationality should be identified? 
Concepts of rationality are common ground in social and economic theories, but 
rationality in everyday life seems to be something else. To what degree does the 
concept of bounded rationality (Simon, 1947, p. 61–65) weaken the link between 
knowledge and action? Is there a threshold of minimal knowledge that is neces-
sary for action?
 4. Action theory and language. How constitutive is language use for action? Searle 
(1969), with his concept of speech acts, points out that speaking can be acting. 
To speak about X requires knowing something about X. If someone is not able to 
speak about Z, can that person act upon Z or does the inability to speak about Z 
imply the inability to act upon Z? What about the idea that “actions speak louder 
than words” (Tanner, Brügger, van Schie, & Lebherz, 2010)?
The contribution from my own empirical work addresses mainly the first and at 
least in part the second of these four main aspects, leaving many of the other ques-
tions to the reader.
After a short section on definitions, I ask whether action is possible without 
knowledge and afterward venture the question of whether it is possible for people to 
act against their own knowledge. Thereafter, I review some of the standard views on 
the relation between knowledge and action, interpretations that may help this chap-
ter’s exploration of that connection through three theories: planned behavior, uncon-
scious thought, and the option-generation framework. The chapter then continues 
with empirical evidence from my own research area, problem-solving, and shows 
that the relation between knowledge and action is strong within that area.
 Definitions of Knowledge and Action
 Knowledge and Belief
Knowledge is not always knowledge; it is necessary to distinguish between knowl-
edge and true belief. A person who believes that leaves of a red tree are green defi-
nitely knows about his or her belief. Hence, there is knowledge that depends on 
states in the outer world (it being a purely empirical question whether the leaves are 
green or red) and on other knowledge that is a priori true (i.e., my knowledge about 
my beliefs). In the philosophy of language, this position is called externalism. For 
the issues considered in this chapter, it suffices to state that I am talking about the 
person’s internal knowledge not at a metalevel but rather at the level of assertions 
that are believed to be true.
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 Types of Knowledge
The distinction between explicit (verbalizable, declarative) and implicit (nonverbal-
izable, tacit) knowledge is well known and relates to the distinction between con-
scious and nonconscious knowledge. Cognitive processes in general are often seen 
as working in two modes, a deliberate, conscious one and an automatic noncon-
scious type of processing (e.g., Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2011).
 Action
The definition of action as goal-directed human activity helps set it apart from pure 
behavior (e.g., sneezing, which is not directed to any particular goal). Action is that 
part of behavior which occurs intentionally. Keep in mind that even trial-and-error 
behavior could be classified as action if it happens intentionally.
 Is Action Possible Without Knowledge?
Is action possible without knowledge? Can one really posit that idea as a serious 
option? If one takes the term action to mean goal-directed human activity, the 
answer must be no. Action implies goals, and in order to realize goals a person 
needs appropriate means. The means–end connection is knowledge—to know that 
one can use bamboo sticks to fetch a banana lying just beyond arm’s reach outside 
the bars of a cage was an important insight to Sultan, the most intelligent chimpan-
zee analyzed by Köhler (1925).
But what is the relation between goals and knowledge? Are goals part of what 
people call knowledge or are they a separate entity only derivative of knowledge? In 
my understanding, knowledge is a piece of subjectively acquired information about 
the world. In German one would say that knowledge about the world is angeeignet 
(appropriated, assimilated, internalized). In a certain sense it could be construed as 
embodied information.
But how is embodied information linked to goals? Goals are representations of 
future states and derive their power from the possibility of finding a way from the 
given present state to an envisioned future state. When talking about goals, people 
always talk about degrees of distance between the given and the goal state. Because 
the path from the given state to the goal state is sometimes not easy to discover, 
problem-solving comes into play. Indeed, the epistemologist Karl Popper (1999) 
argued that “all life is problem solving.”
To answer the question of whether action is possible without knowledge, I must 
thus conclude that the use of the word action logically implies the connection to 
some background representation, which is normally called knowledge.
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 Is Action Possible Against One’s Better Knowledge?
It may be more interesting to ask whether action is possible against knowledge. The 
question is related to the understanding of human rationality. Newell (1981) stated 
the principle of rationality simply by saying, “if an agent has knowledge that one of 
its actions will lead to one of its goals, then the agent will select that action” (p. 8). 
This principle would not allow a person to act against her or his goals.
Yet everyday experience brims with examples to the contrary. People love ani-
mals—but at the same time do not hesitate to slaughter them professionally in the 
slaughterhouse. Concern about climate change is widespread, though people con-
tinue to pollute the environment by driving big cars. The gaps between attitude and 
behavior are large, but are attitude and behavior the same as knowledge and action? 
Take smoking for example. Evidence indisputably shows that smoking is detrimen-
tal to human health, but people continue to smoke despite their knowledge of this 
fact. Are they acting against their knowledge? I would say, no! Given even such 
blatant violations of their own attitudes, people follow principles of bounded ratio-
nality. When smoking despite knowledge about the negative consequences of that 
behavior, a person might argue, “Yes, I know about the negative effects, but my 
family has a very good gene pool, so I do not assume I’ll get cancer as easily as 
normal people will.” This argumentation conveys a kind of justification for behavior 
that, from the viewpoint of the individual, is no longer irrational but instead has its 
own limited rationality.
 Can Knowledge Impede Action?
Planning before taking action is usually thought to be wise, but it can have disad-
vantages. Although having plans generally makes people more likely to act on a 
goal than they would without them, an experiment reported by Masicampo and 
Baumeister (2012) showed that subjects who had devised plans to achieve a goal 
failed at that task, particularly when it was essential to recognize and seize an alter-
native opportunity in order to succeed. The authors concluded that with sufficient 
(unlimited) time a previously learned specific plan increased attainment of the goal, 
replicating the usual benefit of planning. With insufficient time, however, the spe-
cific plan impaired performance because participants failed to capitalize on an alter-
native opportunity for accomplishing the goal. The final conclusion by Masicampo 
and Baumeister was that plans can drastically decrease overall rates of attainment 
when openness to alternatives is crucial to success.
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 The Relation Between Knowledge and Action
What are the standard views on the relation between knowledge and action? I con-
centrate on three approaches that posit assumptions about this relationship: (a) the 
theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991), (b) the theory of unconscious thought 
(Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006), and (c) the option-generation framework (Kalis, 
Mojzisch, Schweizer, & Kaiser, 2008).
 The Theory of Planned Behavior
The theory of planned behavior formulated by Ajzen (1991) has become one of the 
best-known theories in psychology. Roughly, it states that behavior depends on the 
intention or resolve of the individual to behave in a certain way, say, to exercise at 
least five times a week. Intention itself depends on a behavioral attitude (e.g., exer-
cising at least five times a week would be good/bad), subjective norms (e.g., most 
people important to the person think that she or he should exercise at least five times 
a week), and perceived behavioral control (e.g., exercising at least five times a week 
would be easy/difficult). This theory, in its new versions, is referred to as the “rea-
soned action approach” (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010).
As depicted in Fig. 6.1, action depends on previous knowledge in the form of 
intention. The empirical evidence bearing out this theory is impressive, with meta- 
analyses of empirical studies (Armitage & Conner, 2001; Manning, 2009) over-









Fig. 6.1 The main elements that constitute the theory of reasoned action. Behavioral attitude, 
subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control causes intention that brings about behavior 
(with additional influence from perceived behavioral control)
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behavior. But is this finding really a surprise? Werner Greve, a psychologist from 
Hildesheim University, has argued that the empirical success of the theory of 
planned behavior is not astonishing. According to him, the connection between 
intention and action is logical, not causal. In his article “Traps and Gaps in Action 
Explanation” (2001), he stated that intention is an inherent part of what is called 
action. Speaking about action therefore implies the assumption that an intention 
must exist to carry out a certain action.
The consequence of Greve’s (2001) argument is clear. In his view most of the 
empirical studies on the theory of planned action are pseudoempirical research in 
that things that are true a priori are proven empirically. If a person intends to diet 
and sometime later starts to undergo dietary treatment, that action comes as no sur-
prise. It is a logical consequence of the fact that at some time t a person decides to 
begin dietary treatment and then at time t + 1 the diet really commences. But what 
about the cases in which persons do not start their dietary treatment? Would their 
lapse falsify the logical connection between intention and action? No, it would only 
mean that the intention was not strong enough to reach a threshold needed to turn 
intention into behavior.
 The Theory of Unconscious Thought
A second approach is the theory of unconscious thought (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 
2006). The basic idea is that the quality of decision-making depends on conscious 
and unconscious thought simultaneously. The term conscious thought is understood 
to mean a mental state that encompasses a person’s rational awareness, whereas the 
term unconscious thought refers to the underlying influence, of which one is typi-
cally unaware and which has an impact on one’s behavior. Unconscious thought 
takes place when conscious attention is directed elsewhere. Unconscious thought 
tends to outmatch conscious thought, especially in complex and untransparent 
situations.
The relative impacts that conscious and unconscious thought can have on 
decision- making become evident in the data from experiments by Dijksterhuis, Bos, 
Nordgren, and van Baaren (2006). The task for participants was to choose the most 
favorable car from a selection of cars that were described by only four aspects (the 
simple situation) or as many as twelve aspects (complex situation). Part (a) of Fig. 
6.2 shows the percentage of persons who chose the best option; part (b), as a sec-
ondary measure, shows the difference in attitude toward the best option. The left- 
hand set of two bars in part (a) shows that most of the subjects made the correct 
decision in the simple situation if they were in a conscious-thought mode (repre-
sented by the white bar). But when the complexity of the task increased to twelve 
aspects, as is shown in the right-hand set of bars in part (b), the mode of uncon-
scious thought has a great advantage over that of conscious thought, a finding that 
supports the theory by Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006). As part (b) of Fig. 6.2 
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illustrates, not only are the decisions improved by unconscious thought but the atti-
tude toward the desirable and undesirable car depends on the mode of thought.
 The Option-Generation Framework
A third theory that deals with the relation between knowledge and action is the 
option-generation framework by Kalis et al. (2008). Studying the weakness of will 
(a phenomenon known as acrasia), these researchers concentrated on option genera-
tion, a little-understood process that precedes option selection and action 
initiation.
Figure 6.3 illustrates the idealized process of option generation, option selection, 
and action initiation and gives the background of the ideas that Kalis et al. (2008) 
have about degenerative processes in this area. Table 6.1 affords an overview of the 
ways in which dysfunctions in option generation can result in irrational behavior. 
The table presents two dimensions—dysfunction in the quantity of options (hypo-
generation and hypergeneration) and dysfunction in the quality of options. The two 
rows separate instrumental irrationality from noninstrumental irrationality, meaning 
that options can be seen either as a means to realize certain goals (i.e., the instru-
mental understanding) or as irrationality in the goals themselves (i.e., noninstru-
mental irrationality). This concept links knowledge and action in a special way: It 
makes a connection between options and actions.
Fig. 6.2 Decision-making criteria for choosing a car: (a) Percentage of participants who chose the 
most desirable car as a function of complexity of decision and of mode of thought (n = 18 to 22 in 
each condition). Error bars represent the standard error. (b) Difference in attitude (on a scale of –25 
to +25) toward the desirable and undesirable car as a function of complexity of decision and of 
mode of thought (n = 12 to 14 in each condition). Error bars [the vertical lines above the bars] 
represent the standard error (Reprinted from Dijksterhuis et al. (2006, p. 1005) with permission 
from the American Association for the Advancement of Science)
6 How Much Knowledge Is Necessary for Action?
106
This walk through the three theories on the connection between knowledge and 
action gives an understanding of current approaches to that area of inquiry. In this 
chapter’s final section I bring to this subject empirical evidence from my own 
research area, problem-solving.
 Evidence From Problem-Solving Research
What is meant by problem-solving? In my understanding, problem-solving is the 
intentional generation of knowledge for action instead of simple trial-and-error 
behavior. From the perspective of a problem-solving approach, the connection 
between knowledge and action is a classical means–end relation. The question 
remains how one can demonstrate that subjects generate knowledge intentionally 
Fig. 6.3 Stages of decision making in our model. (Kalis et al., 2008, p. 403) (Copyright 2008 by 
Springer Science + Business Media. With permission of Springer)
Table 6.1 Six types of irrational behavior
Irrationality
Dysfunction in quantity of options Dysfunction in 
quality of optionsHypogeneration Hypergeneration
Instrumental (1) Absence of options 
leads to leads to 
reduced effectiveness 
in attaining one’s 
goals.
(2) An increase in the 
number of options 
leads to problems in 
selection and initiation.
(3) Options are 
inadequate means 
to one’s goals.
Noninstrumental (4) Absence of goals 
leads to a reduction in 
one’s options.
(5) An increase in the 
number of goals leads 
to defocused option 
generation.
(6) Options are 
means to goals that 
are themselves 
irrational.
Based on Kalis et al. (2008, pp. 407–411)
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for action? My tentative answer comes from experiments in which researchers pres-
ent subjects with problems by using multistep tasks of reasonable complexity 
(Funke, 2010).
Figure 6.4 illustrates the MicroDyn approach, which was implemented for the 
2012 cycle of the OECD’s worldwide Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA) (Wüstenberg, Greiff, & Funke, 2012). In the upper part is a 
screenshot of a small scenario, called “Handball Training.” It involves three types of 
training—A, B, and C (input variables). The task of the problem-solver is to find out 
how the types of training influence the three output variables (motivation, power of 
throw, and exhaustion). The problem-solver can change the amount of training and 
will see the response on the side displaying the output variables. Giving certain 
amounts of input, as in this example, seems to increase the motivation level and 
decrease exhaustion.
The experiments that my colleagues and I have designed and conducted typically 
have three stages (see Fig. 6.5). First, subjects have to explore the system for about 
3 min. This stage is “information retrieval” because in unguided explorations sub-
jects generate information for the second stage, “model-building.” This second 
stage requires reflection about the causal model behind the different entities. There 
are assumed connections between input and output; training A, for example, 
increases motivation only. The third stage is “forecasting” and requires the subjects 
to achieve given values on the various endogenous variables—the output variables 
in this example—by entering the correct values into the system. In such experiments 
subjects have to work on many similar tasks. This requirement allows for psycho-
metrically sound measurement of the three abilities—information retrieval, model- 
building, and forecasting (for more details, see Greiff & Funke, 2009; Wüstenberg 
et al., 2012).
As demonstrated by the results of the studies reported in this section, a clear con-
nection exists between the generation of knowledge and the application of that 
knowledge (action). This structural equation model with three latent variables 
shows that model-building is a major prerequisite for the two other postulated abili-
ties, forecasting and information retrieval. The fit between this model and the data 
is fine and allows acceptance of the model. My colleagues and I have also con-
structed a measurement model that sequences the three abilities—information 
retrieval, model-building, and forecasting. It is simple, another characteristic that 
fits the data well. Our empirical results thus reveal strong connections between 
knowledge and action. Acting on a system requires knowledge about the system’s 
structure if goals are to be attained successfully.
Berry and Broadbent (1984) argued that this system knowledge need not be ver-
balizable and explicit and that, instead, implicit knowledge might guide the action 
of subjects controlling a system. They even postulated a negative correlation 
between control performance and verbalizable knowledge. But Buchner, Funke, 
and Berry (1995) showed that this explanation is not fully convincing, for the only 
subjects who acquired knowledge about the system were those who were not able to 
accomplish the given goal immediately.

































































































































































































Knowledge and action is an interesting relationship! As I have shown, there are 
conscious and unconscious influences, and they are primarily logical, not causal. 
Kaiser, Wölfing, and Fuhrer (1999), who analyzed the relation between environ-
mental knowledge, environmental values, and ecological behavior (intention as well 
as observed behavior), concluded on the basis of structural equation modeling that 
only 40 % of the variance in the intention that it entails was attributable to knowl-
edge and values but that this intention explained 75 % of the variance in observed 
behavior. From the viewpoint of action, I have concluded that it is not possible to act 
without knowledge but that we humans can act—at least at a surface level—against 
our knowledge! For God’s sake, may all persons in our small world act in concor-
dance with their knowledge.
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 Chapter 7 
 Knowing and Not Knowing 
 Nico  Stehr 
 As aptly as these introductory words by Schütz and Simmel summarize my own 
hypothesis on the presumed phenomenon of non-knowledge, 1 I note that it is cap-
tured still more precisely by economist Joseph Stiglitz’s ( 2005 ) formulation about 
the “invisible hand” (p. 133) ostensibly operating in the market place. Asked why 
the invisible hand is invisible, Stiglitz gave a straightforward answer: because it 
does not exist. Similarly, I ask in this chapter why non-knowledge is diffi cult to 
grasp. And my equally analogous response is: because there is no such thing as 
non-knowledge. 
 Not wishing to capitulate already at this early point, I concentrate in this chapter 
on scientifi c discourses in which participants maintain that something like non- 
knowledge does exist. The knowledge/non-knowledge dichotomy appears in many 
discussions on the subject as a kind of performative speech act (Sartori,  1968 ). 
However, it recommends only one side of that which it designates, namely, knowl-
edge. I cannot quite sustain my doubt about the existence of not-knowing; from time 
to time I have to deviate from it and maintain that non-knowledge does exist. At the 
same time, I draw attention to other terms that are empirically and theoretically 
more productive than the naked assertion that non-knowledge exists. Finally, I will 
point to a number of intriguing, but rarely studied topics relating to the question of 
the societal function or societal treatment of apparently insuffi cient knowledge. 
1  My usage of the term  non-knowledge follows the convention in the literature that discusses the 
absence of knowledge. The term is synonymous with  not knowing and has a close affi nity but not 
identity with  ignorance . In German the term is  Nichtwissen . 
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 The outstanding feature of a man’s life in the modern world is 
his conviction that his life-world as a whole is neither fully 
understood by himself nor fully understandable to any of his 
fellow-men. Alfred Schütz ( 1946 , p. 463) 
 In the presence of the total reality upon which our conduct is 
founded, our knowledge is characterized by peculiar limitations 
and aberrations. Georg Simmel ( 1906 , p. 444) 
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 Freud and Hayek: Why Quit? 
 The treatment of non-knowledge by Sigmund Freud and Friedrich von Hayek is of 
particular interest in this context because their approach is, if I am not mistaken, 
quite representative for much of scientifi c discourse. Both Freud and Hayek recog-
nized that there can be no such thing as a researchable subject called non- knowledge, 
but, unimpressed by their own conclusion, they continued to examine something 
that does not exist. Their grappling with this issue gives me the opportunity to ask 
why concerning oneself with the subject of non-knowledge is typical especially for 
the German-speaking scientifi c community. Is it a sort of eccentricity? 
 Freud’s (1924/ 1963 ) theory of the dream as a psychic phenomenon is based on the 
primary conviction that the dreamer himself should “say what his dream means” 
(p. 100). But an evident fundamental obstacle to doing so is that the dreamer is, as a 
rule, fi rmly convinced that he does not know what his dream means. As Freud notes, 
“the dreamer always says he knows nothing” (p. 101). The lack of information from 
the dreamer confronts Freud with an apparent scientifi c and methodological conun-
drum defying sound interpretation of dreams. “Since he [the dreamer] knows nothing 
and we [the psychoanalyst] know nothing and a third person could know even less, 
there seems to be no prospect of fi nding out [the dream’s meaning]” (p. 101). 
 Instead of accepting these fi ndings as a sound conclusion and therefore forsaking 
any further search for the meaning of dreams, Freud (1924/ 1963 ) considered another 
possibility: “For I can assure you that it is quite possible, and highly probable 
indeed, that the dreamer  does know what his dream means:  only he does not know 
that he knows it and for that reason thinks he does not know it ” (p. 101). This inter-
pretation seems to be confusing and self-contradictory. Freud even asked himself 
whether a contradiction in terms might exist in his hypothesis that there are “mental 
things in a man which he knows without knowing that he knows them” (p. 101):
 Where, then, in what fi eld, can it be that proof has been found that there is a knowledge of 
which the person concerned nevertheless knows nothing, as we are proposing to assume of 
dreamers? After all, this would be a strange, surprising fact and one which would alter our 
view of mental life and which would have no need to hide itself: a fact, incidentally, which 
cancels itself in its very naming and which nevertheless claims to be something real—a 
contradiction in terms. (pp. 102–103) 
 For Freud what followed from these observations was the conclusion that one ought 
to abandon this method of dream interpretation as lacking any substance. But Freud 
did not. After all, the knowledge does not really hide from the observer. One has 
only to search for it persistently. “It is very probable, then, that the dreamer knows 
about his dream; the only question is how to make it possible for him to discover his 
knowledge and communicate it to us” (p. 104). 
 Hayek, confronted with a similar dilemma, decided, just like Freud, to ignore it. 
In his essay entitled “The Creative Powers of a Free Civilization” (1960/ 1978 ), in 
which the lack of knowledge is a question of the distribution of knowledge in mar-
kets, Hayek fi rst noted that any progress in civilization is the result of an increase of 
knowledge. In the real world, according to Hayek (1960/ 1978 ), it simultaneously 
holds true that “the individual benefi ts from more knowledge than he is aware of” 
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(p. 22), and he added that “this fundamental fact of man’s unavoidable ignorance of 
much on which the working of civilization rests has received little attention” (p. 22) 
in science. 2 Human knowledge is far from being complete. 
 The key passage in Hayek’s (1960/ 1978 ) analysis of the difference between what 
he called the “boundaries of ignorance” (p. 22) or man’s “unavoidable ignorance” 
(p. 22) and “conscious knowledge” (p. 24) is: “It must be admitted, however, that 
our ignorance is a peculiarly diffi cult subject to discuss....We certainly cannot dis-
cuss something intelligently about which we know nothing” (p. 23). Hayek takes 
recourse to a kind of Münchhausen maneuver: “We must at least be able to state the 
questions even if we do not know the answers....Though we cannot see in the dark, 
we must be able to trace the limits of the dark areas” (p. 23). Nevertheless, as Hayek 
emphasizes, “If we are to understand how society works, we must attempt to defi ne 
the general nature and range of our ignorance concerning it” (p. 23). 
 The Excess Boom in Non-knowledge 
 Despite of the problems that Freud and Hayek quite obviously had with the concept of 
non-knowledge, why has the term resonated so much in the contemporary cultural and 
social sciences, particularly in German-speaking countries? In the media and public dis-
course alike, the category of non-knowledge is increasingly becoming a prominent and 
trenchant monetary unit as the shady side of knowledge, but why is it gaining currency? 
 The boom in refl ection on non-knowledge certainly has to do with the essentially 
controversial concept of knowledge as well as with the common understanding of 
the modern conditions for the production of knowledge, with the societal role often 
attributed to knowledge, and with the theory of modern society as a knowledge 
society. Is the difference between knowledge and non-knowledge an example of the 
typically static conceptual polarity of Old European philosophy? Or is that differ-
ence basically only the widespread cultural criticism that the individual—given the 
extensive and growing volume of objectifi ed knowledge in modern societies and 
given the sophisticated new technical and complicated methods of accessing it—
disposes over only a minute (and probably diminishing) share of all knowledge? 
Are the widely discussed fi ndings on the average voter’s alleged political ignorance, 
stupidity, and disenfranchisement and on the danger it poses to democracy a cause 
of the topicality of the subject of non-knowledge? 
 Is it, on the other hand, unrealistic to assume that the average citizen, including 
the well-educated contemporary citizen, has (or should have) suffi cient  technical 
expertise to intervene, for example, in the complex decision-making on economic 
questions of the goal confl ict between infl ation and unemployment? At root, does 
the concept of non-knowledge merely mean the societally necessary  distribution of 
2  The German wording that Hayek chose as translations of two central concepts in his English 
original is of interest, and is, in my opinion, fully adequate. “The boundaries of his ignorance” and 
“man’s unavoidable ignorance” are rendered as  Grenzen seines Unwissen and  unvermeidlichen 
Unkenntnis des Menschen (Hayek, 1960/ 2005 , p. 31). In other words, there is no reference to non-
knowledge ( Nichtwissen ). 
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knowledge? Does the concept of non-knowledge perhaps refer primarily to the 
future present, about which one is really little informed? Does the origin of the 
boom in observations about non-knowledge lie, under certain circumstances, in an 
overestimation of the societal role of allegedly unquestioned scientifi c knowledge 
and in an underestimation of the societal roles of knowledge? 
 In my view the societal phenomena perceived as non-knowledge can be better 
captured by other terms, such as “systemic ignorance” (Moore & Tumin,  1949 , 
p. 789), that express how a lack of knowledge or information is manifested in mod-
ern societies and how people can deal with knowledge gaps. In any case, two keys 
to recognizing the myth of non-knowledge are the concept of knowledge itself and 
the complicated question of distinguishing between information and knowledge. 
 Knowledge as a Societal Construct 
 The discussion on the concept of non-knowledge often refl ects a liberal intermingling 
of the terms  knowledge and  information . I assume that one should distinguish between 
the two, even if this differentiation is diffi cult to maintain in practice. A lack of infor-
mation is not non-knowledge. 3 Just exactly what knowledge is and how knowledge 
differs from information, human capital, or other intellectual or cognitive characteris-
tics is an essentially controversial question. Neither the concept of knowledge nor the 
manner of knowledge’s production, distribution, use, or consequences can be taken 
for granted. They constitute foregone conclusions, at least for the scientifi c observer. 
 I would like to defi ne knowledge as the capacity for societal action (the capacity 
to act), as the possibility to get something going. Knowledge therefore refers to pro-
cess knowledge. Knowledge is a model for reality. Shannon (1948/ 1949 ), for exam-
ple, explained how words and images can be converted into characters and transmitted 
electronically. He thus contributed to realizing the Digital Revolution. 4 According to 
Shannon, the expansion of knowledge represents a broadening of the horizon of pos-
sibilities. Whether the broadening of the possibilities for action also automatically 
represents an increase in the possibilities for disappointment (often also understood 
to be an increase in non-knowledge) has to be regarded as controversial. Insuffi cient 
knowledge on the part of an individual or a group accordingly means the inability of 
those actors to mobilize knowledge in order to put something in motion. 
3  For instance, Wehling ( 2009 , p. 99) characterizes the insuffi cient information “Does the guest 
arrive at 5 or 6 p.m.?” as a case of non-knowledge. This example is at best vague information, as I 
show more precisely in this chapter. 
4  Dyson ( 2011 ) described Shannon’s case: “In 1945 Shannon wrote a paper, A Mathematical 
Theory of Cryptography, which was stamped SECRET and never saw the light of day. He pub-
lished in 1948 an expurgated version of the 1945 paper with the title ‘A Mathematical Theory of 
Communication’. The 1948 version appeared in the  Bell System Technical Journal , the house 
journal of the Bell Telephone Laboratories, and became an instant classic. It is the founding docu-
ment for the modern science of information. After Shannon, the technology of information raced 




 Knowledge exercises an active function in the societal sequence of actions only 
when action is not carried out in essentially stereotyped habitual (effortless) pat-
terns or is otherwise largely regulated, that is, where there is leeway and the need for 
decisions and where this situation necessitates mental exertion. 5 , 6 The societal prac-
tices in which decisions are possible and necessary represent the ecology of knowl-
edge or, more exactly, of its application. 
 Every implementation of knowledge, not only of great scientifi c experiments, 
requires control of the circumstances of action (the initial conditions) through active 
agents, who, for example, want to translate laboratory successes (or a thought 
experiment) into practice. In other words, when “scientifi c knowledge is to be 
‘applied’ in society, adaptation to the initial conditions prevailing there has to be 
made, or societal practice has to be remodeled according to the standards set by sci-
ence” (Krohn & Weyer,  1989 , p. 354). 7 
 Information and Knowledge 
 I defi ne information in distinction to the concept of knowledge as follows: The con-
tent of information concerns the characteristics of products or results (output, con-
dition, supply), whereas the stuff that science consists of refers primarily to the 
qualities of processes or resources (input, procedures, business enterprises), which 
are used in processes. Knowledge is the capacity to act, whereas information does 
not enable one to set anything in motion. 
 It is just as important to emphasize from the outset that information and knowl-
edge have, to a limited extent, common attributes. The most important basic com-
mon denominator is that neither information nor knowledge can be understood 
independent of societal contexts. In daily life, as in the scientifi c discourse, the 
conceptual interchangeability of information and knowledge is extensive. It is none-
theless notable that public places such as airports, shopping centers, railroad sta-
tions, and highway roadhouses commonly do not have a knowledge stand but rather 
5  A variant of these thoughts worth considering—one quoted by Hayek (1960/ 1978 , p. 22)—can be 
found in Whitehead’s ( 1911 )  Introduction to Mathematics : “Civilization advances by increasing 
the number of important operations which we can perform without thinking about them. Operations 
of thought are like cavalry charges in a battle—they are strictly limited in number, they require 
fresh horses, and must only be made at decisive moments” (p. 61). 
6  Luhmann’s ( 1992 ) observations about the preconditions for the possibility of making a decision 
may permit a still broader application of knowledge. “One can only decide,” as he very plausibly 
underlines, “when and to which extent it is not certain what will happen” (p. 136). On the premise 
that the future is highly uncertain, the lack of knowledge in decision-making processes can extend 
over many other societal contexts, too, and thereby also to those that are normally characterized by 
routines and habitual behavior. 
7  Hans Radder ( 1986 ) arrived at a similar conclusion when he pointed out that material as well as 
social prerequisites ultimately have to be met for long-term practical success in technical produc-
tion: “The creation and maintenance of particular social conditions (for example, a bureaucratic 
and centralist administration in the case of nuclear energy) is necessary in order to be able to 
guarantee the permanent technological success of a project” (p. 675). 
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an information stand. The blending of these terms will probably continue to prevail 
in practice, in science and everyday life alike, because who can distinguish between 
the information society and the knowledge society? 
 Observing Non-knowledge, and Some of the Questions I Ask 
Myself in the Process 
 With these observations in mind, I try to ascertain what could or could not be meant 
when one speaks of non-knowledge. People’s actions are guided by knowledge. 
Knowledge of others and self-knowledge are prerequisites for socialization. Hence, as 
Simmel ( 1906 ) noted, knowledge is an anthropological constant: “All relationships of 
people to each other rest, as a matter of course, upon the precondition that they know 
something about each other” (p. 441). There can be no societal actors without knowl-
edge. One is just as far from being unknowing  without knowledge as one is naked 
without a headscarf. A society without secrets is inconceivable. Ignoring knowledge 
and information is sensible, even rational. A society in which there is total transpar-
ency is impossible. Knowledge is never created out of nothing. Knowledge, or the 
revision of knowledge, arises out of already existing knowledge (not out of forms of 
non-knowledge). The existence of a  non- knowledge society is just as questionable as 
that of a human society without language. Humans live in a complex society marked 
by a high degree of functional differentiation in which almost all of its members are 
non-knowledgeable about almost all knowledge. Knowledge in the broad sense meant 
in this chapter is not restricted to any particular social system in modern societies. 
Thus, knowledge is everywhere (Luhmann,  1990 , p. 147). 
 It is useful to ignore information and knowledge. Each individual knows that his 
or her knowledge is limited. Yet people profi t a great deal from knowledge they are 
not acquainted with. What indicators could be used to characterize a non- knowledge 
society empirically? Almost half of the American population is convinced that the 
Earth is younger than 10,000 years old. Is the American society for that reason a 
non-knowledge society? 
 Who or what is the standard of comparison when one speaks of the duality of 
non-knowledge and knowledge or of the relationship of knowledge to non- 
knowledge (as  known unknowns )? Is it the individual or rather a collective? 
Privileging the individual is common. To put it more stringently, does the concept of 
non-knowledge mean a single process, a single quality (information), or the progno-
sis of an occurrence? How long must (or can) non-knowledge be perceptibly recog-
nizable in order to be non-knowledge? Can cluelessness, for example, last only for 
seconds? Does one refer to individual forms of knowledge (or information) that the 
isolated individual (e.g., a scientist) or a non-knowledgeable collective does not—
and cannot—have because one always proceeds selectively or is forced to fi lter? 
 Knowledge, by contrast, is a variable societal phenomenon that lies on an indi-
visible continuum and points to the existence of the elementary distribution of 
knowledge in complex societies. No clear-cut difference between knowledge and 
non-knowledge exists. Knowledge is a total societal phenomenon. 
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 There is no comprehensive knowledge; nobody can know everything. Acting 
under conditions of uncertainty is commonplace. Knowledge of these gaps is 
knowledge. But knowledge of gaps does not belong in the category of non- 
knowledge if it is a case of negative knowledge (to the extent that one fi nds this 
designation helpful). Actually, one can often close this gap quickly because it is 
possible to know or fi nd out who might know it (a task fulfi lled by the role of 
experts, for instance). On the other hand, there are things that everyone, or almost 
everyone, knows or about which almost everyone is informed (e.g., the fact that 
almost every human has two eyes or that there is such a thing as weather or climate). 
There are a number of expressions that are both empirically and practically more 
productive than  non-knowledge and nonetheless illuminate the horizon of problems 
that non-knowledge allegedly comprises. In the following section I limit myself to 
just one of these possibilities. 
 Asymmetric Information/Knowledge 
 In an infl uential article entitled “The Market for Lemons,” the economist and later 
Nobel Laureate George Akerlof ( 1970 ) paved the way to a systematic analysis of 
asymmetric information by conducting an exemplary analysis of the respective 
information that buyers and sellers of used cars had. An asymmetric state of infor-
mation is one of the fundamental characteristics of various classes of participants in 
the used-car market. As a rule, the owner and the driver of the used car on sale have 
much more detailed knowledge about the dependability and history of the vehicle’s 
mechanical problems than the potential purchaser does. In a credit agreement the 
debtor is guided by certain intentions to repay the credit or not. The lender usually 
has no access to that information. Nor can the lender be certain that the debtor’s 
intended investment will actually be profi table. Generally speaking, asymmetric 
information on the part of market participants should lead to market failure. 
 Buyers and sellers, lenders and debtors are often conscious of the fact that there 
is or can be a state of asymmetric information. It follows that the buyer or lender 
seek indicators that diminish the mistrust in the available information or allow that 
information to be considered more or less reliable. Because the transaction costs of 
the acquisition of relevant information might be high, the very accessibility of the 
information on the seller’s or debtor’s social reputation will likely be an important 
indicator for the lender or buyer. 
 From Akerlof’s deliberations and those of other economists (e.g., Chappori & 
Salanie,  2000 ; Sharpe,  1990 ; Wang,  2012 ), I derive the following general lesson for 
my analysis of the antithesis of information and knowledge: Because societal 
knowledge is scattered asymmetrically rather than evenly distributed, one has to 
assume a cognitive-societal functional differentiation in all societal institutions. 8 
8  In memory research an extreme example of asymmetric information has recently come under 
study—the few people who have “superior autobiographical memory” (Parker, Cahill, & McGaugh, 
 2006 , p. 36), that is, the ability to recall every single day of their lives or to remember the occur-
rences of every single day. 
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In science such a cognitive division is not only perceived as a matter of course but 
is also generally understood to be a functional characteristic of science as an institu-
tion. Not every scientist can work on just any question. And the role of every scien-
tist cannot be classifi ed in relation to itself, but only in relation to that of other 
scientists. It is therefore natural to speak of a cognitive functional differentiation in 
all societal institutions. In other words, it can make sense only to speak of a range 
of knowledge in groups of actors in comparison to symmetrically limited knowl-
edge in other groups of actors, and not of knowledge and non-knowledge. 
 On the Virtues (Advantages?) of Non-knowledge 
 The functional meaning of non-knowledge differs from one societal institution to 
the next. In an institution such as science it is a state of development of knowledge 
that must be overcome, a condition that acts as an incentive. In a highly stratifi ed 
societal institution (e.g., a total institution) differing states of knowledge are a con-
stitutive characteristic feature (a functional necessity) that is defended by all means. 
A society in which complete transparency prevails would be, as Merton (1949/ 1968 ) 
emphasized, “diabolical” (p. 345). In practice, a mutually transparent, complex 
society is unrealistic. 
 Moore and Tulmin ( 1949 , p. 787), in their classical functionalist analysis of the 
societal functions of ignorance, therefore pointed to what in their opinion is the wide-
spread opinion that ignorance is the natural enemy of societal stability and of the 
possibility for orderly societal progress and that every increase in knowledge auto-
matically increases human welfare. A generally positive public attitude toward new 
knowledge, which was widespread in the years immediately following World War II, 
is at present losing ground to growing skepticism about new scientifi c and technical 
knowledge. It is not unusual anymore to encounter the opinion that people know too 
much. Explicit knowledge politics, that is, efforts to police novel knowledge, com-
mences once new capacities for action have been discovered (Stehr,  2003 ). 
 There is a multitude of convincing references to the virtues and advantages of 
ignorance, a lack of knowledge, and invisibility. The discussion and formulation of 
the novel moral principle for an individual’s “right to ignorance” by Jonas ( 1974 , 
pp. 161−163) is clearly germane to a discussion of the political and ethical dilem-
mas generated by the dynamics with which knowledge grows. Jonas’s moral prin-
ciple is opposed by equally formidable ethical demands that insist on a right to 
know, especially at the collective level or from a macroperspective (Sen,  1981 ; 
Stiglitz,  1999 ). In everyday life, sentiments that support the virtue of not knowing 
fi nd expression in such sayings as “What I don’t know can’t hurt me” and “Where 
ignorance is bliss, it is folly to be wise.” 
 Opposition to excessive transparency of one’s own behavior and that of other 
actors, as Merton (1949/ 1968 , p. 343) also emphasized, stems from certain struc-
tural characteristics of societal groups. To these features belong, for instance, the 
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institutionally sanctioned, but in reality also limited, negligence in complying with 
or enforcing existing social norms. The characteristics also include psychologically 
determined, variable opposition to maximum behavioral transparency (Popitz, 
 1968 , p. 8). 9 In modern society technical and legal barriers and these conditions for 
opposition preclude an unlimited investigation of the behavior and convictions of 
individual actors—about whom one would like to know everything. The alleged 
goodwill or maliciousness of the thought police is irrelevant. For instance, new pos-
sibilities for avoiding technically mobilized monitoring keep turning up. 
 Popitz ( 1968 ), on the other hand, pointed to the  disencumbering function that 
limited behavioral information has for the system of sanctions. 10 Limiting the avail-
able or requested behavioral information—a decision that is tantamount to relin-
quishing sanctions—is also a sort of “indeterminacy principle of social life” (p. 12). 
It “opens a sphere in which the system of norms and sanctions need not be taken 
literally without obviously giving up its claim to validity” (p. 12). 
 Lastly, there is a further (primarily cognitive) function of insuffi cient knowledge. 
It has repeatedly been claimed that knowledge arises from non-knowledge, or that 
non-knowledge can be transformed into knowledge. Just how this transformation is 
supposed to happen is scarcely addressed, however. The hypothesis that knowledge 
originates in non-knowledge as it were, in nothing ( ex nihilo ), completely overlooks 
the societal genealogy of knowledge, such as the close, even intimate relationship 
between scientifi c and practical knowledge. The birth of a scientifi c discipline is no 
parthenogenesis. The hypothesis of the transformation of non-knowledge into 
knowledge favors certain knowledge in that the origin of new knowledge is simply 
suppressed. 
 The Societal-Cognitive Functional Differentiation 
Between Non-knowledge and Societally Determined 
Knowledge Gaps 
 One of the self-evident realities in a modern society, with its functionally differenti-
ated cognitive structure, is that individuals, societal groups, and societal institutions 
have long since given up as an illusion the wish, or the hope, for their knowledge to 
be self-suffi cient. Limited knowledge alleviates. Knowledge is unequally 
9  Inasmuch as the disregard and sanctioning of existing social norms by certain incumbents of 
societal positions of a group is known, it must be decided whether “the basic formal structure of a 
group is being undermined by the observed deviations of behavior. It is in this sense that authorities 
can have  excessive knowledge of what is actually going on, so that this becomes dysfunctional for 
the system of social control” (Merton, 1949/ 1968 , p. 343; emphasis added). 
10  In this respect I note that the expression  non-knowledge ( Nichtwissen ) in the title of Popitz’s 
treatise does not appear a single time in the text. The work’s title may be the work of the publishing 
house. The exposition shows that Popitz rightly avoided the term  non-knowledge and more guard-
edly wrote of limited behavioral information and limited behavioral transparency. 
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distributed. As a rule, managers do not themselves have the technical knowledge of 
their employed laborers, engineers, or assembly-line workers. 11 Despite this lack of 
knowledge, managers still become managers. 
 Knowledge gaps or incomprehensive forms of knowledge distribution,  not non- 
knowledge, are a constitutive element of functionally differentiated societies. 
Asymmetrical stocks of knowledge do not lead to society’s collapse. A society’s 
ability to act competently is not a function of the knowledge and information of 
isolated individual actors. A competent actor, for instance, as a politically active 
citizen, need not be comprehensively informed as an individual. 
 A society without this fundamental limitation, without this cognitive functional 
differentiation, is inconceivable. No one has to know everything. But this elemen-
tary fact, which determines the way society is, does not justify the conclusion that 
that non-knowledge is the opposite of knowledge. A being constantly caught up in 
non-knowledge cannot exist. The more collective knowledge increases,
 the smaller the share of all that knowledge becomes that any  one mind can absorb. The 
more civilized we become, the more relatively ignorant must each individual be of the facts 
on which the working of his civilization depends. The very division of knowledge increases 
the necessary ignorance of the individual and most of this knowledge. (Hayek, 1960/ 1978 , 
p. 26, emphasis added) 
 Abandoning the hope for autarkic knowledge, especially the  individual self- 
suffi ciency of knowledge, and giving up the conviction that knowledge is funda-
mentally limited (bounded) entails both costs and benefi ts. But the loss of 
autarky—inasmuch as autarky had ever existed, even in traditional societies—is 
never to be understood as a form of non-knowledge. Societal innovations such as 
the market and the scientifi c or political system help manage knowledge gaps 
(Pérez, Florin, & Whitelock,  2012 ). 
 Relevant functionally differentiated scales of knowledge differ according to fac-
ets such as their respective epoch, the type of society, the pattern of societal inequal-
ity, and the interests of the dominant worldview. 12 In modern complex societies the 
scale of knowledge is longer than in traditional societies. The distance to the sources 
of knowledge is often great. Personal acquaintance with the knowledge producer is 
not necessary. Only in exceptional cases does the knowledge that one does not have, 
but can obtain, include the knowledge that was necessary for the production, legiti-
mation, and distribution of the knowledge acquired. 
11  Collinson’s ( 1994 ) examination of labor resistance—based on two case studies—drew on the 
emphasis that Clegg ( 1989 ) placed on knowledge and information of subordinates and outlines 
generally “the importance of different forms of knowledge in the articulation of resistance” (p. 25). 
Collinson summarized his fi ndings and pointed out that “specifi c forms of knowledge are a crucial 
resource and means through which resistance can be mobilized. Knowledge in organizations is 
multiple, contested and shifting. Employees may not possess detailed underpinnings of certain 
bureaucratic/political processes, but they often do monopolize other technical, production-related 
knowledges that facilitate their oppositional practices” (p. 28). 
12  The concept of the scales of knowledge has a parallel in the concept of the degrees of property 
rights, which are calibrated according to the labor, need, or performance, that is, the merits, of the 




 The current intense debate among social scientists, with its radical polarization of 
knowledge and non-knowledge, is like an echo from a lost world or the wish to be 
able to live in this lost, but secure, world. It was a world in which knowledge was 
reliable, objective, ontologically well-founded, truthful, realistic, uniform, and 
undisputed. It was a world in which scientifi c knowledge was unique and the pro-
fane world of nonscientifi c knowledge was largely disqualifi ed. It was a world in 
which more knowledge alone—such as that which enables one to act successfully 
in practice—was always superior to having no additional knowledge (knowledge 
bias). The world of unquestioned knowledge has vanished. Unclear is whether the 
disappearance of such knowledge is a real loss, as one is evidently supposed to 
believe from talk of the divide between non-knowledge and knowledge, or whether 
it is a form of intellectual emancipation. 
 The difference between knowledge and non-knowledge is an old European 
antithesis with an ancestry harking back to premodern cultures. The old European 
tradition of a dichotomy of non-knowledge and knowledge becomes apparent espe-
cially in the attribution of persons or groups to one of these two categories. Such 
ascription holds that the unknowing person or, more generally, the unknowing social 
class is not only helplessly exposed to the power of knowledge but also pitiable and 
backward. And inasmuch as the occurrence of non-knowledge applies to other 
 societies and cultures, it is foreign knowledge—not one’s own—that is non-knowl-
edge. As described by Fleck (1935/ 1979 ): “Whatever is known has always seemed 
systematic, proven, applicable, and evident to the knower. Every alien system of 
knowledge has likewise seemed contradictory, unproven, inapplicable, fanciful, or 
mystical” (p. 22). 
 For that reason these traditional deliberations on the great divide between knowl-
edge and non-knowledge come nowhere close to resolving the dilemma described 
by Luhmann ( 1991 ): “Is the generally held assumption that more communication, 
more refl ection, more knowledge, more learning, more participation—that more of 
all of this would bring about something good or, in any sense, nothing bad—at all 
justifi ed?” (p. 90, my translation). The emerging political fi eld of knowledge poli-
tics is dedicated to this societal dilemma posed by the risks of knowledge (Stehr, 
 2003 ). 
 One should not insist on an absolute antithesis of knowledge and non- 
knowledge—there is only less or more knowledge and those who know something 
and those who know something else. The practical problem is always to know how 
much or how little one knows in a given situation. A person is not either knowledge-
able or unknowing. A person has more knowledge in one context than in another: A 
person may know a great deal about tax regulations but hardly anything about play-
ing golf. 
 Actors (including scientists) react to complex societal forms by simplifying men-
tal constructs of these relationships. The mental constructs are, in fact, incomplete 
inasmuch as they do not depict reality in its full complexity. These simple models 
7 Knowing and Not Knowing
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change, react to the unexpected, but are hardly non-knowledge. One of the advan-
tages of liberal democracies is the consciousness that omniscience can be dangerous 
and that safeguarding privacy must remain a form of sanctioned ignorance. 
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 Chapter 8 
 How Representations of Knowledge Shape 
Actions 
 Ralph  Hertwig and  Renato  Frey 
 In 2009 the world found itself in the midst of the worst recession since the Great 
Depression. Events thought of as extremely unlikely, such as the burst of the U.S. 
housing boom, the meltdown of the fi nancial system, and the bankruptcy of colossal 
companies, happened in breathtakingly fast succession. Why was the world so 
badly prepared for these improbabilities? One explanation is that the crisis of the 
fi nancial industry preceding the economic recession occurred because the industry’s 
supposedly optimal risk-management models failed to reckon with “black swans” 
(Taleb,  2007 )—unexpected and unpredictable rare events that carry an enormous 
impact. Of course, modern risk-management paradigms were not alone in failing to 
take the black-swan event into account—so did individual players, such as many 
homeowners who could no longer afford their mortgages. Can psychological theo-
ries and fi ndings account for such blind spots? 
 At fi rst glance, the answer is no. Infl uential studies in behavioral decision 
research consistently suggest the opposite propensity: People are oversensitive to 
rare events. For example, they overestimate the chance of getting food poisoning or 
of contracting lung cancer from smoking (Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman, 
& Combs,  1978 ; Viscusi,  2002 ). Moreover, people are depicted as remembering 
past experiences by how they felt at their peak (rare moment) and end (Redelmeier 
& Kahneman,  1996 ). Such oversensitivity is not only empirically observed but also 
theoretically suggested. According to the most infl uential descriptive theory of risky 
choice, people overweight low-probability events (Tversky & Kahneman,  1992 ). In 
fact, cumulative prospect theory explains the puzzling co-occurrence of two 
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 behaviors—that the same people who purchase lottery tickets promising tiny 
chances of winning (thus being risk-seeking) also take out insurance against tiny 
chances of damage (thus being risk averse; Friedman & Savage,  1948 )—on the 
assumption that small probabilities receive too much weight. 
 In light of people’s ostensible oversensitivity to rare events, why did so many 
people, fi nancial experts and laypeople alike, behave as though they were not cog-
nizant of the rare events that triggered what some observers called a bona-fi de 
depression (Posner,  2009 )? Analyses have highlighted a variety of enabling factors, 
ranging from purportedly rational bankers who acted on strong incentives to take 
maximum risks in their lending (Posner,  2009 ) to humans’ “animal spirits” (Akerlof 
& Shiller,  2009 ). However, there is another possibly enabling condition. The cus-
tomary portrayal of humans as being oversensitive to rare events obscures the evi-
dence that people, when recruiting their experience sampled across time to make 
risky decisions, tend to accord rare events (such as the burst of housing bubbles) less 
weight than they deserve according to their objective probabilities. 
 The Description–Experience Gap 
 Just as biologists use the  Drosophila as one model organism, behavioral-decision 
researchers have used choice between monetary gambles as a model for risky 
choice, assuming that many real-world options have the same properties as gam-
bles, namely,  n outcomes and associated probabilities (Lopes,  1983 ). Moreover, 
many researchers have grown accustomed to presenting their respondents with one 
particular genus of the fruit fl y: gambles in which all outcomes and their probabili-
ties are stated and respondents make a single choice. Figure  8.1 illustrates typical 
description-based decision-making problems.
 In everyday life, however, people can rarely peruse such descriptions of probabil-
ity distributions—although there are a few exceptions, such as media weather fore-
casts stating probabilities of precipitation (Gigerenzer, Hertwig, Van Den Broek, 
Fasolo, & Katsikopoulos,  2005 ). When people decide whether to take out a loan or 
contemplate the success of a fi rst date, there are no risk tables to consult. Instead, 
people need to rely on whatever experience they have had with these options, making 
decisions based on experience rather than on description (Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & 
Erev,  2004 ). Both kinds of decision can be understood as opposite poles on a con-
tinuum of uncertainty about what one is choosing between. In Knight’s ( 1921 ) termi-
nology, decisions from descriptions involve  a priori probabilities , whereas decisions 
from experience involve  statistical probabilities , which one must assess “if at all, by 
tabulating the results of experience” (p. 215), so they invariably fall short of the stan-
dards of accuracy set by a priori probabilities (Hau, Pleskac, & Hertwig,  2010 ). 
 In the 1950s and early 1960s, before modern behavioral-decision research, sci-
entists who studied decision-making investigated decisions from experience. They 
examined, for example, whether and how people learn the probability structure of 
an outcome distribution through trial-by-trial feedback (for a review see Luce & 
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 Fig. 8.1  How to study decisions from descriptions and experience. The choice task in decisions 
from description typically consists of two monetary gambles with explicitly stated outcomes and 
their probabilities ( a ). In decisions from experience, three paradigms have been employed. The 
 sampling paradigm ( b ) consists of an initial sampling stage (here represented by seven fi ctitious 
draws) in which a person explores two payoff distributions without costs by clicking on one of the 
two buttons on the computer screen, followed by an outcome drawn from the respective distribu-
tion. The buttons chosen by a participant are marked in  red . After terminating sampling, the person 
sees a choice screen ( green screen ) and is asked to select the button to draw once for real. The 
 partial-feedback paradigm ( c ) combines sampling and choice, thus each draw represents both an 
act of exploration and an act of exploitation. The respondent receives feedback regarding the 
obtained payoff after each draw from the chosen button ( red box ). The  full-feedback paradigm ( d ) 
is identical to the partial-feedback paradigm, except that it also provides feedback concerning the 
forgone payoff (i.e., the payoff that the person would have received had she chosen the other 
option;  white box ) (Reprinted from Hertwig and Erev ( 2009 , p. 518) with permission from Elsevier) 
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Suppes,  1965 ). The impracticality of the research designs—purportedly hundreds of 
trials are needed before behavior stabilizes—may have been the reason that modern 
behavioral-decision research turned away from the transients of learning (for an 
exception see, for example, Busemeyer,  1985 ). Moreover, with the increasing 
importance of expected utility theory, the study of anomalies became pertinent, 
which required the conveying of perfect information about the probabilities of rel-
evant events (Fig.  8.1a ). Interest in issues of learning and experience-based deci-
sions, however, remained alive in other fi elds, such as operation research (see 
literature on multiarmed bandit problems; Sutton & Barto,  1998 ). 
 Modern decision-making researchers’ interest in decisions from experience has 
been rekindled by the recent observation of systematic and robust differences 
between them and decisions from description. Research on decisions from experi-
ence has come with a simple experimental tool, a “computerized money machine.” 
Respondents see two buttons on a computer screen, each one representing an ini-
tially unknown payoff distribution. Clicking a button results in a random draw from 
the respective distribution. Three variations of this experimental tool have been 
employed. In the  sampling paradigm (Fig.  8.1b ), people fi rst sample as many out-
comes as they wish and only then decide from which distribution to make a single 
draw for real (Hertwig et al.,  2004 ; Weber, Shafi r, & Blais,  2004 ). In the  full- 
feedback paradigm (Fig.  8.1d ), there is a limited number of draws (typically 100), 
each of which contributes to people’s earnings, and they receive draw-by-draw 
feedback on the obtained and the forgone payoffs (i.e., payoff received had the other 
option been selected; Yechiam & Busemeyer,  2006 ). The  partial-feedback para-
digm (Fig.  8.1c ) is identical to the full-feedback paradigm, except that people learn 
about the obtained payoffs only (Barron & Erev,  2003 ; Erev & Barron,  2005 ). 
Unlike the fi rst two paradigms, the partial-feedback paradigm presents respondents 
with an exploitation–exploration trade-off. Exploitation and exploration represent 
two alternative goals associated with every choice, namely, to obtain a desired out-
come (exploitation) or to gather new information about other, perhaps better, actions 
(exploration; Cohen, McClure, & Yu,  2007 ). 
 Across all three experiential paradigms, a robust and systematic description–
experience gap has emerged in numerous studies. Figure  8.2 illustrates this gap in 
six decision-making problems (Erev et al.,  2010 ). Each one offers a choice between 
a risky option with two outcomes and a safe option. In the risky options, either the 
desirable outcome or the less desirable outcome occurs with low probability (.1 or 
less). In all three experiential paradigms, respondents tend to select the risky option 
when the desirable outcome occurs with high probability, and they select the safe 
option when the desirable outcome occurs with low probability. This tendency is 
reversed in decisions from description. The general pattern can be summarized as 
follows: In decisions from experience, people behave as if the rare events have less 
impact than they deserve according to their objective probabilities, whereas in deci-
sions from description people behave as if the rare events have more impact than 
they deserve (consistent with cumulative prospect theory).
R. Hertwig and R. Frey
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 What Causes the Description–Experience Gap? 
 Several causes may be contributing to the description–experience gap. 
 Small Samples 
 Two classes of factors have been identifi ed as shaping the search process in the 
sampling paradigm: properties of the decision-making problems (e.g., the magni-
tude of the incentives, see Hau, Pleskac, Kiefer, & Hertwig,  2008 ; and whether the 



























Decision from Description 
Problem 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Safe option 7 -4.1 11.5 2.2 6.8 11 
Risky option 
Maximum 16.5 1.3 25.6 3 7.3 11.4 
p (maximum) .01 .05 .10 .93 .96 .97 
Minimum 6.9 -4.3 8.1 -7.2 -8.5 1.9 
Expected value 7 -4.0 9.9 2.3 6.7 11.1 
 Fig. 8.2  Proportion of choices of the risky option as a function of the probability of the more 
desirable outcome in 6 of 120 problems studied in Erev et al. ( 2010 ). Each problem presents a 
choice between a risky option and a safe option. The decision-making problems and the expected 
values (EV) of the risky options are displayed below the plot. Each problem was studied using the 
four paradigms listed in Fig.  8.1 (Erev et al.,  2010 ; the data from the full-feedback paradigm are 
unpublished). Participants (20 per paradigm) were paid (in shekels) for one of their choices, ran-
domly selected. The partial- and full-feedback paradigms involved 100 choices per problem, and 
the reported proportions are the means over these choices and participants (Reprinted from Hertwig 
and Erev ( 2009 , p. 519) with permission from Elsevier) 
 
8 How Representations of Knowledge Shape Actions
132
individual characteristics, such as people’s emotional state (Frey, Hertwig, & 
Rieskamp,  2014 ) or age (Frey et al.  2015 ). However, across numerous studies 
(reviewed in Hau et al.,  2010 ), respondents typically proved restrained in their 
information search, with a median number of samples per choice problem typically 
ranging between 11 and 19. These results suggest that reliance on small samples is 
one factor that contributes to the attenuated impact of rare events (Hertwig et al., 
 2004 ). For small samples the chances are that a person does not even experience the 
rare events. More generally, one is more likely to undersample than oversample the 
rare event, for the binomial distribution of the number of times a particular outcome 
will be observed in  n independent trials is markedly skewed when  p is small (i.e., 
the event is rare) and  n is small (i.e., few outcomes are sampled). Interestingly, reli-
ance on small samples has also been discussed as a potential explanation for bum-
blebees’ underweighting of rare events: Studying foraging decisions by bees in a 
spatial arrangement of fl owers that promise with varying probabilities different 
amounts of nectar, Real ( 1991 ) concluded that “bumblebees underperceive rare 
events and overperceive common events” (p. 985). He explained this distortion in 
bees’ probability perception as a consequence of their sampling behavior—“bees 
frame their decisions on the basis of only a few visits” (Real,  1992 , p. 133)—and 
suggested that such reliance on small samples can be adaptive.
 Short-term optimization may be adaptive when there is a high degree of spatial autocorrela-
tion in the distribution of fl oral rewards. In most fi eld situations, there is intense local com-
petition among pollinators for fl oral resources. When “hot” and “cold” spots in fi elds of 
fl owers are created through pollinator activity, then such activity will generate a high degree 
of spatial autocorrelation in nectar rewards. If information about individual fl owers is 
pooled, then the spatial structure of reward distributions will be lost, and foraging over the 
entire fi eld will be less effi cient. In spatially autocorrelated environments (“rugged land-
scapes”), averaging obscures the true nature of the environment. (p. 135) 
 Could there be any advantage to frugal sampling in experience-based decisions 
by humans? Hertwig and Pleskac ( 2008 ,  2010 ) proposed one possible advantage 
that rests on the notion of amplifi cation. Unlike Real ( 1992 ), however, they argued 
that amplifi cation proffers a cognitive rather than an evolutionary benefi t. Through 
mathematical analysis and computer simulation, Hertwig and Pleskac ( 2010 ) 
showed that small samples amplify the difference between the options’ average 
rewards. That is, drawing small samples from payoff distributions results in experi-
enced differences of sample means that are larger than the objective difference. 
Such amplifi ed absolute differences simplify the choice between gambles and 
thereby explain the frugal sampling behavior observed in investigations of decisions 
from experience—a conjecture for which Hertwig and Pleskac ( 2010 ) found empir-
ical evidence. 
 The explanation of the description–experience gap in terms of small samples has 
prompted a critical response (Fox & Hadar,  2006 ) and has led to an ongoing debate. 
What appears to be underweighting of rare events in decisions from experience 
could be consistent with overweighting of low probabilities as assumed in cumula-
tive prospect theory. When the probability experienced in a sample is smaller than 
the event’s objective probability, people may still overweight this sample  probability. 
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Despite this overweighting, the erroneous impression of underweighting would 
emerge if the  overweighting did not fully compensate for the  underestimation that 
results from the skew in small samples. In this view the description–experience gap 
is statistical (sampling error) rather than psychological in nature. 
 Several approaches have been taken to examine whether the gap observed in the 
sampling paradigm can indeed be reduced to sampling error. If sampling error was 
the sole culprit, then reducing the error by extending the sample should attenuate 
and eventually eliminate the gap. Increasing sample sizes substantially (up to 50 and 
100 draws per choice problem) reduced but did not eliminate the gap (Hau et al., 
 2008 ,  2010 ). If sampling error caused the gap, then removing the error by aligning 
the sample’s experienced probabilities to the objective probabilities should elimi-
nate it. It did not (Ungemach, Chater, & Stewart,  2009 ). If sampling error was the 
sole root of the gap, then presenting respondents in the description condition the 
same information that others experienced ( yoking ) should eliminate the gap. In one 
study it did (Rakow, Demes, & Newell,  2008 ); in another it did for small samples 
but not for large ones (Hau et al.,  2010 ; see these authors’ discussion of trivial 
choices as one possible explanation for the mixed results obtained). The gap per-
sisted even when people were presented both descriptions and experience rather 
than descriptions only (Jessup, Bishara, & Busemeyer,  2008 ). 
 In summary, the reality of the description–experience gap across the three expe-
riential paradigms is unchallenged—its cause, however, is disputed. Some research-
ers have argued that the gap in the sampling paradigm is statistical in nature (Fox & 
Hadar,  2006 ; Hadar & Fox,  2009 ; Rakow et al.,  2008 ); others have proposed that the 
sampling error is not the sole cause (Hau et al.,  2008 ,  2010 ; Hertwig et al.,  2004 ; 
Ungemach et al.,  2009 ). Regardless of how this debate will advance, it is informa-
tive to go beyond the sampling paradigm. Reliance on small samples, for example, 
cannot be the reason behind the description–experience gap in the full-feedback 
paradigm (Fig.  8.1d ) paradigm, in which the impact of rare events is attenuated even 
after a hundred trials with perfect feedback. Beyond sampling error, what psycho-
logical factors may be in play? 
 Recency 
 A psychological factor that may contribute to the description–experience gap is 
 recency (Hertwig et al.,  2004 ). Ubiquitously observed in memory, belief updating, 
and judgments (Hogarth & Einhorn,  1992 ), recency refers to the phenomenon that 
observations made late in a sequence receive more weight than they deserve (i.e., 
more than 1/ n ). Recency is closely related to reliance on small samples: The small 
sample of recent events can reintroduce the aforementioned skew into large samples 
of experience. Although the original fi nding was that people give more weight to 
recent than to previous outcomes in the fl ow of their experience (Hertwig et al., 
 2004 ), little or no impact of recency was observed in later studies (Hau et al.,  2010 ; 
Rakow et al.,  2008 ; Ungemach et al.,  2009 ). 
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 Estimation Error 
 In theory, the description–experience gap could also be the result of a systematic 
estimation error (Fox & Hadar,  2006 ), with people systematically underestimating 
the frequencies of the rare event experienced in the sample. Studies of frequency 
and probability assessments, however, commonly report overestimation of rare 
events (Hertwig, Pachur, & Kurzenhäuser,  2005 ; Lichtenstein et al.,  1978 ). 
Moreover, studies recording people’s estimates of rare events in the sampling para-
digm found them to be well calibrated or a little too high relative to the experienced 
frequency (Hau et al.,  2008 ; Ungemach et al.,  2009 ). That is, people do not system-
atically estimate rare things to be even rarer than they statistically are. 
 Contingent Sampling 
 Still another factor that could underlie the description–experience gap, especially in 
the feedback paradigm, is the notion that people inform their decisions by recruiting 
recent and past experiences garnered in similar situations (for related notions see 
Gilboa & Schmeidler,  1995 ; Gonzalez, Lerch, & Lebiere,  2003 ). Such contingent 
sampling is likely to be ubiquitous in the wild (Klein,  1999 ). For example, when 
fi refi ghters need to predict the behavior of a fi re, they appear to retrieve from mem-
ory similar instances from the past. Contingent sampling implies recency and reli-
ance on small sampling to the extent that similarity decreases with time. Furthermore, 
in dynamic environments (e.g., the restless bandit problem; Whittle,  1988 ), reliance 
on similar experiences is an effi cient heuristic (Biele, Erev, & Ert,  2009 ). Below, we 
turn to the manner in which the process of contingent sampling can be modeled. 
 Spatial Search Policies 
 Like any organism, humans can sample information in at least two very different 
ways from payoff distributions (e.g., fl owers, ponds, other people, and gambles). 
Figure  8.3 depicts two paradigmatic sequential-sampling strategies based on two 
assumed options. In piecewise sampling, the searcher oscillates between options, 
each time drawing, in the most extreme case, the smallest possible sample. In com-
prehensive sampling, by contrast, the searcher samples extensively from one option 
and then turns to the other option to explore it thoroughly.
 Taking these two sampling strategies as a starting point, Hills and Hertwig ( 2010 ) 
suggested that this spatial way of sampling foreshadows how people make their 
fi nal decision. Specifi cally, they proposed that a person who samples piecewise will 
tend to make decisions as would a judge who scores each round of a boxing match: 
She determines which option yields the better reward in each round of sampling and 
ultimately picks the one that wins the most rounds. By contrast, a person using a 
comprehensive-sampling strategy will tend to gauge the average reward for each 
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option and then choose the one promising the larger reward harvest. The reason for 
this dependency of the decision strategies on search is that the piecewise- and 
comprehensive- sampling strategy foster comparisons across different scales of 
information: rounds vs. summaries, respectively. Determining a winner who is 
ahead in most rounds and determining the one yielding the largest expected reward 
 Fig. 8.3  ( a ) Representations of the sampling patterns associated with piecewise- and 
comprehensive- sampling strategies. Piecewise strategies repeatedly alternate back and forth 
between options. Comprehensive-sampling strategies take one large sample from each option. 
Following the sample phase, the participants make a decision about which option they prefer. ( b ) 
Representations of the comparison strategies associated with roundwise and summary strategies 
for a set of hypothetical outcomes. Roundwise strategies compare outcomes over repeated rounds 
and choose options that win the most rounds. Summary strategies compare fi nal values (here, the 
overall expected value) and choose options with the better fi nal value (Reprinted from Hills and 
Hertwig ( 2010 , p. 1788) with permission from Associations for Psychological Science) 
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can lead to different choices even when both decisions-makers experience the same 
information. The reason is that the person using the former decision strategy weighs 
each round equally, ignores the magnitude of wins and losses, and thus acts as if it 
underweights rare, but consequential, outcomes. That link between sampling strat-
egy and decision strategy is exactly what Hills and Hertwig ( 2010 ) found. Individuals 
who frequently oscillated between options were more likely to choose the round- 
wise winning options and to make choices as if they underweighted rare events than 
were individuals who switched options rarely. 
 In summary, modern behavioral decision research has been strongly focused on 
people’s responses to descriptions of events. In recent years three experiential para-
digms have been used to study how experience affects risky choice. A consistent 
picture has emerged. When rare events are involved, description-based and 
experience- based decisions can drastically diverge. We now turn to different ways 
of modeling decisions from experience. 
 Cognitive Strategies in Decisions from Experience 
 In attempting to capture the information search (learning) and decision-making pro-
cesses in decisions from experience, researchers have proposed models that can be 
grouped into three classes. The fi rst class—neo-Bernoullian models—rests on the 
premise that respondents form a mental representation of the relative frequency 
(probability) with which events occur in the process of sampling outcomes. 
Combined with outcome information, these probabilities then enter the evaluation 
of the two gambles’ desirability. But do decisions from experience inevitably give 
rise to an explicit representation of probabilities? The second and the third class of 
models—associative learning models and heuristics—refl ect the assumption that 
decision-makers can and will do without probabilities. In this section we discuss the 
three classes of models. 
 Neo-Bernoullian Models 
 Expected utility theory postulates that one can, or should, model human choice by 
assuming that people behave as if they have multiplied some function of probability 
and value and then have maximized it. Applied to decisions from experience, 
expected utility theory and related models require explicit representation of proba-
bilities. An example is the “two-stage model” (Tversky & Fox,  1995 , p. 279) of 
decision under uncertainty, in which it is assumed that decision-makers fi rst esti-
mate the probability  p of an uncertain event  A and then make a choice. The psycho-
logical impact of the event  A with its associated (estimated) probability  p is then 
measured in terms of cumulative prospect theory’s probability weighting function π 
(Fox & Tversky,  1998 ). 
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 Associative Learning Models 
 In this class of theories, human choice is conceptualized as a learning process 
(Busemeyer & Myung,  1992 ; Bush & Mosteller,  1955 ). Learning consists in chang-
ing the propensity to select a gamble according to the experienced outcomes. Good 
experiences boost the propensity of choosing the gamble associated with them, and 
bad experiences diminish it (e.g., Barron & Erev,  2003 ; Denrell,  2007 ; Erev & 
Barron,  2005 ; March,  1996 ). Two associative-learning models that have been pro-
posed to capture decisions from experience are the value-updating model (Hertwig, 
Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2006 ) and the instance-based learning (IBL) model 
(Gonzalez & Dutt,  2011 ). 
 The value-updating model stipulates that learners update their estimates of the 
value of the gamble after each new draw from it. Specifi cally, the model computes the 
weighted average of the previously estimated value and the value of the most recently 
experienced outcome. The model includes two parameters, namely, the number of 
draws and a recency parameter. The former parameter is determined empirically; the 
second is adjustable (i.e., fi tted to the data). Importantly, the model does not necessi-
tate representation of probabilities. Furthermore, the best fi tting parameter in a model 
competition indeed suggested a substantial recency effect (Hau et al.,  2008 ). 
 The IBL model also stipulates a learning process but goes beyond the relatively 
simple assumptions of the value-updating model: It is assumed that a choice (given 
that it is not automatically reproduced) represents the selection of the option with 
the higher utility (blended value). An option’s blended value is a function of its 
associated outcomes and the probability of retrieving corresponding instances from 
memory (contingent sampling). Memory retrieval depends on memory activation, 
which, in turn, is a function of the recency and frequency of the experience. 
Activation is specifi ed by the mechanism originally proposed in Adaptive Control 
of Thought—Rational (ACT-R; Anderson & Lebiere,  1998 ), a cognitive architec-
ture used by cognitive psychologists to model problem-solving, learning, and mem-
ory. The IBL model is particularly attractive because it “predicts not only the fi nal 
consequential choice but also the sequence of sampling selection” (Gonzalez & 
Dutt,  2011 , p. 529; but see Hills & Hertwig,  2012 ) and because it offers a single 
learning mechanism (leading up to an instance’s activation) across all experiential 
designs (Fig.  8.1b–d ). Indeed, in a quantitative comparison of models, Gonzalez 
and Dutt ( 2011 ) were able to show that the IBL model predicts fi nal experience- 
based decisions as well as or better than any other proposed model (including, for 
instance, the value-updating model and cumulative prospect theory). 
 Heuristics 
 Another class of models designed to describe both the process and outcome of 
choice are cognitive choice heuristics (see Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, & 
Hertwig, 2006 ). Heuristics can be separated into two classes: those that use solely 
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outcome information and exclude probabilities (outcome heuristics), and those that 
use at least rudimentary probability information (dual heuristics). Outcome heuris-
tics such as maximax and minimax (Luce & Raïffa,  1957 ; Savage,  1954 ) were origi-
nally proposed as models for decision-making under ignorance in which people 
have no information whatsoever about probabilities. 
 Another cognitive heuristic that focuses on outcomes is the natural-mean heuris-
tic (Hertwig & Pleskac,  2008 ). It works in two steps:
 Step 1. Calculate the natural mean of outcomes for both gambles by summing, sepa-
rately for each gamble, all  n -experienced outcomes and then dividing by  n . 
 Step 2. Choose the gamble with the larger natural mean (i.e., the gamble that had the 
best average outcome in the sampling phase). 
The natural-mean heuristic was originally proposed in the context of  n -armed ban-
dit problems (Sutton & Barto,  1998 ) as a simple method for estimating the values of 
actions (e.g., the play of one of a slot machine’s levers) and for using the estimates 
to select between actions: “The true value of an action is the mean reward received 
when the action is selected. One natural way to estimate this is by averaging the 
rewards actually received when the action was selected” (p. 27). The natural-mean 
heuristic totes up all experienced rewards (or losses) per gamble and then divides 
this sum by the sample size per gamble to arrive at the  natural mean . One interpreta-
tion of the natural-mean heuristic is that in decisions from experience it is a simple 
and psychologically plausible instantiation of the expected-value calculus—partic-
ularly in continuous outcome distributions. Indeed, the natural-mean heuristic was 
not inferior to the more complex models described above and predicted a compa-
rable number of correct predictions in decisions from experience (Hau et al.,  2008 ). 
 In light of these models that do not require explicit representations of probabili-
ties, we return to the question of what the possible codeterminants of the gap 
between description and experience are. The two associative-learning models and 
the natural-mean heuristic are format dependent. That is, they cannot capture deci-
sions from description, for the input into these models consists of a sequence of 
outcomes that get integrated into one summary measure. They have no conceptual 
parameters with which to take probability information into account, and, in fact, 
probabilities are not directly apparent in decisions from experience. In decisions 
based on description, however, probabilities are made explicit to decisions-makers. 
Differences in description- and experience-based choices could therefore arise 
partly because different formats of mathematically equivalent information trigger 
different cognitive strategies (see Gigerenzer & Hoffrage,  1995 , for a related argu-
ment in Bayesian reasoning). 
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 Decisions from Experience: A Key to Otherwise Puzzling 
Human Behavior 
 The most famous eruption of Mount Vesuvius occurred in 79 AD, destroying many 
neighboring towns, among them Pompeii, the luxurious resort of wealthy Romans 
and now the most renowned still life of volcanic doom. This eruption, however, was 
not the most devastating one. As recent volcanological and archaeoanthropological 
studies have revealed, an earlier, Bronze Age eruption (around 3780 BC) covered 
the surrounding area as far as 25 km away, burying land and villages, causing a 
global climatic disturbance and the abandonment of the entire area for centuries. 
The loss of life and property was less extensive in the Bronze Age cataclysm than in 
the eruption of AD 79, but researchers recently discovered evidence of a mass exo-
dus: a huge number of human and animal footprints pressed into the ash bed and all 
leading away from the volcano (Mastrolorenzo, Petrone, Pappalardo, & 
Sheridan, 2006 ). 
 At present, at least three million people live within the area that was destroyed by 
the Bronze Age eruption. In fact, the periphery of Mount Vesuvius, which includes 
a signifi cant chunk of the Naples metropolitan area, is among the most populated of 
any active volcano (Bruni,  2003 ). According to simulations by Mastrolorenzo et al. 
( 2006 ), an eruption comparable in magnitude to the Bronze Age eruption would 
cause total devastation and mortality within a radius of at least 12 km (7½ miles). In 
addition, great quantities of fi ne ash in more distant zones might cause severe 
respiratory- tract injuries and fatalities due to acute asphyxia. Although it is impos-
sible to predict the exact probability of such a catastrophe happening, volcanolo-
gists such as Michael Sheridan have argued that roughly 2000 years have passed 
since Pompeii’s destruction and that “with each year, the statistical probability 
increases that there will be another violent eruption” of Vesuvius (Wilford,  2006 ). 
In light of these dire forecasts, one might expect that local residents would be keen 
to move away from the danger zone. On the contrary, relocating residents has proven 
extremely diffi cult, despite considerable incentives offered by the regional authori-
ties. “In the shadow of Vesuvius, those residents have cultivated a remarkable opti-
mism, a transcendent fatalism and a form of denial as deep as the earth’s molten 
core” (Bruni,  2003 , par. 12). 
 How can one explain the willingness of residents to defy fate? Perhaps it has 
become clear by now why the distinction between description-based and experience- 
based decisions may be key to understanding this and other puzzling risk-taking 
behavior. Personal experience tells residents in the vicinity of Mount Vesuvius that 
violent eruptions are extremely rare; in fact, in most people’s lifetime, they have 
been nonexistent. Unless catastrophes have occurred recently, the relative indiffer-
ence with which citizens and politicians often consider rare, but high-consequence, 
events like bursting levies, catastrophic earthquakes, and eruptions of volcanoes 
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may be owed to the experience of their rarity (Weber,  2012 ). Just as residents in the 
vicinity of Mount Vesuvius have ignored incentives to relocate, people living in 
fl ood plains who make decisions about insurance based on their personal experience 
with fl oods—a rare event—have tended to turn down even federally subsidized 
fl ood insurance (Kunreuther,  1984 ). 
 At the same time, experiencing a rare, but highly consequential, event in reality 
can also have a lasting psychological impact. This possibility brings the discussion 
full circle. Generations growing up in a period of low stock returns appear to take 
an unusually cautious approach to investing, even decades later. In other words, 
young people who experienced the dramatic economic slump of 2008–2009 may 
enter the stock and housing market much more cautiously than their parents did. 
 Conclusion 
 Modern behavioral decision research has commonly focused on decisions from 
description. The observations stemming from this research suggest that humans 
overestimate and overweight rare events. Recent research on risky choice that takes 
into account the role of experience has found that people behave as if rare events are 
accorded less weight than they deserve relative to their objective probabilities. These 
observations are not contradictory; they describe how the mind functions in two dif-
ferent informational environments. In other words, research on description- based 
behavior and research on experience-based behavior should not be played against 
each other—their contrast is enlightening. However, to improve the understanding of 
how people make decisions with incomplete and uncertain information “in the wild” 
and how people respond to events that are rare but highly consequential, it is neces-
sary to study the psychology and rationality of people’s decisions from experience. 
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 Chapter 9 
 Refl ection and Impulse as Determinants 
of Human Behavior 
 Anand  Krishna and  Fritz  Strack 
 The Missing Link Between Knowledge and Action 
 The experience of being and acting human is a universal theme of cultural expres-
sion. From movies to great literary works, great weight is placed on both of these 
aspects, being and acting. Literary fi gures that resonate in our minds do so both 
because of their heroic (or antiheroic) actions and their inner life—their motiva-
tions, feelings, and thoughts on their own existence and actions. Sometimes this 
inner life refl ects a clever, refl ective type of thinking, as with the Danaans in Homer’s 
 Iliad and their plan to defeat the Trojans by infi ltrating the city in a wooden horse. 
But equally fascinating are the stories of protagonists who show an impetuous, 
impulsive side, such as Icarus, the Greek youth who fl ew too close to the sun and 
thereby melted his artifi cial wings despite his father’s specifi c warning. Lastly, there 
are those fi gures who are faced with an inner confl ict between refl ection and 
impulse—Odysseus, for all his cleverness, cannot resist the temptation to hear the 
deadly song of the Sirens, yet his forethought in having himself tied to the mast of 
his ship defeats the impulse to drown himself trying to reach them. 
 These three Greek legends appear to show different ways of thinking that lead to 
different results. Coming up with complex plans such as the Trojan Horse requires 
refl ection and active use of knowledge, whereas such deliberation would seem anti-
thetical to Icarus’ fl ight. However, these two different modes of thought do seem to 
come together in a fashion, as is in Odysseus’ use of forward planning to defeat the 
consequences of his impulsive decision. In everyday life, as well, people often 
approach situations in these two ways—spending a while considering what to eat 
for lunch and making a deliberate selection but also automatically grabbing a sweet 
dessert without thinking about it at all. When considering how these mental 
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 processes work, it makes sense to look at the two styles of thinking separately to 
gain an understanding of their interaction and of their actual effect on behavior. 
 In this chapter we seek to illuminate the characteristics of these two processes, 
show their interactions with each another, and point out their common effect on 
behavior. To do so, it is fi rst necessary to evaluate each system independently, exam-
ining historical and current perspectives on refl ective and impulsive styles of 
thought. Thereafter, we present an integrative model of thinking and action in an 
endeavor to identify when which system of thought will be active and under what 
circumstances it will infl uence behavior. 
 A Short Overview of Refl ective and Impulsive Styles 
of Thinking 
 Theories of Refl ection 
 The idea that human behavior is based on active, refl ective thought guided by the 
principle of attaining benefi cial things is old and makes intuitive sense. It is diffi cult 
to argue why people would actively decide to act in a fashion that they know is bad 
for them without some belief that the action would ultimately be positive. In this 
conception of human thought, negative outcomes can be explained by a lack of 
information. The Greek philosopher Socrates, for example, proposed that people 
would otherwise act in ways that were good for them. 
 From a social psychological perspective, this kind of thinking is exemplifi ed in 
expectancy-value theories and the concept of  homo oeconomicus (e.g., Fishbein & 
Ajzen,  1975 ). The theory of planned behavior (Ajzen,  1985 ) is an established exam-
ple of an expectancy-value model (Conner & Armitage,  1998 ). It depicts behavior 
as a function of several specifi c mental factors. In this conceptualization the three 
determinants of behavior are the attitude toward the behavior, the subjective norm 
relevant to the behavior, and the perceived behavioral control over the behavior. An 
attitude toward a specifi c behavior is generated by multiplying the evaluation of a 
possible perceived outcome of the behavior (a value) by the perceived likelihood of 
that outcome (an expectancy) and then summing the results of this multiplication 
for all possible outcomes. Similarly, the subjective norm is calculated by multiply-
ing the actor’s motivation to comply with another person’s expectation by the per-
ceived likelihood that that person holds that expectation over all persons. By 
contrast, perceived behavioral control is a function of the perceived power of 
behavior- inhibiting or behavior-facilitating factors multiplied by the likelihood that 
the actor has access to these factors. 
 The assumption in the theory of planned behavior is, therefore, that a human 
actor’s calculation of these three determinants of behavior is optimally based on all 
available information. Once the determinants are established, the actor will  integrate 
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them for all possible behaviors and select the best option. This behavior is then initi-
ated via a behavioral intention. 
 This idea is echoed in various domains, both historically and in more modern 
contexts, such as organizational psychology (Vroom,  1964 ), addiction research 
(Sutton, Marsh, & Matheson,  1987 ), and education (Wigfi eld & Eccles,  2000 ). 
There is solid empirical support for the ability of expectancy-value models to pre-
dict intentions and behavior (e.g., Armitage & Conner,  2001 ). However, even the 
strongest empirical studies do not conclude that this kind of thinking can com-
pletely predict behavior. In particular, it seems unlikely that behavior occurring 
without conscious thought could be dependent on this kind of deliberative, inten-
tional processing (e.g., Langer, Blank, & Chanowitz,  1978 ). Therefore, one must 
consider alternative mental processes that are characterized by less deliberative 
processing. 
 Theories of Impulse 
 Expectancy-value models can describe the careful planning behind the Trojan horse 
well, but they seem less able to explain why Icarus would immolate his wings. The 
kind of action implied in the latter myth is apparently not infl uenced by the knowl-
edge of the action’s expected consequences. It may rather be seen as reckless, as 
based on an impulse that seems to instigate behavior automatically. This determi-
nant of behavior differs from the rational assumptions of Socrates or the theory of 
planned behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen,  1975 ) and must be explained by other means. 
Historically, this point is recognized by Aristotle in the  Nicomanchean Ethics 
(Crisp,  2000 ) when he argues that people may at times act against their judgment. 
In his view an overwhelming passion—physical feelings (e.g., hunger) and emo-
tions (e.g., fear or pleasure)—directly implies a practical conclusion to act on it. 
This practical conclusion may at times overpower the conclusions reached by 
reason. 
 Psychology as a discipline has focused mostly on factors that affect the ability of 
reasoned conclusions to control passionate ones (Hofmann, Friese, & Strack,  2009 ). 
For example, children’s ability to forgo a small, immediate reward in favor of a 
larger, delayed reward has been shown to depend on various factors, including 
opportunity to pay attention to the immediate reward and thinking happy or sad 
thoughts (Mischel, Ebbesen, & Raskoff,  1972 ). Muraven and Baumeister ( 2000 ) 
conceptualize the control of impulses as being achieved by a metaphorical “muscle” 
that is powered by limited resources and is subject to fatigue, a state called  ego 
depletion . In this view, reasoned control of impulses will fail if remaining resources 
of self-control are insuffi cient to overcome impulse strength. Personality variables 
have been linked to the ability to control impulses (e.g., Block & Block,  1980 ; 
Carver,  2005 ), as have physiological variables such as blood glucose and alcohol 
levels (Bushman & Cooper,  1990 ; Gailliot et al.,  2007 ) and situational factors such 
as the availability of tempting stimuli (Schachter,  1971 ). 
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 Another approach to impulses and their effect on behavior is provided by research 
on implicit attitudes. Implicit attitudes are seen as spontaneous, automatic affective 
and behavioral responses to attitude objects (Greenwald & Banaji,  1995 ). The view 
that impulsive behavior comes from overwhelming passion caused by a situation 
maps well onto this idea that attitude objects may spontaneously cause affect and 
behavior via automatic processes. This view contrasts with the position that atti-
tudes are evaluations of target objects (e.g., Eagly & Chaiken,  1993 ). The evaluative 
position implies a more deliberative assessment of object properties, which corre-
sponds to processes similar to those described in the theory of reasoned action 
(Fishbein & Ajzen,  1975 ). Researchers studying implicit attitudes generally adopt 
indirect attitude measures such as the affective priming paradigm (Fazio, 
Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes,  1986 ) or the implicit association test (IAT) 
(Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz,  1998 ). These instruments typically use a com-
bination of valent and categorical stimuli and measure their inhibition or facilitation 
of a target behavior. Affective priming studies show that people categorize evalua-
tive adjectives such as  good or  bad faster when they are congruent in valence to an 
attitude object shown immediately beforehand (Fazio,  2001 ). The IAT measures the 
difference between reaction times when participants are asked to categorize an 
object by attitudinal categories via a key-press reaction also associated with a par-
ticular valence (Greenwald et al.,  1998 ). These measures show that behavioral 
responses to specifi c stimuli are infl uenced by the valence of these stimuli. The dif-
ference between what these implicit measures capture and what traditional evalua-
tive measures (e.g., self-report questions) assess is apparent from their only moderate 
correlations (Fazio & Olson,  2003 ) and by the relative robustness of implicit mea-
sures with regard to participants’ conscious control (Banse, Seise, & Zerbes,  2001 ; 
Kim,  2003 ; but see Mierke & Klauer,  2001 , and Fiedler & Bluemke,  2005 , for criti-
cal discussions). One explains these results by stating that the spontaneous response 
to an attitudinal object is governed by associations that may differ in content from 
the results of a deliberative evaluation. These associations occur between perceived 
objects, behavior, and affect. The link between impulse and behavior has some theo-
retical basis—including the ideomotor principle (James,  1890 ) and the perception- 
behavior link (Bargh,  1997 )—as does a direct link between perception and affective 
response (Zajonc,  1980 ). However, research on implicit attitudes has not succeeded 
in explaining what an implicit attitude actually is, beyond the tautological func-
tional defi nition that an implicit attitude is what is measured by indirect measures 
(Strack & Deutsch,  2007 ). With evidence accruing that implicit attitudes may be 
strongly affected by the context (Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park,  2001 ) and type (Bosson, 
Swann, & Pennebaker,  2000 ) of the measurement, the question of what exactly an 
impulse might be is becoming ever more relevant. 
A. Krishna and F. Strack
149
 Bridging the Gap: The Refl ective-Impulsive Model 
 The research and models presented so far shed some light on the mysteries of human 
behavior. The careful plan behind the Trojan Horse seems rooted in deliberative, 
expectancy-value thinking, whereas Icarus’ doomed fl ight into the sun might be 
seen as a lack of self-regulatory resources preventing him from automatically fl ying 
close to the bright sun. What has yet to be addressed is the question of the interac-
tion of these systems—how does Odysseus defeat the Siren’s call, or in more gen-
eral terms, how do deliberative, rational thought and impulsive affect and action 
interact? In the past three decades many researchers have attempted to address this 
question. In the realm of social psychology, the challenge has been met with many 
different dual-process models (see Chaiken & Trope,  1999 , for examples). These 
dual-process models stem from research on different topics, including persuasion 
(Chaiken,  1987 ; Petty & Cacioppo,  1986 ), stereotyping (Devine,  1989 ), causal attri-
bution (Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull,  1988 ), and general cognition (Epstein, Lipson, 
Holstein, & Huh,  1992 ). Although these models deal with different aspects of 
human behavior and cognition, they share certain structural traits. In all cases, two 
modes of information processing are proposed, one of which is characterized by 
effortful, rule-based processing, the other by almost effortless, associative process-
ing. This distinction is delineated clearly by Sloman ( 1996 ), who describes both of 
these modes in detail. 
 Many infl uential dual-process models conform to this structure, but not all mod-
els provide for interactions between the proposed processes (for an overview, see 
Smith & DeCoster,  2000 ). Even fewer models make statements about how both 
processes infl uence behavior and whether they are interdependent in doing so. 
Rather, they specify how information is processed at a cognitive level—they 
describe how people think about what to eat for lunch and how they process the 
information that sweet desserts are available, but these models do not go beyond the 
formation of a behavioral decision on what would be best to eat. They also cannot 
describe how behavior can be instigated independently from a decision (e.g., Strack 
& Neumann,  1996 )—how it can be that one decides to eat a healthy lunch but still 
reach out for the sweet muffi n. In order to address these issues and fi ll the gap 
between knowledge and action, an integrative model that incorporates both ele-
ments is needed. For this purpose, Strack and Deutsch ( 2004 ) propose the refl ective- 
impulsive model (RIM), a dual-systems model conceived to clearly defi ne and 
integrate the theoretical perspectives so far presented under the headings of impul-
sive and refl ective. 
9 Refl ection and Impulse as Determinants of Human Behavior
150
 The Refl ective System 
 The RIM refers to the rational, rule-based system of thought as the refl ective sys-
tem. Slow and driven by resources of working memory, this system has limits on its 
capacity for information processing. It may be disengaged from processing under 
certain circumstances, but it is capable of generating knowledge via syllogistic 
inferences. It does so by activating concepts and possible relations between these 
concepts and then assigning a truth value to the proposition formed by the concepts 
and the relation. For example, the concepts  salad and  health may be activated, along 
with the relation of  is/is not . In this case the refl ective system would assign the value 
of  true to the confi guration, yielding the proposition  salad is healthy . If the concept 
of  muffi n was activated instead of  salad , the truth value might instead be  false , yield-
ing the proposition  muffi n is not healthy . 
 It is important to note that any other relation might be used beyond  is/is not , such 
as  implies/does not imply ,  causes/does not cause , or  is/is not a member of , to name 
a few. If several related propositions are constructed, new knowledge may be gener-
ated by the combination of these propositions. In keeping with the example proposi-
tions given above— salad is healthy and  muffi n is not healthy —an additional 
proposition of  being healthy is good might yield both the conclusion that salad is 
good and that muffi ns are not. Because the refl ective system is able to assign truth 
values to statements, rule-based inferences can be drawn in order to maximize the 
consistency of the resulting representation (Gawronski & Strack,  2004 ). The ability 
of this mode of processing to help a person generate and infer conclusions makes it 
extremely fl exible and useful for facilitating many operations typically associated 
with deliberative thought, including expectancy-value judgments and advanced 
social behavior (e.g., the discernment of people’s states of belief; see Wimmer & 
Perner,  1983 , for example) and the learning of new connections between concepts 
without much or any repetition. 
 The refl ective system is limited by boundary conditions that constrain its ability 
to process information. Two of the most important of these conditions are working 
memory capacity and arousal. The activation of concepts and relations and the 
transformation of the resulting propositions are assumed to take place in the work-
ing memory (Baddeley,  1986 ). These dynamics provide a functional limit to the 
complexity and scope of refl ective operations, in that the capacity of working mem-
ory may be insuffi cient to contain all the required propositions for a given operation 
concurrently. This statement is bolstered by studies showing that an impairment of 
working-memory capacity through a manipulation of cognitive load impairs logical 
reasoning (De Neys,  2006 ; DeWall, Baumeister, & Masicampo,  2008 ). Arousal, by 
contrast, affects refl ective processing in a nonlinear fashion resembling the Yerkes- 
Dodson Law (Yerkes & Dodson,  1908 )—intermediate levels of arousal facilitate the 
operation of the refl ective system. Evidence exists that high levels of arousal reduce 
complexity in social judgments (Baron,  2000 ; Lambert et al.,  2003 ; Paulhus & Lim, 
 1994 ), whereas low arousal, characteristic in a state of fatigue, for example, is also 
associated with lowered capacity to engage in refl ective processing. 
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 Important and ubiquitous cognitive phenomena rely upon the refl ective system’s 
ability to assign truth values to relations between concepts, an example of which is 
negation. The RIM predicts that negations of propositions can be processed only 
under circumstances in which the refl ective system can be engaged, that is, under 
conditions endowed with resources suffi cient for efforts to engage in processing. 
This statement differs from models based on the assumption that negations may be 
“tagged” onto propositions once and for all and henceforth no longer require refl ec-
tive engagement (e.g., Gilbert,  1991 ), and it is supported by evidence that negations 
require cognitive resources to process (Wason,  1959 ). 
 Refl ective processing is accompanied by a state of noetic awareness of whether 
something is the case or not. This awareness may sometimes be accompanied by a 
particular feeling that is processed consciously, a state of experiential awareness. It 
should be noted, however, that some operations in the refl ective system may require 
so few resources that they can be processed without corresponding noetic awareness 
or a feeling of intentionality (Deutsch, Kordts-Freudinger, Gawronski, & Strack, 
 2009 ). 
 The Impulsive System 
 Aside from the refl ective system, the RIM proposes the existence of an associative 
system of thought called the impulsive system. This system works continuously and 
effortlessly. Whereas the refl ective system uses working memory capacity, the 
impulsive system can be seen as long-term memory and therefore has functionally 
unlimited capacity. The impulsive system forms associative links between individ-
ual elements that may be of varying strengths. When an element is activated, other 
elements linked to it are activated in accordance with the strength of the links to the 
original element, a form of spreading activation. Recent or frequent activation of an 
element also increases both the accessibility of that element and the likelihood of its 
continued processing if further activation occurs. Links between elements are based 
on the principles of contiguity and similarity, so that stimuli that occur a short time 
or distance from one another are more likely to become linked or to have existing 
links strengthened than is the case with temporally or spatially nonproximal stimuli. 
It is important to note that refl ective processes activate corresponding patterns of 
impulsive elements, meaning that even elements that are never perceived together in 
the world may become associatively linked if they are often refl ectively processed 
together. The activation of impulsive elements may be accompanied by an experien-
tial state of awareness, with people experiencing a specifi c feeling without being 
able to say where it comes from. Such feelings are themselves elements in the 
impulsive system and may therefore be connected to other elements with varying 
link strengths. 
 This process of association is slow and enduring but also rigid. Although propo-
sitional processing in the refl ective system may create associative links between 
concepts in the impulsive system, it is not necessarily the case that propositional 
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processing can become completely automatic and effortless with enough practice 
(Deutsch et al.,  2009 ). Instead, specifi c patterns of thought may become easier but 
lose or change their meaning under circumstances where refl ective processing is 
hindered. As an example, African Americans who feel that whites perceive them 
negatively may often refl ectively think “Blacks are not bad” as a response; in the 
impulsive system, however, the concepts of  black and  bad are being activated at the 
same time and thereby linked (Livingston,  2002 ). This simultaneity may counterin-
tuitively lead African Americans to have additional negative feelings and associa-
tions with their in-group when they have no refl ective resources with which to 
negate the associative relation. However, the rigidity of associative processing is 
somewhat alleviated by the effects of motivational orientation. When people are in 
an approach orientation, they are prepared to reduce the distance between them-
selves and some aspect of their environments, whereas an avoidance orientation is 
preparedness to increase this distance. These fundamental orientations can facilitate 
associative activation when this activation is compatible (e.g., approach orientation 
may facilitate the activation of positively valent elements). Therefore, the sight of a 
muffi n might elicit the positive associations of  tasty ,  sweet , and  good more strongly 
when one is in an approach orientation, as when selecting what salad one would 
prefer for lunch, than when one is not. If one is currently in an avoidance orienta-
tion, having just read a brochure on calorie content and having selected the salad 
that would be least fattening, these associations might be weaker even before the 
activation of the refl ective system. However, it is clear that the associative system 
alone, although it requires no resources and works very quickly, is generally far less 
fl exible and adaptive than the refl ective system. 
 Interaction of Systems 
 Now that we have described the basic operating principles of the RIM’s two sys-
tems, it is necessary to show how they function together. The very structures of the 
two systems contain a fi rst important point relevant to their interaction: the impul-
sive system is always effortlessly active, whereas the refl ective system may also be 
inactive. The implication is that the refl ective system, when it does operate, does so 
in parallel with the impulsive system, not in place of it. That is, refl ective processing 
always occurs with parallel impulsive processing. It is also clear that the concepts 
that are transformed in working-memory space in the refl ective system do not come 
from nowhere but from the long-term store of the impulsive system. 
 As the systems cannot interact when the refl ective system is disengaged, it is 
adequate to examine how they interact from the beginning to the end of a refl ective 
operation. When a refl ective operation begins, perceptual input will already have 
activated several associative elements. For example, when thinking about what to 
have for lunch, a person may already have seen what is on offer in the cafeteria, a 
selection that will activate whatever associations that person has with the given meal 
options, but other perceptual data in the attentional focus (the presentation of the 
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food, the attractiveness of the serving staff, and any number of other concepts) will 
also activate associations of their own. Some of these associations will achieve suf-
fi cient activation to attain awareness, so a particularly delicious-looking muffi n 
might prompt an automatic expectation of a good taste. The refl ective system then 
categorizes and relates the activated concepts, the result being that the muffi n is 
recognized as tasting good, and activates additional relevant content in the impul-
sive system—such as health. This concept, in turn, changes the activation pattern in 
the impulsive system, so the associated concept of  salad might become activated as 
well. This activation pattern is again categorized, and the process repeats until a 
decision or inference is reached. Such end results in the refl ective system are driven 
by the principle of consistency of the propositions generated. For example  health is 
good ,  taste is good ,  health is more important than taste might lead to the decision 
to select the healthy salad rather than the unhealthy one but also the tasty muffi n, for 
this choice would be consistent with a greater number of propositions. However, the 
content of the propositions generated is necessarily limited by the activation pattern 
of the impulsive system—although tennis is also healthy, its activation potential in 
the environment of the cafeteria during lunch hour is very low, so the refl ective 
system will not include it in processing without any prior link or further relevant 
perceptual stimuli. 
 Synergy between the systems occurs when the impulsive system’s associations 
are valid and relevant to a consistent refl ective solution. When the impulsive activa-
tion pattern is in synergy with refl ective processing, concepts relevant to the focus 
of refl ective processing become comparatively accessible, and cognitive effort is 
therefore reduced. The refl ective system is not forced to perform extra categoriza-
tions and activations of concepts to achieve consistency, so subjective effort is less-
ened. This reduction may be accompanied by a feeling of fl ow (Winkielman, Huber, 
Kavanagh, & Schwarz,  2012 ), that is, ease of processing, which is then linked to 
positive affect. Therefore, when both systems are in accord, it feels easy and good 
to think and make decisions. As an example, if the only tasty option in the cafeteria 
were the healthy salad, people who ate there and cared deeply about their health 
(i.e., had a high accessibility of the concept health) would fi nd it natural to choose 
the salad and, moreover, would feel good about how easy the choice was. A differ-
ent picture emerges when the systems are at odds with each other, as when impul-
sive activation patterns present associations that are opposed to a consistent refl ective 
conclusion and produce a feeling of confl ict. It requires additional cognitive effort 
to activate new impulsive patterns and to form propositions that lead to a consistent 
end state. Once the muffi n is added to the lunch options, the decision-maker must 
actively work against the temptation of the tasty dessert in order to generate the 
propositions about healthy eating that justify selecting the salad. This dependence 
of effortful processing on automatic activation has an interesting consequence: A 
fl uently (synergistically) processed inference should have a higher truth value than 
a disfl uently (antagonistically) processed inference does, unless the refl ective sys-
tem specifi cally corrects for the consequences of fl uency (Allport & Lepkin,  1945 ; 
Begg, Anas, & Farinacci,  1992 ; Schwarz, Sanna, Skurnik, & Yoon,  2007 ). The 
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 fl uency of processing should affect both how sure a person is of a syllogistic infer-
ence and how securely she or he stands behind a given decision. 
 Common Pathway to Behavior 
 Having described how the refl ective and impulsive systems are structured and how 
they interact during the process of thought, we now turn to two issues that many 
other dual-process models have not yet addressed: how these mental processes are 
linked to behavior and especially how they interact when causing behavior. The 
RIM seeks to provide an answer to this central question through the component of 
behavioral schemata . In a general sense, behavioral schemata are clusters of ele-
ments in the impulsive system. They consist of specifi c motor representations of 
behavior, the perceptual input of typical context factors for the behavior, and the 
consequences of those factors. As elements of the impulsive system, specifi c behav-
ioral schemata (e.g., how to grip a fork) will likely be associated with other behav-
ioral schemata that are relevant to the context, the specifi c motor activation, or the 
consequences of the behavior. This result leads to the conclusion that several spe-
cifi c, concrete behavioral schemata might form clusters that, in turn, can be seen as 
behavioral schemata of greater abstractness. Gripping a fork and gripping a spoon, 
for instance, are similar in terms of expected consequences (tasting food) and con-
text (involving food, eating utensils, etc.). The more abstract behavioral schema in 
this case might be termed  holding cutlery , which might, in turn, connect to other 
schemata to form a cluster of  eating politely , and so on. This conceptual hierarchy 
bears some relationship to other conceptualizations of schemata but is more specifi c 
than its typical use (for a discussion see Fiske & Linville,  1980 ; Lodge, McGraw, 
Conover, Feldman, & Miller,  1991 ). 
 If behavioral schemata are situated in the impulsive system, they are also subject 
to spreading activation. In a way similar to that of nonbehavioral elements in the 
impulsive system, behavioral schemata can be activated automatically if enough 
other elements with suffi ciently strong links to the schema are activated. In the case 
of behavioral schemata, activation includes performance of the motor program 
embedded within the schema. The refl ective system, on the other hand, activates 
behavioral schemata by propositionally connecting the self to the required behav-
ioral schema by means of a behavioral decision. If the decision refers to a behavior 
that is to take place in future, the refl ective system additionally links the behavior’s 
expected relevant context with the cluster, creating an intention (Gollwitzer,  1999 ). 
Although the systems encompass different precursors to behavior, they use the same 
fi nal gateway to enact behavior, namely, the activation of behavioral schemata, ele-
ments of the impulsive system. The implication is that the same principles of system 
interaction that apply to purely mental operations in the RIM also apply to behav-
ioral processes—fl uent, synergistic processing of behavioral decisions leads to 
behavior that is performed more smoothly and easily than disfl uent, antagonistic 
processing. In extreme cases of the latter, the impulsive activation of behavioral 
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schemata might be so strong that a refl ective behavioral decision will not lead 
directly to behavior, as when one knows that eating the dessert is wrong and has 
decided not to, but the eyes and hands still seem to have their own volition to fi xate 
on the forbidden. In this case the operating conditions of the systems will decide 
which behavior is performed. In states inimical to refl ective processing, such as 
high arousal or reduced working memory capacity, the impulse to act will likely win 
out, whereas an unhindered refl ective system might redirect the activation pattern in 
the impulsive system by, for example, diverting attention or actively linking nega-
tive consequences or attributes to the impulsive behavior. In this sense, there is little 
difference between mentally grappling with an unwanted impulsive idea, such as 
unwanted racist thoughts, and with an unwanted physical impulse, such as reaching 
for that tempting muffi n. 
 Knowledge and Action: Bidirectional Connections 
 Having established that behavioral schemata are situated in the impulsive system, 
we note that an important additional implication of the RIM becomes clear. In the 
impulsive system, each element adheres to the mechanism of spreading activation, 
including behavioral schemata. Because behavioral schemata are linked to conse-
quences and contextual stimuli, activating the behavior also activates related con-
cepts. Therefore, behavior can directly infl uence cognition, both by creating and 
modifying associative links and by infl uencing what concepts are likely to become 
active in the refl ective system. For example, the act of reaching for the muffi n, if 
repeated often, may eventually become suffi ciently associated with the sight of the 
muffi n that the action is triggered by the sight. Similarly, this association makes the 
muffi n more likely to come to mind when one is reaching for the salad, that is, when 
performing the very motor program associated with the muffi n. This bidirectional-
ity of infl uence—behavior to cognition as well as cognition to behavior—also holds 
for motivational orientation in that behaviors associated with approach will activate 
an approach orientation, whereas avoidance behavior has the opposite effect. 
 This link between behavior and cognition is not a new idea in principle. A similar 
effect is assumed in several infl uential theories, such as cognitive dissonance theory 
(Festinger,  1957 ) and self-perception theory (Bem,  1967 ). They also predict a 
change in attitudes as a specifi c form of cognition that is based on behavior, albeit 
via different mechanisms. The important difference lies in precisely these mecha-
nisms. According to cognitive dissonance theory, a behavior that runs counter to an 
existing belief about the self causes an aversive motivational state that may be alle-
viated by changing existing beliefs or adding new ones, whereas the assumption in 
self-perception theory is that people infer their attitudes toward particular objects 
from their own behavior toward those objects. Both of these proposed mechanisms 
require propositional processing because they depend on a categorization of the 
behavior in question. The RIM, on the other hand, describes a direct link between 
behavior and cognition via the associative links between behavioral schemata and 
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contiguously activated concepts in the impulsive system. It is not that cognitive dis-
sonance and self-perception theory lack validity but rather that their path from 
behavior to cognitive change is not the only possible one. 
 When this perspective on the connection between behavior and implicit associa-
tive links is applied to the fi eld of implicit attitudes, several interesting implications 
arise. From the perspective of the RIM, implicit attitudes measured by the IAT, 
affective priming, and other procedures based on reaction time refl ect the strength 
of associative links between a target and a valence by means of a behavior associ-
ated with that valence. 1 In view of the attributes of the impulsive system, it follows 
that negated targets or valences should, under certain circumstances, have the same 
effect on reaction times as nonnegated ones do. Evidence supporting this logic 
comes from the Bona Fide Pipeline task (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 
 1995 ), which was used in a study by Deutsch, Gawronski, and Strack ( 2006 ), who 
showed that positive prime words facilitated categorization of positive targets even 
when the prime was negated, whereas both negated and nonnegated negative prime 
words facilitated categorization of negative target. Although this effect is not uni-
versal (Deutsch et al.,  2009 ), it provides evidence that impulsive associations are 
what implicit attitude procedures measure. Procedures used to change implicit atti-
tudes, such as automatic stereotype reduction training (Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, 
Hermsen, & Russin,  2000 ), can also benefi t from the implications of the RIM’s 
structure. In the original automatic stereotype reduction training, participants were 
induced to respond to stereotype-congruent pairings with a NO key and to stereotype- 
incongruent pairings with a YES key. Although this method was effective in reduc-
ing automatic stereotype activation, a study using only stereotype-incongruent 
pairings has shown the procedure to work (Gawronski, Deutsch, Mbirkou, Seibt, & 
Strack,  2008 ). The same studies also showed that negation of stereotype-congruent 
pairings alone actually increased implicit stereotyping, a prediction derived from 
the contrast between the propositional nature of negation and the associative nature 
of contiguous stimuli pairs. 
 The bidirectional link between behavior and cognition in the RIM also makes that 
model a valuable framework for studies that deal with embodied effects on cognition. 
The basic idea of embodiment research is that cognition is always founded in mecha-
nisms of sensory processing and motor control (e.g., Wilson,  2002 ). The role of percep-
tual information and motor-processing in the impulsive system and the infl uence 
thereby exerted on the refl ective system mirror this basic assumption. Precursor 
research to the current wave of embodiment movement, such as the pen study by 
Strack, Martin, and Stepper ( 1988 ) and the headphone study by Förster and Strack 
( 1996 ), have already been discussed from the perspective of the RIM (Strack & 
Deutsch,  2004 ), but newer investigations into embodied processes might also be inte-
grated into this model. For example, Zhong and Lijenquist ( 2006 ) show that washing 
hands reduced the effects of guilt on compensatory prosocial behavior. The authors 
explain the effect in terms of symbolic self-completion (Wicklund & Gollwitzer,  1981 ), 
1  The IAT is also capable of measuring associations other than valence, but because the argument 
is analogous to valence associations, it is omitted here. 
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but an alternative explanation offered by the RIM would be that the metaphorical asso-
ciation of purity with cleanliness might confl ict with a negative activation of the self in 
the context of guilt and thereby alleviate the guilt’s effects on behavior. Thus, an impe-
tus is given for further inquiries into the precise mechanism behind embodiment effects. 
 Determinants of Systematic Behavioral Control 
 Having established the parameters and attributes of the two systems of the RIM and 
their parallel effects on behavior, we turn to explaining possible determinants of 
either system’s dominance over the other in having these effects. If it is possible to 
identify variables that can affect which system determines behavior, one can vastly 
improve the predictive power of the RIM for behavior. Because the impulsive sys-
tem is always active and processing, this question can be rephrased: Under what 
circumstances will the refl ective system assert behavioral control when in confl ict 
with the impulsive system? 
 Motivation and Opportunity 
 Fazio ( 1990 ) describes two modes of thinking—a spontaneous processing mode 
based on attitude accessibility, and a deliberative processing mode based on attitude 
behavior. These modes of thinking are remarkably similar in structure to the RIM’s 
proposed systems, certain differences in mechanisms notwithstanding. Therefore, 
the MODE model (Fazio,  1990 ), which predicts when the deliberative mode will be 
engaged in processing the possible consequences of behavior, may be applicable to 
the RIM as well. In this conceptualization, engagement in deliberative processing 
depends on motivation and opportunity. Motivation in the MODE model is generated 
by the fear of invalidity (Kruglanski & Freund,  1983 ), a function of the perceived 
costliness of a judgmental mistake to the self, whereas opportunity is a function of 
the available time and resources for processing. Applying this framework to the RIM, 
one fi nds that the defi ned properties of the refl ective system are in accord with these 
predictions. Refl ective processing is accompanied by a feeling of subjective effort 
and so requires motivation, whereas both the reliance on the resources of working 
memory and the relatively slow speed of the refl ective system make it clear that the 
refl ective system can infl uence behavior only if the opportunity is given. 
 Evidence for this dependence on opportunity exists in many domains. Cognitive 
load, a manipulation often used to impair deliberative processing, has been applied 
in various different studies whose results can be explained with the RIM. Self- 
control (e.g., Lattimore & Maxwell,  2004 ; Wegner, Erber, & Zanakos,  1993 ), pro-
cessing of negated stimuli (Deutsch et al.  2009 ), social judgments and attributions 
(Gilbert et al.,  1988 ; Krull & Erickson,  1995 ; Trope & Alfi eri,  1997 ), moral 
 judgments (Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen,  2008 ), and general 
reasoning (De Neys,  2006 ) have all proven to be impaired by cognitive load in ways 
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that are consistent with the RIM’s predictions. The idea that working memory 
resources may also play a role in refl ective processing has been tested in several 
studies, both by comparing individuals with dispositionally high or low working 
memory capacities (Hofmann, Gschwendner, Friese, Wiers, & Schmitt,  2008 ; 
Thush et al.,  2008 ) and by specifi cally taxing resources of working memory 
(Deutsch et al.,  2009 ). The conceptualization of working memory as “a domain-free 
limitation in ability to control attention” (Engle,  2002 , p. 19) points to the conclu-
sion that the effects of attentional cognitive load manipulations on refl ective pro-
cessing may be mediated by working memory capacity. 
 Self-Regulatory Resources 
 Vohs ( 2006 ) argues that the RIM’s refl ective system is, in fact, powered by self- 
regulatory resources (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice,  1998 ). This 
account is based on the similarity between the idea of such resources and the cogni-
tive resources discussed in relation to the RIM. Vohs & Faber, ( 2007 ) argue that 
impulsive spending, a phenomenon expected to occur under circumstances that 
inhibit refl ective processing, does indeed occur more often when participants are 
depleted of self-regulatory resources. A structurally similar argument is made with 
respect to overeating among dieters (Vohs & Heatherton  2000 ). Further evidence for 
this integration of theories comes from research showing that effortful self- 
regulation has a detrimental effect on subsequent reasoning capabilities (Schmeichel, 
Vohs, & Baumeister,  2003 ). The bidirectionality of this effect, that is, a negative 
effect that prior refl ective decision-making exerts on subsequent self-regulation, is 
shown in a laboratory paradigm encompassing many simple decisions followed by 
a self-regulatory exercise. The effect’s bidirectionality also surfaces in a fi eld study 
in which shoppers who reported having made effortful decisions previously solved 
fewer math problems than those who had engaged in fewer decisions during their 
shopping trip (Vohs et al.,  2008 ). Although this evidence hints at a connection 
between self-regulatory and refl ective cognitive resources, these studies do not 
show a direct link between the two. Other research shows that dietary standards and 
explicit target attitudes predict behavior only when self-regulatory resources are 
available; when it is not, implicit attitudes are better predictors (Friese, Hofmann, & 
Wänke,  2008 ; Hofmann, Rauch, & Gawronski,  2007 ). The fact that impulsive and 
refl ective predictors diverge depending on the availability of self-regulatory 
resources underlines the conceptualization of self-regulation as a confl ict between 
impulsive and refl ective behavioral activation. Together with the evidence presented 
by Vohs ( 2006 ), these fi ndings permit the conclusion that research on resource- 
based self-regulation can be integrated into the RIM. It remains to be seen whether 
self-regulatory resources are equivalent to working memory resources or whether 
they constitute their own construct. 
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 Implications of the RIM 
 Thinking Is Tough! 
 Coming up with a complex plan of action is not a simple endeavor. The Trojan 
Horse required the cunning Odysseus to think hard for a long time, and this story is 
one of the main reasons he endures as a hero fi gure. In general terms, it is not easy 
to engage in refl ective processing—beyond the subjective feeling of diffi culty, there 
may be physical limits to the human ability to think (Gailliot et al.,  2007 ). Although 
thinking may sometimes be facilitated when the refl ective and impulsive systems 
are in accord, people must often use refl ective processing against the pull of impul-
sive associations. Whether this struggle is due to temptation or to particularly com-
plex challenges in the environment, the diffi culty in staying the refl ective course is 
clear. 
 However, cultivating moral or thoughtful habits may become easier with time. 
Specifi c propositional operations can become associated with the feeling of tempta-
tion if they are activated often enough, and even the experiential component of 
refl ective operation (the feeling of effortful cognition) is itself represented in the 
impulsive system and may thus become associated with it. For careful planning 
habits, positive affect associated with successful plans may lead to the process of 
planning itself acquiring a positive valence, with these habits of thought perhaps 
eventually becoming inculcated through successful implementation. However, this 
effect is not suffi cient to become truly automatic. Although refl ective processing 
may become facilitated by such mechanisms, propositional reasoning itself cannot 
become automated. If resources are lacking, not even these habits of refl ection will 
make for better control of impulses or careful planning. No matter how accessible 
the relevant propositional transformations may be in the impulsive system, refl ec-
tive resources are required if a person is actually to bring those transformations to 
bear upon activated concepts. 
 The habit of critical metacognition is a particularly interesting case. Metacognition 
refers to thoughts about one’s own thoughts, and critical metacognition is therefore 
those thoughts that evaluate the thinking process. In cognitive-behavioral therapy, 
thoughts are actively evaluated by the patient and classifi ed as rational or irrational 
(Baer,  2003 ). The goal of such interventions is often to change dysfunctional behav-
ior or thinking patterns, such as “catastrophizing” (Beck,  1976 ). Pursuing this kind 
of metacognitive thought alteration or suppression may be especially diffi cult 
because of the vast refl ective resources required. A strong association between the 
metacognitive monitoring process and the undesired thoughts would eventually 
activate the latter rather than suppress them, requiring additional refl ective resources 
to eliminate them. Evidence from studies on emotional disorders shows that meta-
cognitive thought suppression does indeed increase the frequency of unwanted 
thoughts (Purdon,  1999 ). Although long-term use of metacognitive strategies may 
eventually divest undesired thoughts of their potency, it seems clear that the way 
there is a long and cognitively taxing one. 
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 Sometimes No Means Yes If I Can’t Process It 
 Given the research showing that negation is a refl ective process that requires refl ec-
tive resources (Deutsch et al.,  2006 ,  2009 ; Grant, Malaviya, & Sternthal,  2004 ), one 
must wonder at the effi cacy of negated persuasive messages. Evidence showing that 
older adults may be more likely to misremember explicitly negated information has 
been interpreted as a warning against negatively worded statements in healthcare 
materials (Wilson & Park,  2008 ). Wakefi eld et al.’s ( 2008 ) fi nding that antismoking 
campaigns funded by tobacco companies have few, if any, negative effects on teen-
agers’ intentions to smoke may be partially due to the negated messages employed 
(e.g., “Think, Don’t Smoke”; see Farrelly, Niederdeppe, & Yarsevich,  2003 ). These 
effects can be explained by a lack of processing resources in recalling the content of 
the messages. If advertisements or healthcare instructions convey associations that 
are negated in the message, then recall of the message may be confi ned to the asso-
ciation between the elements under circumstances of low refl ective resources. This 
limitation can lead negated statements to be remembered as affi rmed. Positively 
formulated messages (i.e., those whose association mirrors their propositional con-
nection) are more effective, as with antismoking ads that depict smoking in combi-
nation with serious consequences for health (Biener,  2002 ). 
 This logic might also be generalized to ethical norms in everyday life. If pre-
sented as negated statements (such as  don’t drink and drive ), strong ethical norms 
may have a behavioral effect opposite to what is expected. If people are continually 
reminded of what they should not do, the unwanted action will be continually acti-
vated in the impulsive system and thereby affect subsequent refl ective and impul-
sive operations. If a sermon on the forbidden practice of adultery activates that 
concept and its infl uence on evaluations, the listener could see some other members 
of the congregation as attractive for possibly committing adultery with them. Of 
course, this possibility would be negated, but only if the listener had suffi cient 
refl ective resources available to perform the negation. It would be particularly prob-
lematic in cases where the forbidden behavior is hedonically attractive to start with; 
the activation of the concept would then also activate the expectation of the pleasant 
feeling associated with it and elicit an approach orientation. A better approach to 
ethics according to this logic might instead be to praise exemplars of morality or to 
prescribe morally positive acts as opposed to forbidding negative ones. Instead of 
saying no to vice, one should say yes to virtue. 
 Improving Implicit Self-Esteem 
 Implicit self-esteem is a much researched construct of recent years (e.g., Koole, 
Dijksterhuis, & van Knippenberg,  2001 ; Yamaguchi et al.,  2007 ). In a general sense, 
implicit self-esteem is defi ned as an automatic evaluation of the self that occurs 
nonconsciously and affects spontaneous reactions to self-relevant stimuli (Bosson, 
et al.  2000 ). Implicit self-esteem has been shown to specifi cally predict diverse 
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outcomes in a range of situations, including apparent anxiety in participants as they 
complete a self-relevant interview (Spalding & Hardin,  1999 ), levels of implicit 
gender bias in combination with implicit gender identity (Aidman & Carroll,  2003 ), 
and depressive symptomatology 6 months after measurement (Franck, De Readt, & 
De Houwer,  2007 ). Explicit self-esteem (i.e., explicit evaluations of self-worth), on 
the other hand, has specifi c predictive power for subjective well-being (Schimmack 
& Diener,  2003 ). It is the combination of the two constructs, however, that has 
excited most interest in recent years. In particular, the question of discrepant self- 
esteem has been examined (Zeigler-Hill,  2006 ). That is, what effects do high explicit 
but low implicit, or low explicit but high implicit, self-esteem have on behavior? 
One direct prediction based on psychodynamic theory concerns narcissism. The 
 mask model of narcissism assumes that narcissistic individuals are characterized by 
deep self-doubt (corresponding to low implicit self-esteem), which they compen-
sate for by projecting grandiose self-views (corresponding to extremely high explicit 
self-esteem) (Bosson et al.,  2008 ). Empirical evidence supporting this model has 
remained mixed, however, perhaps partly because of the relative unreliability of 
measures of implicit self-esteem (Bosson et al.,  2000 ). 
 By rather precisely spelling out the concepts involved, the RIM can contribute to 
the discussion of these and other phenomena of the implicit self. Implicit self- 
esteem might, for instance, be conceptualized as the total valence of the associative 
pattern linked with activation of the self in the impulsive system. This specifi cation 
would imply recommendations for effective measures of implicit self-esteem—
namely, measures that do not require any explicit judgment but rather depend solely 
on valence and behavior interference (e.g., the IAT, measures based on the logic of 
affective priming). In addition, the same logic that is applied to automatic stereotype 
reduction training (Gawronski et al.,  2008 ) may be applied to the implicit self- 
esteem construct. Doing so yields a method through which to increase implicit self- 
esteem by consistently affi rming positive pairings of valence and self (e.g., 
Dijksterhuis,  2004 ), suggesting a possible avenue for therapy of narcissism and 
other negative effects of low implicit self-esteem. 
 Conclusion 
 The RIM offers a multitude of predictions that can help improve the understanding 
of the link between knowledge and action, whether it be explaining the reasoning 
processes behind complex plans such as the Trojan Horse, the seemingly self- 
destructive fl ight of Icarus, or even the confl ict between rationality and impulse as 
epitomized in Odysseus’ suffering of the Siren’s song. Although effortful, refl ec-
tive processing may occur in fl uent synergy with impulsive processing, there are 
often confl icts between the two systems. Their resolution is a question of available 
refl ective resources and motivation to use them. But whether the systems work in 
concert or struggle against one another, the pathway to behavior is ultimately the 
same—behavioral schemata are activated depending on the results of both 
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systems’ processing. However, it is not just knowledge that may determine action 
in the context of the RIM. The bidirectional associative links between behavioral 
schemata and other elements of the impulsive system mean that action, in turn, 
infl uences knowledge. This bidirectionality in combination with the functioning of 
the two systems can tell much about what it means to think and act, when No might 
appear to mean Yes, and how to pinpoint and modify the elusive implicit self. 
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 Chapter 10 
 Planning and the Control of Action 
 Frank  Wieber and  Peter  M.  Gollwitzer 
 Planning has been found to have a powerful effect on human actions (e.g., Gollwitzer 
& Sheeran,  2006 ). But how do people plan? In this chapter we fi rst introduce imple-
mentation intentions (e.g., Gollwitzer,  1999 ) as an effi cient way of planning. 
Implementation intentions refer to specifi c plans in which individuals and groups 
can specify when, where, and how they intend to act using an if-then format (e.g., 
“If I come home from work on Fridays, then I will immediately put on my jogging 
shoes and go for a 30-minute run!”). After we examine how they support goal pur-
suit, we differentiate between spontaneous and strategic planning—two ways in 
which if–then plans can be made on the basis of goal-related knowledge. 
 With respect to spontaneous planning, we highlight the importance of the acces-
sibility of goal-related knowledge. We introduce goal systems theory (Kruglanski, 
Shah, Fishbach, Friedman, Chun, & Sleeth-Keppler,  2002 ) as a conceptual frame-
work because it addresses the question of how goals can increase the accessibility 
of knowledge about when, where, and how to pursue the goal. To illustrate how the 
accessibility of goal-related knowledge facilitates goal attainment, we discuss a set 
of recent studies. They show that individuals spontaneously grasp goal-relevant 
information in the form of implementation intentions (Marquardt, Tröger, Wieber, 
& Gollwitzer,  2016 ; see also Marquardt,  2011 ) even if it is incidentally provided in 
their environment and that they use this knowledge to improve their goal attainment 
without being prompted to do so. 
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 Regarding strategic planning, we argue that individuals’ knowledge about their 
goals, potential obstacles during goal pursuit, and effective goal-directed actions is 
central to devising effective plans and to the successful control of action. We intro-
duce Mental Contrasting with Implementation Intentions (MCII; Oettingen, 
Wittchen, & Gollwitzer,  2013 ; Oettingen,  2014 ) as an effective self-regulation strat-
egy with which to systematize the selection of goal-relevant knowledge and the 
translation of that knowledge into if–then plans. In this chapter we discuss a recent 
experimental study suggesting that such strategic planning is very useful in unstruc-
tured situational contexts that require identifi cation and selection of appropriate 
goal-relevant knowledge. We further suggest that strategic planning is less useful in 
structured situational contexts that prompt the goal-directed actions without requir-
ing any knowledge about advantageous opportunities to act and about potential 
obstacles (Sailer et al.,  2015 ). We conclude by emphasizing how useful spontaneous 
and strategic planning is for transforming individuals’ goal-related knowledge into 
action. 
 Controlling Actions by Goals and Implementation Intentions 
 In the psychology of action (e.g., Lewin, Dembo, Festinger, & Sears,  1944 ; 
Gollwitzer & Bargh,  1996 ), two phenomena are thought to be relevant to goal pur-
suit: goal-setting and goal-striving. They are governed by different principles. Goal- 
setting is concerned with the choice of a desired end state for which to strive (What 
is being pursued?); goal-striving is associated with moving toward the desired end 
state (How is the goal being pursued?). Goals are thereby defi ned as desired end 
states that people intend to attain and to which they commit themselves (Gollwitzer 
& Oettingen,  2012 ). For individuals to commit themselves fi rmly to a goal, they 
must perceive it as highly desirable and feasible. These assessments are based on an 
individual’s knowledge about a potential pursuit of the goal. Knowing that sunny 
weather has been forecast and having no commitments for the coming weekend, for 
example, one might judge a weekend trip to a nearby national park as both desirable 
and feasible and might consequently commit oneself to the goal of going on a week-
end trip to that place. 
 Nonetheless, even when individuals have strongly pledged themselves to a goal, 
such commitment does not guarantee successful goal attainment. This fact is 
referred to as the intention–behavior gap (e.g., Sheeran,  2002 ). In a meta-analysis 
by Webb and Sheeran ( 2006 ), for instance, a moderate-to-large change ( d = 0.66) in 
the strength of individuals’ intentions resulted in only a small-to-moderate change 
in the individuals’ behavior ( d = 0.36). In considering why the transition of one’s 
intention into goal-directed actions might fail, researchers (e.g., Gollwitzer & 
Sheeran,  2006 ) have identifi ed several typical problems that have to be overcome 
during goal-striving. People must start acting on a goal, persist or even intensify 
their efforts in the face of diffi culties or obstacles, shield their goal from interfer-
ences or distractions, abandon ineffective means or even the goal itself if it becomes 
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obviously unattainable, and economize on their limited resources to self-regulate 
their actions. Knowledge about the when, where, and how of striving toward a goal 
is necessary, but not suffi cient, for successfully attaining it. Even when individuals 
know how to pursue a goal, they might struggle to turn their knowledge into goal- 
directed actions. Strategies that allow effective regulation of one’s thoughts, feel-
ings, and actions during goal-striving are needed. One time- and cost-effi cient 
strategy to promote individuals’ goal-striving is to devise implementation intentions 
for planning when, where, and how one intends to act (Gollwitzer,  1993 ,  1999 , 
 2014 ; overview by Wieber, Thürmer, & Gollwitzer,  2015b ). In implementation 
intentions, people specify a well-suited or critical future situation and link an adap-
tive goal-directed response to it in an if–then format. For example, aa person intend-
ing to learn a new language might opt for one of the following implementation 
intentions: “If I am fi nished eating my Sunday morning breakfast, then I will work 
through one lecture of the language course on my computer,” or “If ‘New E-mail’ 
notifi cations pop up while I am working on the language course on my computer, 
then I will ignore them.” 
 What is so special about such simple if–then plans? Researchers studying the 
processes underlying the effects of implementation intentions have systematically 
tried to answer to this question. Essentially, implementation intentions are at the 
junction of controlled and automatic processes (e.g., Evans,  2008 ; Strack & Deutsch, 
 2004 ). The intentional formation of if–then plans typically emerges from delibera-
tion on when, where, and how to act. By contrast, the implementation of goal- 
directed action in response to an existing, specifi ed, critical situation entails features 
of automaticity (e.g., Bargh,  1994 ): Effects of implementation intentions have been 
observed to be immediate and effi cient, and once the specifi ed situation is encoun-
tered they come about without requiring extensive deliberation on how to respond 
(e.g., Aarts, Dijksterhuis, & Midden,  1999 ; Webb & Sheeran,  2007 ,  2008 ; Wieber 
& Sassenberg,  2006 ). 
 Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that forming implementation intentions in 
addition to mere goals leads to faster responses to critical situations (e.g., Parks- 
Stamm, Gollwitzer, & Oettingen,  2007 ) and improved performance in a secondary 
task without compromising the simultaneous performance in a primary task (i.e., 
speed-up effects are still evident under high cognitive load; e.g., Brandstätter, 
Lengfelder, & Gollwitzer,  2001 ). This research also suggests that there is no need 
for a further conscious intent to act in a critical moment. For instance, Bayer, 
Achtziger, Gollwitzer, and Moskowitz ( 2009 ) found that implementation inten-
tions encouraged successful pursuit of a goal even when the critical cue was pre-
sented subliminally, that is, when it was not consciously recognized. Moreover, 
studies of the human brain have found evidence that implementation intentions 
change action control from slow top-down to fast bottom-up processes (e.g., 
Gilbert, Gollwitzer, Cohen, Oettingen, & Burgess,  2009 ; Schweiger Gallo, Keil, 
McCulloch, Rockstroh, & Gollwitzer,  2009 ; Hallam et al.,  2015 ). In summary, 
implementation intentions strategically automate the control of goal-directed 
actions, instantly and effi ciently activating the action response linked to a critical 
situation when the individual enters it. 
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 The Role of Knowledge Accessibility in Planning 
and in the Control of Action 
 To assist the individual’s pursuit of a goal effectively, implementation intentions 
need to specify relevant critical situations in the if-component and instrumental 
responses in the then-component (see also Gollwitzer, Wieber, Myers, & McCrea, 
 2009 ). Prior studies have generally observed that people can indeed identify and 
self-select suitable situations and responses (e.g., Adriaanse, de Ridder, & de Wit, 
 2009 ; Gollwitzer & Brandstätter,  1997 ). In fact, both experimenter-provided and 
self-generated implementation intentions have been shown to foster goal attainment 
effectively (Armitage,  2009 ). But how do people generate effective plans? 
 Individuals have to access goal-relevant knowledge before they can further pro-
cess this information. Generally, psychological research shows wide agreement that 
knowledge accessibility is important for individuals’ cognition and behavior (over-
view by Wyer,  2008 ). As for the accessibility of goal-related knowledge, goal sys-
tems theory (Kruglanski et al.,  2002 ) affords a helpful conceptual framework for 
understanding how pursuing a goal affects the accessibility and application of 
knowledge that is relevant to planning. This theory rests on a cognitive approach to 
motivation. Its proponents apply a network conceptualization that allows for 
dynamic and malleable modeling of the activation and permits application of cogni-
tive content to motivation content. Within this “motivation-as-cognition” approach, 
goal systems are defi ned as “the mental representations of motivational networks 
composed of interconnected goals and means” (Kruglanski et al.,  2002 , p. 333). 
Given this connectedness of goals and means, the activation of a mental representa-
tion of a goal should also activate the mental representation of suitable means to 
pursue this goal. When this idea is applied to planning, it follows that when one is 
pursuing a goal (e.g., to prepare a healthy dinner), knowledge of possible means that 
is relevant to planning the when, where, and how of goal-striving becomes easily 
accessible (e.g., thinking of the salad in one’s fridge and of the tomatoes that one 
has to purchase on the way home). 
 Two properties of the interconnections are thus especially interesting for the acti-
vation of goal-relevant knowledge: structure and strength. As far as the structure of 
the interconnections are concerned, the number of means that are attached to a goal 
can vary. For one person, activating the physical fi tness goal might activate only the 
means of going to the gym, but for another person it might activate a multitude of 
means (e.g., going to the gym, riding a bike to work, and taking the stairs). In addi-
tion to such interindividual differences, the number of means connected to a goal 
might also vary from one goal to the next. For instance, there might be numerous 
ways to pursue the goal of eating healthily (e.g., eating at least fi ve portions of fruit 
and vegetables a day, drinking water rather than soft drinks) but only a few ways to 
pursue the goal of acquiring a driver’s license (i.e., taking the offi cial test). 
Concerning the strength of the interconnections, one may expect the strength of the 
cognitive association between the goal and the means for achieving it to be stronger 
when the number of those means is relatively low than when it is relatively high. 
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Going to the gym will probably be more likely to come to one’s mind if it is the only 
means rather than one of several that are connected to one’s physical fi tness goal. In 
summary, the structure and strength of the goal–means interconnections relating to 
a given goal seem relevant to planning because the activation of knowledge about 
potential means is a starting point for individual planning. Thus, the activation of 
the goal should ease the access to the knowledge relevant to the when and where 
(the if-component) and to the how (the then-component) of implementing that goal. 
 Spontaneous Use of Incidentally Presented Goal-Relevant 
Information 
 Given the importance of accessibility, one might wonder whether incidental knowl-
edge that is offered in an external context is also used by individuals to support their 
pursuit of a goal. In other words, are individuals capable of grasping goal-relevant 
knowledge about suitable opportunities, potential obstacles, and instrumental action 
strategies without much conscious effort? 
 Studies by Marquardt et al. ( 2016 ) addressed this question. They tested whether 
incidentally furnished goal-relevant information favors subsequent goal attainment. 
Moreover, they investigated whether the spontaneous use of incidentally provided 
implementation intentions depends on the activation of the particular goal. The 
authors expected that individuals would make spontaneous use of incidentally pro-
vided implementation intentions—but only when the goal had been previously 
activated. 
 Marquardt et al. ( 2016 ) fi rst examined whether incidentally communicated plans 
can promote high school students’ achievement in a school setting. Initially, the 
researchers implicitly activated the achievement goal of the participating students 
by having them work on a crossword puzzle containing either achievement-related 
words (achievement-goal condition) or neutral words (no achievement-goal-control 
condition). Priming the goal rather than asking individuals to set the goal them-
selves was intended to reduce the likelihood that they would try to plan consciously. 
To induce spontaneous implementation intention, all students in the study com-
pleted on paper a puzzle about sentence construction. It presented 34 sentence frag-
ments in scrambled order. The task of the students was to (a) form six meaningful 
sentences by connecting the fragments and (b) write down these sentences. All six 
sentences had been composed as conditional phrases (if–then structure). The only 
difference between the intention conditions was that one of the six sentences in the 
implementation-intention condition was relevant to the subsequent creativity task 
(“If I have found a use, then I will instantly search for the next use.”), whereas none 
of the six sentences in the no-achievement-goal condition and the mere- achievement- 
goal condition were relevant to the subsequent creativity task. 
 Students then worked on an ostensibly unrelated alternative- uses task (Guilford, 
 1967 ), in which they had to write down as many different ways of using a matchbox 
10 Planning and the Control of Action
174
as possible. The number of different ways that students came up with was used to 
measure the effects of the manipulations of the goal and the plan. The results showed 
that participants in the achievement-goal-plus-implementation-intention condition 
found more uses for a matchbox than did the participants in the mere-achievement- 
goal and no-achievement-goal-control conditions. Thus, giving goal-relevant infor-
mation (i.e., the implementation intention) improved goal attainment even when the 
information was delivered incidentally (i.e., before participants knew that it consti-
tuted an effective planning strategy for performing well on a later task). These fi nd-
ings tentatively bear out our argument that people can spontaneously use goal-related 
knowledge to bolster their goal attainment. 
 To corroborate these fi ndings, Marquardt et al. ( 2016 ) ran a second study on the 
spontaneous use of goal-relevant knowledge. This time, the degree to which the 
individuals’ healthy-diet goal benefi ted from incidentally shared plans to eat health-
ily was tested in a university cafeteria. The study was divided into two parts. The 
fi rst part took place in the morning and served to manipulate participants’ goal to eat 
healthily. Participants either read a short text of evidence-based arguments for a bal-
anced diet with fi ve portions of fruits and vegetables a day (healthy-diet goal condi-
tion) or a neutral text on nutrition science in Germany (no-goal-control condition), 
which was approximately the same length and had no words related to the healthy- 
diet goal. 
 Below the goal manipulation texts, a graphical display was positioned on the 
information sheet. This display was used to manipulate the incidentally offered 
plan. In all three conditions—no-healthy-diet-goal-control (A), mere-healthy-diet- 
goal (B), and mere-healthy-diet-goal-plus-implementation-intention (C)—partici-
pants received pictorial information on how to act on the healthy-diet goal. The 
graphical display consisted of three photographs showing the cafeteria’s salad bar, 
the vegetable bar, and the fruit shelf (each seen from the perspective of an individual 
standing directly in front it). All participants therefore had identical information on 
the how of eating healthily at the cafeteria. However, only participants in condition 
C received two additional pieces of information. First, to the left of the three photo-
graphs, the participants saw one photograph of the cafeteria entrance. This image 
thus depicted a suitable opportunity for them to act on their healthy-diet goal and 
can be thought of as specifying the if-component of an implementation intention. 
Second, they saw an arrow pointing from the picture of the cafeteria entrance to the 
three photographs of the suitable responses (i.e., selecting salad, fruit, and/or vege-
tables). The arrow thereby connected the different pictures and was an equivalent to 
the link between the if-component and the then-component in verbal implementa-
tion intentions. In summary, participants in condition C received information on the 
how of goal pursuit (photographs of the salad bar, the vegetable bar, and the fruit 
shelf), the when and where (picture of the cafeteria entrance), and a graphical link 
between the pictures that implied the characteristic structure of the if–then 
condition. 
 The second part of the experiment took place during lunch time. Participants 
completed a questionnaire after they had fi nished their meal at the cafeteria. They 
indicated how many portions of salad, vegetables, and fruit they had consumed 
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there on which day. The total sum was used to measure the effects that the goal and 
plan manipulation had on the diet of the participants. Participants in condition C 
consumed a greater quantity and variety of healthy foods than did participants in 
either condition A or B. Thus, passing on if–then information that was relevant to 
planning improved goal attainment even when this information came incidentally 
(in this case, through a graphical display). 
 Together, these fi ndings further underline the importance of knowledge accessi-
bility for individuals’ goal pursuits. People readily used their newly acquired goal- 
related knowledge to conceive if–then plans for their goal attainment spontaneously. 
In our view, such spontaneous planning highlights the fact that automatic processes 
can be instrumental in the adaptive control of action. It is, however, important to 
note that the spontaneous planning occurred on the basis of an activated goal, fur-
ther indicating that effects of implementation intention depend on the activation of 
a superordinate goal (Sheeran, Webb, & Gollwitzer,  2005 ). 
 Strategic Use of Goal-Relevant Knowledge with MCII 
 The use of goal intentions to guide action is aided by the coactivation of means 
associated with a goal. However, identifying and forming effective if–then plans 
might vary in diffi culty, depending on the individual, the situation, and the specifi c 
goal. It may well be that neither the automatic activation of goal-related knowledge 
nor the spontaneous acquisition and use of incidentally presented goal-relevant 
information is enough to guide individuals’ actions successfully when pursuing the 
goal is diffi cult (e.g., when that pursuit is cognitively or motivationally demanding). 
A goal can be diffi cult for reasons related to the individual, such as internal obsta-
cles (e.g., ego control or procrastination; see Gollwitzer, Bayer, & McCulloch, 
 2005 ; Wieber & Gollwitzer,  2010 ,  in press ). Or it may be diffi cult because of the 
situation, that is, because of external obstacles (e.g., distractions; see Wieber, von 
Suchodoletz, Heikamp, Trommsdorff, & Gollwitzer,  2011 ). Whatever the case, 
individuals must carefully select the action they include in the if- and then- 
components of their implementation intentions. Depending on the goal at hand and 
on the existing ideas about goals and means, individuals might either narrow their 
focus to fewer situations and responses or extend the range of situations and 
responses they take into account when pursuing their goal. If people experience 
problems with sticking to a healthy diet when watching TV in the evening, they 
might want to address this situation specifi cally. Or when people experience prob-
lems with recognizing opportunities to exercise, they might want to expand the situ-
ations and means connected to their physical fi tness goal. 
 A systematic guide to planning would be helpful for such challenging goal pur-
suit, and that guide exists—the preparation of if–then planning by means of mental 
contrasting (e.g., Oettingen et al.,  2009 ; Oettingen, Pak, & Schnetter,  2001 ; for 
summaries see Oettingen,  2012 ,  2014 ). Mental contrasting brings individuals to 
actively search through their goal-relevant knowledge and select or even derive 
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critical situations and suitable responses. In the application of the strategy, individu-
als are asked to formulate a personal wish, to imagine positive future outcomes of 
realizing that wish, and to mentally contrast these outcomes with current potential 
obstacles to their goal-striving. Mental contrasting thereby increases the accessibil-
ity of both a positive future vision and the current reality, instilling a sense that 
action is necessary. Moreover, mental contrasting is thought to activate relevant 
expectations that allow for an adjustment of personal goal commitment (a person’s 
attachment to a goal or the decisiveness to reach it; Locke, Latham, & Erez,  1988 ). 
If the expectation of reaching the desired outcome is high, commitment is strength-
ened by mental contrasting; if it is low and effort might be in vain, commitment is 
weakened and individuals disengage. 
 In the next step, MCII guides individuals in using this knowledge of potential 
obstacles and in detecting instrumental responses to each of them. Corroborating 
the effectiveness of combining mental contrasting and implementation intentions, 
one study found that MCII participants reported greater success at reducing their 
unhealthy snacking consumption than did participants who used either only mental 
contrasting or only implementation intentions (Study 2 in Adriaanse et al.,  2010 ). 
According to this line of thought, MCII is likeliest to contribute to one’s goal attain-
ment when the strategic search for one’s goal-relevant knowledge and planning can 
make a difference. MCII is less likely to do so when one’s environment prompts the 
when, where, and how of goal-directed actions to begin with. 
 One study by Sailer et al. ( 2015 ) addresses this argument. The authors ran an 
MCII intervention study on physical exercise in a clinical context. Previous research 
had indicated that regular exercise can have positive effects on both the physical and 
mental health of persons with schizophrenia. However, shortcomings in cognition, 
perception, affect, and volition make it especially diffi cult for people with schizo-
phrenia to plan a behavior and follow through on it. As a result, studies that had 
incorporated exercise reported poor attendance and high drop-out rates, indicating 
that schizophrenic patients were not able to overcome the manifold barriers to phys-
ical activity. Sailer et al. therefore tested whether MCII helps convert schizophrenic 
individuals’ exercise intentions into behavior while taking into account the support-
iveness of the situational context. 
 The patients diagnosed with a schizophrenic spectrum disorder lived in either an 
autonomy-focused setting (a self-supply ward with daytime care by nurses, medical 
doctors, and psychologists) or a highly structured setting (a ward providing intense 
therapy to activate patients and affording continuous availability of psychiatric 
care). Whereas participants in the autonomy-focused setting had to manage attend-
ing the exercise groups on their own, those in the highly structured setting were 
actively reminded and invited to each exercise session. The authors predicted that 
engaging in MCII would help individuals attain their exercise goals in the autonomy- 
focused setting (in which each search and application of goal-relevant knowledge 
depended on the patients themselves) but not in the highly structured setting (in 
which the environment made the relevant information available in order to prompt 
the goal-directed actions). To test this prediction, participants who agreed to partici-
pate in the study were randomly assigned to an information-plus-goal-intention 
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condition (control group) or an information-plus-MCII condition (MCII group). 
Patients in the control group read a nonfi ction text on the benefi ts of physical activ-
ity and on potential obstacles for which one must prepare (e.g., motivational prob-
lems and tiredness). They then set the goal to attend jogging sessions and wrote it 
down. Patients in the MCII group read the same nonfi ction text and then worked 
through the MCII strategy, listing three positive outcomes associated with attending 
the exercise session (e.g., losing weight) and three obstacles (e.g., feeling tired). 
Next, they identifi ed their most important obstacle and, with their therapist, worked 
out a specifi c solution to this obstacle before translating it into an implementation 
intention in the if–then format: “If [obstacle], then I will [response].” In both groups 
participants were treated by a trained therapist during individual training sessions 
that involved an equal amount of contact between the therapist and each of the 
patients. 
 The attendance and persistence of the patients in the exercise program of the 
participating clinics during the 4 weeks after their treatment was measured as the 
dependent variable. In both the autonomy-focused and the highly structured setting, 
two jogging sessions were scheduled every week and did not confl ict with therapies 
or other events. During jogging sessions, participants could run at their own pace 
and decide how long they wanted to run. Results in the highly structured setting 
showed that MCII and control participants alike attended about 70 % of the offered 
exercise sessions. In the autonomy-focused setting, however, control participants 
attended less than 40 % of the sessions, whereas the MCII participants continued 
attending about 70 % of them. When it comes to successful goal attainment, these 
fi ndings demonstrate the importance of self-regulating one’s goal pursuits and goal- 
striving in rather unstructured situations. When goal-directed actions were prompted 
contextually, MCII did not improve goal attainment, for it was already rather high. 
But when goal-related knowledge mattered because remembering and initiating the 
goal-directed actions was up to individuals, MCII did improve goal attainment. 
These fi ndings imply that the MCII self-regulation strategy constitutes a time- and 
cost-effi cient action-control tool that helps patients with severe mental illness (see 
also Toli, Webb, & Hardy,  2016 ) to achieve their health-related goals in an autono-
mous setting. 
 Strategic Planning of the Automatic Activation of Goal-Relevant 
Knowledge 
 In addition to the spontaneous and strategic planning described above, planning 
with implementation intentions can also be benefi cial as a context-sensitive reminder 
of one’s strategies or goals that supports refl ective decision making and goal- 
directed actions. This strategic use of the automatic effects of planning with imple-
mentation intentions is related to the demands that have been postulated for 
human-centered computer systems in information management. The aim in the 
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interaction between humans and computers in sociotechnical systems is to commu-
nicate the right information at the right time and the right place in the right way to 
the right person in order to empower that person to fi nd and select the best goal- 
directed response (e.g., Fischer,  2012 ). Implementation intentions might also be 
used to achieve this end. 
 First, implementation intentions provide the relevant information about instru-
mental action responses in critical situations during goal pursuit. In a study on group 
decision-making (Thürmer, Wieber, & Gollwitzer,  2015a ,  2015b ), participants set 
themselves the goal of performing well. In keeping with this goal, they then either 
generated the specifi c goal of reviewing the advantages of the nonpreferred alterna-
tives before making a group decision (control condition) or included this strategy in 
the implementation intention: “And when we fi nally take the decision sheet to note 
our preferred alternative, then we will go over the advantages of the non-preferred 
alternatives again” (Thürmer et al.,  2015a , p. 104). As a result of this small differ-
ence in planning, implementation-intention groups succeeded more often than mere 
goal-intention groups at transforming their respective intentions into actions and 
thereby improving their goal attainment. Apparently, implementation intentions 
provided the strategy information to the group members just before the group deci-
sion was taken and thereby oriented them in their search for the best solution to the 
issue on which they were about to decide. 
 Second, implementation intentions have also been found to be capable of activat-
ing one’s goal at a critical juncture and thereby increasing the impact of this goal on 
individuals’ cognition and behavior (van Koningsbruggen, Stroebe, Papies, & Aarts, 
 2011 ). In a study on dieting, unsuccessful dieters either formed a think-of-dieting 
implementation intention (“The next time that I am tempted to eat chocolate [cook-
ies, pizza, French fries, or chips], then I will think of dieting”) or just indicated why 
it was important for them to resist the temptation to eat chocolate [cookies, pizza, 
French fries, or chips]. In a subsequent word-completion task, participants in the 
implementation-intention condition were instructed to fi ll in unfi nished words (e.g., 
_ij_e_) that were preceded by one of the fi ve food cues (e.g., chocolate). In complet-
ing the task, they used diet-related words (e.g.,  lijnen , Dutch for dieting) instead of 
neutral words (e.g.,  tijger , Dutch for tiger) more often than control participants did. 
Evidently, implementation intentions reminded individuals of their dieting goal 
when they encountered a tempting situation (Study 1) and thus empowered unsuc-
cessful dieters to reduce their consumption of palatable foods (Study 2). Together, 
the fi ndings of these studies (Thürmer et al.,  2015a ,  2015b ; van Koningsbruggen 
et al.,  2011 ; see also Wieber, Thürmer, & Gollwitzer,  2015a ) demonstrate that stra-
tegic automation of action control by planning with implementation intentions can 
serve goal attainment even when a refl ective decision needs to be made or when 
individuals are not aware of instrumental action strategies at the time of planning. 
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 Conclusion and Outlook 
 In this chapter we have examined the role that knowledge has in planning and 
action control. We have stressed that knowing which goal one intends to pursue 
and committing oneself to that goal are often only the fi rst step toward successful 
goal attainment. Planning when, where, and how to act with implementation 
intentions has proven to be an effective self-regulation strategy for reducing this 
intention–behavior gap. Regarding the acquisition and use of plan-relevant 
knowledge, we have argued that individuals have a variety of ways to form 
implementation intentions. They range from spontaneous planning of how to 
approach a goal on the basis of accessible goal-related knowledge to strategic 
planning that includes a systematic search of knowledge for critical situations 
and instrumental action responses. 
 With respect to spontaneous planning, we have argued that the activation of a 
goal coactivates goal-relevant knowledge and thus greatly facilitates the decision 
on when, where, and how to pursue the goal. Although this automatic coactivation 
is likely to be an adaptive mechanism that promotes successful control of action 
most of the time, it can also hinder behavioral change. For instance, having the 
goal of getting to work might automatically induce one to take the car rather than 
use public transport, even if one intends to adopt a sustainable lifestyle (e.g., 
Bamberg,  2000 ). In that sense, strategic planning is a powerful self-regulatory 
tool informing behavioral change. In fact, authors of meta-analyses of effects that 
implementation intention has on physical activity (Bélanger-Gravel, Godin, & 
Amireault,  2013 ) and eating behavior (Adriaanse, Vinkers, de Ridder, Hox, & de 
Wit,  2011 ) found that implementation intentions successfully aid the translation 
of individuals’ intentions into action. The strategic automation of action control 
by implementation intentions has even been found to remind the individual of a 
useful refl ective strategy (Thürmer et al.,  2015a ), to reinforce one’s goal in a criti-
cal situation (van Koningsbruggen et al.,  2011 ), or to foster the restructuring of 
automatic goal–means connections that are required to change habitual behavior 
(e.g., Adriaanse, Gollwitzer, de Ridder, de Wit, & Kroese,  2011 ). Combining 
mental contrasting and implementation intentions in order to extend planning has 
proven more effective than either mental contrasting or implementation intentions 
alone (Study 2 in Adriaanse et al.,  2010 ). Hence, strategic planning with MCII 
appears to be an especially effective tool for encouraging individuals to make 
effective use of their goal-relevant knowledge and thus improve the attainment of 
their goals. In summary, the planning research we have presented in this chapter 
highlights the adaptive role of spontaneous and strategic planning in turning an 
individual’s knowledge into action. 
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Chapter 11
Pragmatic Philosophy and the Social Function 
of Knowledge
Tilman Reitz
Even the members of the scientific community still do not know what it means to 
live in a “knowledge” society. Recent discussions of the issue are pervaded by a 
tension that is rarely noticed, for its aspects are situated within different academic 
disciplines. The social sciences mostly lack a well-considered definition of knowl-
edge, whereas philosophical debates about such a definition usually fail to discuss 
the social constitution of knowledge. The following contribution presents an analy-
sis of this problem, outlines a solution, and points out some of its implications.
Useful inspiration is found in pragmatic philosophy and in the efforts of social 
epistemology. Yet I argue that both of these approaches, too, overlook or repress a 
theoretical challenge: the spatial dispersion of social knowledge, which has been 
important since the invention of writing and storage media but which is pivotal in 
global networks of information. If knowledge is seated not only in the minds of 
individuals but also in the ways in which they collectively and collaboratively map 
their world, then it also matters where that knowledge is kept and how access to it is 
organized. The library thus serves as a paradigm of my account. The definition that 
will be developed permits inclusion of material resources and places in understand-
ings of knowledge, and it can be noted at the outset that the very term social episte-
mology was coined in library studies (Shera, 1970).
I proceed in four steps. First, I illustrate the problematic tension of sociological 
characterizations and philosophical definitions of knowledge. The second step 
develops an alternative to dominant philosophical discussions of the issue. The 
intention is to arrive at a definition that allows one to conceive of knowledge as a 
complex of social practices and cultural artifacts. In the third step, I compare this 
approach to results of social epistemology and identify the problem of space. Lastly, 
I place my account in the context of reflections about the knowledge society.
T. Reitz (*) 
Institute of Sociology, Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Jena, Germany
e-mail: tilman.reitz@uni-jena.de
186
 How to Define and How to Obscure Knowledge
One may question whether sociological or economic accounts of the knowledge 
society need to define knowledge. As soon as they do, however, quite different 
views surface. The best examples (also in the sense of solid, not simply deficient 
considerations) are found in the classical theories on the topic. Drucker (1969), 
probably the first writer to offer a conception of the knowledge society, was brief in 
definitional matters. Using an approach that has since become widespread (outside 
philosophy), he also made a specific point: “Knowledge, that is, the systematic 
organization of information and concepts,… makes apprenticeship obsolete. 
Knowledge substitutes systematic learning for exposure to experience” (p. 268). In 
context, Drucker focused even more on issues of application: Knowledge is ana-
lyzed as crucial in increasing the productivity of labor.
Four years later, Bell (1973) highlighted the opposite side when he noted a “new 
centrality of theoretical knowledge, the primacy of theory over empiricism” (p. 343, 
his italics). Accordingly, basic science is the main reference when he defines knowl-
edge as “a set of organized statements of facts or ideas, presenting a reasoned judg-
ment or an experimental result, which is transmitted to others through some 
communication medium in some systematic form” (p. 175). This definition has 
remained popular in descriptions of the recent, computer-based take-off of the 
knowledge society (see Castells, 1996, p. 17, for example). But the focus on explicit 
statements cannot account for a central novelty that characterizes the work of con-
temporary knowledge workers or symbol analysts (Reich, 1991)—the importance 
of situated problem-solving, which demands capacities of embodied or organiza-
tional knowledge. Such a capacity is probably at stake when Willke (1998) tries to 
define knowledge in structures where it matters “not as truth but as a resource” 
(p. 161): “Whereas information designates systemically relevant differences, knowl-
edge originates when such information is embedded in contexts of experience” 
(pp. 161–162, my translation).1 Unlike the standardized situations Drucker had in 
mind, this experience presumably affords more than textbooks can convey.
Historical differences set aside, the given examples seem to offer three system-
atically distinguishable accounts of knowledge:
 1. Knowledge as a systematic set of applicable recipes
 2. Knowledge as an organized body of theoretical statements
 3. Knowledge as a developed capacity of situated problem-solving
These accounts do not necessarily constitute or presuppose different concepts of 
knowledge. Maybe they are really only about different contexts in which knowledge 
matters and thus give different perspectives on the same thing. But if there should 
1 “Während Informationen systemspezifisch relevante Unterschiede bezeichnen, entsteht Wissen, 
wenn solche Informationen in bestimmte Erfahrungskontexte eingebunden sind.” (Willke, 1998, 
pp. 161–162). An interesting question would be whether strict social systems theory is really com-
patible with the strong accent on experience, particularly that of the individual.
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be an underlying concept of knowledge, it would be helpful to have a definition 
making it explicit.
The preceding quotations also hint at a strong option: They all identify knowl-
edge as information that is relatively organized and that can thus orient perception 
and action. If one adds the concept of data to that approach, a clear structural picture 
emerges:
Data is considered as a coded resource of operations, it is transformed into information 
when it is integrated into a relevant context where it makes a difference as a difference, it 
gains relevance and meaning relative to an integrating system. Information is transformed 
into knowledge when it is integrated into a context of experience. (Fuchs, 2004, par. 11).2
Such a model leaves open different possibilities of how information is organized 
and which kind of context is relevant. Following written instructions fits, as does 
employing individual mind maps in complex social constellations. Of course, both 
the definition of information and the notion of a context of experience call for fur-
ther explication. As far as necessary, it is given below. But two more principal prob-
lems should be tackled first. On the one hand, the redundancy of organizing data 
into information and organizing information into knowledge gives pause. Is it really 
necessary to draw two distinctions of the same kind? If knowledge should not mean 
only very dense information (processed in human culture), one needs to spell out the 
specific ways in which it is organized and becomes operative. On the other hand, 
distinguishing knowledge from information may involve more than specifying a 
context. Semantically, knowledge is characterized by strong cognitive optimism—
or by the kind of relation to truth that authors like Willke try to dismiss. Although 
information may be insufficient or misleading, knowledge is supposed to be about 
what is really the case. If someone says that you know and not only reasonably 
believe something (e.g., about natural laws, financial markets, the name of a coun-
try’s president), she or he means you are right. I try to show how this peculiar trait 
matters in social analysis. But first and more basically, the question is what it means 
for the definition of knowledge.
At this juncture one naturally turns to philosophy. I leave aside some interesting 
knowledge philosophies of the past, namely, of knowledge as systematic self- 
reflection of a culture (Hegel) or as an elucidation of our being-in-the-world 
(Heidegger). I also refrain from concentrating on the special case of scientific 
knowledge and the philosophy of science. Instead, I consider contemporary debates 
about knowledge in general, discourses in which reduced ontological claims, pre-
cise definitions, and aims of wide conceptual extension are to be expected. Sadly, 
most of these debates turn out to be almost literally footnotes to Plato and not even 
based on a precise reading of the text. As a result of this discussion, the need for a 
fresh pragmatic account will become discernible.
2 Fuchs (2004) does not quite agree with the structural outline (which he ascribes to authors such 
as Willke instead)—but only because his own project is a general theory for “all self-organizing 
physical, biological, and social systems” (par. 11). According to Fuchs, attention must thus be 
drawn to restrictions: “[T]he triad is not data-information-knowledge, but data-knowledge-practi-
cal knowledge as a manifestation of information in the human realm” (par. 11).
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Where contemporary philosophers turn to defining knowledge, they almost inev-
itably start with the classic paradigm: justified true belief. The passages in Plato 
suggesting this definition of knowledge are found in the dialogues Meno (trans. 
1990) and Theatetus (trans. 1996). In both dialogues, the term epistéme (knowledge 
or even science) is defined in similar ways:
• as metà lógou alethés doxa, true belief/opinion with reasoning/explanation 
(Theatetus, 201c) and
• as orthé or alethés dóxa, correct or true belief/opinion, together with aitías 
logismós, an account of the reason/origin (Meno, 97b–98a).
In one of the dialogues, the proposed definition fails; in the other it is accepted. 
What is of interest here is only what can be made of them (which actually involves 
one additional reference to the argument of Meno). Contemporary debates show 
that, for example, a narrow Cartesian interpretation is possible. Various authors 
accentuate that only individuals can believe and thus know something, and some 
commentators even take the degree of belief as decisive: Whoever is not certain is 
no candidate for knowing. I call this stance Cartesian because it makes individual 
consciousness central. Other scholars, such as the British philosopher Edward Craig 
(1990), have argued that belief does not matter at all (pp. 12–17) or have developed 
notions of group knowledge and belief (see below, section on Social Epistemology 
and Spatial Difference). The whole range of positions, however, leaves the structure 
of the Platonic definition remarkably untouched. This lack of conceptual innovation 
is even clearer from the fact that most discussions have focused on the meaning of 
justified or on the question in which sense reasons turn true belief into knowledge. 
A glimpse of these debates is useful to gain a sense of where the discussion got 
stuck.
The main idea of asking what justified means can serve as a starting point: What 
if I entertain a belief that is both justified and true, but only accidentally so? 
Examples and thought experiments relating to this question abound.3 A simple one 
should be sufficient for my purposes in this chapter. Suppose, for instance, that I 
reasonably believe the refrigerator contains something to drink because I put orange 
juice in. And suppose that there actually is something to drink in there—but not the 
juice I am thinking about, for someone took it out and replaced it with milk without 
my realizing it. It would thereby not seem correct to say that I know the true state of 
affairs. Different solutions have been proposed, among them creative ones such as 
recurring to intellectual virtues (which, as virtues, imply success).4 The general pat-
tern may be derived from the initial question about the role of justification: Justified 
true belief that is not just contingently true.
Yet this extended definition is not the only possible solution. Goldman (1999), a 
main proponent of social epistemology, proposed distinguishing between different 
3 A major part of the debate refers to a short text by Gettier (1963), after whom the said thought 
experiments are named Gettier-style cases.
4 A resulting definition reads: “Knowledge is a state of (true) belief arising out of acts of intellec-
tual virtue” (Zagzebski, 1996, p. 271).
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kinds or degrees of knowledge instead. In cases of “weak knowledge” (p. 23), true 
belief alone is sufficient. Reasons hardly matter when I ask, “Who in this room 
knows the capital of Cambodia?” But there are also cases where one insists on hav-
ing “strong knowledge,” which then has to be qualified by “some additional element 
or elements” (p. 23) “such as justification or warrant for the belief, and the exclusion 
of alternative possibilities” (p. 23). Goldman even develops a third model of quasi- 
infallible, “super-strong knowledge” (p. 23), but he does so mainly to show that 
there is little or no practical need for such a concept. This argument about context is 
also what I take to be the message of his account: It is necessary to ask which under-
standing of knowledge makes sense in what kind of everyday circumstances.
Following this line, a general critique of the debates in question can be mounted. 
It is certainly laudable that contemporary philosophers start with everyday language 
and intuitions when they discuss components and definitions of knowledge. But it is 
not sure that these sources are differentiated enough to pin down the true and exact 
meaning of a notion that signifies diverse and complex practices. Moreover, the 
usual approach focuses only on a very small segment of the various ways in which 
people actually talk about knowing and knowledge. An aspect that will turn out to 
be crucial is that analytic philosophers almost invariably explicate the verb to know 
when they want to find out something about the noun knowledge. In a classical 
study, for instance, Chisholm (1989) proposed the following “definition of knowl-
edge” (p. 98): “h is known by S = Def (1) h is true; (2) S accepts h; (3) h is evident 
for S” (followed by an unnecessarily complicated fourth clause) (p. 98).
Unlike such definitions, everyday language seems to distinguish between verb 
and noun in important respects. Whereas knowing is exclusively attributed to per-
sons (or, controversially, to quasi subjects like groups or clever animals), knowledge 
may also be situated in objective media or structures and transpersonal organiza-
tions. I do not really claim that my computer knows what I wrote during the last few 
years (even if it has it all stored), but no formal reason keeps me from saying that 
the knowledge of the National Security Agency (NSA) is frighteningly extensive, 
that the library of Alexandria housed most of the knowledge of classical antiquity, 
or that Wikipedia increasingly encompasses the basic common knowledge of the 
present world.
Such uses of language do not already imply an alternative definition of knowl-
edge. They are as useful and potentially misleading as uses of to know are. But if 
there is no sensible way to decide where to start, it is appropriate to adopt an alterna-
tive strategy of using common language and practice to derive and test definitions. 
Instead of determining without ambiguity what is meant by one specific way to talk 
about knowledge and knowing—or, worse, intuitions about both—it would be 
instructive to ask which set of practices and capacities people typically refer to when 
applying these notions. Marginal cases such as group convictions and tacit or 
implicit knowledge may remain problematic then, but much is gained when they 
can at least be related to a core understanding.
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 Knowledge as Practice: Keeping Information Available
A new approach is thus not only desirable but apparent as soon as one specifies how 
a pragmatic philosophy of knowledge should proceed. It should not simply identify 
as true what proves useful (although a notion of use will indeed be important). It 
should ask how people act in contexts in which the concept of knowledge makes 
sense. The strategy just outlined has already been employed by Craig (1990), who 
introduced an additional reflection to make his point: What is called knowledge can 
be best constructed in contrast to a sociocognitive state of nature without or before 
it.
If what I shall say is along the right lines, the core concept of knowledge is an outcome of 
certain very general facts about the human situation; so general, indeed, that one cannot 
imagine their changing whilst anything we can still recognise as social life persists. Given 
those facts, and a modicum of self-awareness, the concept will appear; and for the same 
reasons as caused it to appear, it will then stay (p. 10).
I do not try to be equally transhistorical. But I do subscribe to Craig’s project to 
develop a “prototypical case” (p. 15) or a social core situation of knowledge use by 
spelling out what one could not do without it.
I am less satisfied with his answer. Craig (1990) constructs only a very basic 
original situation of knowledge, and he actively refuses to introduce necessary 
extensions. The basic problem he refers to is that reliable information is needed 
from someone else. It is this other person, not some presocial believer, to whom 
knowledge is typically (and prototypically) ascribed. This construction has two 
components. The first is unproblematic, but not sufficient: “To put it briefly and 
roughly, the concept of knowledge is used to flag approved sources of information” 
(p. 10). What is missing is, again, a specific way to distinguish knowledge from 
mere information, however approved its sources may be. Craig’s way of solving the 
problem brings in the second component: Although there are many possible sources 
of information, only personal informants are said to have and convey knowledge. 
Once again, the verb to know is employed to make the distinction plausible, but 
Craig’s text also includes a substantial pragmatic argument: Natural sources of 
information and even cultural artifacts cannot cooperate with the seeker of informa-
tion; other members of her or his epistemic community can. The idea is most inter-
estingly illustrated by books. Craig explains both why he does not want to attribute 
knowledge in this case and why some notion of knowledge still seems appropriate:
Books and the like [are] excellent sources of information, but never, even in the spirit of 
metaphor, said to know anything…Not that specialist knowledge of any kind is required to 
unravel their secrets—a large part of their point is to provide a perspicuous source, acces-
sible to anyone with a command of the language they use. But they have none of the psy-
chology of the prototypical informant: they have no beliefs, they do not act, they are not felt 
to co-operate with us, and they cannot empathise with us so as to anticipate our purposes. 
Besides, they have a special place amongst the sources of information: they are the evidence 
laid down by creatures that are prototypical informants precisely as the most perspicuous 
vehicle of their information. (p. 38)
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This description is fine, but Craig (1990) seems to overlook an obvious conse-
quence—the human practice of knowledge may require both personal informants 
and storage media like books. The result is that Craig’s prototype adds nothing 
substantial to the preconception of knowledge that has already emerged in social 
science accounts. He, too, could have defined knowledge as information (processed 
in human culture), and he may not even be able to give a satisfying account of cul-
ture. At root, an even vaguer summary seems adequate: “The human form of life 
demands good information, and the reliable flow of information. The concept of 
knowledge, along with related concepts, serves those needs” (Greco, 2009, p. 320).
This summary includes a minor mistake but it hints at a basic problem. Craig 
probably did not mix up the concept of knowledge with the practical structures it 
designates, but his account seems to lack important practical distinctions. In order 
to see what is lacking, one only has to ask whether the word flow applies equally 
well to both knowledge and information. As far as I see, both have different practi-
cal characteristics in this respect. Whereas information is typically transferred (and 
received as something new), knowledge is usually kept available over time. For 
example, one speaks of a flow of information when talking about communication 
technology but says that knowledge is kept in books and assembled in libraries. 
Even the information age could produce the sentence, “I store my knowledge in my 
friends.” It goes without saying that these formulations may all only be manners of 
speaking and that society has also developed huge infrastructures for storing poten-
tial information or data. But the idea that it is an essential feature of knowledge to 
be kept available for future use is consistent with many other characteristics dis-
cussed so far in this chapter: its higher degree of organization, its versatile employ-
ability, even the semantic connection between knowledge and truth. Above all, I 
think this idea gives a specific answer to Craig’s question of why there is occasion 
to apply the concept knowledge. It is because there are established practices of 
keeping correct beliefs or information available over time so that people can ask 
informants, use cultural sources of information, or just resort to their own mne-
monic capacities when necessary.
Before I try and condense these initial reflections into a definition, I would like 
to offer my own footnote to Plato, who expressed similar intuitions about knowl-
edge. When in Meno the question is asked what makes knowledge more valuable 
than mere true opinion, the answer is that it will not run away; reasons are ties that 
keep it fixed in the soul (Meno, 98a). One of Plato’s own examples helps show how 
this image relates to the proposed account. If someone just happens to have a true 
opinion about the way to Larissa, she can give me the right information. But if that 
person really knows about it (or, even better, about the location of the city), she will 
be a steady, reliable informant in this respect. This interlocutor will, for instance, 
first check whether the place from which I set out is near Athens or near Thessaloniki, 
then think about roads going northwards or southwards from there, and so on. My 
informant may, in non-Platonic spirit, even use a map in order to refresh her knowl-
edge or, as one might also say, have recourse to the cultural knowledge laid down in 
maps and the like.
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Which definition can be drawn from this account? First, one needs basic ele-
ments such as the correct, useful opinions, beliefs, statements, or indications that 
figure in the given examples. As most examined contemporary theories suggest, 
information is an adequate term for grasping their common core. In other words, the 
material of knowledge consists of transferrable patterns that enable one to tell some-
thing about something in the world or that make a difference for operations of 
diverse systems in a changing environment. These patterns may be sentences 
explaining a travel route, a bee dance giving directions for collecting pollen, or even 
substances transmitting signals in an organism. The more exclusively human char-
acter of knowledge originates, second, when such information is assembled, inte-
grated into a given framework, fixated, and stored for future use (practical or 
epistemic). None of these operations is redundant, but for the sake of brevity, inte-
gration into frameworks and fixation can be taken as implied in the exercise of 
assembly and structured storage. Most important, all operations are part of one pro-
cess. They interact in the way information is organized, or reorganized, as a perma-
nently available structure of orientation. Many versions of this interaction are 
conceivable. Assembling often includes generalizing and subsuming. Both opera-
tions usually occur within established logical or topical hierarchies. Fixation, too, 
involves ordering and aims at facilitating accessibility. Only where such organiza-
tion takes place do books, experts, and universities, and not merely repositories or 
hard drives, have a role to play. Together, these considerations are sufficient for 
venturing a definition of knowledge:
Knowledge is information in the condition of being assembled and kept available 
for future use.
As a definition offered in pragmatic spirit, this formulation is open to empirical 
specification and maybe even substantial amendment. I immediately note the main 
variable aspects, indicating where I take them to be strengths and where I think 
additional reflection is needed.
 1. The most obvious and voluntary openness of the proposed definition is that it 
does not specify media of knowledge. Information may be assembled and kept 
available in the minds of people, in cultural artifacts, and in social organizations. 
One can even argue that artifacts and social cooperation are a necessary part of 
the knowledge process, for people generally keep information available through 
symbols. (The person who knows that she put something in the fridge thus turns 
out to be a weak case, comparable to a squirrel that “knows” where it put the 
hazelnut.) This openness about media gives space for research on knowledge 
structures in the social sciences and humanities. The only restriction is that the 
practice of knowledge implies potential users of information.
 2. What is also left open is the way in which information is actually organized, or 
how assembling, fixating, and keeping available work together. Maybe further 
reflection could carve out a clear functional scheme in this regard (e.g., a scheme 
oriented to the telos of availability), but I rather think that there are culturally and 
historically varying possibilities. One paradigmatic context where the concrete 
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organization of permanently available information can be studied is, obviously, 
the institution of science.
 3. A less visible openness is implied in the perspective from which the definitional 
terms are chosen. As the notion of information exemplifies, they should work 
from the inside perspective of cultural participants as well as from an external 
focus on observable operations and causal relationships. The terms assemble, 
keep available, and use certainly have a participant bias—but they are nearly 
neutral, allowing for phenomenological, hermeneutic, semantic, and objectivist 
specification.
 4. Finally, the definition does not systematically include the idea that a language 
community takes knowledge per se to be true. It only suggests why people do so: 
Information that is kept available for future use is deemed worthy of being kept. 
What counts as knowledge, not just as guess, opinion, belief, or conviction in 
intersubjective settings is understandably a stock of preserved, cultivated, 
proven, and tested insights and orientations.5 Whether we—individuals, groups, 
cultures—are right to rely on it is a different question. In some cases we have 
very reliable clues, sometimes whole cultures turn out to be wrong. Any further 
inquiry would also have to see whether it is really the same kind of reliance in 
which they may be wrong. Perhaps the key words episteme, scientia, and knowl-
edge, or even knowledge, savoir, and Wissen, do not designate the same thing.
The last reflection deserves further comment; it brings up problems of relativism. 
To avoid them, one could add that the information kept available for future use has 
to be correct, or reliable, or even organized as a true account of reality. Yet this cri-
terion would force strong presuppositions into a mere definition. I prefer to leave 
even this consideration open by referring to the different possible views indicated in 
point 2, above. A deeper analysis from the participant perspective would have to 
make sense of several conflicting facts: that people cease to treat beliefs and state-
ments as knowledge when they prove to be untrue, whereas people also know they 
risk error when they state or believe anything at all; that they disagree with the truth 
procedures of other cultures and times and yet would not deny that those cultures 
had knowledge; and so forth. Solutions may be either relativistic or objectivistic. 
For research in which the observer perspective predominates, however, it is suffi-
cient to know what counts and functions as knowledge (or something very similar) 
in different sociocultural contexts. Researchers in social science (and epistemology) 
cannot avoid coming back to their own life world, but they do not need to become 
mired in efforts to make it transparent. Moreover, only reaching beyond the horizon 
of one’s inherited language and practices may show just how much relativism is 
possible.
The proposed conceptual philosophical reflection thus allows me to come back 
to issues of sociocultural enquiry. This is precisely the desired effect. Yet the 
5 A stronger formulation would be that information is filtered before it is kept: “Knowledge…is the 
consequence of a filtering process; the process of filtering…facts through the ethical system or the 
intellectual system, or the system of scholarship…of the individual who receives it” (Shera, 1970, 
p. 96).
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 question remains whether a modestly innovative, pragmatic, philosophical defini-
tion of knowledge changes anything for the empirical disciplines.
 Social Epistemology and Spatial Difference
Another theoretical detour will help find answers. Proponents of social epistemol-
ogy have worked out an account that fits well with the purpose of the proposed defi-
nition. They, too, wish to avoid restricting the attribution of knowledge to individuals. 
Instead, they situate knowledge in collectives and organizations. In doing so, they 
offer instruments that may help analyze the changing social composition of knowl-
edge and to advance from definitions of the concept to a discussion of concrete 
conceptions. I introduce three innovations of this sort and discuss their perspectives 
and limits. As already indicated, the main problem that will show up is a lack of 
attention to the cultural media of knowledge and an ensuing space blindness—
against which more extensive sociodiagnostic opportunities will become apparent.
A difficult, but interesting, point of departure can be found in Gilbert (1994), 
who is generally concerned with shared intentionality. Specifically, she also assumes 
collective or group beliefs. According to her, such beliefs surface when a group 
member expresses a view to which the others presumably (and legitimately) show 
reactions of shocked surprise. All had agreed for a long while that John is an 
unpleasant type, and suddenly Maggie comes up with the remark, “How nice John 
was again yesterday!” A group of string-theory researchers sits down for lunch, 
when a member sighs, “What nonsense this whole string theory is!” Gilbert argues 
that appalled reactions such as “What did you just say?” are quite in order here. 
Long-standing agreement (in the first example) and shared practice (in the second 
example) have produced a kind of obligation not to utter the statements in question. 
Such obligations may be unpleasant themselves, but they are to some extent 
unavoidable and fulfill basic social functions:
Apart from the general function of providing individuals with a sense of unity or commu-
nity with others…, the collective beliefs evidently provide points from which people can go 
forward, not forever locked in the back and forth of argumentative conflict. (p. 253)
I momentarily refrain from evaluating this argument and step right ahead to a 
second, more refined account of collective intellectual organization. Whereas 
Gilbert’s (1994) model refers only to the most basic practice of knowledge, the 
preservation of belief, this second account is concerned with reasons or collective 
rationality. Pettit (2003) has argued that a genuinely collective combination of ele-
ments of reasoning can often yield better results than is possible with an aggregate 
of complete individual judgments. Judging indeed offers an instructive example. 
Take a legal committee that must decide whether someone is liable for having bro-
ken a contract and whose members separately consider whether there was a valid 
contract in place to begin with and whether a breach of contract has occurred. The 
result may be the following distribution of premises and conclusions (Table 11.1).
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In this case the majority of complete individual judgments or conclusions speaks 
against liability (1:2)—but the sum of premises or basic judgments says the oppo-
site (4:2 in favor of liability). So which stance is the more rational one: respecting 
the integral individual opinions or forming an integral collective judgment? Pettit 
(2003) suggests that comparable cases occur in various spheres of life and that in 
most cases people choose the strategy of “collectivizing reason” (p. 176). Moreover, 
if procedures and goals remain constant, collective agents emerge, and under Pettit’s 
premises it really seems rational to be obliged to follow their lead. The elements of 
collective reason, then, are not integral individual opinions but rather observations, 
arguments, and other information cut out of the context of their individual 
processing.
The model of collective rationality, of course, does not offer a complete concep-
tion of knowledge. It offers only material for rethinking aspects of knowledge prac-
tices (affecting the element justified in the standard definition or, in Shera’s (1970) 
terms, the process of filtering information; see footnote 5, above). Most important, 
it says little about how conclusions can be socially stabilized—Pettit (2003) only 
sketchily refers to the concept of the juridical person in Gierke’s (1990) 
Genossenschaftsrecht (law of fellowship). Hence, a third account that explicitly 
introduces the notion of collective knowledge is welcome. Goldman (2004) pro-
posed just such an account as an alternative to Pettit’s (2003) collective rationality. 
The new aspect is the organization of epistemic competencies and epistemic author-
ity. First, Goldman proposes to add that individual judgments may be differently 
weighed. (For instance, the opinion of an experienced doctor counts more than that 
of an apprentice.) As far as I see, this addition is compatible with (maybe even 
envisaged by) Pettit. What is more interesting is a second nondemocratic consider-
ation, namely, whether an epistemic collective needs persons who are exclusively 
authorized to define its knowledge and draw consequences. In Goldman’s (2004) 
view, only such an authority structure can explain sentences such as, “We learned 
since 9/11 that not only did we not know what we didn’t know, but the F.B.I. didn’t 
know what it did know” (p. 12).
How is it possible that the same entity, in this instance the U.S. Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, knew something and did not know it? Goldman’s (2004) answer is 
that the organization’s authorities did not realize the threat, so the organization 
could not react: “[A]t least one Bureau official with appropriate decision-making 
authority had to receive messages from the various agents, had to believe those mes-
sages, and had to pool or amalgamate them into a larger pattern” (p. 19).
Table 11.1 Individual and collective rationality in a court decision
Judge Valid contract? Breach? Liability?
1 Yes Yes Yes
2 Yes No No
3 No Yes No
From Pettit (2003), p. 169
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That account may be adequate, but it confounds two different aspects: achieving 
knowledge and drawing practical consequences. On the one hand, one might simply 
ask whether knowledge of an imminent threat existed at all somewhere in the orga-
nization or even at the correct place. Such knowledge could have existed, for 
instance, because it would have been easy for people to combine alarming observa-
tions; because at least one agent, with or without authorization, actually brought 
together relevant pieces of information; or because a computerized system had 
switched over to flight-attack alert. On the other hand, this knowledge could have 
led decision-makers to draw consequences or not. In that case a fitting description 
would be that the FBI knew something but did not react. What remains of Goldman’s 
(2004) account is that epistemic organizations need nodal points where information 
is brought together and theoretical conclusions are arrived at. But these organiza-
tions need not be so hierarchical that the persons who know and those who decide 
are the same individuals.
Taken together, the three accounts of social epistemic structures present an inter-
esting range of possibilities. All may be translated into conceptions of knowledge, 
but into obviously one-sided ones. In Gilbert’s (1994) case, keeping information 
available would involve dull conformity pressure, or what Durkheim (1893/1933) 
called “mechanical solidarity” (pp. 71–110). In Goldman’s (2004) view, assembling 
information seems to be possible only in top echelons of a hierarchy. Even in Pettit’s 
(2003) democratic vision constant socioepistemic unity is tied to a narrow pattern, 
corporate law.
Hence, two very different conclusions can be drawn. The first is that the nature 
of knowledge heavily depends on its social organization. Whether a collective, a 
person, or a set of rules decides will affect various aspects like the complexity, gen-
erality or particularity, and expandability or closure of the information kept avail-
able. Luckily, real social knowledge is circulating between different organizations 
and is today also structured by other patterns of social order, such as systemic codes 
of communication. But the claustrophobic impression conveyed by the discussed 
paradigms of social epistemology may also be due to another factor, their neglect of 
the spatial and medial externality of fixated knowledge.
More precisely, the second possible conclusion about the effect of social epis-
temic structures has to do with the way in which information is stored for later use. 
Gilbert (1994), Pettit (2003), and Goldman (2004) all aim at a seat of epistemic 
unity (group belief or obligation, the juridical person, and decision-making author-
ity, respectively). However, information can be kept available for future use in spa-
tial dispersion as well. A corporation or intelligence agency may have stored its 
knowledge in experts and archives and on tapes and hard drives in various locations, 
and may still have relatively well-organized procedures of reporting and access. 
Even a group of researchers may confidently rely on past publications. Recognizing 
such reservoirs immediately reduces social pressure in most of the given examples. 
Gilbert’s string theorists could allow each other some free expressions of doubt at 
lunch time; Goldman’s chief officers could leave to others some of the knowledge- 
generating work and concentrate on making decisions under difficult circumstances. 
At the level of theory, the introduction of material infrastructures helps to avoid the 
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simplistic dichotomy of knowledge as a mere aggregation of individual views and 
the idea of a completely unified knowledge community.
Certainly, spatial dispersion also poses problems. In the given context they can 
be subsumed in a simple principle, capturing the flip side of relaxed social pressure: 
lack of social control. Sometimes reporting procedures fail, leaving the officers in 
charge little or no chance to bring the knowledge of their organization to bear. 
Sometimes the research group falls apart because different members draw different 
conclusions from collective publications. The resulting ambivalence could be a rea-
son why spatially dispersed knowledge is not very popular in epistemology. 
Proponents of anarchist epistemologies like Jacques Derrida are the main (and in 
philosophy almost the only) ones to show a special interest in this issue.6
Other theoretical accounts, however, would have reason to follow, for the spa-
tially enriched approach offers a range of systematic perspectives, not least an 
understanding of the way in which media- and communication-technology condi-
tions epochs of knowledge. It undeniably helps reconstruct traditional settings in 
which a whole geography of knowledge centers (from Athens to Paris) and places 
of assembly (archives, libraries, collections, and schools) had to be mastered and in 
which new mechanisms of dispersion (e.g., the printing press and an expanding lit-
erary market) brought about radical change. It can even be used to analyze structural 
changes of knowledge in an age of ever-improving communication and information 
technology, where the epistemic importance of spatial distance is allegedly in 
decline or at least changing its character. In this context new observations concern-
ing the density of socioepistemic control will also be possible.
 Delocalized and Resituated Knowledge in the Information Age
I offer a deliberately fragmentary outlook encompassing only two schematic obser-
vations pertinent to the proposed definition and the spatial structures of knowledge. 
Both show changes in the organization and dispersion of epistemic practices. I first 
introduce my observations, then explain and discuss each in turn:
 (a) As the physical location of knowledge loses importance, the social location of 
the agents and use of knowledge becomes increasingly relevant.
 (b) As the long-standing functional division between information and knowledge 
becomes partly challenged by information-processing machines, the sociophys-
ical location of stored data partly replaces the traditional geography of 
knowledge.
Part of assumption (a) is common sense today. An optimistic statement contain-
ing it is, “Today a child anywhere in the world who has Internet access has access 
6 An accessible version of Derrida’s (1996/1998) theory of spatially dispersed knowledge is the 
partly autobiographic essay on monolingualism, where he explained what it means to learn French 
culture in Algeria. For a systematic reconstruction of this theory, see Quadflieg (2007).
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to more knowledge than a child in the best schools of industrial countries did a 
quarter of a century ago” (Stiglitz, 1999, p. 318). This statement is true as far as 
access to textual sources of knowledge is concerned, and yet it sounds rather naïve. 
The reason is that Stiglitz is not speaking of the social and cognitive framework that 
helps one choose the right sources and make sense of them, nor does he mention 
possible contexts of use. Even if the child, by chance or by genius, finds the right 
track to develop sophisticated knowledge in genetic engineering, or investment 
banking, or the construction of microchips, she or he will still need other favorable 
conditions in order to put this knowledge to any use or even make money with it. 
The ensemble of such conditions—such as nationality, language background, travel 
opportunities, established contacts, educational credentials, and material means—is 
what I propose to call (with loose reference to Bourdieu, 1985) the social location 
of the knowledge protagonist. Of course, globalized access to knowledge sources 
will enable additional people to repair cars, build bombs, or engage in software 
programming, but in many cases the limits of their social location will replace the 
former effects of spatial distance.
Further reflection on the economic uses of knowledge shows that social location 
may even become more important than it has been in industrial capitalism. General 
knowledge that can be technically distributed at little more than zero cost is not well 
suited as a source of private wealth. Standard economic approaches show that treat-
ing it as a nonpublic good incurs general inefficiencies in both immediate consump-
tion and the chances of creating further knowledge (Arrow, 1962; Stiglitz, 1999). 
Things look different, however, for the situated knowledge of experts. Tasks such as 
adapting software to a firm’s special needs, installing new microchips in a car mod-
el’s control system, finding the cheapest possible labor force where supply chains 
are still sufficient, and identifying the passages in U.S. patent law that keep com-
petitors off the market involve profitable expertise. As the examples suggest, such 
expertise can be needed either in productive settings or in settings marked by con-
flicting interests, to the benefit or detriment of general welfare. In both cases, it is 
the unique social situation of use that determines the structure of valuable knowl-
edge. In light of the previous discussion, this new impact of social location can also 
be seen as a factor that tightens social control. Instead of socially overdetermined 
spatial distances, mere social power relations now sort out who can successfully act 
as a knowledge agent.
At the same time, reduced generality, or increased sensitivity to individual 
capacities and specific situations, affect the concept of knowledge itself. The mar-
ginal case is that knowledge is reduced to intransparent expert reputation, or mere 
knowing how to do things at a certain (social) place.7 In rather unspecific and imper-
sonal settings, other reasons raise the question of whether knowledge is still appro-
priate as a name. As observation (b) suggests, the old practices of keeping 
information available for future use have been duplicated by a process not easily 
7 The examples of knowledge work discussed by Willke (1998), taken mainly from the sphere of 




called knowledge: storing encoded information or data for future operations. The 
relevant word here is operations, for encoded information is something that one can 
already find in charts, written calculations, and even books. What is new is that such 
information can be automatically processed without the intervention of human 
agents but with huge practical and epistemic effects. Examples are the instances 
when stock market programs buy and sell shares, police software identifies danger-
ous persons, and semantic tools browse scientific data bases.
The standard definition makes it simple to distinguish the information processed 
from knowledge in such cases. The operations in question involve neither beliefs 
nor truth and justification, or do so only in the period when programs are designed. 
Pragmatic definitions, too, offer a clear criterion of distinction in that use or context 
of experience imply that human agents participate in the process. Yet I think the 
more interesting point is that practices of knowledge are really pervaded by pro-
cesses that make it hard to draw boundaries. A semantic symptom is that the knowl-
edge economy and society have always been discussed in relation to mere 
information.8 That scope proves to be adequate. Human agency is only one of an 
increasing number of forces that keep information available and intervene in the 
world accordingly.
Goals and consequences are still a human and social affair. One of the most 
remarkable effects of the rise of information technology is that the geopolitical loca-
tion of data storage is gaining new relevance. Although knowledge is spreading ever 
more widely across the globe, the question of whose territory data are stored on 
plainly matters because the answer determines who will protect them or can compel 
access to them. In broad theoretical terms, the duality of social control and not com-
pletely controllable spatial dispersion must be complemented by a third dimension: 
struggles over the control of the spatial infrastructure of information. Such struggles 
have probably occurred ever since the first clay-tablet reports on crops were assem-
bled in capital cities, and they continue in the age of the transhuman information–
knowledge complex.
 Conclusion
Taken together, my sketchy concluding observations convey the thrust of the pro-
posed definition of knowledge. The intention is to achieve not only conceptual clar-
ity but a renewed empirical view and the chance to explore hitherto unseen 
connections. This aim can even entail risking the stability of the definition itself or 
restricting its historical extension. I have highlighted an obvious, but usually omit-
ted, basic function of knowledge in order to escape both restricted and unspecific 
8 The first paradigm was given by Machlup (1962), who simply refused to distinguish between 
knowledge and information (p. 8). Extensive studies of the “information economy” have followed 
(Porat & Rubin, 1977), and publications on the “information society” have abounded since the late 
1970s.
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uses of the concept. The risk stems from the fact that this very function—keeping 
information available for future use—is finding ever more near equivalents in the 
processing of information and the storing of data. In the course of the argument, 
however, it turned out that this hazard is not the only problem that keeps even social 
philosophers from leaving traditional epistemology. As soon as the spatial disper-
sion of knowledge looms, scholars still seem to shrink from addressing gaps in 
socioepistemic control and from recognizing power struggles that the mind cannot 
master.
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 Chapter 12 
 Semantic Knowledge, Domains of Meaning 
and Conceptual Spaces 
 Peter  Gärdenfors 
 What Is Semantic Knowledge? 
 What is it that you know when you know a language? Certainly, you know many 
words of the language (its lexicon), and you know how to put the words together in 
an appropriate way (the syntax). More important, you know the  meaning of the 
words (the semantics of the language). If you do not master the meaning of the 
words you are using, there is no point in knowing the syntax (unless you are a par-
rot). You can communicate in a foreign language with some success just by know-
ing some words and without using any grammar. In this sense semantic knowledge 
precedes syntactic knowledge. This chapter focuses on an aspect of semantic knowl-
edge that has not been well studied, its organization into domains. 
 Children learn a language without effort and completely voluntarily. They learn 
new words miraculously fast. Teenagers master about 60,000 words of their mother 
tongue by the time they fi nish high school. In their speech and writing they may not 
actively use more than a subset of the words, but they  understand all of them. A 
simple calculation reveals that they have learned an average of 9–10 words  per day 
during childhood. A single example of how a word is used is often suffi cient for 
learning its meaning. No other form of learning is so obvious or so effi cient. 
 Nevertheless, the semantic learning mechanisms show some strong asymme-
tries. For instance, why is it easier to explain to a 4-year-old the meaning of the 
color terms  chartreuse and  mauve than to explain monetary terms like  infl ation or 
 mortgage ? The difference is not a matter of word frequency: The monetary terms 
are more frequent, but the 4-year-old masters the semantic domain of colors and 
thereby knows the meaning of many color words. Adding new color terms is just a 
matter of learning the mapping between the new words and the color space. 
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For example,  chartreuse is a kind of yellowish green, and  mauve is a pale violet. On 
the other hand, the child is normally not acquainted with the domain of economic 
transactions. To the child, money means concrete things—coins and bills—that one 
can exchange for other things. Abstract monetary concepts are not within a child’s 
semantic reach. Grasping a new domain is a cognitively much more diffi cult step 
than adding new terms to an already established one. Once a domain is common to 
a group of potential communicators, various means (e.g., words, gestures, and 
icons) of referring to different regions of the domain can be developed. Conversely, 
if a domain is not shared, communication is hampered. The organization into 
domains speeds up language learning. 
 This chapter presents a model of such domain-oriented language learning, based 
on conceptual spaces. I illustrate the model with some of the semantic domains that 
a child acquires during the fi rst formative years of life. I also present linguistic data 
supporting the hypothesis that semantics knowledge is organized into domains. 
 Semantics Based on Conceptual Spaces 
 I have proposed conceptual spaces as appropriate tools for modeling the semantics 
of natural language (Gärdenfors,  2000 ). A conceptual space is defi ned by a number 
of qualitative dimensions. Examples of perception-based qualitative dimensions are 
temperature, weight, brightness, and pitch, as well as the three ordinary spatial 
dimensions of height, width, and depth. The dimensions represent perceived simi-
larity: The closer two points are within a space, the more similar they are judged to 
be. In the next section, I present a number of further dimensions that are involved in 
communicative processes. 
 I argue that properties can be represented as convex regions of conceptual spaces. 
For example, the color red is a convex region of the three-dimensional color space. 
A concept can thus be defi ned as a bundle of properties combined with information 
about how the properties are correlated (for a more precise defi nition see Gärdenfors, 
 2000 , p. 105). The concept of an apple, for instance, has properties corresponding 
to regions of color space, shape space, taste space, nutrition space, and other spaces 
(see Gärdenfors,  2000 , pp. 102–103, for a more detailed account of this example). 
 The distinction between properties and concepts is useful for analyzing the cog-
nitive role of different word classes. In Gärdenfors ( 2000 ), I proposed that proper-
ties are typically expressed by adjectives, which describe a convex region of some 
domain such as color, shape, or size. Correspondingly, concepts representing a com-
plex of properties from a number of domains are typically expressed by nouns. 
Gärdenfors and Warglien ( 2012 ) extended this analysis to verbs on the basis of the 
models of actions and events outlined in the section on Action domain, below. 
 Because the notion of a domain is central to my analysis, I should clarify its 
meaning. To do so, I draw on cognitive psychology’s notions of separable and inte-
gral dimensions (see Garner,  1974 ; Maddox,  1992 ; and Melara,  1992 , among oth-
ers). A set of quality dimensions are said to be integral if one cannot assign an object 
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a value in one dimension without giving it a value in one or more others. For exam-
ple, an object cannot be given a hue without also giving it a brightness, and the pitch 
of a sound always goes along with its loudness. Dimensions that are not integral are 
said to be separable, as is the case with the size and hue dimensions. This distinction 
allows a domain to be defi ned as a set of integral dimensions separable from all 
other dimensions. 
 The notion of a domain has been used to some extent in cognitive linguistics 
(e.g., Croft,  2002 ; Croft & Cruse,  2004 ; Langacker,  1986 ). Langacker ( 1986 ) pre-
sented his notion of a basic domain as follows:
 It is however necessary to posit a number of “basic domains,” that is, cognitively irreducible 
representational spaces or fi elds of conceptual potential. Among these basic domains are 
the experience of time and our capacity for dealing with two- and three-dimensional spatial 
confi gurations. There are basic domains associated with various senses: color space (an 
array of possible color sensations), coordinated with the extension of the visual fi eld; the 
pitch scale; a range of possible temperature sensations (coordinated with positions on the 
body); and so on. Emotive domains must also be assumed. It is possible that certain linguis-
tic predications are characterized solely in relation to one or more basic domains, for exam-
ple, time for [BEFORE], color space for [RED], or time and the pitch scale for [BEEP]. 
However most expressions pertain to higher levels of conceptual organization and presup-
pose non-basic domains for their semantic characterization. (p. 5) 
 Langacker’s notion of domain fi ts well with the one I present. Besides basic domains, 
Langacker also talked about abstract domains, for which identifying the underlying 
dimensions is more diffi cult. In general, though, it seems that the notion of a domain 
within cognitive linguistics has a broader meaning than I intend (see Gärdenfors & 
Löhndorf,  2013 , for a narrower use). Croft and Cruse ( 2004 , chap. 2), for example, 
even identifi ed domains with frames. 
 Semantic Domains Involved in Children’s Development 
 Levels of Intersubjectivity 
 Using conceptual spaces as my framework, I now trace the development of semantic 
knowledge in children by identifying and describing the domains that are required 
for various basic forms of communication. A central hypothesis is that many of 
these domains are tightly connected to the development of intersubjectivity (also 
called  theory of mind ). In this context, I use the term  intersubjectivity to mean the 
sharing and representing of others’ mentality. Following Gärdenfors ( 2008 ), I break 
intersubjectivity down into fi ve capacities: representing the emotions of others 
(empathy), representing the attention of others, representing the desires of others, 
representing the intentions of others, and representing the beliefs and knowledge of 
others, an ordering arguably supported by phylogenetic and ontogenetic evidence 
(see Gärdenfors,  2003 ,  2008 ). These fi ve components are exploited so naturally in 
adult human communication that their importance often escapes attention. 
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 Emotive Domain 
 The ability to share others’ emotions is often called  empathy (Preston & de Waal, 
 2002 ). Bodily and vocal expressions of emotion, the most obvious signals among 
the social animals, communicate the agent’s negative or positive experiences. 
Preston and de Waal argue that most, if not all, mammals are endowed with empa-
thy (at least in a basic form) as a mechanism linking perception and action. 
 The importance of empathy to interaction highlights the question of how emo-
tions are represented mentally. Several competing theories on the structure of the 
emotive domain exist. However, most of these theories contain two basic dimen-
sions: a value dimension on a scale from positive to negative aspects of emotions, 
and an arousal dimension on a scale from calm to excited emotional states (e.g., 
Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum,  1957 ; Russell,  1980 ). 1 The Cartesian product of 
these two dimensions allows a spatial representation of the basic emotions (see Fig. 
 12.1 ). Distances in emotive space indicate degrees of similarity between emotions.
 It is well known that emotive intersubjectivity is an important aspect of mother–
infant attunement interactions (Stern,  1985 ). The infant learns the correlation 
between different emotions and the corresponding facial and vocal expressions. In 
other words, the child learns how to map behaviors into an emotive space. Sharing 
an emotion means that the participants in the exchange are in emotional states that 
are closely located within the same emotive space. That is, the emotions are attuned. 
Such coordination of emotions is arguably the most fundamental way of sharing 
meaning. 
 Visual and Physical Domains 
 During the fi rst months of life, the child learns to coordinate sensory input—
vision, hearing, touch and smell—with motor activities (Thelen & Smith,  1994 ). 
This process generates a narrow, egocentric space that basically maps onto her 
or his visual fi eld. The subsequent role of this space in intersubjective engage-
ment is manifested, for example, by the child’s ability, as of 6 months of age, to 
follow the gaze of the mother if she turns her head to look at an object within 
the visual fi eld of the child (D’Entremont,  2000 ). From 12 months of age, the 
child can follow the mother’s gaze if the mother just turns her eyes toward the 
object (Butterworth & Jarret,  1991 ). 
 Representing the attention of others means that one can understand when some-
one is looking at some object or noticing some event. As suggested above, even very 
young children can understand where other people are looking. Shared attention is 
the result of two agents simultaneously attending to the same target. It has clearly 
1  Of course, a representation of more nuanced emotions may involve further dimensions. 
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been demonstrated among the great apes (Hare, Call, Agnetta, & Tomasello,  2000 ). 
A more sophisticated version is drawing  joint attention to an object. If I see that you 
are looking at an object, and you see that I see the same object, we have established 
joint attention. 
 The visual domain expands throughout the child’s development. From about 18 
months on, a child can follow the gaze of others even if they look at points outside 
its immediate visual fi eld. This ability requires that the represented visual space 
extend beyond the current visual fi eld to cover the entire physical space. The child 
can now comprehend references outside its visual fi eld. It should be understood that 
the represented physical space is not just an extension of the visual domain but an 
amodal abstraction from visual, auditory, tactile, and perhaps even olfactory 
perceptions. 
 A more advanced transformation of the represented space emerges with the abil-
ity to represent an allocentric space, a space seen from the point of view of another 
(Piaget,  1954 ). This transformation involves a shift of perspective. A concrete 
example is the ability to direct somebody whose vision is obstructed. 
 More precisely, the domain of physical space should be seen as a combination of 
an allocentric representation of physical space and an egocentric representation pro-
vided by the visual system. This double aspect of physical space is revealed by the 
two linguistic codes established for referring to positions: egocentric  left and  right , 
and allocentric  west and  east (or  north and  south ). 
 Fig. 12.1  A two-
dimensional emotive space 
(Reprinted from Russell 
( 1980 , p. 1168) with 
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 Category Domain 
 Objects are not only located in physical space; they are also represented in a cate-
gory domain that has its own quality dimensions (Gärdenfors,  2000 ). If the physical 
domain represents where an object is, the category domain represents  what it is. 2 
The category domain is composed of a number of subdomains, such as color, size, 
and shape. 
 Although communicative coordination in the emotion and physical domains can 
be achieved without words, coordination in category space is, at the least, enhanced 
by the use of words. The fi rst fi fty or so words acquired by children are mainly cat-
egory words for perceptually identifi able concrete objects: people, food, body parts, 
clothing, animals, vehicles, toys, and household objects (Fenson et al.,  1994 ). They 
are often used in situations involving the joint attention of the child and an adult. 
 Hurford ( 2007 , p. 224) has written that declarative pointing communicates only 
the location of an object and indicates nothing about its properties. This observation 
means that pointing may function without a shared category space having been 
established. Parents often scaffold children with words, in a situation of joint atten-
tion, to provide information about a category domain. As Goldin-Meadow ( 2007 ) 
and others have demonstrated, children combine pointing with words long before 
they rely on words alone. The words complement pointing or gaze-sharing and thus 
expand the possibilities for shared meaning domains in the communicative situa-
tion. The minds of the communicators meet in two ways: in the visual domain and 
in the category domain. Only later does the child learn words for abstract category 
domains such as kinship relations or money. 
 It is not well known how category space develops in children. Some cues can be 
obtained from children’s ability to learn nonsense words for new things (Bloom, 
 2000 ; Smith,  2009 ). There seems to be a shape bias in that the shape of objects 
seems to be the most important property in determining category membership for 
small children (Smith & Samuelson,  2006 ). Children also overgeneralize concepts 
(Bloom,  2000 ; MacWhinney,  1987 ). 
 From 18 through 24 months of age, children undergo what might be called a 
naming spurt, acquiring a substantial number of nouns for representing objects. 
Evidence suggests that, during this period, they also learn to extract the general 
shape of objects and that this abstraction helps in category learning (Smith,  2009 ; 
Son, Smith, & Goldstone,  2008 ). One interpretation is that the development of the 
shape domain, as a region of the category domain, strongly facilitates the learning 
of names for object categories. 




 Value Domain 
 Understanding that others may not have the same desires as oneself requires a rep-
resentation of value space, one that is detached from other domains. This capacity 
develops before the ability to represent the beliefs of others (see Flavell, Flavell, 
Green, & Moses,  1990 ; Wellman & Liu,  2004 ), emerging as a separable domain 
somewhere between 14 and 18 months of age (Repacholi & Gopnik,  1997 ). A rea-
sonable hypothesis given the empirical data is that children initially consider the 
value of an object to be intrinsic to the object, in other words, a dimension of the 
category domain, such as color or size. Only later is the value domain separated 
from the category domain so that different individuals may be understood as assign-
ing different values to the same object. 
 Whereas emotions express how an individual feels, desires express an individu-
al’s attitudes toward objects, events, and other agents. Because desires are rela-
tional, representing the desires of others is cognitively more demanding than 
representing their emotions is. One way to represent an individual’s value domain is 
with a utility function that assigns values appropriately. Other representations exist. 
However, I do not discuss the structure of the value domain in this chapter. 
 Action Domain 
 Experiments on how one perceives the movement of persons and other objects (e.g., 
Giese & Lappe,  2002 ; Giese & Poggio,  2003 ; Johansson,  1973 ) have suggested that 
the kinematics of movement contain suffi cient information to identify the underly-
ing dynamic force patterns. Runeson ( 1994 , pp. 386–387) has gone further, claim-
ing that one can directly perceive the forces that control different kinds of motion. 
The process is automatic; one cannot help but see the forces. This capacity seems to 
develop early in infancy (White,  1995 ). Thus, the force domain can be understood 
as a shared domain for purposes of communication. 
 In Gärdenfors ( 2007b ) and Gärdenfors and Warglien ( 2012 ), that analysis was 
extended to actions and the forces involved in generating those actions. The basic 
premise is that an action can be represented as a pattern of force vectors. The force 
pattern for running is different from the force pattern for walking; the force pattern 
for saluting is different from that of throwing (Vaina & Bennour,  1985 ). Note that 
forces as represented by the brain are psychological constructs and not Newton’s 
scientifi c concept. 
 Similarities between actions should be studied in order to identify the structure 
of the action space. This investigation can be done with the same basic methods as 
those used for objects. Walking is more similar to running than it is to throwing. 
Little is known about the geometrical structure of action space. I make the rather 
weak assumption that the concept of betweenness remains meaningful. An action 
concept can then be characterized, like other concepts, as a convex region, in this 
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case of force patterns. Unlike other ways of modeling action, this form of represen-
tation does not require explicit representation of the time domain. Explicit represen-
tations of time appear to develop comparatively late in childhood. 
 Like other basic domains, forces can be understood metaphorically. Language 
often describes applications of mental force, as when one person threatens or per-
suades another. In such cases the term  power is often substituted for that of  force 
(Gärdenfors,  2007a ; Winter & Gärdenfors,  1995 ). 
 Goal Domain 
 Even though one can interpret another’s behavior as goal-directed, doing so need 
not mean that one represents the other’s intention. It is suffi cient to represent the 
action’s goal. Because the human cognitive system takes self-induced motion as a 
cue for goal-directedness, intentions to act are inferred from observed behavior. 
Gergely and Csibra ( 2003 ) argued that infants do not primarily interpret instrumen-
tal actions as intentional actions. Instead, they judge them by their effi ciency in 
reaching a goal, perceiving them as a function of the physical constraints of the 
agent’s situation, that is, as obstacles, visual conditions, and so forth. Only later do 
children adopt a mentalistic stance, learning to attribute intentions to the actor. 
 Therefore, any representation of intentions requires that goals already be repre-
sented. The goal domain is primary and must be described fi rst. When the agent is 
located at a certain physical distance from a desired object, the goal domain can be 
read from the physical domain. Reaching the goal is reaching the location. The dif-
ference is that, in the physical domain, the locations of the agents and objects are in 
focus, whereas in the goal domain, the focus is on the distances between them. In 
this example the goal domain is the space of force vectors that extend from the ini-
tial to the desired location. When the goal is represented in this way, two principal 
ways of obtaining the goal arise. One is that the agent moves to the goal location and 
grasps the object. The other is that the agent uses imperative pointing, so that another 
individual brings the object to the agent. 
 Goal domains can be more abstract than force vectors in the physical domain. In 
principle, goal vectors can be defi ned in all kinds of semantic domains. If I want the 
wall to be painted purple, my goal is to change its color from the current location in 
the green part of the color domain to the desired location in the purple region. Goal 
spaces are represented as abstract spaces in economics, cognitive science, and arti-
fi cial intelligence. The classic example from artifi cial intelligence is Newell and 
Simon’s ( 1972 ) General Problem Solver. I suggest that these spaces are generated 
by metaphorical extensions from the original physical space and thus always main-
tain the key notion of distance. This hypothesis is supported by the pervasiveness of 
spatial metaphors in relation to goals, as in “he  reached his goal,” “the goal was 
 unattainable ,” “the target was set  too high ” (see also Lakoff & Johnson,  1980 ). 
 Consider next the problem of representing intentions. The basic premise is that 
the intention domain can be seen as a product of the goal domain and the action 
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domain. 3 An intention is thus a combination of a goal and a planned action con-
ceived of as leading toward that goal. Take the difference between  blink and  wink . 
A blink is an often unintentional action, a pattern of forces exerted on the muscles 
around the eye. By contrast, a wink is an  intentional action combining the action of 
blinking in order “to awaken the attention of or convey private intimation to [a] 
person” ( Concise Dictionary ,  1911 ). 4 
 Event Domain 
 The most advanced test for intersubjectivity in humans or other animals is designed 
to fi nd out whether they can represent what others believe or know. The most com-
mon method for evaluating this capacity is the false-belief test (e.g., Gopnik & 
Astington,  1988 ; Mitchell,  1997 ; Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer,  1987 ). It is generally 
accepted that this capacity develops in children during their fourth year. 
 Wellman and Liu ( 2004 ) have argued that children can represent other persons’ 
diverse beliefs before they can judge false beliefs. They found that many 3-year- 
olds who cannot pass false-belief tests can still correctly answer a target question 
concerning an agent’s belief that is opposite from their own; it seems they under-
stand that people’s actions are infl uenced by diverse beliefs. Language profi ciency 
in children is correlated with their ability to pass the false-belief test (Astington & 
Jenkins,  1999 ). In particular, parental use of mental predicates in their child-directed 
speech is correlated with their children’s performance in false-belief tests (de 
Villiers & Pyers,  1997 ) . 
 What is involved semantically in representing the beliefs of others, as in knowing 
that somebody has a false belief? Beliefs are normally expressed as propositions. 
So, how is the meaning of propositions related to semantic domains? 5 One possibil-
ity is that most simple propositions express events. In Gärdenfors and Warglien 
( 2012 ), we modeled an event in terms of two vectors: a force  vector , which typically 
represents an action performed by an agent, and a result vector, which describes a 
change in the location or properties of a patient. 6 Consequently, the event domain is 
cognitively more complex than other domains. 
 Given this model, one may reasonably speculate that understanding the beliefs of 
others requires understanding their representation of events. If this conjecture is 
3  Product is meant in the mathematical sense. The intention domain is that product space generated 
from the goal domain (a vector space) and the action space (derived from the space of forces). 
4  As I show in the following section, this model of intentions is the same as the model of events—
except that the action involved in an intention is only planned. This analysis fi ts well with Gergely 
and Csibra’s ( 2003 ) proposal that one infers the intentions of a person from the beliefs and desires 
one attributes to that person. 
5  Cognitive semantics has traditionally not handled propositions well. 
6  The event domain can thus be expressed as the product space of the action domain and either the 
physical or the category domain (see intentions). 
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correct, it is no wonder that understanding the beliefs of others develops rather late 
in childhood. Consider Nelson ( 1996 ), who showed how the use of the word  know 
develops over time in children and does not achieve its ordinary meaning until after 
children can pass the false-belief test. 
 This section has identifi ed a number of semantic domains needed for children’s 
communication. Several are based on the different possible levels of intersubjectiv-
ity. I have outlined how these domains can be represented with the aid of conceptual 
spaces. Because independent semantic evidence suggests that the domains are nec-
essary for modeling basic meanings, their connection to intersubjectivity can be 
used as a stepping stone to an analysis of the development of semantic knowledge. 
 Some Linguistic Evidence of Semantic Domain Knowledge 
 A central thesis of this chapter is that the semantic domains, as structured by con-
ceptual spaces, form an important part of semantic knowledge. In this section I 
present linguistic evidence that the development of semantic knowledge can appro-
priately be described as the development of separable semantic domains. 
 In the analysis of child language data, the establishment of a word in the vocabu-
lary of children is often analyzed for the average frequency of the word’s usage at a 
certain age. 7 Typically, the frequency of a word’s usage starts at or close to zero, 
increases rapidly, then levels off once the word is established in the vocabulary. 8 The 
resulting curve thus has an  S shape. I hereafter call the interval during which usage 
increases rapidly the  establishment period for a word. 
 I can now formulate a general hypothesis concerning semantic domains:  If one 
word from a domain is learned during a certain establishment period, then other 
(common) words from the same domain tend to be learned during roughly the same 
period. In order to test this hypothesis, I have analyzed data from the Child Language 
Data Exchange System (CHILDES) corpus and have used the publicly available 
web-based ChildFreq application, a highly effi cient tool for such investigations. 9 
In this chapter I can present only a few examples from my analysis. 
 For most of the domains discussed in the previous section, words are established 
during the language spurt that takes place between 12 and 24 months of age. This 
observation holds in particular for the different regions of the category domain. For 
example, consider the region of fruits, part of the category domain. Figure  12.2 
shows the frequency curves for the names of several of the most common fruits: 
 apple ,  banana ,  pear ,  grape , and  orange . These words have an establishment period 
7  An alternative to using age as the independent variable is to consider the general linguistic com-
petence of the children, often measured in terms of an utterance’s mean length (number of words). 
8  In fact, a word’s usage usually shows a slow decline, in part because the need for any particular 
word decreases as more words are learned. 
9  ChildFreq was developed by Rasmus Bååth. It is available at  http://childfreq.sumsar.net/ 
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between 12 and 18 months of age.  Orange is something of an exception, probably 
because it is also used within the color domain.
 There are some domains for which the words are clearly established later. One 
such domain is that relating to life and death. Figure  12.3 shows that the establish-
ment of the words  live ,  die ,  alive , and  dead occurs mostly between 30 and 42 months 
of age.
 Another example is the domain relating to knowledge and memory. Figure  12.4 
shows the frequency curves for the words  believe ,  remember ,  forget , and  guess . In 
this case the establishment period occurs between 36 and 54 months of age. Note 
that these words concern an individual’s relation to facts and thereby relate to the 
event domain (see the immediately preceding section). Furthermore, the period 
coincides with the one during which children learn to pass the false-belief tests.
 A fi nal example from ChildFreq concerns the levels of intersubjectivity (see the 
section on Levels of Intersubjectivity, above). It is diffi cult to fi nd a clear correspon-
dence between these levels and the learning of particular words. However, I have 
chosen the verb  look as an indicator of understanding the attention of others; and the 
verbs  want to and  wanna as indicators of understanding desires;  going to and  gonna 
as indicators of understanding intentions; and  know ,  think , and  believe (the latter 
 Fig. 12.2  The establishment periods for some common fruit words (Reprinted from Gärdenfors 
( 2014 , p. 67) with permission from MIT Press) 
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two combined into one category) as indicators of understanding belief and knowl-
edge (see Fig.  12.5 ). 10 
 Figure  12.5 suggests that the sequence of the establishment periods conforms to 
the one I proposed in Gärdenfors ( 2008 ). An analysis of the uses of these words in 
different contexts is required in order to establish the connection with intersubjec-
tivity more clearly than I have in this chapter. Note that  know ,  think , and  believe do 
not quite follow the usual  S shape. Their trajectories may partly be explained by the 
many idiomatic uses of these words, which make their frequencies increase at a rate 
more constant than that of other words. Although I can present only a limited num-
ber of examples in these pages, it should be clear that my hypothesis on establish-
ment periods is rich in empirically testable predictions. I invite corpus linguists and 
child development researchers to continue testing it. 
 Further evidence of the domain called organization of semantic knowledge is the 
way that metaphors do not come alone. Lakoff and Johnson ( 1980 ) convincingly 
argued that metaphors are organized around schemas such as “argument is war,” 
“time is a resource,” and “more is up.” I have proposed that a metaphor expresses an 
10  It is diffi cult to identify any expression that corresponds to understanding emotions (empathy), 
for this capacity develops well before words are learned. 
 Fig. 12.3  The establishment periods for some words from the “live” domain (Reprinted from 




“identity in topological or geometrical structure between different domains” 
(Gärdenfors,  2000 , p. 176). That is, a word that represents a particular structure in 
one domain can be used as a metaphor to express the same structure in another 
domain. Once a metaphor has established such a mapping, it can be exploited to 
provide other metaphors from the same domain. 
 An example of such a mapping is the designation of certain computer programs 
as  viruses . This metaphor drawing on the biological domain has created a new way 
of looking at this class of programs. It has suddenly opened up possibilities for 
expressions like  invasive viruses,  vaccination programs, and hard-disk 
 disinfection . 
 Conclusion 
 In the tradition of Chomskian linguistics, learning a language is learning its syntax. 
By the same token, one does not know a language unless one knows the meanings 
of the words that one uses. In this chapter I have illustrated some key aspects of how 
cognitive structure constrains the learning of semantic knowledge. The central 
 Fig. 12.4  The establishment periods for some words from the “knowledge” domain (Reprinted 
from Gärdenfors ( 2014 , p. 69) with permission from MIT Press) 
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thesis is that semantic knowledge is structured by domains defi ned as sets of inte-
gral dimensions. This understanding of domains can be used to analyze semantic 
development in children. I have presented the central domains involved in children’s 
cognitive development, in particular with respect to their development of intersub-
jectivity. I have offered some linguistic evidence supporting the hypothesis that it 
becomes easier to learn new words within a domain once it has been established. 
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 Fig. 12.5  The establishment periods for some verbs related to stages of intersubjectivity (Reprinted 
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Chapter 13
So What Do You Do? Experimenting 
with Space for Social Creativity
Ariane Berthoin Antal and Victor J. Friedman
As John Dewey (1934/2005) observed “the first great consideration is that life goes 
on in an environment; not merely in it but because of it, through interaction with it” 
(p. 12, italics in original). It is puzzling that although organizational scholars may 
agree with him, they have not agreed on how social and physical space interact. 
Researchers who consider it problematic that “most previous research assumes that 
spatial orderings of things and people are merely part of the background” (Edenius 
& Yakhlef, 2007, p. 207) have been exploring space in organizations from different 
angles. Some authors are very critical of the passive role assigned to space: “To 
picture space as a ‘frame’ or container with no other purpose than to preserve what 
has been put in it is an error displaying traces of Cartesian philosophy” (Kornberger 
& Clegg, 2004, p. 1101). However, there is a risk that analysts attempting to redress 
the balance sometimes attribute such great powers to space as to anthropomorphize 
it and thereby relegate its inhabitants to the status of pawns of masterbuilders (e.g., 
Kornberger & Clegg, 2004). Our contention is that a clear conceptualization of the 
relationship between physical and social space is critical for understanding the 
actions people undertake in their present setting and envisage for the future. Our 
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Direct experience comes from nature and man interacting with 
each other. In this interaction, human energy gathers, is 
released, dammed up, frustrated and victorious. There are 
rhythmic beats of want and fulfillment, pulses of doing and 
being withheld from doing.
(Dewey, 1934/2005, p. 1)
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objective in this chapter is to deepen our understanding of the relationship between 
space and the generation of knowledge through and for action.
 Theoretical Framework
Some work has been done in this direction (Baldry, 1999; Edenius & Yakhlef, 2007; 
Ford & Harding, 2004; Friedman, 2011; Kornberger & Clegg, 2004; Meusburger, 
2009; Taylor & Spicer, 2007; Woodward & Ellison, 2010). A review of the growing 
literature on space in organization studies found the field fragmented but identified 
three principal streams, each with interesting contributions and shortcomings (Taylor 
& Spicer, 2007). In one stream scholars conceive of space in terms of distance and 
proximity between points and have convincingly demonstrated how space makes a 
difference for important issues at the micro-, meso-, and macrolevels. However, they 
are “unable to account for the ways in which actors attribute meaning and signifi-
cance to a space … [and] not able to explain the role which perceptions or experi-
ences of distances and proximity play” (p. 329). In another stream researchers 
compensate for this weakness by focusing on the materialization of power—but it is 
questionable “whether all spaces are necessarily manifestations of power” (p. 332). 
Furthermore, such a focus implies a “systematic disregard of the ways that space 
may actually be the product of inhabitants’ ongoing experience and understandings” 
(p. 333). Scholars in the third stream attend to this gap by exploring “how spaces are 
produced and manifest in the experiences of those who inhabit them” (p. 333). The 
inherent disadvantages are that power relations are overlooked and that the emphasis 
on perception undervalues the material, physical aspects of space. Logically, there-
fore, Taylor and Spicer argue for an integrated approach that addresses all three 
dimensions by building on the ideas of Lefebvre (1974/1991), who sought to bring 
together mental, physical, and social modalities of space (see also Ford and Harding 
2004, p. 817). Although we agree that an integrated approach is needed, this particu-
lar proposal does not take some essential concepts into account.
Strikingly absent from the organizational literature on space is the work on social 
space by two of the twentieth century’s most influential, and nonconventional, 
social scientists, the psychologist Kurt Lewin (1936, 1948/1997, 1951/1997) and 
the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1985, 1989, 1993, 1998; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 
1992). Both placed social space as the cornerstone of their theoretical and method-
ological work, turning to the philosophical work of Ernst Cassirer (1923/1953, 
1944, 1961), who conceived of space in rather relative terms as the positional qual-
ity of the material world. Cassirer, Lewin, and Bourdieu adopted the view that there 
is no empty space, only spaces that are formed by and between objects, and they 
applied this concept to the creation of social reality rather than to the physical world. 
At the heart of social space is a relational logic of social reality, which focuses nei-
ther on the individual nor the group as the unit of analysis but rather on the pro-
cesses through which individuals, in interaction with others, construct their social 
spaces and identities (Friedman, 2011). These interactions are causal loops that link 
the ways people bring their thinking and feeling into the world through action, to 
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other people’s responses generated by those actions, and back again to the ways 
those responses are interpreted and to the ways they shape what people think, feel, 
and do. Cassirer (1961) depicted with special eloquence the recursive movement 
between thinking, feeling, and acting in space as a process of creating and experi-
encing possibilities: “Human action is known only in its realization; only when it is 
realized are we aware of its living possibilities…. [I]ndeed, its work is precisely that 
of seeking and creating ever new possibilities” (p. 37).
Social spaces take shape when these interactions between people are sustained 
and acquire patterns that differentiate them and give them distinctive configurations. 
Each configuration of social space can be characterized by its constituents, the posi-
tions they hold relative to each other, the “rules of the game” that govern interaction, 
and the shared meanings that hold the space together and facilitate sustained inter-
action (Friedman, 2011). Hence, social space is a creation of the mind, a construct 
that can be used to think relationally about the physical or the social world and 
thereby provide a means for making order out of any given set of elements. Both 
Lewin and Bourdieu applied these basic ideas to the study of society and culture at 
every level of aggregation.
A problem with the conceptualization of the construction of social space thus far 
is that it has not attended to the physical dimensions of the process: humans with 
bodies interacting in physical spaces that also include objects. We propose to inte-
grate the physical environment in this construction process by seeing space and 
objects as being in relation with people rather than by allotting them a separate 
ontological status as containers that hold, and influence, social behavior. The rela-
tion is created by the multiple senses with which humans experience the physical 
environment. Whereas the importance of bodily ways of knowing has been obvious 
to artists and neuroscientists (Lehrer, 2007), organizational researchers misplaced 
corporeality for many years and have only recently begun to retrieve it by drawing 
on notions of aesthetics (Linstead & Höpfl, 2000, p. 3). The literature review cited 
above noted the emergence of this work in their third strand, though too narrowly, 
so we mine it further in this chapter.
Scholars seeking to bring the body back into the picture point out that “although 
an organization is indeed a social and collective construct…, it is not an exclusively 
cognitive one but derives from the knowledge-creating faculties of all the human 
senses” (Strati, 2000, p. 13). The aesthetic approach to studying human behavior 
reveals the roles the body plays in reading a context, first to make sense of it because 
“one of the first things a newcomer to any organization has to learn is how to navi-
gate within this new spatial environment” (Baldry, 1999, p. 535). The newcomer 
makes “a prima facie aesthetic judgment” (Hein, 1976, p. 149) in defining the rela-
tional composition of a situation. People use all their senses to seek cues to make 
sense of and orient their behavior, and when the interaction occurs in a built physi-
cal space they orient themselves to the fixed factors (the structure, the walls, and the 
floor) and the semifixed factors, such as furniture and other movable objects 
(Rapoport, 1982). The body thereby also participates in deciding and signaling to 
others which rules of the game to adopt for the situation at hand. Researchers have 
shown “how bodily practices produce discourse in the form of rules, routines, and 
procedures” (Edenius & Yakhlef, 2007, p. 195).
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Connecting aesthetic approaches to the analysis of the construction of social 
space therefore enriches the understanding of the relational processes of generating 
shared meaning and agreeing on how to behave in the current situation. Furthermore, 
the aesthetic dimension of experience plays a role in defining the scope for future 
social space because it has the “capacity to animate actors’ imaginations and 
actions” (Woodward & Ellison, 2010, p. 46).
In this chapter we use this integrated relational conceptualization of social and 
physical space to analyze data from a series of action experiments we organized in 
2009 in Israel. We invited people in small mixed groups to explore together how to 
envisage a future social space in the same setting. We consciously intensified atten-
tion to the aesthetic dimension of the process from the outset by choosing a fine-arts 
studio as the setting and by providing art materials for the participants to use there, 
sharing the assumption that “creative activity with portable, discrete objects allows 
an extension of potential space” (Woodward & Ellison, 2010, p. 50). For this chap-
ter we have decided to apply an aesthetic approach to the data analysis by focusing 
only on the visual documentation in order “to avoid committing the cognitive and 
rational error of ignoring the bodies of the people involved in the decision process 
and only considering their minds” (Strati, 2000, p. 20). Our objective is, therefore, 
to explore how much one can learn about processes of constructing current and 
future social space, in which physical relations are integrated, by including aesthetic 
dimensions of the experience in the analysis.
The next section of the chapter describes the context in which we conducted the 
action experiments. It is followed by an explanation of the methodology that was 
used to collect and analyze the data. We then present an analysis of the sessions, in 
which we identify different configurations that evolved during the interactions of the 
participants with one another and with the physical aspects of a studio. In the final 
section of the chapter, we present our conclusions about how to conceptualize and 
analyze social and physical space in an integrated manner and suggest next steps.
 Context: The Studio for Social Creativity
The stimulus for carrying out this study was the development of the Studio for 
Social Creativity at the Max Stern Jezreel Valley College in Israel, a college created 
to bring higher education to Israel’s northern periphery (Friedman & Desivilya, 
2010). This region is characterized by chronic socioeconomic underdevelopment 
and deep intergroup divisions, especially between Jews and Palestinian Arabs.1 
Victor and several other faculty members at the college were interested in 
1 The Israeli population is composed of approximately 80 % Jewish and 20 % Palestinian Arab citi-
zens. This Palestinian population should be distinguished from Palestinians who live in the 
Occupied Territories—the West Bank (Samaria and Judea) and Gaza—and are not Israeli citizens. 
The Arab citizens of Israel are termed by different people in various ways, such as Arabs, Israeli 
Arabs, and Palestinians. Each of these terms has a political implication.
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promoting a process in which people from the region could (a) bring up problems, 
ideas, and visions, (b) meet others with whom to learn and collaborate on issues of 
common concern, (c) work together to create innovative, viable projects and enter-
prises to meet human and economic needs, and (d) create and enact shared visions 
of regional development that promotes inclusiveness and interdependence rather 
than competition and divisiveness.
The original idea was to create a unique kind of incubator that would stimulate 
social entrepreneurship (Friedman & Sharir, 2009), a process that would also 
include conflict engagement because the tensions in the region severely restrict the 
development of social capital needed for social entrepreneurship (Friedman & 
Arieli, 2011; Friedman & Desivilya, 2010). The idea of bringing in the arts to sup-
port the learning process was stimulated by Ariane’s research on various forms of 
artistic interventions as triggers for organizational learning (Berthoin Antal, 2009, 
2012, 2013, 2014) and by our joint reflections on how to benefit from working with 
the arts in action research (Brydon-Miller, Berthoin Antal, Friedman, & Gayá 
Wicks, 2011).
Serendipitously, Victor discovered on the college campus a little-used fine-arts 
studio, which had originally been the backstage area of a theater. He immediately 
experienced it as a space that offered powerful creative potential and decided that 
the studio metaphor as the environment in which to nurture innovative social think-
ing and action was much more appealing than the incubator metaphor, especially if 
people, practices, and products from the world of the arts could be integrated into 
these processes. The studio’s large rectangular shape (approximately 16 m long and 
12 m wide, or about 52ʹ × 39ʹ) offered an open, flexible space (see Fig. 13.1). A high 
Fig. 13.1 The Studio for Social Creativity, Max Stern Jezreel Valley College, Israel (Photograph 
by the authors)
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ceiling contributed to the sense of spaciousness. The windows were set along the 
top of one of the long sides of the room, and the shorter sides each had a narrow 
balcony, accessible by narrow steep staircases. The stained linoleum floor showed 
signs of years of use. Water was available from a faucet in a washbasin.
Two critical questions needed to be clarified in order to launch the Studio for 
Social Creativity: What does it mean, in practice, to integrate processes of social 
entrepreneurship, conflict engagement, and the arts? How could the studio space be 
utilized to host and facilitate these processes? Having read the conceptual paper 
Victor had written with his colleague (Friedman & Desivilya, 2010), Ariane sug-
gested interrupting the writing process to actually engage with potential stakehold-
ers—social entrepreneurs, experts on conflict, activists, artists, college faculty, and 
students—in the studio. Adapting Frye’s (1964) succinct definition of imagination 
as “the power of constructing possible models of human experience” (p. 22), we 
observed that the discovery of the studio on campus offered the space for experi-
menting with imagination in practice. The stakeholders could be invited to 
 participate in constructing possibilities for using the space for social innovation and 
for strengthening the link between the college and the community.
 Method: Action Experiments
The first step was to identify people in the college and in the community who we 
thought would be interested in participating in what we called a series of action 
experiments. By this term we meant asking participants to develop and actively try 
out ideas together in a given space, recording the process, then analyzing it as a 
basis for ensuing steps. We use the term experiment in this chapter only to imply an 
exploratory learning-by-doing—trying something out in order to see what happens. 
We do not mean it here in the sense of a laboratory experiment, which implies both 
clear predictions about what should happen and a high degree of control so as to 
permit a clear linkage between cause and effect. In this case the action experiments 
entailed bringing mixed groups to explore what the Studio for Social Creativity 
could be in future. Victor approached each person personally and afterward sent a 
brief written description of the studio and the experiment. The text also explained 
that the sessions were to be filmed as a basis for development of and research on the 
studio. We organized five sessions in June 2009, distributing the 18 volunteers so 
that each session included participants with experience in social entrepreneurship, 
conflict engagement, and the arts, as well as both Jews and Palestinian Arabs, and 
men and women.2 The size of the groups varied from five to nine people, including 
the researchers. Although some of the participants knew each other, each mix 
included one or more people they did not know, so none of the sessions had groups 
2 We also held a sixth session but do not report on it here because it was quite different in format. 
It encompassed 60 students from the nursing program in the college, for whom the participants of 
Session 2 planned an intervention in the studio.
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whose members all had experience working together. In other words, each set of 
participants entered what was for them a new space with a new group and a new 
task.
The research team consisted of three people: the two authors and the cameraman, 
who was a drama student and the son of one of the authors. The members of the 
research team did not define themselves as facilitators or observers standing outside 
the experiment but rather interacted with the participants and took part in the think-
ing and action processes that unfolded. Victor participated fully in each session. 
Because Ariane did not speak Hebrew, the nature of her participation varied depend-
ing on whether the session was held in Hebrew (Sessions 2 and 4) or English 
(Sessions 1, 3, and 5). The cameraman filmed all of the sessions in the red-nose 
mask from the world of theater. He felt it would greatly enhance his ability to look 
on the action with curiosity and openness. By definition there was no language bar-
rier for the cameraman: The Nose does not speak; it communicates with eyes and 
the rest of the body. As it turned out, the Nose also became part of the studio, signal-
ing to participants as soon as they arrived that it was an unconventional place in 
which playfulness was allowed.
Our hope was that the participants would generate an output that would articulate 
their ideas in ways that could be observed, recorded, and shared with others. We 
also hoped that the participants would not only interact verbally but also use the 
room and art materials in some process of thinking and acting together. At the same 
time, we wanted to leave things as open as possible rather than impose a particular 
process on the participants. Our intention was to maximize the probability of gener-
ating newness. As Stark (2009) pointed out, “spaces of ambiguity” (p. 3) are impor-
tant when the challenge is to generate newness by integrating knowledge from 
different domains. Prior to the experiment, we therefore defined for ourselves a 
number of principles that guided our behavior as conveners and researchers.
• Allow the participants to be as self-organizing as possible in their use of the 
space, their interactions with each other, their use of the resources, and the topics 
and issues they choose to discuss.
• Bring the participants’ knowledge together on as equal a footing as possible. 
Although we were keenly interested in seeing how art might contribute to this 
process, we did not privilege the artists, nor any of the other participants, by 
explicitly attributing to them the status of experts, facilitators, or leaders.
• Set a clear time frame (2 h maximum). Aside from practical considerations, our 
research on artistic interventions sensitized us to the fact that time constraints 
can stimulate groups to reach higher levels of performance than the participants 
had previously considered achievable.
By choice, we wanted to allow each group to develop its own approach, so the gen-
eral principle we followed was “trust the process” (McNiff, 1998).
The studio was sparsely furnished with art equipment: easels, stools, folding 
chairs, a platform (probably for a model), a spotlight, and a ladder. Each time we 
arrived in the studio these furnishings were already distributed around the room in 
no given order, and we did not arrange them for our participants. The walls were 
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bare, except in one case, where balloons had been left hanging by the previous occu-
pants. After each of our sessions, we removed whatever work had been produced so 
that it would not influence the participants in the subsequent session. Building on 
the artful-listening approach with which Ariane had been experimenting to support 
reflection and expression in groups, we bought materials (e.g., oil pastels, finger 
paints, plasticene, scissors, glue, a bell, a beach ball, and different kinds and sizes of 
paper) for the participants to play with during the sessions. Experiments in seminars 
Ariane had conducted had shown that people often reported that their listening was 
enhanced when they occupied their hands with other forms of expression. We placed 
the materials on the low platform, which was at the middle-front of the room.3 The 
participants were also invited to bring with them materials or tools they typically 
use in their practice. Only the musician in Session 1 took up this offer, bringing two 
musical instruments (an oud and a recorder).
We invited the participants in each session to meet in Victor’s office and then walk 
together across campus to the studio so that they would begin the experiment 
together. The cameraman waited at the studio entrance to greet them as they arrived. 
Once everyone had entered the studio, we briefly explained the background to the 
experiment: the idea of the Studio for Social Creativity and how it had originated, the 
history of the space itself, the participants’ task, and the guidelines. After this intro-
duction we suggested that the participants explore the space for themselves, encour-
aging them to take the initiative and engage in the task without our guidance.
 Data Analysis
We have undertaken several modes of analysis of the action-experiment sessions in 
the studio since conducting them in 2009. The first mode was simultaneous with the 
process—we discussed each experience intensely together and with the cameraman, 
exchanging thoughts and feelings about what was surprising, disappointing, or 
delighting us. The second was a preliminary review of the results based on tran-
scripts we made of the recorded material, which we presented at a conference a 
month later (Berthoin Antal & Friedman, 2009). As interesting as that material was, 
however, we soon realized that we, like other colleagues, had “fallen prey to the 
dominant approach to studying organization, by relying on discursive material” 
(Edenius & Yakhlef, 2007, p. 209). We had in our hands the pictorial material those 
colleagues yearned for after the fact, but we had focused on the written words we 
had typed up! We therefore decided to write this chapter based entirely on what we 
could see happening in the film material. After considering different methods of 
analyzing these data, we decided to apply a grounded-theory approach (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967) rather than use a formal coding system derived from existing theories 
3 Having observed in the first session that the act of unpacking the materials might have been a 
barrier to using them, we took them out of their packaging as of the second session, spreading out 
the oil pastels and paint bottles on the platform to make them more easily available.
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on group dynamics or collective creativity processes that would restrict our vision to 
existing categories. More than a year after the experiences in the studio, we revisited 
the films and turned off the audio track, noting down separately what we saw people 
doing in the physical space—when and for how long they engaged with each other 
and with the fixed or semifixed physical aspects of the studio. We then compared our 
individual observations, jointly checking the film material again when we found we 
had noticed things differently. It is from this iterative process that we gained fresh 
insights into the integrated process of constructing social and physical space.
In the account that follows we rely as much as possible on these observations and 
provide visual illustrations from the video recording. Although we disciplined our-
selves to base our analysis on the film material, it is difficult to exclude additional 
knowledge from our analysis completely, for we had jointly designed and experi-
enced all the sessions. We include some details that are not based on the visible 
evidence when we feel it would be essential for the reader’s understanding.
 Configurations in Spaces of Social Creativity
Each of the sessions was unique in the ideas or works the participants came up with 
and in the ways they produced those outcomes. In observing the video recordings of 
the five sessions, however, we noticed patterns, or configurations, of organization 
and behavior. We use the term configuration in four senses: (a) the participants’ 
positions in the room and relative to each other during a specific time period, (b) the 
observable interactions of the participants among each other and with materials in 
the room, (c) the observable application of behavioral rules, and (d) the creation of 
shared meaning (to the extent that it can be inferred from the group’s observable 
behavior and outputs).
To illustrate these configurations and make inferences from them about the use 
of space for bringing together different kinds of knowledge to generate creative 
action, we first analyze in depth the pattern of configurations formed by participants 
in one of the sessions, Session 2. We then relate this pattern to those formed by 
participants in other sessions. We have chosen this session for presenting our analy-
sis because it is representative in terms of the number and types of configurations 
and because the entire session is available on video recordings (parts of this material 
of two other sessions were corrupted, so we can analyze only their soundtracks).
 Looking Closely at a Sample Session
As in all of the sessions, the participants in Session 2 were asked to think about how 
they would use this space to combine processes of social entrepreneurship, conflict 
engagement, and the arts in ways that would connect the college with the commu-
nity and contribute to regional development. However, this session was unique 
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because it centered on meeting an immediate need on campus for a defined target 
group. A class of approximately 60 nursing students, half of them Jewish and half 
Palestinian Arab had requested support in engaging in a real conflict they were 
experiencing in class. The head of the nursing program had asked Victor and a 
member of the nursing faculty who taught anthropology to these students whether 
they could help the group address the issues (see also Arieli, Friedman, & Knayzev, 
2012). The two faculty members agreed to take on the challenge and decided to use 
a session in the studio to design it. Victor offered three students from his social 
entrepreneurship course the opportunity to work on the project with him as their 
practical assignment for the course, and he asked one of the teaching assistants in 
the social entrepreneurship course to help as well. The artist chosen for this session 
came on the recommendation of one of the students from the social entrepreneur-
ship course. Table 13.1 provides an overview of the nine participants in Session 2.
Session 2 lasted 100 min, during which time the participants formed seven con-
figurations in the studio space (see Table 13.2). The session was entirely in Hebrew 
because the students, the teaching assistant, and the artist were not comfortable 
using English. Researcher 2, therefore, did not speak in the session; she listened and 
observed but could not understand exactly what was said.
Table 13.1 The nine participants in Session 2 of the action experiment at Max Stern Yezreel 
Valley College in Israel
Description of participant Reference in text
Lecturer in the college nursing faculty, Jewish woman anthropologist Lecturer




Jewish woman student participant in workshop on social 
entrepreneurship
Student 3
Teaching assistant in a social entrepreneurship practicum, Palestinian 
Arab woman graduate of the college
Teaching assistant
Jewish woman artist Artist
Action researcher, faculty member of the college, Jewish man Researcher 1
Senior researcher in a German research institute, French-American 
woman
Researcher 2
Drama student filming the session, French-American man Cameraman
Table 13.2 Session 2 of the 
action experiment at Max 
Stern Yezreel Valley College 
in Israel
Sequence Configuration Duration (in min.)
1 Orientation 15
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The first configuration, Orientation, formed as soon as the participants entered 
the studio. As visible in Fig. 13.2, the participants bunched closely at the entrance 
to the studio (the door is invisible just to the left). Three of the participants leaned 
against a table, one sat on a table, and three stood (the teaching assistant had not yet 
arrived). At least three of the participants looked outwards into the studio space, 
getting a sense of the room itself. A few minutes into this configuration the video 
showed that the participants turned toward each other, talking, listening, gesturing, 
and looking at a document.4
In the Orientation configuration, the participants were acquiring a sense of both 
the space and their task in the session. Researcher 1 and the artist did most of the 
talking. To the extent that the participants explored the space, it was only with their 
eyes. The students, in particular, appeared pensive and uncomfortable with the size 
of the space and the uncertainty of the task itself.
The shift to a new configuration occurred a quarter of an hour into the session, 
shortly after the lecturer arrived. She briefly observed the situation, then found chairs, 
which student 3 helped her arrange in a semicircle in front of the table at which the 
participants were huddling. The positioning of the chairs caused a change in the 
positioning of the participants. Those who had been standing in front of the table sat 
down, facing the others, who were sitting or leaning on the table (see Fig. 13.3). 
4 In preparation for the intervention, the students in the nursing course had been asked to respond 
to a questionnaire asking them to define the kind of atmosphere they would like to create in their 
class, why this kind of atmosphere was important to them, and what concrete steps should be taken 
to create it. Researchers 1 and 3, together with the students from the course on social entrepreneur-
ship, had analyzed the responses prior to Session 2 so as to provide a resource to the planning team.
Fig. 13.2 Orientation configuration, Session 2 of the action experiment in the Studio for Social 
Creativity (Photograph by the authors)
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The new physical arrangement signaled to the participants that they were in a meet-
ing, hence our choice of the name Meeting Mode for this configuration. The partici-
pants looked more comfortable with the situation, into which they could bring the 
known rules of behavior for meetings. More of the participants spoke during this 
configuration than during the Orientation.
Although there was a change in the organization and physical positioning of the 
participants in the Meeting Mode, there was almost no change in the group’s loca-
tion in the room. Figure 13.3 shows that the members of the group remained closely 
clustered next to the door through which they had entered the studio. Researcher 2 
attempted to direct attention to the availability of larger space and the art materials 
by walking to front-center of the room, where the art materials were located on a 
low platform. She began finger-painting on a large piece of flipchart paper, captur-
ing words she picked up from the conversation. However, the other participants did 
not appear to pay any attention to this attempt at modeling. The ineffectiveness of 
this attempt may be related to the language barrier that led researcher 2 to hover 
around the group but never actually join in the planning process throughout the 
session.
The next configuration, which we termed Expansion, began after 19 min (see 
Fig. 13.4). Researcher 1 stood up and walked toward the middle of the room, fol-
lowed quickly by the teaching assistant. The other participants began to move 
slowly across the room toward the art materials, with the lecturer joining them after 
a conversation with students 1 and 2.
Researcher 2 stopped finger-painting and picked up her sheet of flipchart paper 
from the pile on the platform so that others could take paper. The artist bent down 
Fig. 13.3 Meeting-mode configuration, Session 2 of the action experiment in the Studio for Social 
Creativity (Photograph by the authors)
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and began picking up sheets of flipchart paper, spreading them on the floor in the 
middle of the room. Some of the participants began to look at, pick up, inspect, 
and handle the materials. The artist sat down on the floor, followed by researcher 
1, the lecturer, and then the students and the teaching assistant. Researcher 2 car-
ried colors, paints, clay, and other materials from the platform to various points 
near the group.
We called this configuration Expansion because the participants pushed back the 
boundaries of the space they had created for themselves. Before sitting down, the 
artist had taken off her shoes, and the others followed suit, signaling a shift to less 
formal rules of behavior in the group’s new space. The video recording of Session 2 
shows the participants talking in a more relaxed way than in the previous two con-
figurations and occasionally laughing. The lecturer began writing with a marker on 
the paper, researcher 1 played with finger-paints, and the teaching assistant also 
began to draw. The Expansion configuration involved exploration and the opening 
up of new possibilities for the use of the physical space, the materials, behaviors, 
and ways participants related to each other. Laughter broke out when researcher 1 
withdrew an offer he had made on a piece of paper for the group to focus on. 
Observing the video material, we think that this moment marks another shift in the 
rules of behavior because the agenda-setting power of the most senior participant 
and convener of the session in the studio was visibly called into question. The lec-
turer then began to lead a discussion, looking at the other participants and inviting 
them to express themselves. It lasted for 25 min, the lengthiest of all the configura-
tions in Session 2.
Fig. 13.4 Expansion configuration, Session 2 of the action experiment in the Studio for Social 
Creativity (Photograph by the authors)
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There was a sudden transition to a new configuration in which the participants 
began drawing or painting on two shared sheets of paper. Everyone was leaning 
forward, and there was an appearance of great intensity. We term this configuration 
Creation (see Fig. 13.5) because a relatively cohesive group took shape and created 
a collective work.5 During this Configuration the group appeared to be comfortable 
behaving as artists, each individual concentrating on aesthetic expression.
After 10 min of the intense Creation configuration, the participants of Session 2 
stopped drawing on the paper and leaned back, looked at what they had done, and 
began talking again. We called this the Reflection configuration (see Fig. 13.6). The 
rules of the game were no longer the same as in the previous configurations that had 
been dominated by talking: The participants pointed to elements on the paper, asked 
questions, and invited others to speak. No one speaker dominated, and the material 
that lay in the middle of the room played a significant role. The participants remained 
in the same physical location and arrangement, and there was no movement through 
the space of the studio. However, by leaning back to consider the physical expres-
sion of their shared thinking, they appear to have expanded the space they inhabited 
together at that moment.
The Reflection configuration lasted 8 min, at which point all of the participants 
stood up, took the picture they had created, hung it on the front wall of the studio, 
and stepped back to look at it. We termed this configuration Exhibition (see 
Fig. 13.7) because it was as though the participants had transformed part of the 
5 The audio material reveals that at this point the group had just decided to experiment together 
with how they would actually envisage the intervention with the class of 60 students.
Fig. 13.5 Creation configuration, Session 2 of the action experiment in the Studio for Social 
Creativity (Photograph by the authors)
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Fig. 13.6 Reflection configuration, Session 2 of the action experiment in the Studio for Social 
Creativity (Photograph by the authors)
Fig. 13.7 Exhibition configuration, Session 2 of the action experiment in the Studio for Social 
Creativity (Photograph by the authors)
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studio into an exhibition space, displaying their work as artists usually do. In this 
configuration the participants not only moved to a different part of the studio and 
used wall space for the first time, they behaved differently from all previous constel-
lations by arranging themselves as though they were in a gallery, standing opposite 
a picture, observing it, and commenting to cospectators.
Figure 13.7 also documents how the participants traversed and utilized various 
parts of the studio space at different times. Traces of earlier configurations remain: 
the chairs from the Meeting Mode in the foreground, near the entrance to the studio; 
and the papers on the floor in the front-center of the room.
The Exhibition configuration in Session 2 lasted for only 3 min, at which point 
the participants re-formed into a kind of a loose circle with the picture to their backs 
and began talking and moving around, using a much larger part of the room. We 
termed this new arrangement the Rehearsal configuration (Fig. 13.8) because the 
video recording shows the participants physically acting something out to each 
other and commenting after each performance.
The audio file documents that the participants were talking about and trying out 
how to apply what they had learned from this process to the following week’s 
planned session with the 60 nursing students. The Rehearsal implied expanding the 
space of the participants in several ways: They moved around a larger portion of the 
studio while acting out their presentations, they extended their space into the future, 
and they related to the entire studio space as they envisioned the way 60 nursing 
students could use it in the upcoming intervention.
Fig. 13.8 Rehearsal configuration, Session 2 of the action experiment in the Studio for Social 
Creativity (Photograph by the authors)
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Rehearsal was the final configuration we observed in this session. It lasted for 20 
min—until the time for Session 2 ran out—at which point the group broke up, some 
participants rushed away, and others began cleaning up while talking.
 Comparative Analysis Across Sessions
Having looked at Session 2 in some depth, we now compare it with the other ses-
sions to specify the configurations and their various forms. There was a different 
group of participants in each session, but they were all given the same basic task. 
Each group used the space and the materials in a different way and came up with 
very different insights and products. Nevertheless, most of the configurations we 
observed in Session 2 recurred in the other sessions as well, though not always in 
the same order. A comparative analysis permits us to hypothesize that—
 1. there are definable configurations of participants’ positions and interactions 
among each other and with materials in a given place and period of time, and 
they change over the course of a group’s engagement with social creativity;
 2. some configurations are associated with greater expansion of space than others;
 3. there are patterns in the flow between configurations; and
 4. some patterns may be more generative of social creativity than others.
By flow, we mean the change in and order of configurations over time. Generativity 
in this context refers to the observable collective output.
Table 13.3 provides an overview of the configurations that took shape during all 
five sessions. It reveals that all the sessions started with Orientation. Sessions 3 and 
4 showed the greatest similarity with the flow in Session 2, encompassing Expansion, 
Creation, and Exhibition. The flows in Sessions 1 and 5 were essentially the same, 
with a repetition of the Meeting Mode after a phase of Expansion.
A detailed comparison of the configurations in each session would exceed the 
scope of this chapter, but it is useful to consider some of the similarities and differ-
ences a bit more closely.




Session 2 Session 1 Session 3 Session 4 Session 5
Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation
Meeting 
mode
Meeting mode Expansion Meeting mode Meeting mode
Expansion Expansion Creation Expansion Expansion
Creation Meeting mode Exhibition Creation Meeting mode
Reflection Reflection (Reflection) Exhibition
Exhibition Pseudocreation
Rehearsal
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 Orientation
There were significant differences in the way the participants in the five sessions 
initially oriented themselves to the space. Whereas the Orientation configuration in 
Session 2 was characterized by huddling—with the participants remaining almost 
frozen in one spot for the whole time—the video recordings of Sessions 1, 3, and 5 
show the people moving around and physically exploring the space.
 Meeting Mode
In each case this configuration was initiated by someone suggesting that the partici-
pants sit or by someone bringing chairs out. The Meeting Mode seemed to be a way 
of reducing the size of the room and establishing a known set of behavioral rules in 
the undifferentiated space offered in the studio. We observed that once participants 
had positioned themselves in the Meeting Mode it was difficult for them to break 
out of that configuration and do anything besides talk. Only in Session 3 did no 
Meeting-Mode configuration come about.
 Expansion
The Expansion configuration usually followed the Meeting Mode, but it formed in 
very different ways, took different amounts of time, and led to different configura-
tions. In Session 1 Expansion began after participants had been in a Meeting Mode 
for over an hour. One of the participants stood up and began exploring the studio 
space by walking around and playing his musical instrument (a small mouth organ) 
at different points in the space. Researcher 1 joined in, using some of the furniture 
in the room for drumming. The other participants stood up, moved out of the circle 
of chairs, and observed what was happening. After a few minutes, however, the 
participants returned to the same circle of chairs, and the group appeared to revert 
to the Meeting Mode. There was no change in their position in the room or in their 
spatial relation to each other. Nor was there any sustained change in their use of the 
physical space. In Session 5 there was a brief Expansion when one of the partici-
pants got up from his chair and walked to the center of the room with Researcher 1 
to illustrate how he would redesign the space. However, the other participants 
remained in their places, and everyone returned to the Meeting Mode after a few 
moments.
In Session 4 Expansion was quite lengthy, lasting approximately 45 min. It began 
with a sudden burst of movement into singing, dancing, drumming, wandering 
around the room, and working with the art materials. For the most part the partici-
pants carried out these actions separately—each one doing his or her own thing. 
After about 2 min the participants began to reconfigure themselves, interacting with 
each other one-on-one or wandering around the room and looking at what others 
were doing. Gradually, they formed into a single group around paper and materials 
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that the researchers had placed on the floor in the center of the room. The partici-
pants then shifted into the Creation configuration, talking around the paper and 
starting to use the art materials. In Session 3 the participants went directly from 
Orientation into Expansion—sitting on the floor and playing with materials as they 
talked.
 Creation Configuration
Creation was characterized by the participants’ trying out new ways of jointly act-
ing and expressing thoughts and feelings that led to a collective outcome. It entailed 
the use of the art materials provided for the session but also the use of other objects 
in the room and the participants’ own bodies (e.g., drumming on a board or whis-
tling to make music). In Session 2 the work was a set of pictures; in Session 3 the 
participants painted, danced, hummed, whistled, and engaged in pantomime; and in 
Session 4 they made graffiti. The Creation configuration was generally character-
ized by a shift from talking to doing. In Sessions 2 and 3 there was little or, for 
stretches of time, even no talking during Creation. In Session 4 there was an inter-
weaving of doing and talking. The intensity and length of the configuration varied, 
too: Creation in Session 2 was highly intense but relatively brief (10 min). In Session 
3 it was both extremely intense and lengthy (36 min). In Session 4 it lasted for 
almost 35 min, but at the end of that session the participants engaged in an activity 
that we designate as pseudocreation: They accepted the offer of one of the members 
to lead them in a Tai Chi exercise. Although it was a collective dance of a kind, it 
was highly ritualized, leaving the followers no scope for a creative response. We did 
not observe a Creation configuration in Sessions 1 and 5, whose participants never 
appeared to form as a group around a task other than talk and did not generate an 
observable product.
 Reflection
The video recording shows evidence of Reflection in two of the sessions, and in 
both cases material played a focusing role. At the end of Session 1, the participants 
are seen holding and looking at a balloon on which the cameraman had written sat-
isfaction, and they are talking while throwing it to each other. In Session 2 the par-
ticipants leaned back to reflect together on their drawings. One of the factors that led 
us to give this configuration separate ontological status was that fact that its absence 
was conspicuous in Session 3, in which the participants had decided to communi-
cate without speaking. The Creation configuration lasted to the end of the session, 
and there was no time for any other configuration. However, the participants felt 
such a strong need to reflect on the experience and talk about it that they spontane-
ously decided to meet for dinner later in the week. The experience of Creation 
without Reflection left the participants feeling as though something were 
unfinished.
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 Exhibition
In three sessions the participants put their work on the wall, taking the creation out 
of the group’s realm and displaying it as artists do. There were interesting differ-
ences worth noting. In Sessions 1 and 4 the participants became observers standing 
opposite the work, whereas in Session 3 the participants sat under their picture and 
took a group photograph, capturing themselves as part of the work that they had 
created (Fig. 13.9).
In Session 4 the Exhibition configuration formed when the participants hung 
their graffiti-like outputs of the Creation configuration onto the wall at the front of 
the room (see Fig. 13.10). Rather than transforming that part of the studio into a 
gallery space, it transformed it into a kind of public wall on which one might paint 
or spray graffiti messages for passers-by to see.
 Rehearsal
In this configuration the participants expanded the space in order to include other 
people in a future session. Rehearsal was most evident in the video of Session 2, 
when the participants tried out ways of presenting their ideas for the intervention 
with the nursing students. In Session 4 the Rehearsal configuration took a different 
form. It was an attempt to mentally enact or envision what might happen rather than 
a physical acting out of a future event. The Exhibition of the graffiti on the studio 
wall presented the participants with a vision of what their messages could look like 
Fig. 13.9 Exhibition configuration, Session 3 of the action experiment in the Studio for Social 
Creativity (Photograph by the authors)
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if displayed on walls of the college. The audio material captured a heated discussion 
about this scenario, revealing possible responses from students and the administra-
tion. During Rehearsal in Session 2, the participants set out the rules of behavior for 
themselves and the 60 nursing students, whereas Rehearsal in Session 4 involved 
the participants’ self-projection into conditions where the rules of behavior were not 
under their control. In the end they decided not to pursue the idea of taking their 
work out of the studio.
 Discussion
The goal of this chapter has been to deepen our understanding of the relationship 
between space and the generation of knowledge through and for action. The first 
thing we noticed from the analysis of the video recording was that the different 
groups varied widely in their use of the space, their interactions among each other, 
and their use of the materials. Furthermore, the groups’ outputs—the ideas gener-
ated for using the space—differed significantly. The second striking outcome of our 
analysis was that commonalities existed across the sessions in terms of the 
knowledge- production processes. We identified seven distinct configurations: 
Orientation, Meeting Mode, Expansion, Creation, Reflection, Exhibition, and 
Rehearsal. These configurations differed in content, duration, and the transitions 
between them. However, their fundamental structural similarity allows us to formu-
late key insights into, or propositions about, the relationships between space, action, 
and knowledge generation.
Fig. 13.10 Exhibition configuration, Session 4 of the action experiment in the Studio for Social 
Creativity (Photograph by the authors)
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 Orientation in Undifferentiated Space
As illustrated in the data analysis, every group began with the Orientation configu-
ration. The participants took some time to become acquainted with the space and to 
figure out where and how to situate themselves so as to engage in the task. The 
Orientation configuration of each group differed significantly—some stood in one 
spot and looked around. Others walked around, exploring the room. We recognize 
that this behavior was at least in part a response to our opening suggestion that the 
participants explore the space for themselves. But our experience of this configura-
tion, both in the actual moment and in subsequent observation of the video, has led 
us to conclude that it was also a reaction to uncertainty about what to do in this 
space and how to do it. Kornberger and Clegg (2004) wrote that space can be con-
ceived of in two ways, namely, “as an absence of presence, as a vast emptiness, as 
something that one can get lost in …[A]lternatively, it may be thought of socially” 
(p. 1095). By contrast, we suggest that, in practice, both conceptions can occur 
simultaneously because the physical and the social are interrelated in space. The 
participants entering the studio saw a vast emptiness, which led some to huddle 
along the wall, others to cluster close together elsewhere in the room. They per-
ceived an absence of cues for positioning and behaving, and as a group they had no 
rules of their own yet for how to engage with each other in going about the task at 
hand in this new space.
The Orientation configuration led us to hypothesize that the uncertainty was the 
result of a particular relationship between features of the physical space and how the 
participants perceived and experienced them. The first feature was the undifferenti-
ated character of the space. Kurt Lewin (1951/1997) introduced the construct of 
“differentiation” (pp. 218–220) to conceptualize learning as a change of sociopsy-
chological space. In order to illustrate this notion, he drew an analogy to the process 
of finding one’s way around an unfamiliar city without using a map. At first the city 
seems like a large undifferentiated mass, which a person experiences as uncertainty 
and in which one easily feels lost. Getting to know a city means mentally differen-
tiating, or bounding off, distinct places and regions, seeing their location relative to 
other areas, and identifying ways of getting from one to another. Thus, the city 
becomes differentiated in the person’s mind into distinct blocks, neighborhoods, 
and districts bounded by streets and other demarcations. Differentiation of a space 
also is at least partly about becoming aware of the rules governing behavior, such as 
knowing where one should not walk after dark.
For the participants in the experiment, the studio was, at first, highly undifferen-
tiated, a characteristic that was influenced by both physical and social features. For 
them, it was a large, unfamiliar space as well as an encounter with people who came 
from different backgrounds and who had never worked together as a group before. 
Baldry (1999, p. 536) pointed out that physical environments as well as social fac-
tors (e.g., formal authority, gender) usually provide cues for behavior, so environ-
mental cues reinforce what is socially defined as being appropriate or inappropriate. 
Both the structure of the room and semifixed aspects such as furniture and décor 
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suggest what is to be done and how it should be done. To the extent that people have 
the prior knowledge to recognize these cues, they are likely to conform to expecta-
tions (p. 544). If we had brought the same people into a classroom, meeting room, 
or office, they would immediately have known where to sit and how to act because 
the space itself would have been perceived by the participants as full of clear cues 
about the rules of the game—that is, how to behave in this space. It is important to 
stress, however, that differentiation is not an intrinsic feature of the physical space 
itself but rather the way in which a person perceives that space and interacts with it.
 Orientation in Unencrusted Space
The second feature that contributed to uncertainty is what we call unencrustedness 
of the space. By unencrustedness we mean that the room did not retain traces of the 
production of our previous sessions, that it was free of vestiges that might orient 
later groups in defining their task and shaping their expectations about the outcome. 
Unencrustedness was not a feature of the space itself but rather reflected an interac-
tion between a decision of the convener-researchers, the physical space, and the 
participants. We had considered the option of leaving the products of previous 
groups’ work in the room, of preserving changes they had made in the room’s 
design, and/or of actually incorporating their suggestions for how the room should 
be used. Adopting any of those possibilities would have meant that each new group 
entering the studio would have been faced with evidence of the knowledge that had 
emerged from the previous group’s engagement with the task. A group could have 
ignored this material or could have done something quite different, but it would still 
have been doing its work in the context of previous work and under its influence. 
Such an approach would have meant conceiving of the experiment as shaping the 
space through a cumulative, historical process in which each group, at least in part, 
interpreted and built on what earlier groups had done. We decided against this 
option because our guidelines called for leaving each group as much freedom as 
possible in determining how they would think and act in this space. Encrusting the 
space might have constrained the range of future possible ways of using the room. 
Of course, the space still had a history. Indeed, two of the participants remembered 
that the space had been an open stage, and its now closed structure saddened them.
 Qualifying Spaces of Possibility
Our analysis confirms and extends work by scholars who have addressed the con-
nection between space and possibility. Lewin (1951/1997, p. 268) suggested that 
undifferentiated space is not only full of uncertainty but full of possibilities. This 
assumption is also reflected in the work of contemporary scholars such as 
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Kornberger and Clegg (2004), who argued that “space has to contain possibili-
ties, which might be perceived as emptiness” (p. 1106) and that organizations 
need “chaotic, ambiguous and incomplete space” (p. 1106) in order to generate 
creative problem-solving. Other scholars, too, have suggested that “spaces of 
ambiguity” (Stark, 2009, p. 3) and “incomplete” work environments lend them-
selves to the kind of collaborative inquiry that is needed to deal with problems 
characterized by a lack of clarity and ambiguous information (Horgen, Joroff, 
Porter, & Schön, 1999, p. 197). The implication is that the experience of undif-
ferentiated space creates potential for producing new ways of thinking and act-
ing. In an analysis of aesthetic experience with theater, Woodward and Ellison 
(2010) struck a similar note, describing it “as a space of imaginative elaboration, 
extension and perhaps even a space that afforded a type of ‘reflexivity’ in that it 
drew on existing structures as the basis for the realization of creative social action 
into the future” (p. 53).
The results of the experiment lead us to qualify these assumptions about undif-
ferentiated space as spaces of possibility and to add the concept of unencrusted 
space. When faced with a space that generated uncertainty, almost all the groups 
went into the Meeting-Mode configuration. The participants sat and talked in a 
small circle, making no use of the open space of the room, of the artistic materials, 
or of other objects in the room. It appeared almost as though they created a room 
enclosed by invisible walls within the larger space. Thus, in a large room offering 
many possibilities in principle, people tended to reduce their uncertainty about how 
to engage with each other and the task by recreating a traditional kind of meeting 
space that utilized only a small fraction of the total space.
We hypothesize that the Meeting Mode provided participants with a sense of 
security and order in the face of uncertainty caused by a vaguely defined task and a 
large, strange, and undifferentiated space—and that the Meeting Mode exacts a 
price for this sense of security. Although we do not claim that the Meeting-Mode 
configuration necessarily prevents groups from thinking and acting creatively, our 
inference from the experiment is that the Meeting Mode is less likely to offer oppor-
tunities to experience surprise or newness. Once in the Meeting Mode, all the groups 
had a hard time breaking out of it and transitioning into what we called the Expansion 
configuration, and some of them never moved into Creation. We hypothesize that 
the Meeting-Mode configuration reflected a powerful norm or mental imprint that 
dictates how people come together to work at least in this particular organizational 
and cultural constellation. A theater or dance ensemble, like other groups from the 
art world, would most likely have perceived and used the space very differently. 
Future research could clarify whether mixed groups of participants who already 
have experience working together might be more experimental and playful than our 
participants were while working on a new task in the studio or whether their prior 
knowledge of how to work together would reduce the range of possibilities they 
could envision in the space.
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 Constructing Spaces Conducive to Newness
Our research leads us to suggest that the experience of undifferentiated and unen-
crusted space offers a potential source of newness—if the participants use the 
opportunity. This view of the relationship between physical and social space is more 
accurate than a claim that undifferentiated and unencrusted spaces are spaces of 
possibility. We hypothesize that such space provides a context conducive to experi-
encing not knowing as an opening for creating new knowledge (Berthoin Antal, 
2013). However, not knowing generates a sense of uncertainty that people (other 
than artists) tend to experience as uncomfortable. As a consequence, this experience 
of spaces confronts people with a choice in seeking to generate new knowledge: Do 
they impose a familiar set of rules onto the social and physical space, or do they 
engage the newness of the space to experiment with unfamiliar modes of being, 
thinking, and interacting with each other, the space, and objects in the space?
The qualified advantages of spaces of possibility and the phenomena of the 
Meeting Mode illustrate how space is constructed by people through interaction 
with the physical space, with objects, and among themselves. This fundamental 
point is often obscured in the literature when authors write about physical space as 
though it acted, almost with a will of its own, upon the people who interact with it, 
independently of their perception and choices. For example, Kornberger and Clegg 
(2004) asserted that “space is both the medium and outcome of the actions it recur-
sively organizes” (p. 1106) and that “such spaces are capable of transforming them-
selves while being (ab)used and occupied by different people only temporarily” 
(p. 1106). These statements tend to anthropomorphize space, attributing to it an 
ability to “organize” or even “transform itself” and thereby opening the door to 
deterministic thinking. The findings of our experiment remind us that a space 
becomes generative or is transformed only through the agency of people who inter-
act with the physical space and among themselves. Our analysis of the video record-
ings of the action experiments we conducted in the Studio for Social Creativity 
illustrates how physical space comes into human perception and is then acted upon 
and shaped by people, becoming a part of social space.
 The Relationship Between Talking and Doing6
Another insight from the experiments concerns the relationship between talking and 
doing as media for innovative thinking and action. In designing the experiment, we 
hoped that the participants would go beyond verbal communication and do some-
thing with the room, the materials, and each other. Our inclination to favor action 
6 We recognize that this duality is simplistic and even misleading because talk is also a form 
of action. We are using this formulation as a short form for purely cognitive verbal communication 
as distinct from multisensual ways of knowing, feeling, and expressing.
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over talk stemmed from the assumption that doing would heighten the aesthetic 
dimensions of experience by involving the body, the senses, and movement. We 
assumed that this intensification would enhance the innovative thinking of the par-
ticipants and ultimately increase the creativity of outputs presented as a model of 
aesthetic relations “centered on exchanges of emotional energy which mark out 
moments of intersubjectivity between people” (Woodward & Ellison, 2010, p. 52).
The familiar Meeting-Mode configuration favored talk and other engagement at 
the cognitive level. Even though some of this talk touched on highly interesting 
insights, our inference, based on our observations of the group members and our 
own subjective experience of this configuration, was that discussions in the Meeting 
Mode generated little energy. In Session 2, which we analyzed in depth, we could 
observe, and feel, the gradual, positive change in energy as the group moved out of 
the Meeting Mode into Expansion and then Creation. Our observation of the ses-
sions revealed relationships between the engagement with objects and changes in 
energy levels. We confirm that “objects are manipulated and energized as products 
of the relations between the material, the sensual and the embodied as they play out 
in relation to imagination and the mind” (Woodward & Ellison, 2010, p. 46). Our 
observations lead us beyond corroborating this claim; they bring us to suggest that 
by energizing objects, people energize themselves. The bodily experience of mov-
ing and shifting position in the process of working with the objects and art materials 
in the room stimulated and reinforced energy at both the individual and the group 
levels. The engagement of multiple bodily ways of knowing heightened the aes-
thetic dimensions of experience in ways that were energizing. We hypothesize that 
this energy made it easier for the participants to engage the uncertainty and explore 
new possibilities for thinking and action.
In our estimation the moment of highest energy and aesthetically most powerful 
experience occurred in the Creation configuration in Session 3. The participants 
chose to stop talking entirely. For approximately 45 min they used the artistic mate-
rials and their bodies, communicating through their eyes, movements, and touch. 
Ironically, the experience in this configuration led us to revise our thinking about the 
relative value of doing and talking. The nonverbal communication lasted until the 
end of the session, at which point all the participants expressed a strong need to talk 
about the experience. There was a sense of incompleteness without the opportunity 
for shared reflection. This experience led us to see talking and doing as two crucial 
moments whose interplay is critical in the creative process.
 Methodological Reflection
In addition to the insights gained about the relationship between social and physical 
space and the generation of knowledge through and for action, we offer several 
methodological reflections from our experience with the action experiments in the 
Studio for Social Creativity. We confirm the value of separating visual from verbal 
analysis. It has permitted us to overcome the problem of most publications in this 
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field: that “space has mainly been associated with the aural (auditory-oral) medium, 
emphasizing talking and listening, overlooking other salient bodily features such as 
seeing, looking, gazing, glancing, contemplating, scrutinizing, gesturing and mov-
ing in specific ways” (Edenius & Yakhlef, 2007, p. 194). We benefited in at least 
three ways from the artistic presence of the Nose with the video camera. First, it was 
helpful to have an artist as part of our research team for a project that entailed 
exploring the possible contribution of artistic ways of knowing in social creation. 
He helped push us out of our comfort zone by posing questions before and after the 
sessions and by sharing his perspective on the experience. Second, the participants 
responded positively to his curious presence, reducing the camera to a playful 
instrument in all but one instance.7 Third, his inquisitive, energy-seeking approach 
revealed in the video material spaces of possibility the groups were not (yet) using.8
 Conclusion
The analysis of our action experiments in the Studio for Social Creativity has per-
mitted us to formulate propositions about the interaction between social and physi-
cal space. First, we invited people to envisage how to generate new possibilities (for 
interaction?) and then observed how these participants engaged with each other in 
the social and physical space provided for their task. On this basis we identified 
seven distinct configurations: Orientation, Meeting Mode, Expansion, Creation, 
Reflection, and Rehearsal. Second, by focusing on the video material, we revealed 
how anxious it makes people to be in what they perceive as undifferentiated space, 
how quickly they try to import rules from other spaces in order to reduce their 
uncertainty, and how they thereby risk getting locked into established ways of think-
ing and behaving. Third, the visual analysis also showed that shifting from one 
configuration to another involved expanding into new physical space (e.g., moving 
to the middle of room, working on the floor, or using the wall for exhibition) and 
engaging creatively with art materials and other objects. Adding aesthetic ways of 
experiencing and communicating increased the group’s social creativity. Fourth, we 
postulate that both undifferentiated and unencrusted space are conducive for 
enabling the emergence of newness by maximizing the choice participants have as 
to how to engage with each other and their task. We thereby underscore and clarify 
the significance of space for creativity while avoiding the anthropomorphization of 
7 Although the Nose usually greeted the participants outside the studio, in one session he was 
perched on a ladder and holding the camera when the participants entered the room. One of those 
participants did not remember having been informed about the filming of the sessions, so he 
addressed what he felt to be an infringement. Recording stopped while the group discussed the 
situation. One of the participants commented “with a cameraman like that, nothing bad can hap-
pen,” and they all agreed to the filming.
8 Sometimes participants subsequently used the space to which the Nose had turned his attention 
(e.g., the balcony in Session 1). We do not know whether their actions were triggered by his, or 
whether he sensed something earlier that they discovered a little later.
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space, a conceptual trap that we encountered in the literature. Fifth, we note the 
need for movement between nonverbal and verbal forms of interaction in creating 
knowledge and sharing meaning. When people limit themselves to just talking, they 
tend to become stuck. Choosing not to talk during a phase of experimentation with 
bodily forms of knowing and communicating is generative; and verbal communica-
tion is needed once more for shared reflection.
The action experiments confirm how valuable it is for us as researchers to move 
out of our comfort zone when we are seeking new knowledge. We took two such 
steps in this project. First, we decided to participate in such an open exploratory 
process rather than stand back as observers or facilitators of a clearly structured 
workshop. Second, we chose in this chapter to focus our analysis solely on the vis-
ible evidence recorded on film. Both steps have proven highly generative. However, 
we recognize that the focus on the visible in our analysis did not give us access to 
certain important aspects. In order to explore the meaning the participants were 
giving to their actions, we need to listen to what they said and then connect that 
back to what we have observed. An analysis of the spoken words would enable us 
to correct or refine our configurations, for example. The other aspect we have not 
yet attended to are the power dynamics in the Studio for Social Creativity. Of 
course, they were present in the situation, for conflict in the region and tensions 
between groups at the college were two of the drivers for conducting the sessions 
in the studio. Moreover, there were differences in status among the participants 
(e.g., students vs. different levels of faculty; Palestinian Arab vs. Jewish back-
grounds; men vs. women; and artists, academics, and practitioners). Exploring 
those dynamics in the construction of social space and use of physical space would 
require analyzing the spoken and written (e.g., graffiti) aspects along with the vis-
ible process.
Another issue that needs to be examined is the potential paradox inherent in the 
Studio for Social Creativity. We have posited that the undifferentiated and unen-
crusted nature of the space is an important condition for enabling participants to 
generate new ideas and ways of engaging there. How will its potential as a space of 
possibility be maintained for groups to return to over time? The more they use the 
space, the more likely it is that they will build mental models of how to use it (even 
if they leave it unencrusted), making it harder on their return for them to break out 
of an unusual way of having used it. We sense a need to engage more frequently 
and intimately with the world of the arts to stimulate our learning. Actors and musi-
cians have experience with the paradox because they have to keep being creative on 
the stages they return to night after night. Fortunately, some artists are seeking 
inspiration precisely by moving out of the spaces they know in order to engage in 
learning creatively with people from other worlds, including academics (Berthoin 
Antal, 2015).
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 Chapter 14 
 The Decision to Move: Being Mobile 
and Being Rational in Comparative 
Anthropological Perspective 
 Thomas  Widlok 
 Small Places, Big Issues 
 Looking at the relationship between rationality and action in the domain of space, 
anthropologists fi rst think of actions such as walking and the related decision to 
move or to stay. Walking may be considered the prototypical human action in a 
spatial setting. Correspondingly, the decision to move is the prototypical challenge 
to human practical reasoning in the context of moving through space. I wish to con-
tribute to the topic of rationality and action by reviewing cases of human mobility 
and human orientation in space in some detail. This chapter is based on ethno-
graphic work I have carried out with various groups of mobile hunters and gatherers 
over the years, particularly in southern Africa and Australia. Do these remote forag-
ers have anything to offer to understanding decisions that matter most in the current 
world (regarding the current refugee and migration crisis, for instance)? I propose 
the following considerations with regard to this question. First, bringing in exam-
ples from far away is a key element in combating the common bias that “there is no 
alternative” (see Widlok,  2009a ). A case study exemplifying a very different mode 
of engaging rationality with action underlines that alternatives always exist and that 
it is worthwhile to spell them out clearly and develop them creatively. Second, the 
forager decision to move occupies the opposite end of the spectrum of human pos-
sibilities in that it focuses on rationality and action in a basic face-to-face setting 
without being confounded by effects of larger institutional frameworks. Third, the 
major global crises always come down to numerous smaller dilemmas and ques-
tions that social agents need to solve and that preoccupy them. For most agents the 
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large issues become problematic only when they translate into everyday decisions 
such as whether or not to relocate. In this chapter I therefore adopt the general 
anthropological strategy of tackling big issues in small places: I study the relation 
between rationality and action as exemplifi ed by foragers in the Namibian bush. 
 Although the decision to move may be thought of as basic, many differences 
between various foraging groups are ignored in this chapter for the sake of the general 
argument. One uniting feature of forager mobility stands out from the diversity of 
cases, climatic zones, and points in time: All foragers clearly have more than just eco-
logical reasons for relocating. Granted, when social agents justify a relocation they 
often mention environmental factors, especially the accumulating dirt at a certain place 
and the anticipated ripening of a desired fruit at another, distant place, but a variety of 
motives can lead individuals or groups to pick up and move. Ethnographic evidence 
leaves no doubt that reference to environmental conditions is in fact usually a pretext 
to cover up either actual or imminent social confl ict that people want to escape or pre-
vent (Kent,  1989 ; Widlok,  1999 ). Moving is the main strategy for solving disputes. 
When ill-feelings or social tensions occur in these societies, the dominant strategy is to 
split up and move apart. Hence, there are many more moves than the natural environ-
ment alone necessitates. Even in situations where people are more or less settled, they 
move their hut within the settlement for purposes of dispute resolution, altering spatial 
closeness and distance in order to manage  social closeness and distance. Out of 89 huts 
in a settlement that I stayed in, less than 18 % remained in the same place in the course 
of a single year (Widlok,  1999 , p. 10). The challenge is to understand this mobility and 
these decisions to move, to place them in the larger framework about theories connect-
ing rationality and action. What is the rationality behind these moves? Is it a special 
kind of rationality geared specifi cally to the action at hand? What general lessons 
about the social embeddedness of decision-making can be drawn? 
 State of the Art: Rational Choice Models of Mobility 
 The mobility of hunter-gatherers is not a new fi eld, so this chapter begins with a 
brief review of some of the existing anthropological models so as to prepare the 
ground for my theoretical argument. Probably the best known anthropological 
model in this respect is optimal foraging theory (Martin,  1983 ). It is particularly 
interesting because its application has not been limited to living hunters and gather-
ers but broadened to cover human behavior more generally. For instance, this theory 
has served to model human behavior in western-style museum exhibitions (Rounds, 
 2004 ). The assumption is that visitors to an exhibition optimize their visit by match-
ing elements of high-interest value with low search costs and that there are some 
do’s and don’ts that result in rules for deciding how long and in what order one 
should view the items at an exhibition. These rules (search rules, attention rules, 
quitting rules) are aimed not at the best possible solution but at one that is satisfac-
tory given the environment as it is (p. 404). 
 The original version of optimal foraging theory consists of theorems intended to 
explain when and how foragers move from one resource to another (see Kelly,  1995 , 
T. Widlok
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for an overview). For example, the theorem of diminishing returns, a central feature 
of optimal foraging theory, holds that staying in a given patch, say a grove or a small 
forest of nut trees that foragers exploit, requires increasing work in the form of 
walking to nut trees that are ever further away within the patch. At a certain point 
the additional work generates ever fewer returns. The rational choice solution to the 
problem, namely, moving camp to another grove, is an initial extra investment, but 
there is a point at which that investment is compensated for by the decreasing returns 
of the original patch. On the basis of several assumptions about caloric requirements 
and caloric expenditure (Kelly,  1995 , pp. 133–134), the optimal foraging theory 
predicts that hunter-gatherers will make a move to another patch when a one-way 
foraging distance reaches 3 km (1.9 miles) on average. This calculation matches 
what many reports say about the way in which foragers move. Foragers do not stay 
in a forest until the last nut has been consumed. They walk off much earlier, and the 
model can show that this strategy complies with rationality in terms of getting the 
best deal given a number of available patches. When the gathering of the same 
amount of nuts requires ever more effort, the point at which foragers will leave a 
given patch of resources will be earlier than the point at which approaching starva-
tion would necessitate a move. Optimal foraging theory also goes beyond this sce-
nario, for it takes into account more complicated ones as well. Indeed it must 
because many factors are involved (e.g., the number of foragers, the size of a group 
that shares foraging returns, the variety of storage possibilities, increases or 
decreases in the desired quantity to forage, and the nature of what is foraged). One 
could even say that it will eventually be very diffi cult to disentangle causes and 
effects in such a model. What appears to be a given patch may turn out to be the 
variable outcomes of a combined set of practices. 
 According to optimal foraging theory, forager movements are rational because 
they follow calculable thresholds. Of course, foragers do not perform this calcula-
tion abstractly with graphs. Instead, they are driven by the logic inherent in the 
environmental conditions and the ways in which human exploitation interacts with 
these conditions. Other proximate reasons, such as social tensions, may also be 
considered, but they are thought to boil down to the  ultimate causes inherent in the 
logic of resource exploitation (Kelly,  1995 , p. 140). In other words, in this model 
rationality (as exhibited in the way foragers use scarce resources) is completely 
contained in the environmental action and ultimately dictated by environmental 
conditions. It is still a sort of rationality but one that mandates certain cultural prac-
tices by ecological necessity instead of being mandated by cultural rules. 
 Nonetheless, caution is needed to avoid succumbing to the “fallacy of the rule” 
(Bourdieu,  1977 , p. 29), which establishes a likely outcome and reinstills it in the 
minds of the agents as something that has caused the outcome. Optimal foraging 
theory exemplifi es a strongly deductive notion of rationality. It is usually seen as 
adhering a strict, nomothetic, deductive approach. The conditions of a patch and the 
characteristics of the forager group exploiting it (e.g., the number of people and 
their caloric intake) are defi ned as premises allowing one to derive what the rational 
behavior in that situation will be, for that behavior necessarily follows. If real-life 
foragers depart from what is predicted, either they are mistaken (and will eventually 
14 The Decision to Move
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die out from maladaptation) or the observers are mistaken in their premises and 
need to adapt the formula (the values making up the graph), but the deductive logic 
of the model at large is not questioned. However, optimal foraging theory may be 
more productive in combination with abductive reasoning (see below). After all, the 
assumption that foragers move (or shall move) after three days  because of the inher-
ent rationality of patch depletion holds only until there are alternative explanations 
that are more plausible. 
 A need for alternative explanations seems evident from a close examination of 
the ethnographic record that describes the life of foraging groups. As formulated in 
a study on Canadian Unuk (Eskimo) hunter-gatherers,
 In the spring…the spirit of impermanence seemed to infect people, so that, from my point 
of view, they seemed to make the maximum rather than the minimum necessary number of 
moves. When the fl ooding river forced us uphill, the retreat was always made foot by foot 
as the river rose. For several days we moved camp at least once a day and sometimes 
oftener, and always when the water had arrived within inches of our doorsteps....It some-
times seemed as though moving—rearranging the environment—were a form of play for 
the Eskimos, a pleasure in itself. Whatever the explanation, I never completely shared the 
Eskimo spirit....Moves were a nuisance that disrupted my work and, worse, shifted my 
world as a kaleidoscope shifts its bits of glass, making me uncomfortably aware of the pat-
tern’s fragility. (Briggs,  1970 , p. 32) 
 This account is but one of the many that have shed doubt on the universal appli-
cability of optimal foraging theory. As pointed out above, residential moves are not 
guided only by subsistence effi ciency. The acquisition of other raw materials or the 
attraction of other places may also be important (e.g., for fi nding a spouse or for 
joining a ritual). A place’s adverse conditions (e.g., a plague of insects) may be a 
crucial factor, too. All these aspects are possible social motivations for residential 
moves (Kelly,  1995 , p. 147). The model of diminishing returns is not a  law of dimin-
ishing returns. One cannot assume (or deduce) that moves are  ultimately due to 
foraging effi ciency. It is possible only to abduct that this foraging effi ciency for food 
resources is a factor that is part of the rationality at work, more in some cases and 
less in others. The implication is not, however, that the aforementioned Unuk 
Eskimos (and the other known groups) are acting irrationally. Should one assume 
instead that they have a kind of primitive rationality, now politically more correctly 
called a forager mode of thought? What else may lie behind formulations such as 
“spirit of impermanence” or “the Eskimo spirit” in the quotation above? 
 State of the Art: Decision-Making Probability 
 Most anthropologists studying hunter-gatherers have explored this relativistic alter-
native by trying to come as close as possible to achieving what is usually called the 
 emic view. It is the approach of basing descriptions of the decision-making process 
on locally defi ned criteria, taking the decision-makers to be the experts, and allow-
ing that the rationality of the agents may be very different from that of the observer. 
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One can try to systematically adopt the emic view by drawing on ethnographic deci-
sion tree modeling (Gladwin,  1989 ). The textbook example for this theory is not one 
of foragers but rather of American college students and the question of whether or 
not they go to have lunch at McDonald’s. The technique is that one tries through 
interviews to elicit as many criteria as possible that are said to be relevant for this 
decision to go or not to go (criteria such as whether one likes the food, likes the 
service, knows where a McDonald’s is). Then the criteria are sorted according to a 
decision-making tree, which is subsequently tested against the decisions that the 
college students actually report when being asked where they have lunch. That is, 
the model should account for most of the decisions observable in real life. Failure to 
do so would indicate that a criterion is either missing from or misplaced in the 
decision-making tree. As a product of inductive reasoning, the tree makes predic-
tions on the basis of probability and takes account of local values and decision- 
making criteria. If some of the decision-making tree’s underlying criteria and values 
are subject to change (e.g., with age), decision-making trees will likely differ from 
one cultural or subcultural group to the next. One can thereby test and substantiate 
a relativistic hypothesis through the inductive reasoning of probability. 
 Again, this model of ethnographic decision trees works well in some instances. 
It apparently holds in particular for small-scale farmers and their choices of which 
crop to grow and when. Stated differently, it seems to work in settings of small 
homogeneous groups with decisions of seasonal regularity. It does not work as 
nicely with foragers, however, as I found when trying to employ this method with 
San (“Bushmen”) in Namibia. The individuals there are not homogenous in their 
responses, and it seems that the decision to move camp is not considered an instance 
that can be looked at through the lens of probability but rather only in personal 
terms as it were. The question that I asked in my fi eld research was not about going 
to McDonald’s (Namibia being one of the world’s few countries without 
McDonald’s). Instead, I asked what locals thought about attending secondary 
school, which for them means moving away from home, attending boarding school, 
or staying with distant family. There was no problem in eliciting an ethnographic 
decision tree. Everyone agreed that secondary education was important and that 
children should take this opportunity if they had found someone to pay their fees, 
buy them a school uniform, and offer them a place to stay. There was also agreement 
that discrimination by teachers or fellow students, food shortage at the place one 
was staying, or similar problems should not be permitted to make the children quit 
school. Despite this consensus, however, individuals constantly, and often for highly 
idiosyncratic reasons, deviated from the outcome predicted by the model. 
 It emerged in this research that the social agents concerned refused to see major 
personal choices (such as moving away from home to attend school) as decisions to 
be taken from a perspective of nowhere in particular. The agent was not regarded as 
replaceable by anyone else. There was no notion of “all things being equal,” which 
would have allowed for a neutral weighing of alternatives. This personalization of 
decisions applied to the manner in which the agent is perceived, the fact that a deci-
sion is seen to be analogue rather than digital, and the degree to which individual 
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decisions are seen as incongruent with those of others. In the following paragraphs 
I examine these aspects in more detail. 
 First, the San place a high social premium on allowing individuals to make their 
own decisions, and this applies to children from an early age. Parents leave it to their 
children to choose whether or not to go to school. The teachers, who are exclusively 
from other ethnic groups with a farming background, tend to be outraged about this 
practice and shake their heads. When they go to see the parents to ask them why a 
child has run away from school or did not attend, the parents would usually respond, 
“Go and ask the child. She [He] is sitting right here.” Whereas the teachers feel that 
the parents have a duty to make their children go to school (and that the children 
have a duty to obey their parents), San parents and children see it as a matter of 
personal autonomy for the pupil to decide. Even if one is generally in favor of 
schooling, this preference is trumped by the self-determination of the individual for 
his or her own life. 
 Second, San parents and children alike strongly emphasize the need to be able to 
revise decisions. Decisions are made as one goes; they are not thought of as on/off 
switches or inexorable if-then mechanisms. This characteristic, too, clearly surfaces 
in intercultural contact when understanding breaks down. Employers (and anthro-
pologists for that matter) who think they have struck a medium- or long-term agree-
ment that, for example, obliges local people to produce tools in exchange for money 
or to attend school for an extended period are constantly frustrated. The local people 
often decide to abandon the plan or their cooperation halfway through, even if it 
means that they do not receive the money or diploma they had originally envisioned. 
This frustration by outsiders has been translated into a stereotype casting San peo-
ple as unreliable and unstable. From a San perspective, however, it is a consequence 
of avoiding decisions that cannot be revised in the light of new information and 
events. They do not wish to make a decision once and for all at the beginning of an 
action but rather only once the action has been completed. 
 Third, social agents in the San cultural settings seem to be aware at all stages of 
the decision-making process that they are living only that one life and that decisions 
such as splitting up or joining up again are not repetitions of one another, although 
they may occur frequently. In discussions of past or future decisions, there is a pre-
occupation with particulars. Even if everyone has agreed in principle on the criteria 
for a sound decision on schooling, for instance, the underlying assumption is that 
one small thing can be suffi cient to allow the shared hierarchy of criteria to topple. 
A minor thing of this sort could be, for instance, a brief exchange of words with a 
teacher or another student, some insult, or some minor problem with food. What 
seem to be excuses to the outside, such as the fact that one had no soap with which 
to wash, no shoes to wear, or no decent food that morning, are acceptable contingen-
cies that distinguish one decision from another. Just as personal lives are ultimately 
unique because they are subject to particular differences, so are individual decision- 
making processes (see, Widlok,  2009b , for a discussion of moral decision-making). 
Decisions may be faulty with respect to principles but comprehensible and justifi -
able in terms of the particulars. 
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 Given the high premium on individual autonomy, a stance representing a proba-
bilistic model of reasoning becomes inimical to understanding the personal and 
situational aspects of the decisions in this ethnographic case. Arguably, the decision 
to move is felt to be a personal, not a rational, one if the term  rational decision is 
understood to mean a choice arrived at from no particular perspective that allows 
one to weigh aims and means in a detached manner. By contrast, the default assump-
tion is that the decision to move is made at a particular time by a particular person 
in a particular evolving setting. I thus realized that there would always be cases 
unaccounted for by any of these decision-making trees despite a degree of agree-
ment on the criteria for the decision to move from one location to another. In prac-
tice the predictive value of these tree models is precarious: Because of everyday 
life’s imponderabilia, decision-makers in these settings are ready to reconsider their 
decision at any time. These decisions are seen as uniquely affecting personal lives, 
so people refuse to judge them aloofl y as being instances of a general type. Instead, 
they highlight the personal, ultimately unique setting. A calculus of probability does 
not work, for the underlying presupposition of such a calculus is that one such deci-
sion is interchangeable with other decisions of the same type and that the two alter-
natives can be weighed against each another. However, one should be cautious to 
treat this observation as evidence of the rare or exotic nature of decision-making in 
this particular group of foragers. In fact, many observations in modern western set-
tings also fi t the description of personalized decisions (Fuchs,  2008 , p. 342), espe-
cially when considering fundamental, irreversible decisions of one’s life that do not 
comply with ideas of stock-taking (Spaemann,  1996 , p. 126). 
 The Pragmatics of Decision-Making 
 At this juncture I take the opportunity to recapitulate the two models presented so 
far for understanding forager mobility. Optimal foraging theory is generally used as 
a deductive model that underlines the necessity to move, that is, the assumed exi-
gencies that ultimately dictate the decisions that foragers make. Ethnographic deci-
sion tree modeling, by contrast, has been employed primarily to generate inductively 
whatever local models of decision-making may exist to offer agents (and observers) 
probable outcomes and probable criteria that constitute a decision-making process. 
Optimal foraging theory, one could say, links all rationality to outcomes, whereas 
ethnographic decision trees separate out different rationalities and their resulting 
actions. I have suggested that neither of these models can fully account for the eth-
nographic evidence of forager mobility. There appear to be patterns in the ethnogra-
phy, but the arguments involved are neither those of necessity nor of probability but 
rather of  plausibility . 
 The need is for a less problematic model that links rationality and action in a 
procedural view of rationality. I suggest going beyond the traditional models of 
strict deductive or inductive logic, strict in the sense that they claim truth outside the 
conversations and interactions that unfold in the social context of the reasoning in 
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question. As a fi rst step it is important to have an idea of what the social context 
looks like in this case. 
 Decision-making in a forager group such as the San of Namibia does not follow 
quasi-legal or rigid procedures. Instead, participants and observers alike can derive 
decisions only from the continuous discourse that allows them to make decisions 
based on plausibility. Their conversational and interactional style is a particular one 
of repetitions, overlaps, and echoing in everyday talk. Consensus is achieved as the 
interlocutors repeat and echo some opinions or arguments and leave out others. This 
kind of exchange enables people to make intelligent guesses about what they and 
others will be doing next. The strategy requires that everyone be allowed to join in 
the conversation while avoiding prominence (and exposure) as an individual voice 
of authority. Similar strategies for achieving consensus have been observed else-
where, as in Aboriginal Australia (Liberman,  1985 , p. 104). Taken together, they 
differ not only from the dominant western-style conversation and interaction but 
also from the aggressive and self-assertive style found in many societies, including 
“Big Man societies” in Melanesia or segmentary systems in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 The following excerpt is one of the best known examples from the !Kung San, 
who are neighbors of the Hai//om San with whom I have worked and who have a 
similar interactional practice of overlapping and echoing talk: “‘Yesterday,’ ‘eh,’ ‘at 
Deboragu,’ ‘eh,’ ‘I saw old/Gaishay.’ ‘You saw old/Gaishay.’ ‘eh, eh.’ ‘He said that 
he had seen the great python under the bank.’ ‘EH!’ ‘The python!’ ‘He wants us,’ 
‘eh, eh, eh,’ ‘to help him catch it’” (Marshall,  1976 , p. 290). 
 Among the San, people often talk in parallel, and there is no formal conclusion 
to this talk. Instead, it is made up largely of “topographical gossip” which invokes 
places and movements but without any formal decisions (Widlok,  1997 , p. 321). 
Apart from this feature of particular conversational forms, the reasoning involved 
allows for unpredictable events in that nonhuman and apparently nonanimate fea-
tures of the environment are expected to come in as well, infl uencing the direction 
that a decision may take. When people in this community refrain from long-term 
planning, it is not that they are incapable of doing so but rather that they allow the 
state of the environment or of other persons to prompt or trigger their decisions at 
certain stages of the process. Detailed studies on the process of tracking animals 
have shown that anticipating and predicting the movement of an animal that one is 
pursuing involves a continuous creation of new hypotheses in the light of new infor-
mation added to the incomplete picture of tracks and other signs on the ground. This 
activity also involves a constant dialogue between trackers who are allowed to 
maintain their diverging views as events unfold (Liebenberg,  1990 , p. 108). Making 
decisions about moving (or indeed any other decision) entails a similar process of 
encouraging heterodoxy in views, keeping the decision open until very late in the 
process and ultimately always allowing individuals to maintain their own diverging 
view. In residential mobility this tolerance of diverging views is facilitated by the 
fact that packing up one’s belongings is easy; it allows for fast and fl exible reactions 
either to join a party that leaves or simply stay put. 
 Having briefl y described the mode of reasoning ethnographically, one may now 
ask whether there is a more general model that can help reintegrate these  observations 
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into a comparative theory on rationality and action. It turns out that the plausibility 
mode of decision-making that has been observed in fi eld research with foragers 
appears to have its counterpart in current strands of the theory of reasoning. More 
specifi cally, the philosophy of science has a growing body of literature by scholars 
seeking to defi ne rationality not as a narrow logical concept based on necessity 
(deductive inference) or probability (inductive inference) but rather as reasoning 
based on plausibility, or what is called abductive inference (see Flach & Kakas, 
 2000 ; Josephson & Josephson,  1994 ; Walton,  2004 ). In other words, there is at least 
a third form of reasoning that is both widespread in everyday decision- making and 
capable of accounting for the complexity of decision-making among mobile 
people. 
 Abduction is the generation of hypotheses based on the evaluation of alternatives 
(Walton,  2004 ). People witnessing a surprising event (e.g., the light going out, for-
agers relocating yet again) creatively seek an explanation that would make sense of 
it, would make it appear to be a matter of course. When the light goes out, one 
works backward as it were, usually fi rst suspecting that the bulb is burned out. If  all 
light bulbs are observed to have gone out, one may plausibly infer that a fuse has 
blown. If the lights are out not just in one’s own house but in all the houses on the 
block, then one may suspect a wider power failure as the cause, and so on. None of 
these inferences is necessary, deductively valid, or probable in a strict sense. There 
are many possible reasons for the light bulb(s) having gone out, and some may have 
the same estimated probability (e.g., burned-out bulbs and blown fuses). What peo-
ple do when reasoning abductively is tap into their background knowledge and 
select the most plausible explanation in a procedural fashion. Given the premium 
that the San place on personal autonomy, a forager of that community is constantly 
prompted to make sense of the sometimes erratic movements of other elements in 
the environment, whether fellow foragers, game animals, or erratic rainfall. The 
decision by the forager to move or stay rests on the background knowledge of per-
sons and places that he or she has encountered. It is a type of reasoning that does not 
follow strict rules of necessity, the regularities of majority rule, or predictable sea-
sonality but emerges by deleting the less plausible alternatives in the course of pro-
tracted social decision-making. Abduction is a way of generating an emerging 
certainty (not truth) that identifi es the least defective alternative given the group’s 
incomplete knowledge. 
 Abduction is, of course, a prevalent form of reasoning. When making sense of 
actions, humans usually combine deductive, inductive, and abductive arguments—
each type of logic having its distinct function (Walton,  2004 , p. 86). They all feature 
in scientifi c explanation, including that in the natural sciences (see Agar,  2013 ). But 
unlike deduction and induction, abduction reminds one that explanation and knowl-
edge formation as a whole are dialogical and procedural. Processes of knowledge 
formation do not follow a fi xed set of linear rules. Selection of the most plausible 
hypothesis is a process of dialogue with both objects that play a role (e.g., bulbs and 
natural processes) but also with other humans with whom one is engaged and who 
may support or doubt one’s hypotheses. 
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 For a long time, abduction was taken to be a defective form of deductive reason-
ing, for it was frequently defi ned as a case of affi rming the consequent (e.g., where 
there is smoke, there must be fi re). The idea of abductive reasoning seems to have 
been marginalized together with everyday cognition (Lave,  1988 ) as exemplifi ed by 
the reasoning of foragers (Liebenberg,  1990 ). But the strength of abductive infer-
ence is evidently not in an isolated statement (a syllogism) but rather in a creative 
and explanatory mode of logical reasoning that establishes the best available 
hypothesis at a certain point in an open, explanatory dialogue that invites additional 
testing and evaluation. In other words, this strength is less likely to show up in 
experimental isolation than in ethnographic cases. Understanding reasoning in pro-
cesses means recognizing that it matters where actors are in a complex decision- 
making process. Abduction is a plausible short-cut, especially in the early stages of 
trying to make sense of a situation or an action. But there may be situations (e.g., the 
tracking of animals) in which it is useful to cultivate this mode of reasoning for as 
long as possible in the problem-solving process. Similarly, I argue that this mode of 
reasoning is important  throughout many decision-making processes, not just in their 
initial, creative stages. 
 Trying to explain why someone has moved is, I suggest, very much an abductive 
dialogical exercise that entails observation of natural givens (e.g., the distribution of 
resources and the number of people involved) but also interaction with other agents 
with whom one is in constant communication (and whose motivations one may 
abduct if they are not made explicit). Moreover, I suggest that making a rational 
decision on when to move is also a form of abductive reasoning. Determination of 
the best time to move (and the best destination to move to) is typically  not based on 
necessity or probabilistic calculus but rather on broad background knowledge, 
informed guesses as it were, in dialogue with others, and not only fellow human 
beings. Moreover, I suggest that abductive inference can provide an account that 
links reasoning and action into a coherent whole that can also explain cultural varia-
tion. The recognition of cultural variation in abductive reasoning is the fi nal point of 
this chapter. 
 Variation in Reasoning 
 The case material presented in this chapter can enhance a general model of abduc-
tive inference pertaining to dialogical knowledge formation as it emerges in con-
temporary philosophy and logic. An explanation of variation surfaces when one 
realizes that both the type of dialogue through which reasoning takes place and the 
partners with whom it takes place are likely to vary across situations. The prototypi-
cal forms that the dialogue of explanation takes in the philosophical literature are 
those between teacher and student, between judge or prosecutor and witness, and, 
more recently, between a user and an expert system of artifi cial intelligence through 
an interface (Walton,  2004 , p. 88). None of these three examples resembles that of 
a group of foragers determining whether they should move or not.
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•  Forager decision-making on any matter (as exemplifi ed by the San ethnography) 
differs greatly from the typical teacher–student relationship. As Hoymann ( 2010 ) 
reported, asking inquisitive questions is not encouraged among foragers. Young 
people are expected to learn by observing and trying or by being told at the 
appropriate moment, not by prompting adults as in a typical teacher–learner 
situation. 
•  Communal talk among foragers is also very different from the hierarchical set-
ting of court proceedings in that communal talk among foragers has no fi xed 
leadership roles and no clearly delimited sequences or groups of speakers. 
Indeed, their communication makes heterodoxy possible and sometimes even 
encourages it. People in these settings may stick to their decisions and explana-
tions. Because they are supported by others, they also have “the freedom to be 
wrong at times” (Liebenberg,  1990 , p. 162). When hunting, for instance, indi-
viduals may maintain rather different views as to what the tracked animal is 
likely to do next. When it comes to moving camp, anyone may decide not to go 
with the majority, but there are other options, such as being on one’s own or split-
ting up the group. 
•  Expert systems today commonly take the form of multiple digital circuits of yes/
no decisions. Research specifi cally on questions established that San speakers 
have a preference for not posing yes/no questions (Hoymann,  2010 ). In contrast 
to speakers of many other languages, they do not seem not to use requests for 
confi rmation that would press the interlocutor to use yes/no. In contradiction to 
the most typical form of questioning used in expert systems (Widlok,  2008 ), they 
avoid cornering their interlocutors and seem to take care not to infringe the 
autonomy of others. When they draw on the knowledge of others, it seems very 
unlike the process of consulting an expert machine. 
 What the forager cases suggest is that the dialogic nature of reasoning is compat-
ible with a variety of equally competent forms of dialogue: inquisitive, circumspect, 
digital, open, bilateral, multilateral, unilinear, and multistrand. In fact, I argue that 
the different practices of dialogue may produce different forms of reasoning and a 
spectrum of rational outcomes. It is neither one rationality only nor anything goes 
but rather a limited spectrum of possibilities describable in terms of the dialogical 
practices in which reasoning takes place. 
 The form of dialogue is not the only entity that may be broader than what the 
philosophical literature usually covers; the dialoging partners, too, may have a 
wider range. Reasoning is usually thought to take place either in an experimental 
mode between individuals and nature (as in much of the research on infants) or 
among investigating humans pursuing their own individual decision-making strate-
gies. The aforementioned example of light bulbs that had gone out could include 
interaction with objects (e.g., shaking the bulb, checking the fuses) or interaction 
with other subjects (e.g., the neighbors, people in the room, or the electric utilities 
company). The peculiarity of the case about foragers on the move is that the bound-
ary between nature and other persons is drawn in a particular way and differently 
from what nonforagers may expect. Personalization does not necessarily mean that 
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natural objects are treated as persons, although such anthropomorphization occurs 
as well. In many Australian examples, Aborigines do not just talk about the land and 
its features but may address it directly, as when expressing their respect or even their 
pity when the land has not been cared for properly. In Aboriginal Australia, a typical 
indication of a country 1 that has not been cared for is that no one has set fi re to it and 
that it should be visited (see Rose,  1995 ). Cases differ as to what is subject to person-
alization. It could be animals, various supernatural beings, sacred places or—most 
commonly—a combination thereof (as in the Australian case of totemic Dreaming 
beings that involve animals, superhuman creative beings, and places). The main and 
more general point is not that a certain set of beings (animate or inanimate) can fea-
ture as personalized subjects, as partners with whom one may reason. Rather, it seems 
that anything can become personalized if it is treated as a person, by which I mean that 
this  some-thing is taken not as a thing, an instance of a category, but rather as a unique 
subject with which one interacts. By contrast, many phases of decision making in 
present day economics, for instance, entail processes of depersonalization and isola-
tion. The procedures of reasoning are regarded not as a dialogue between persons but 
either as the interaction between users and computational systems or as abstract sys-
temic processes devoid of personal relations, aspirations, and apprehensions. 
 Therefore, both the style of the dialogue and the partners in the dialogue may be 
much more variable than is apparent. Beyond this case of foragers on the move, it 
may be wise to consider procedural rationality broadly enough to allow inclusion of 
variations in how procedures unfold as particular forms of dialogue and how part-
ners in this dialogue are personalized or depersonalized. Rationality would thereby 
cease to be a purely mental phenomenon. Instead, it would reside partially in forms 
of social communication and interaction as well as in features of the environment 
that western philosophy and science tend to discount as irrelevant but that can be 
important triggers or partners in the procedure of reasoning. Why does abductive 
reasoning describe my ethnographic cases so aptly? I do not think its capacity to do 
so is coincidental. Rather, it is because this mode of inference is not a stand-alone 
mode but one that is tied closely to the interacting, corporeal, and relational social 
beings that we humans are. 
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Chapter 15
Continuity and Change in Older Adults’  
Out- of- Home Mobility Over Ten Years: 
A Qualitative-Quantitative Approach
Heidrun Mollenkopf, Annette Hieber, and Hans-Werner Wahl
Both the ability and the opportunity to move about constitute essential requisites to 
older adults’ independent living and societal participation. The ability–that is the 
fundamental physical capacity–to move is a basic human need and essential to per-
sonal health (e.g., Heikkinen et al., 1992; U.S. Department of Transportation, 2003). 
In that sense, declining mobility has been understood predominantly as a physical 
health and geriatric issue. For decades, a broad range of research has been con-
ducted to understand, among other things, the increasing decline in mobility perfor-
mance, including decrements in sensory abilities and sensorimotor integration, loss 
of motor control and voluntary strength, slowing motor action and speed of process-
ing. shrinking range of motion and flexibility, and decreasing ability to stabilize 
posture (e.g., Fozard, 2003; Fozard & Gordon-Salant, 2001; Ketcham & Stelmach, 
2001; O’Neill & Dobbs, 2004; Owsley, 2004; Spirduso, 1995).
The ability to move about—and by extension to travel—is required to navigate 
from point A to point B, to seek out places of subjective interest or that are essential 
to meeting daily material needs, to participate in cultural and recreational activities, 
and to maintain social relations, familiar habits, and life styles—in short, to live an 
autonomous life for as long as one’s mental and physical capacities permit one to 
participate actively in society (Schaie, 2003). At the same time, age-related changes 
such as physical, cognitive, and/or sensory impairments and social losses may limit 
older adults’ possibilities of ambulating and venturing out.
A multitude of studies in transportation research have provided rich statistical 
data on older adults’ actual travel behavior, usually defined as a movement in time 
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and space, measured in terms of trips or journeys and reported in standardized diary 
forms (e.g., Centre d’études sur les réseaux, les transports, l’urbanisme et les 
 constructions publiques [CERTU], 2001; Clarke & Sawyers, 2004; European 
Conference of Ministers of Transport [ECMT], 2000; Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, 2001; Rosenbloom, 2001; Schaie & Pietrucha, 
2000; Transportation Research Board [TRB], 1988). It is true that findings differ 
depending on national peculiarities, but general tendencies and structures corre-
spond in some salient aspects: In general, travel of older adults has clearly increased 
for about two decades. However, the older individuals are, the less they tend to 
travel, mainly due to declining health and sensory impairments. Older individuals 
with a driver’s license and access to a private automobile travel more than those 
with no car at their disposal. Because the current generation of older women has less 
education, a lower income, and less likelihood of having a driver’s license than men 
of the same age, it is not surprising that they use public transportation more than 
men do, whereas older men use the car more often, take more trips, and travel more 
miles than older women (see e.g., Banister & Bowling, 2004; ECMT, 2000; 
Marottoli et al., 1997; Mollenkopf et al., 2002; Owsley, 2002; Rosenbloom, 2004).
Despite the abundant information available from these research strands, the func-
tional approaches to mobility often neglect the key mobility concerns of older adults 
(Alsnih & Hensher, 2003; Banister & Bowling, 2004; Gabriel & Bowling, 2004; 
Hildebrand, 2003; Mollenkopf, Marcellini, Ruoppila, & Tacken, 2004a; Schlag & 
Schade, 2007; Siren & Hakamies-Blomqvist, 2004). The meaning individuals attri-
bute to mobility and their experiences when venturing out are only scarcely assessed. 
However, mobility can be for its own sake and not just as a derived demand 
(Mokhtarian, 2005). Case studies conducted in four European cities showed that 
mobility means much more to older adults than the mere covering of distance 
(Mollenkopf et al., 2004a). In this context the attraction or deterrence of the natural, 
social, and built environment can play a crucial role (Banister & Bowling, 2004; 
Holland et al., 2005). Motivational, cognitive, or personality aspects also play an 
important role in their decisions to go out. Moreover, in modern society, mobility is 
associated with highly appreciated goals like freedom, autonomy, and flexibility 
(Cobb & Coughlin, 2004; Handy, Weston, & Mokhtarian, 2005; Lash & Urry, 1994; 
Mollenkopf, Marcellini, Ruoppila, Széman, & Tacken, 2005; Rammler, 2001). 
Older adults are members of current societies and therefore are affected by these 
societies’ Zeitgeist, values, and expectations.
Only in recent years has the focus shifted to more subjective and motivational 
aspects of travel and driving behavior. A series of recent studies showed that older 
adults’ ability to move about and to pursue outdoor leisure activities contributes 
significantly to their autonomy, social participation, and subjective quality of life 
(Banister & Bowling, 2004; Cvitkovich & Wister, 2001; Fernández-Ballesteros, 
Zamarrón, & Ruíz, 2001; Marottoli et al., 1997; Mollenkopf et al., 2004a; 
Mollenkopf, Baas, Kaspar, Oswald, & Wahl, 2006; Owsley, 2002; Pochet, 2003). 
Satisfaction with one’s ability to get around, to pursue leisure activities and to travel 
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were significant determinants of quality of life in a study comparing the impact of 
subjective appraisal of different life domains on satisfaction with life in general 
(Mollenkopf et al., 2006). In a study focusing on elderly people’s own definitions of 
quality of life, Farquhar (1995) found that the ability to go out more was cited as 
improving quality of life, whereas being housebound detracted from quality of life. 
Similar findings were reported by Coughlin (2001) with respect to the significance 
of transportation, albeit mostly related to being able to drive a car. Banister and 
Bowling (2004) found that a sense of optimism and positive expectations of life 
constitute a main building block for the transport dimension of older adults’ percep-
tions of quality of life. Psychological variables such as control beliefs and the indi-
vidual importance attributed to being out also played a role in characterizing groups 
of older adults who differed in their out-of-home mobility patterns (Mollenkopf 
et al., 2004b).
Altogether, these findings offer some evidence that functional necessities, on the 
one hand, and modern values and individual needs on the other, strongly comple-
ment one other. In this chapter we wish to further pursue a comprehensive under-
standing of older adults’ out-of-home mobility by taking up and integrating the 
diverging concepts of mobility in an environmental gerontology perspective (Wahl, 
Mollenkopf, Oswald, & Claus, 2007; Wahl & Oswald, 2010). Proceeding from this 
approach, which asserts that an individual’s well-being is influenced by how well 
environmental resources match personal needs, we propose that mobility and related 
appraisals are determined by personal (health-related and psychological) and socio-
economic factors as well as by environmental (structural) conditions and features of 
the person-environment interaction. Findings of the European MOBILATE project 
largely confirmed this fundamental view of mobility in cross-sectional as well as 
longitudinal analyses over the 5-year observation period from 1995 to 2000 
(Mollenkopf et al., 2005).
This chapter presents data based on an extended observational period up to 2005, 
for a total observation time of 10 years. We assume that during that time the men 
and women who had participated in the 1995 study might have experienced age- 
related health impairments, critical social life events (e.g., death of a spouse), and 
changes in their local environments, all of which can seriously jeopardize the out-
door mobility of the older individual.
The goals of our work are threefold. First, we describe 10-year trajectories in 
terms of stability and change of various key qualifiers (e.g., satisfaction) of out-of- 
home mobility such as out-of-home mobility in general, public transportation, out- 
of- home leisure activities, and travel. Second, we link and undergird these 
trajectories with the explicit consideration of meaning imposed on mobility, per-
ceived changes in mobility and perceived reasons for change, as well as satisfaction 
with life in general. Third, we will explore interindividual differences in stability 
and change. We strongly believe that only a mix of methods, in other words, qualita-
tive and quantitative, allows these goals to be addressed in a comprehensive 
manner.




This study started with an initial inquiry on older adults’ out-of-home mobility car-
ried out in four European cities in 1995 (Mollenkopf et al. 2004a). The German 
parts of the investigation—on which the present study is based—were carried out in 
the cities of Mannheim (western Germany) and Chemnitz (eastern Germany). Both 
of them are middle-sized industrial cities with diversified settlement structures and 
public transportation (tram and bus lines) as well as rail connections and national 
roads. The quantitative part of the study included N = 804 persons aged 55 years or 
older, which resulted from a randomly drawn sample of addresses from the popula-
tion registers of the Municipality Registration Offices of Chemnitz and Mannheim. 
Thirty-five of the participants were selected for additional in-depth interviews 
because they showed a particularly low or high degree of mobility. Five years later 
(2000), 271 respondents from the original sample could be reassessed in an initial 
follow-up as part of the project entitled “Mobilate: Enhancing Outdoor Mobility in 
Later Life” funded by the European Commission in the Fifth Framework Programme 
(Programme Area no. 6.3, Project QLRT-1999-02236). The comparative findings of 
this international and interdisciplinary project, including data from Finland, 
Germany, Hungary, Italy, and the Netherlands, have been published elsewhere (e.g., 
Mollenkopf et al., 2003, 2005, 2006; Mollenkopf, Ruoppila, & Marcellini, 2007). 
Another 5 years later (2005), a third assessment took place in the German cities and 
resulted in N = 82 participants, or approximately 30 % from the first follow-up and 
11 % from the original sample. Hence, the present study covers these participants 
over a 10-year period.
Well-trained interviewers from the USUMA research institute (Berlin) con-
ducted the German interviews in 1995 and 2000. The 2005 Chemnitz interviews 
were also conducted by USUMA interviewers, and the interviews in Mannheim 
were conducted by the project staff.
 Sample Description and Drop-Out
The original German sample of N = 804 participants was disproportionately strati-
fied by age and sex, resulting in almost equal subcategories of men and women (50 
% each) and two age groups (51.2 % respondents aged 55–74 years and 48.8 % aged 
75 years or older). The composition of the age groups changed from the first assess-
ment in 1995 to the second in 2000 (61.3 % aged 55–74 years and 38.7 % aged 75 
years or older) and even more dramatically from the second to the third assessment 
in 2005 (84.2 % aged 55–74 years and 15.8 % aged 75 years or older). By shifting 
the age group limit by 10 years and drawing on the participants’ actual age in 2005, 
we again obtained two groups of the same size (50 % each of respondents 65–74 
years old and 75 years old or older).
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The reasons for dropping out of the sample were documented in standardized 
protocols. Because of the long period of time, the most frequent reasons were the 
death of the former participants or a deterioration in their health (almost 20 % each). 
Other dropouts were due to refusals to continue participation and failure to locate or 
gain access to them. Logistic regression analysis based on data from the 2000 study 
indicated that age (OR = .94*),1 education (OR = 1.59*), and the number of trans-
port modes used in 2000 (OR = 1.27**) seemed to influence participation in 2005. 
Probability of participation increased with younger age, higher education, and 
greater variety of transport modes used. The level of education among the 
 participants can be regarded as relatively high, with almost half of them having 
earned a standard or advanced degree.
As Table 15.1 shows, the average age of the 82 individuals who could be assessed 
over the 10-year interval was 75.2 years at T3, with 50 % of these participants 
belonging to the younger age group (65–74 years old) and 50 % to the higher age 
group (75 years old or older). Women and men were almost equally represented in 
the sample (48 % and 52 %, respectively). Most of the participants were married (66 
%) and living in multiperson households (68 %). Approximately one in four (24 %) 
had lost their spouse. Satisfaction with their financial situation decreased on average 
from M = 7.7 in 1995 to M = 7.0 in 2005. Similarly, albeit at a lower level, subjective 
health was rated less positively 5 and 10 years after the first assessment (M = 6.9 and 
6.7, respectively, compared to M = 7.3 in 1995).
 Instruments
In order to guarantee the comparability of the answers from all assessments, each 
follow-up retained main aspects of the instruments used in the first wave of data 
collection, that is, the standardized Outdoor Mobility Survey 1995 and the semis-
tructured interview guidelines for the in-depth 1996 interviews (Mollenkopf et al., 
2003, 2004a). Both of the instruments included questions on objective factors as 
well as subjective ratings concerning important prerequisites for mobility such as 
health and socioeconomic status (individual factors), social networks, and the phys-
ical environment (environmental factors). The survey questionnaire was partially 
based on methods used in previous studies, such as the Finnish Evergreen project 
(Heikkinen, 1998), the Nordic Research on Ageing (NORA) study (Avlund, Kreiner, 
& Schultz-Larsen, 1993; Heikkinen, Berg, Schroll, Steen, & Viidik, 1997), and the 
German Welfare Survey (Zapf & Habich, 1996). Satisfaction with mobility, with the 
ability and opportunity to pursue leisure and other important life activities, and with 
1 Odds Ratio is a way to quantify how strongly the presence of a variable A increases or reduces the 
risk that another variable B is present or absent. Risk is calibrated in this analysis such that 1.0 
means no change in the risk of B appearing when A is present. An OR of .94* means in our case 
that being younger significantly reduced the risk that a participant in our study would drop out. * 
= significant at the .05 level; ** = significant at the .10 level (tentatively significant).
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life in general was assessed on an 11-point Likert-type scale ranging from 0 (lowest 
satisfaction) to 10 (highest satisfaction) (see Veenhoven, 1996; Zapf & Habich, 
1996), which was also used in the German Welfare Survey and the German Socio- 
Economic Panel (SOEP).
The focus of the semistructured interview, representing the qualitative part of the 
assessment, was on the aging adults’ personal experiences and the subjective mean-
ings they attributed to their out-of-home mobility options. In the second and third 
wave of assessment, additional questions were posed concerning changes between 
1995 and 2000 and between 2000 and 2005 with respect to factors possibly affect-
ing mobility.
 Data Analyses
All interviews of the third assessment were tape recorded. After transcription of the 
qualitative portions of the interviews, content analysis (Mayring, 2003) was used to 
extract the main aspects and to group them into conceptually meaningful categories. 





Mean age (years) 62.2 – 75.2
Size of household
n % n % n %
Living alone 13 15.9 19 23.2 26 31.7
Living with others 69 84.1 63 76.8 56 68.3
Marital statusa
n % n % n %
Married, living with a partner 66 80.5 61 74.4 54 65.9
Widowed  8  9.8 13 15.9 20 24.4
Satisfaction with the financial situation of the householdb
M SD M SD M SD
7.7 1.8 7.6 2.0 7.0 2.4
Satisfaction with healthb
M SD M SD M SD
7.3 2.1 6.9 2.4 6.7 2.5
Changes in health
n % n % n %
Became better  6  7.3  3  3.6
Became worse 35 42.7 45 54.9
Remained the same 41 50.0 34 41.5
aThe analyses also included the characteristics married, living separately (n = 1), divorced (n = 3), 
and never married (n = 4), which comprised 10 % of each assessment.bSatisfaction was assessed 
on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (lowest satisfaction) to 10 (highest satisfaction)
Design by authors
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The statements quoted in the results section represent especially characteristic and 
meaningful examples from the extensive amount of material. All names were 
changed to comply with data protection acts.
Quantitative data records were analyzed using the SAS statistical package (SAS 
Institute, Inc.), and the analysis was kept simple because of the rather small sample 
size. Statistical testing consisted mostly of t-tests and chi-square tests, with the 
usual levels of p < .05* applying.
In this study we focus particularly on finding ways to combine quantitative and 
qualitative data so that each data-analytic component complements the other.
 Results
 Overview
We start with findings addressing the subjective meaning of mobility over time, fol-
lowed by perceived changes in mobility and perceived reasons for change. We then 
report on trajectories of satisfaction with key areas of outdoor mobility as well as 
the course of satisfaction with life in general. Finally, we explore the interindividual 
variability over time based on case analyses selected to underscore some of the 
extremes inherent in the data. Results presented in the first step are completely 
qualitative, whereas quantitative and qualitative data analyses are interwoven in the 
remaining steps.
 Subjective Meaning of Out-of-Home Mobility Over Time
The terms in which our participants in 2005 expressed what out-of-home mobil-
ity meant to them were nearly the same as those they had used 10 years earlier 
(see Table 15.2). As in our earlier studies (Mollenkopf & Flaschenträger, 2001; 
Mollenkopf et al., 2004a), we were able to categorize the elicited semantic mate-
rial into seven categories: out-of-home mobility as a basic emotional experience; 
physical movement as a basic human need; mobility as movement and participa-
tion in the natural environment; mobility as a social need; mobility as an expres-
sion of personal autonomy and freedom; mobility as a source of stimulation and 
diversion; and mobility as a reflective expression of one’s life force. For most of 
the respondents, mobility included more than one aspect, and some of the various 
facets are tightly interwoven, reflecting the multidimensional meaning of mobil-
ity. Taken all together, it seems that out-of-home mobility has maintained more 
or less the same bandwidth and richness of meaning over the 10-year observa-
tional period.
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 Perceived Changes in Out-of-Home Mobility Over Time 
and Perceived Reasons for Such Change
Comparing the older adults’ subjectively perceived changes in their out-of-home 
mobility over the 10-year interval gives a clear picture of continuity and change in 
this domain: About two thirds of the study’s participants said in both follow-up 
assessments (2000 and 2005) that their mobility had not changed (Table 15.3). 
About one third (27 % in 2000 and 34 % in 2005) reported a decline each time. 
Table 15.2 The meaning of out-of-home mobility: Main categories in sample verbal citations
Year Category
The overarching meaning of mobility as a basic emotional experience, as essential for the 
quality of life or for life itself
1995 “Joy!”; “It’s everything, it’s life!”
2005 “A part of quality of life—yes, that’s a really considerable part of quality of life!”
“Really, it’s getting out that makes up life, isn’t it? When you stay at home you can 
watch TV, but that’s not life, that’s dying slowly.”
Physical movement as a basic human need
1995 “A person has to move! I want to move and feel good when I do.”
2005 “Moving about outdoors is very important for me. I use every opportunity to get out 
into the open air.”
Mobility as movement and participation in the natural environment
1995 “I have to get out, have to know what is going on in nature!”
2005 “That’s worth a lot....Of course, getting out, open air, movement, and other 
environments and other people and nature—all this has to be worth a lot to everybody.”
Moving around as a social need, as a desire for social integration and participation
1995 “Still being able to take part in social life.” “So that I don’t get lonely.”
2005 “Getting out of one’s home—this means meeting friends and acquaintances, socializing, 
participating in culture, broadening one’s horizons, and a lot more.”
The possibility to move about as an expression of personal autonomy and freedom
1995 “Being able to go out any time I want!” “Not being locked in!”
2005 “A wonderful step to freedom....It has always been like this, the desire to go out into the 
open and the ability to do so—that’s simply beautiful. Being able to do so is important, 
very important.”
Mobility as a source of stimulation and diversion
1995 “Sometimes seeing something other than the four walls you live in!”; “So that I don’t 
go crazy up here!”
2005 “This means a great deal to me. Freedom of movement – and you have to see what’s 
new, the celebrations, meet other people and enjoy things a bit – that’s what you need in 
old age.”
The ability to move about as a reflective expression of one’s remaining life force—A typical 
topic of old age
1995 “The last bit of freedom!” “Proof that I’m still a human being like anyone else.”
2005 “This I can say: I’m still well—I am happy that I am still able to go out and move about 
on my own.”
Design by authors
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Whereas 4 % of the participants still stated an improvement in mobility in 2000, no 
one in 2005 reported an improvement. When age is applied as the distinguishing 
factor, it becomes evident that mobility worsens mainly after the 75th year of life. 
Almost 30 % of the older age group stated a decline in 2000 compared to just 
24.4 % of the younger age group. Five years later, the proportions differed even 
more starkly (50 % and 20 %, respectively). Men and women showed only minor 
differences in this regard.
The perceived reasons for change in mobility can be attributed to both personal 
and environmental circumstances and are centered mostly on the theme of loss and 
deterioration. Declining health, in particular, but also financial constraints; the 
necessity of caring for a family member; difficulties with using a bicycle, car, or 
public transport and with coping with traffic conditions in general; and barriers in 
the built environment tend to result in mobility restrictions. The following quota-
tions illustrate how older people experience their declining mobility and what 
impacts it has on their daily life.
I can no longer move about in the open countryside the way I used to. Five years ago I still 
went fishing, but I can’t any more. If I go to the river, I risk being alone. And if I were to 
pass out, maybe I wouldn’t fall into the water, but I might lay there a long time. (Mr. Nolte, 
88 years old)




Total sample (N = 82)
n % n %
Better  3  3.7  0  0.0
Worse 22 26.8 28 34.2
The same 57 69.5 54 65.8
Age group (in years)
65–74 75 and older 65–74 75 and older
(n = 41) (n = 41) (n = 41) (n = 41)
n % n % n % n %
Better  3  7.3  0  0.0  0  0.0  0  0.0
Worse 10 24.4 12 29.3  8 19.5 20 48.8
The same 28 68.3 29 70.7 33 80.5 21 51.2
Gender
Female Male Female Male
(n = 39) (n = 43) (n = 39) (n = 43)
n % n % n % n %
Better  1  2.6  2  4.6  0  0.0  0  0.0
Worse 11 28.2 11 25.6 14 35.9 14 32.6
The same 27 69.2 30 69.8 25 64.1 29 67.4
Design by authors
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Despite the prosthesis I feel pain, and this restricts my walking. And when I come home—
not in winter, but in the spring and summer—I have to undress, and my wife gives me a 
shower. (Mr. Walter, 86 years old)
I don’t have a car anymore and have to go everywhere on foot. There are only public modes 
of transport like the tram. But I have no further options. I would have to ask my son to take 
me somewhere. (Mr. Ober, 77 years old)
Well, as I said, I can no longer use my bike and I need some help for heavy household tasks 
more often nowadays. (Mrs. Diffler, 68 years old)
Of course, my whole situation has changed because of this task [caring for her husband, 
who suffers from dementia]. I myself, if I were independent, if I did not have to care for 
someone, I could walk, I could travel, and I could do anything I want. (Mrs. Hansen, 75 
years old)
 Satisfaction with Key Areas of Mobility and Satisfaction 
with Life in General Over Time
 Out-of-Home Mobility
The appraisal of one’s possibilities for mobility—assessed on an 11-point scale 
ranging from 0 (not satisfied at all) to 10 (very satisfied)—included all means of 
getting where one wants to go, either on foot, by bicycle, by car as a driver or pas-
senger, or by public transport. In general, the older adults’ satisfaction with their 
mobility options over the 10-year interval was high (Table 15.4). Toward the third 
assessment, however, it decreased from an average rating of M = 8.4 (T1) to M = 8.3 
(T2) and M = 7.8 (T3). This tendency was true of male participants in particular. 
Men and women aged 75 years or older also expressed less satisfaction with their 
mobility options than did younger elders (65–74 years old). As expected, older 
adults who reported a decline in their mobility options in the second and/or third 
assessment were significantly less satisfied with their mobility in general than peo-
ple whose mobility had not changed.
 Public Transport
Average satisfaction with public transport increased over the 10-year interval among 
the people who used it (M = 7.2 in 1995 to M = 8.1 in 2000 and M = 8.2 in 2005; see 
Table 15.5). Women were less satisfied than men in all assessments. When respon-
dents with mobility impairments were distinguished from respondents without such 
limitations, satisfaction of the impaired decreased only slightly between the second 
and third assessment (from M = 7.9–7.2). Older adults who had not reported mobil-
ity restrictions showed a remarkable increase in their appraisal of public transport.
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 Out-of-Home Leisure Activities and Travel
Just as everyday activities require at least a minimum of physical mobility, so do 
leisure activities and travel. Hence, it is no surprise that changes in these domains 
eventually occurred most in people who reported mobility restrictions (61 % in both 
domains compared to 33 % change in leisure and 49 % change in travel among the 
nonimpaired). The main reasons for decreasing activities were the same as for 
Table 15.4 Satisfaction with mobility possibilities: Two German cities
Characteristics of the sample
Year
1995 2000 2005
M SD M SD M SD
N = 82 8.4 1.9 8.3 1.9 7.8 2.1
Age group (in years)
65–74 (n = 41) 8.3 2.0 8.4 2.0 8.2 1.8
75 and older (n = 41) 8.5 1.8 8.1 1.9 7.4 2.3b
Gender
Female (n = 39) 7.9 2.1 7.8 2.4 7.6 2.5
Male (n = 43) 8.8 1.6 8.7 1.4 8.0 1.8b
Perceived changes in mobility 2005
Became worse (n = 28) 8.6 1.6 7.8 2.3a 5.8 2.4b
Remained the same (n = 54) 8.3 2.1 8.5 1.7 8.7 1.2
Note. Satisfaction was assessed on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (not satisfied at all) to 10 (very 
satisfied)
aSignificant differences between 2000 and 2005.bSignificant differences between 1995 and 2005
Design by authors
Table 15.5 Satisfaction with public transportation in two German cities
Characteristics of the sample
Year
1995 2000 2005
M SD M SD M SD
n = 53 (users only) 7.2 2.8 8.1 1.7 8.2 1.7b
Age group (in years)
65–74 (n = 28) 7.2 3.0 8.3 1.9 8.1 1.7
75 and older (n = 25) 7.3 2.5 7.8 1.4 8.3 1.7
Gender
Female (n = 27)  6. 2.8 7.8 2.0 8.0 1.9
Male (n = 26) 7.7 2.7 8.3 1.3 8.4 1.4
Perceived changes in mobility 2005
Became worse (n = 14) 7.9 1.9 7.9 1.6 7.2 2.3
Remained the same (n = 39) 7.0 3.0a 8.1 1.7 8.5 1.3c
Note. Satisfaction was assessed on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (not satisfied at all) to 10 (very 
satisfied)
aSignificant differences between 1995 and 2000.bSignificant differences between 1995 and 2005 
Design by authors
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decreasing mobility: declining health, lack of money, the necessity of caring for a 
family member, the absence of a companion, difficulties with using transport modes, 
and environmental barriers.
About a quarter of all respondents and about half of the respondents with mobil-
ity impairments do not travel at all. This means, however, that half of older adults 
with impairments still travel, albeit to less distant destinations and for a shorter 
period than previously.
With regard to satisfaction with one’s opportunities to pursue leisure activities 
and travel, the evident tendency was similar to that pertaining to satisfaction with 
mobility options. On average, and by subgroups, there was a significant decrease 
within the 10-year interval. Satisfaction with leisure activities decreased from M = 
8.1 in 1995 to M = 7.9 in 2000 and M = 7.5 in 2005 (Table 15.6). The figures for 
satisfaction with travel were M = 8.5 (1995), M = 7.9 (2000), and M = 7.0 (2005) 
(see Table 15.7). The drops occurred mainly between the second and third assess-
ment and among people who reported impaired mobility.
 Life in General
The diverging individual developments in older adults’ mobility and the respective 
impact on domain-specific satisfaction can be examined further in terms of satisfac-
tion with life in general (Table 15.8). In the course of the follow-up investigations, 
overall satisfaction with life remained almost the same among the older adults who 
participated in all three assessments. On average it was rated M = 8.2 in 1995, 
M = 8.2 in 2000, and M = 8.0 in the year 2005. The slight decrease toward the third 
Table 15.6 Satisfaction with possibilities of pursuing out-of-home leisure activities: Two German 
cities
Characteristics of the sample
Year
1995 2000 2005
M SD M SD M SD
N = 82 8.1 2.0 7.9 2.4 7.5 2.3
Age group (in years)
65–74 (n = 41) 8.0 2.0 7.7 2.7 7.8 2.1
75 and older (n = 41) 8.2 2.1 8.0 2.1a 7.1 2.5b
Gender
Female (n = 39) 8.1 2.0 7.6 2.7 7.6 2.3
Male (n = 43) 8.1 2.0 8.1 2.1 7.4 2.4
Perceived changes in mobility 2005
Became worse (n = 28) 8.1 2.1 7.4 2.7 6.3 2.5b
Remained the same (n = 54) 8.1 2.0 8.1 2.2 8.0 2.1
Note. Satisfaction was assessed on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (not satisfied at all) to 10 (very 
satisfied)
aSignificant differences between 2000 and 2005.bSignificant differences between 1995 and 2005
Design by authors
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assessment point is not statistically significant. Women were somewhat less satis-
fied than men in all assessments, but again the decrease in satisfaction did not reach 
statistical significance. There was almost no difference between the younger and 
older age groups. However, when individuals with and without mobility impair-
ments were distinguished, differences that support the notion of a close relationship 
between mobility and quality of life became obvious. Whereas satisfaction of older 
Table 15.7 Satisfaction with possibilities for travel: Two German cities
Characteristics of the sample
Year
1995 2000 2005
M SD M SD M SD
N = 82 8.5 2.0 7.9 2.7b 7.0 2.8c
Age group (in years)
65–74 (n = 41) 8.1 2.3 8.2 2.4b 7.1 2.6c
75 and older (n = 41) 8.8 1.6a 7.5 3.0 6.8 3.1c
Gender
Female (n = 39) 8.3 2.2 7.6 3.1 6.9 3.0c
Male (n = 43) 8.7 2.0 8.1 2.3b 7.0 2.7c
Perceived changes in mobility 2005
Became worse (n = 28) 8.5 2.6 7.3 3.1 6.7 2.5
Remained the same (n = 54) 8.5 1.7 8.1 2.5b 7.0 2.9c
Note. Satisfaction was assessed on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (not satisfied at all) to 10 (very 
satisfied)
aSignificant differences between 1995 and 2000.bSignificant differences between 2000 and 
2005.cSignificant differences between 1995 and 2005
Design by authors
Table 15.8 Satisfaction with life in general: Two German cities
Characteristics of the sample
Year
1995 2000 2005
M SD M SD M SD
Sample (N = 82) 8.2 1.6 8.2 1.5 8.0 1.8
Age group (in years)
65–74 (n = 41) 8.0 1.5 8.2 1.3 8.1 1.8
75 and older (n = 41) 8.3 1.7 8.1 1.6 8.0 1.8
Gender
Female (n = 39) 7.9 1.7 8.1 1.6 7.8 2.0
Male (n = 43) 8.5 1.4 8.2 1.3 8.2 1.6
Perceived changes in mobility 2005
Became worse (n = 28) 8.6 1.7a 7.5 1.7 7.1 1.9b
Remained the same (n = 54) 7.9 1.5 8.5 1.2 8.5 1.5
Note. Satisfaction was assessed on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (not satisfied at all) to 10 (very 
satisfied)
aSignificant differences between 1995 and 2000.bSignificant differences between 1995 and 2005
Design by authors
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adults without mobility limitations even increased over time (1995: M = 7.9; 2000: 
M = 8.5; 2005: M = 8.5), life satisfaction of mobility-impaired individuals dropped 
significantly between both the first and second assessment and over the 10-year 
interval (1995: M = 8.6; 2000: M = 7.5; 2005: M = 7.1).
 Exploration of Interindividual Variability Over Time in a Case 
Contrast Approach
In this section we again examine the key areas of out-of-home mobility from the 
above perspective and contrast selected extreme cases in their divergent trajectories. 
We use the total sample as a platform for overall comparison and provide back-
ground material and quotations, and figures to improve understanding of this diver-
sity. In addition, Fig. 15.1 provides an illustration of interindividual differences in 
mobility as people age.
In comparison with changes in satisfaction of the total sample, the changes in 
satisfaction of Mr. Lechner (80 years old) and Mrs. Dahlmann (87 years old) mirror 
characteristic developments over the 10-year interval (Fig. 15.1, panel a). Mr. 
Lechner’s satisfaction with his out-of-home mobility options had decreased between 
the years 1995 (M = 10.0) and 2000 (M = 9.0) because of a severe illness. He recov-
ered between the second and the third assessment and was happy about his new 
freedom: “Thanks to my recovery it is possible to put more strain on my body, and 
I make the most of it for trips, hiking, and long-distance trips.”
Together with his wife he walks at least five to six kilometers every day and does 
all his shopping and errands on foot or by public transport because they have no car 
available. He is still able to actively pursue his hobbies—cooking, painting, and 
forming wood and other materials—and because he experiences no impairments he 
said, “Hence, I can be quite satisfied” (M = 9.0).
The course that Mrs. Dahlmann’s satisfaction took was quite different. Her 
mobility-related satisfaction had increased between 1995 (M = 7.0) and 2000 (M = 
9.00). However, she suffered from late effects of a cancer surgery and had to undergo 
operations on her veins and hip joint between the second and third assessment. 
Because the latter surgery was not completely successful, her mobility is severely 
restricted. She can still reach shops and services in the neighborhood on foot. 
However, longer trips are no longer possible: She gave up driving and is not yet 
accustomed to using public transport.
Inside activities are only a little limited—of course, my range is not large and that makes a 
big difference. But outdoor mobility and out-of-home activities are restricted....Actually, 
because of pain I walk with the aid of a cane anyway, and I feel extremely unsure as a 
result....The movability of my feet has decreased, and when I step down a curb or something 
similar I have to pay careful attention....In the past I loved hiking, even in high mountain 
areas—but this is no longer possible. My activities are limited to what I have to do: shop-
ping and what is necessary for daily living.
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Against this background, Mrs. Dahlmann’s satisfaction with her possibilities of 
moving about decreased sharply in the third measurement (M = 3.0). Together, the 
two examples point to large individual differences behind the general tendencies 
(Fig. 15.1).
The diverging individual conditions and experiences and the resulting evalua-
tions regarding satisfaction with public transportation are again underscored with 
two examples (Fig. 15.1, panel b). Mrs. Faust, 77 years old, has taken daily care of 
her husband, who has been living in a nursing home. Her limited possibilities of 
moving about were reflected by a rather low satisfaction with public transport 
Fig. 15.1 Case examples to illustrate inter-individual differences in intra-individual changes in 
mobility-related indicators and general life satisfaction (Note: Satisfaction was assessed on an 
11-point scale ranging from 0 (not satisfied at all) to 10 (very satisfied). Design by authors)
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(1995: M = 5.0). When her husband passed away between the second and third 
assessment, she was able to recover from this difficult life event mainly by pursuing 
out-of-home activities. Because she never obtained a driver’s license, she has taken 
most of her trips on foot or by public transport. Because of her severe visual impair-
ment, she has difficulties orientating herself when moving about on foot. For several 
years now public transport modes have therefore grown in significance to her 
because they allow her to maintain her activities (2000: M = 8.0; 2005: M = 9.0). 
“Everything by bus or tram,” she said. “Except to the baker’s. I walk there because 
of my visual impairment and—well, indeed, you are no longer entirely agile with 
advancing age.”
Mr. Nolte is 88 years old and seriously impaired in his physical mobility. 
Nonetheless, in the first and second assessments he was still quite satisfied with 
public transport (1995: M = 9.0; 2000: M = 8.0). However, between the second and 
third assessment, his state of health worsened to the extent that he has depended 
ever since on help to be able to leave the house, so his satisfaction dropped to zero 
(M = 0.0). He complained:
My problem is that I no longer have the strength to walk to the tram stop by myself…
because I am physically handicapped. I am no longer satisfied with the tram because I can-
not use it anymore!
Satisfaction with one’s possibilities for travel decreased significantly over time 
even among nonimpaired elders, whereas satisfaction with leisure opportunities 
stayed almost the same in the respective intervals. There were again great individual 
differences, however, as seen in the examples of Mrs. Pfeil and Mrs. Weimann (Fig. 
15.1, panels c and d).
The options for leisure activities and travel for 72-year-old Mrs. Pfeil had 
improved substantially in the last several years before the third assessment, not 
because of her health but because of changes in her social network. Caring for her 
almost 100-year-old mother required a great deal of time and energy and made other 
activities almost impossible. The situation changed when her mother passed away 
in 2002. “Since retiring…, I often take short trips, short cultural trips. Longer travel 
was not possible as long as my mother was living. I always went to see her. This has 
improved a lot now.” Mrs. Pfeil was able to slowly resume her previous hobbies and 
traveling.
Well, I occupy myself with my computer, with my video recorder. I have been doing this for 
some time and have built up a little video library. I read—there just isn’t time enough! I 
listen to music, actually everything beautiful....I watch TV, especially cultural programs....
Moreover, I visit the museum. In fact, outside the home I exercise, bowl, attend the theater 
and concerts, major events such as the one in the park recently.
Her wide range of activities contributes substantially to both her satisfaction with 
possibilities of pursuing outdoor leisure activities (2000: M = 6.0; 2005: M = 8.0) 
and travel (2000: M = 5.0; 2005: M = 7.0).
Mrs. Weimann, 85 years old, is experiencing quite the opposite. Her husband’s 
stroke has so severely restricted his mobility and reactions that she has to support 
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him in almost all his activities of daily living. This situation heavily impacts her 
own and shared activities.
Leisure—I am rather satisfied in this regard....I still can go out with the dog; and at home, 
of course, I can do cooking, baking, gardening. Elsewhere, I play golf and bridge—but the 
latter is more in winter....What is hard is that I can no longer play golf with my husband, 
that we can no longer take bicycle tours together, and that we cannot go on holiday 
anymore....I cannot take him with me. Even if he had a wheelchair, he would not be able to 
move around.
Consequently, her satisfaction with leisure activities, which had the highest rating 
(M = 10) in 1995, fell to M = 8.0 in 2000 and to M =7.0 in 2005. Regarding satisfac-
tion with travel, the decline was even worse (1995: M = 9.0; 2000: 0.0; 2005: 1.0).
With respect to individual differences in general life satisfaction (Fig. 15.1, panel 
e), we refer again to Mrs. Pfeil, whose satisfaction with outdoor activities and travel 
rose remarkably when she no longer needed to care for her mother, a task that had 
prevented her from pursuing desired activities. The same holds true for her satisfac-
tion with life in general. Starting from a very low rating (M = 5.0) in the first assess-
ment in 1995, her subjective quality of life also increased when her radius of action 
widened again (2000: M = 8.0; 2005: M = 10).
Well, as long as I worried about my mother—I mean, even though she was very old she was 
still my mother. You are so worried, it was like a cloud hovering over you. We watched her 
decline for four years, and we did a lot of grieving. Meanwhile, I have gotten over it and can 
say, “This has changed.” And this burden—it is a burden, whether you want to admit it or 
not—this has changed.
Hence, the positive changes in Mrs. Pfeil’s out-of-home options and her related 
domain-specific satisfaction and subjective quality of life are due to changes in her 
social commitments.
By comparison, the example of 86-year-old Mr. Walter represents those men and 
women whose satisfaction with life in general decreased with advancing age, par-
ticularly because of health and mobility impairments. Although Mr. Walter was 
completely satisfied with his life in the first assessment (M = 10) and almost equally 
satisfied 5 years later (M = 9.0), this appraisal decreased in the third assessment (M 
= 7.0), although he did not suffer from severe impairments. Instead, he reported a 
general decline that most aging people have to cope with: “Because movability has 
diminished and sensitivity to pain has increased—thus we are somewhat less satis-
fied, I would say.”
At the same time he is an example of the strength and adaptability older people 
develop in order to meet everyday hardships and to maintain satisfying activities 
despite mobility restrictions. “But yes, we struggle through, there is no whining and 
sniveling…. When the weather is reasonable we sit outside in the garden, and 
mostly we are four to five more people; that’s fun.”
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 Discussion
The longitudinal investigation of aging adults’ out-of-home mobility, carried out in 
two German cities over an observation interval of 10 years, provided the opportu-
nity to assess and describe how individual, social, and environmental changes affect 
older men’s and women’s options of moving about and what effect these changes 
have on their satisfaction in different mobility-related domains.
One initial key finding is that out-of-home mobility—the opportunity and ability 
to move about outside one’s home and get to places one wants or needs to go—
keeps its remarkable significance as one grows older. Individual statements and the 
correlation between mobility and subjective evaluations indicate the manifold 
meanings of out-of-home mobility and, in particular, its positive quality. The mean-
ings include aspects as basic as zest for life, autonomy and freedom, the sense of 
belonging, and just the pleasure of moving. These results are in line with findings 
reported in previous research (Banister & Bowling, 2004; Coughlin, 2001; 
Fernández-Ballesteros et al., 2001; Holland et al., 2005; Mollenkopf et al., 2006), 
demonstrating that being able to go out, be active, and meet other people can result 
in positive feelings. Consequently, we agree with Banister and Bowling (2004), 
whose view on older people’s travel and quality-of-life issues is wider than that 
conventionally found in transport research.
The results of the follow-up assessments also correspond with the well- 
documented risk of declining health and movability with advancing age (Fozard & 
Gordon-Salant, 2001; Heikkinen et al., 1997; Ketcham & Stelmach, 2001; Spirduso, 
1995), conditions that lead to decreasing out-of-home mobility (CERTU, 2001; 
Marottoli et al., 2000; OECD, 2001; O’Neill & Dobbs, 2004). Study participants 
reported decreasing mobility and activities in all related domains. The decline in 
mobility finds expression in the older adults’ subjective evaluation of their possibili-
ties of getting out and about. In general, their satisfaction with possibilities for gen-
eral mobility and with their opportunities to pursue leisure activities and travel over 
the 10-year interval is high, albeit with substantial individual differences. Moreover, 
subjective evaluations decreased in the total group among the persons aged 75 years 
or older, and in particular among individuals with mobility impairments in the third 
assessment. Women showed slightly lower satisfaction scores than men with respect 
to most of the domain-specific aspects of mobility, perhaps because of the fact that, 
among the present generations of older people, basic preconditions of mobility are 
generally more favorable for the “young” old and for men (e.g., Banister & Bowling, 
2004; ECMT, 2000; Rosenbloom, 2004; Siren & Hakamies-Blomqvist, 2004). 
However, the general decline of out-of-home mobility over the 10-year interval was 
similar.
The development of satisfaction with public transport differs from this general 
pattern—it increases among all subgroups except for the users whose mobility had 
become worse between the second and third assessment. This positive appraisal can 
be explained in part by real improvements in the local transport systems of the cities 
under study. Moreover, if the nearest stop is within easy reach, the vehicles are 
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 easily accessible, and the connections are reliable and cheap, the public modes of 
transportation can be used as an alternative once previously used modes such as 
driving a car are no longer possible.
Apart from health decrements, environmental circumstances, including techno-
logical deterrents, taxing traffic conditions, and obligations such as caring for a 
family member, were found to interfere severely with the older adults’ options of 
venturing out. The effect of such restrictions actually extends over all activities 
outside the home, so it is no surprise that mobility limitations affected the respon-
dents’ subjective quality of life as well. Although average life satisfaction of the 
total group remained almost the same over the 10-year interval, individuals whose 
mobility had worsened over time were not only markedly less satisfied than their 
nonimpaired contemporaries with their possibilities of being mobile and active but 
were also less satisfied with life in general. Together with the differential courses of 
domain-specific satisfaction among individuals whose venturing out was limited 
due to family obligations, these findings suggest a strong relationship between out- 
of- home mobility and overall life satisfaction. They also support our view that older 
adults’ quality of life is largely affected by mobility aspects that promote self- 
determination, flexibility, and the freedom to get where one wants and to do what 
one wants to do.
The results of our previous European studies (Mollenkopf et al., 2005, 2006) 
back up this supposition. The most important variable in almost all domain-specific 
appraisals and satisfaction with life in general was the ability to move about. 
Moreover, participation in a great diversity of outdoor activities and/or the satisfac-
tion with one’s opportunities to move about and pursue desired activities contrib-
uted substantially to both satisfaction with life in general and emotional well-being. 
Similarly, English studies found that poor morale became increasingly prevalent 
among older individuals with worsening mobility (Holland et al., 2005).
In addition, the findings can partly qualify the so-called satisfaction paradox, 
according to which high adaptability of older individuals allows them to maintain a 
high level of well-being despite unfavorable or aggravating life conditions 
(Staudinger, 2000). Obviously, such adaptability no longer has this effect if funda-
mental needs such as the need to be mobile and active are concerned. Means and 
average numbers are apt to obscure remarkable individual developments and related 
evaluations. Hence, only a differentiated view that considers the various conditions 
of older adults’ living circumstances allows for valid statements about their 
 out-of- home mobility. In this respect, the longitudinal perspective of our study and 
its combination of qualitative and quantitative methods proved particularly useful.
In terms of limitations of this study, it should be stressed that the individuals who 
were still able and willing to participate in this research after 10 years are a positive 
selection. Another limitation of this study is that we cannot distinguish the extent to 
which the findings are attributable to regional conditions. Studies comparing 
regional differences (e.g., Holland et al., 2005; Mollenkopf et al., 2005, 2006) sug-
gest that a range of mobility factors play an equally important role in older adults’ 
quality of life under diverging national and regional conditions. At the same time 
some mobility components showed differential significance depending on the area 
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under observation. This observation points to the necessity of considering regional 
peculiarities as well as individual aspects in order to fully understand the respective 
relation between mobility options and quality of life.
The findings confirm what is known from our basic environmental gerontology 
approach (Wahl & Oswald, 2010; Wahl et al., 2007), that an older individual’s phys-
ical, social, and technical resources, as well as the structural resources provided by 
a region or locality, constitute basic prerequisites for moving about. The strong 
impact that the ability to pursue fulfilling activities has on the satisfaction with life 
reflects the importance that a congruence between personal and environmental 
resources has for an individual’s well-being. At the same time, the respective cir-
cumstances seem to be mediated by the subjective evaluation of one’s own possi-
bilities and prevailing environmental conditions.
We believe that our findings have relevance for policy measures and further 
research alike. On the one hand, more detailed knowledge is necessary to improve 
the understanding of the nature, meaning, and significance of specific aspects of 
out-of-home mobility for older adults’ quality of life. In this respect, compiling 
sociological, behavioral, and transportation approaches could provide further 
insights. On the other hand, the available data already show how crucial it is to pro-
mote the mobility of older adults as a means of enabling them to take part in mean-
ingful activities at locations outside their homes through various structural, 
technological, and social measures of prevention and support in order to maintain 
their quality of life and well-being.
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